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 CRITICAL THEORY, DEMOCRACY, AND 
THE CHALLENGE OF NEOLIBERALISM 
 

 Contemporary democratic theory represents a paradox. While academic 
analysis is a robust enterprise, democratic practice in Western society is 
increasingly fragile and under siege. There is little shortage of opinion 
on democratic designs, but very few designs on institutions. To be sure, 
much has been written about how democracy relates to globalization 
and the nation-state, to immigration and multiculturalism, to human 
rights and international and cosmopolitan notions and institutions of 
justice. Yet contemporary states that claim to be or are considered to be 
thriving democracies present a far less rosy picture. 
 This picture is at odds with currently dominant accounts of democ-
racy, which have been powerfully shaped by a triumphant liberalism, 
in particular its neoliberal form. This development is the culmination 
of a dynamic that began after the Second World War. Neoliberals like 
Friedrich Hayek, as well as chastened liberals like Karl Popper and Isa-
iah Berlin, feared that the values of Western society had come under 
attack and indeed had been subordinated to “collectivist,” socialist 
commitments. They rejected the social democratic version of liberalism – 
that of John Dewey stands out here – and reformulated a version of the 
classical liberal conception of the possessive individual, one who is a 
maximizer of goods. This line of thought, carried forward and further 
developed by contemporary neoliberalism, is sceptical of the idea of a 
general will or a participatory democracy. 
 Yet these neoliberal models are not simply a recasting of the clas-
sical Hobbesian or Lockean perspectives. Combined with theories of 
social choice, they posit models of social action that have an affinity 
with a large-scale market economy in which the rationality of consum-
ers is identified with a concatenation of choices. This methodological 
individualism has a weak link to the moral individualism of classical 
liberalism and its notion of limited sovereignty. While contemporary 
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neoliberalism calls for the deregulation of economic relationships and 
the marketization of spheres of society previously regulated norma-
tively, it paradoxically rests on the surveillance and control of indi-
vidual behaviour designed to ensure that this behaviour conforms to 
market standards. Neoliberal regimes value fealty to the market over 
commitment to traditional democratic norms. 
 The rejection of more radical accounts of democratic possibilities is 
not restricted to neoliberals of whatever theoretical orientation. The idea 
of a democracy dedicated to the overthrow of hierarchical power rela-
tions throughout the width and breadth of society, and to the subjec-
tion of social forces to conscious regulation, has withered. Most theories 
reject the notion that there is any alternative to a moderate revision of 
existing institutions. Concerns about social and economic structure are 
safely consigned to the domain of distributive justice, where the tensions 
and problems they generate can be successfully addressed and man-
aged. There is little fundamental engagement with the constraints, struc-
tural conditions, and historical possibilities associated with contempo-
rary capitalism. In other words, there is little evidence of critical political 
economy in the outlook and theoretical assumptions of much current 
thinking about democracy. (And a good deal of what political economy 
does find its way into this theory is decidedly neoclassical and micro-
economic, with an emphasis on individual maximization and rational 
choice; this is the case even for theories harbouring a critical intent.) 
 One important basis for this restrictive view can be traced to “third 
way” conceptions of politics in contemporary democracies. Although 
primarily associated with Tony Blair and Bill Clinton during their days 
in office as, respectively, prime minister of the United Kingdom and 
president of the United States, and hence most prominent during the 
late 1990s and early 2000s, third way accounts of political possibili-
ties continue to provide an important subtext to contemporary public 
life in leading liberal democratic polities. According to Anthony Gid-
dens, a key adviser to Blair and an important architect of the position, 
the third way model lays out a revised social democratic alternative 
to both free market capitalism and state socialism – but without the 
“statist” commitments of classical postwar social democracy. The third 
way rejects market fundamentalism but also dismisses state socialism 
as an implausible option in the face of the supposedly unchallengeable 
superiority of markets as coordinators of economic activity. Third way 
assumptions undergird a limited set of possibilities based on an incre-
mental approach to social justice and inequality. 
 To be sure, proponents of the third way profess commitment to social 
cohesion and community. However, they typically call for neoliberal 
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rather than Keynesian economic policies to achieve their goals. This 
has led in practice to deregulation and marketization that is incompat-
ible with the reduction of inequality. In the United States during the 
Clinton administration, pursuit of the neoliberal agenda brought forth 
policies of welfare reform, prison expansion, bank deregulation, and 
(later) school privatization, often in the name of personal responsibility. 
Subsequent administrations, both Democrat and Republican, have not 
deviated significantly from this approach. 
 Even those who do  not follow the third way have been subtly influ-
enced by the post- Keynesian change in the political and economic cli-
mate. For many citizens, the question of what a good life  means has 
decidedly narrowed and the barriers to achieving it have become more 
imposing. It is now more or less taken for granted that there are signifi-
cant and intractable limits to socio-economic equality. There has been a 
noticeable move away from classically socialist and social democratic 
understandings of economic power and the perceived need to at the 
very least strongly regulate capitalist market relations. This is the case, 
we believe, even with accounts of democracy that openly profess criti-
cal and even radical aims – that make the critique of social and political 
conditions their centrepiece. 
 One currently significant constellation of critically oriented theo-
ries and approaches has sought to replace or at least significantly de-
emphasize the traditional focus of radical democratic thought on eco-
nomic class questions and relations by putting front and centre issues 
of cultural diversity and openness. As important as these issues may 
be – in no small measure because they were often underplayed in 
classical socialist thought and practice – the focus on them has tended 
either to bypass the socio-economic changes of the current neolib-
eral phase of capitalism or to decouple them from broader questions 
of social equality. While such theories provide powerful reasons to 
include more groups and citizens in the discourse of society and to 
expand the range of concerns that must be addressed with respect 
to the meaning of equality and appropriate normative expectations, 
this “cultural” turn in social and democratic theory has been accom-
panied by an implicit acceptance that the vast majority of the popula-
tion need to lower their expectations for a good life. Economic inse-
curity, decreasing social mobility, ecological crisis, and the offloading 
of social risks onto less well-off individuals have together meant that 
most people now find it impossible to envision a future that is signifi-
cantly better than the present. Only recently have such links between 
social movements for equality and the political-economic situation 
been re-examined. 
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 Another avowedly critical and radical perspective on political and 
democratic theory rose to prominence primarily in the wake of the new 
left of the 1960s and the radical political mobilization and contestation, 
in Europe and elsewhere, that characterized this era. In various guises it 
remains influential today. This approach, which draws upon currents of 
post-structuralism, emphasizes agonistic theories of politics. Theories of 
this type provide a largely metaphysical or ontological account of poli-
tics. Politics is ontologically constituted by conflict. Agonistic theories 
of the political and especially theories of democracy tend to associate 
agreement with subject-centred reason. Ontological unity supposedly 
establishes finality. From this point of view, agreement equals certainty 
and eliminates the possibility of political contestation. Thus, agreement 
is consigned to a realm of quasi-scientific understanding that immu-
nizes society against conflict. From this standpoint, theorists of demo-
cratic “agonism” argue that power is omnipresent and formative for all 
types of thought and action. The ontological powers of agreement are 
thus merely ideological in their operation. In suppressing conflict, they 
conceal and sustain domination. 
 In our view, while each of these perspectives raises important ques-
tions for critical and radical democratic theory, they miss or insuffi-
ciently stress elements that we see as vital for a critical analysis of the 
present and its challenges. We contend that in response to those theories 
that stress diversity and the role of social identities – that is, that assume 
a cultural perspective – a critical and robust democratic theory must 
revisit and revive the focus on economic class relations of power cen-
tred on capitalist market relations and institutions. Such a theory must 
stress the need to challenge the currently limited – and limiting – sense 
of what is possible in relation to the basic structures and processes of 
economic life. That is, it must restore a critical political economy as a 
key element in the critical appraisal of existing conditions. 
 With respect to post-structuralist, “agonistic” accounts, we think their 
position is likewise too narrow. If the problem with culturalist theories 
is that they tend to focus too strongly on relations of recognition at the 
expense of redistribution, the problem with agonistic accounts is that 
they tend to assimilate agreement in all cases to enforced unity or confor-
mity and to celebrate contestation and conflict  per se as truly political 
and transgressive. We call instead for a practical everyday understand-
ing in which truth or rightness is never final and certainty is never 
fixed. Everyday understanding always needs to be renewed. It lacks 
the ontological characteristics that agonistic theorists attribute to rea-
son. Political action is not a matter of opposing fixed certainties that 
block understanding and thereby clearing the way for action; rather, 
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it is a practical matter of acting in concert to create conditions that will 
facilitate deliberation on matters of public concern. Viewed in this way, 
the workings of power are not omnipresent but exist when processes of 
understanding are shaped by forms of domination and oppression that 
limit the ability of participants to act in concert. 
 Thus, our view is also different from that of thinkers like Jane Mans-
bridge, who believe that agreement and conflict are not fated always 
to be at odds, but who nonetheless think that deliberation requires the 
incorporation of self-interest if enforced conformity of the sort that trou-
bles agonistic thinkers is to be avoided. They look to situations in which 
deliberation is incomplete or disagreement is intractable. They posit 
that in such cases, recognizing the centrality of self-interest is a way of 
incorporating plurality and diversity into deliberation. This argument 
views the discourse theory of Jürgen Habermas, for example, as based 
on a conception of the unified common good that suggests a strong 
notion of social unity and is hence inadequate as a basis for deliberative 
practices. However, in our view a theory that takes up the consensual 
element in the work of critical theorists such as Habermas does not 
require an excessive emphasis on achieved consensus or similar tropes. 
 In the face of contemporary democratic theory and its challenges, we 
propose a different alternative: a recovery of a developmental account 
of individual agency and democracy that can provide the basis for a 
more critical democratic theory than is typically on offer these days. To 
be sure, as our brief account of current conceptions of critical and radi-
cal democratic thought indicates, many theorists today are committed 
to enhanced democratization beyond dominant representative forms 
and bodies. A wide range of theorists – we’ve already briefly noted the 
work of Jane Mansbridge – emphasize the need for deliberative mecha-
nisms that would permit and encourage citizens to mutually engage 
with one another in multiple forums in order to reach just and equitable 
social decisions. Such thinking obviously must find a place in a critical 
democratic theory. 
 However, a developmental account of the sort we propose represents 
an attempt to go beyond the range of concerns exhibited by most theo-
rists of deliberative democracy. Our understanding of a critical devel-
opmental model assumes that actors do more than decide or deliber-
ate; in deciding or deliberating they produce themselves  as deciders or 
deliberators by responding to and shaping the conditions and structures 
within which they necessarily act. They produce themselves as agents 
of a certain kind: they provide a rational and hence normative content 
that can be “read” off the decisions taken and the institutions objecti-
fied. This content defines them, their relations to one another, and their 
8 Critical Theory, Democracy, and the Challenge of Neoliberalism
ties to their common practices. Our argument here requires, as noted 
above, that we look to the ways of making sense that are embedded in 
everyday life. These activities involve processes of mutual recognition 
and mutual accountability through which individuals constitute the 
meaning of everyday life. While a theory of democracy clearly requires 
more than this, it has to begin with the standpoint of the participants 
who act together to create a social world. 
 To be sure, all theories of democracy, ours included, must contend 
with the relation between theory and practice (and “realist” accounts 
are not exempt, even if their categories and concepts tend to mask this 
element). They need to convey at least some sense of their own condi-
tions of possibility. That there is a gap between the claims and commit-
ments of democratic theory and the realities of (allegedly) democratic 
practice is itself nothing new. Democracy itself has always been an idea 
and a value as much as it has been a set of institutions and practices. 
At least since the emergence of democracy as a universal value and the 
consequent spread of at least nominally democratic institutions, demo-
cratic theories themselves have tended to divide along empirical and 
normative lines. But the problem that provides the starting point for our 
analysis is not simply the gulf between democratic theory and demo-
cratic practice. Rather, it involves how democratic theories, whether 
seen as empirical or normative, whether culturalist or agonistic, have 
been shaped in terms of their conceptual commitments and structures 
by existing reality. It involves how these theories, in turn, and whatever 
the intentions of their architects, have justified the prevailing social and 
political arrangements, even if frequently critical of specific features of 
them. 
 The contemporary situation invites comparisons with the Cold War 
era. The dominant “realist” theories of democracy of that period, lib-
eral and pluralist in their core assumptions, harboured a commitment 
to the mainstream tenets of empirical social science. They were hostile 
to “classical” theories of democracy with their supposedly unrealistic 
views about active citizenship and participation, to say nothing of the 
supposedly “totalitarian” theories of democracy propounded by Marx-
ists and communists. 
 On the surface, the current picture seems considerably different. This 
difference is reflected in those dominant contemporary accounts of 
democracy and its possibilities that we have attempted briefly to iden-
tify and appraise. Unlike the general thrust of Cold War democratic the-
ory, the “realism” of contemporary theory is avowedly normative and 
at least in principle linked to more positive conceptions of active citizen-
ship. The fear of “excessive” popular engagement threatening political 
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stability – a central element of the Cold War theoretical consensus – 
is for the most part absent (although this fear has to some extent resur-
faced in current concerns about the global rise of “populism”). 
 Yet at the same time, the Cold War fear of popular eruption that would 
undermine liberal values and political institutions reflected the sense 
that, however feared or despised, socialism and/or communism was a 
serious option. The normative “space” available for theories that justi-
fied existing democratic values and institutions was limited. Because 
there is no current realistic alternative to capitalism, dominant theories 
of democracy can and do range more freely on normative grounds. But 
this has the ironic consequence of affirming the status quo even more 
strongly than was the case during the Cold War. Implicitly embedded in 
the Cold War outlook was a sense of history and a fear for the future of 
liberal democratic institutions in the face of a plausible, if disagreeable, 
option. In the wake of the ravages of depression and war, the survival 
of capitalism, and thus of liberal democracy itself, seemed anything but 
guaranteed. 
 Of course, a significant body of contemporary theoretical work has 
taken shape against the backdrop provided by the collapse of “really 
existing socialism” and its claim to have ushered in a “people’s” 
democracy, one more authentic than the “bourgeois” form that char-
acterized advanced capitalist states. Inasmuch as this view of democ-
racy was inherently tied to the demand for economic democracy and 
not just political democracy, its demise is inextricably linked to that 
disavowal, already noted, of socialism, or at least extensive regulation 
of capitalist market forces, as a plausible (albeit much less defensible) 
social option. 
 No doubt, reservations about classical Marxist political theory and 
practice are well taken. Along with deliberative models of democracy 
and of democratic will formation, recent forms of “republican” thinking – 
with which to be sure our own efforts possess considerable affinity – have 
been particularly helpful in reminding us of the autonomy of politics in 
relation to other social forces and practices and hence the significance of 
political institutions, law, and citizenship more generally. 
 In this study, however, we call into question what we believe to 
be the unduly limited focus of much current democratic theory. As 
noted above, a democratic theory capable of illuminating the descrip-
tive  and normative dimensions of democracy and their connections 
to each other requires a critical political economy. A critical political 
economy is needed in order to provide a comprehensive picture of 
the current situation; it is also necessary because if political theory or 
philosophy is to have a meaningful role in fostering the development 
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of appropriate conceptual tools for understanding and appraising 
contemporary social and political developments, it must both iden-
tify deeply embedded alternative possibilities, good and bad, for the 
development of contemporary societies and  be prepared to argue that 
profound human ills and misery would ensue should certain possibilities be 
blocked, or others realized . 
 Thus, our commitment to a developmental account of democracy. 
To be sure, this requires that we address current critical accounts of 
democracy, including those that stress the power of and need for 
deliberation. However, as noted, we believe that dominant forms of 
deliberative democracy are excessively narrow. We wish to counter this 
narrowing of deliberative approaches, which typically view delibera-
tion as a supplement to and justification for existing liberal democracy, 
and instead connect deliberation to radical and participatory forms of 
democratic theory. Such forms, we argue, should highlight the signifi-
cance of accountability as a core feature of a robust democratic practice. 
Accountability – specifically,  mutual accountability – is a basic feature 
of social life. This accountability involves not just deliberation as an 
adjunct to formal political institutions. It also requires the extension of 
participation as far as possible to all forms of social life in which power 
is generated and exercised. This expanded participation must be the 
larger goal of any application of deliberative democracy in society. 
 Our approach suggests the continuing significance of the critical the-
ory of the Frankfurt School for an account and appraisal of democratic 
realities and possibilities. Contemporary critical theory in the tradition 
of the original Frankfurt School is paradoxical from our point of view. It 
has focused on advanced capitalism, and while it has offered important 
insights into this social form, it has not provided a similarly detailed 
account of neoliberalism. And while it still contains the seeds for a radi-
cal and participatory account of democracy and has devoted consider-
able attention to questions of universal justice and cosmopolitan and/
or multicultural citizenship, current critical theory has not always been 
faithful to its heritage of radical democracy. Universal justice requires 
this commitment to radical and participatory democracy on a concrete 
level, not just as a philosophical commitment. We also believe in a uni-
versalist program, but such a program would have to be built from 
the bottom up, from practical solidarity rather than from philosophical 
insight. 
 We certainly agree that questions of justice and cosmopolitanism 
must form a significant component of any critical theory of democ-
racy. However, emphasis on these issues has come at the expense of 
more detailed analysis of the pathologies of neoliberalism and thus the 
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barriers to the achievement of cosmopolitan identities in a capitalist 
society. Nor does the ideal of cosmopolitan citizenship in itself serve as 
a basis for a robust emancipatory theory. Thus, the approaches of recent 
critical theory seem incomplete. They lack analysis of the intensifica-
tion of inequality and exploitation under neoliberalism and how these 
might affect a critical democratic theory. In short, they seem to have 
de-emphasized the diagnostic dimension of critical theory in favour of 
a normative reconstruction of current democratic practices and institu-
tions. However, such a reconstructive approach is not clearly connected 
to conditions under which the norms so generated could be brought 
into existence. We think that this is a requirement for a critical theory 
of democracy. 
 The need for an analysis of neoliberalism and its pathologies would 
seem to be essential for critical theories. It would be dogmatic, how-
ever, to see the terms of this analysis as a choice of either/or: either 
the politics of recognition or an old-fashioned economic determinism. 
While we accept a good deal of the neo-Marxist – and, more recently, 
post-Marxist – challenges to Marx’s thought, it remains true that eco-
nomic conflicts play an important role in social theory and that eco-
nomic power is a crucial factor shaping social and cultural life. The 
dominance of neoliberalism is generating social pathologies that are 
significantly undermining current “realistic” claims about existing 
democratic practices, to say nothing of the viability of those normative 
possibilities and requirements identified by contemporary theories that 
claim to embrace a critical stance. We think that capitalism, especially in 
its latest form, continues to be a barrier to the achievement of a robust 
democracy worthy of the name. We cannot formulate a critical theory 
of democracy without some analysis of the barriers to democracy in 
its current constellation. This proposition undergirds the approach to 
democracy that we pursue in this work. 
 In the first chapter we put forward the idea that a critical theory of 
democracy enriched by a synthesis of the perspectives of Jürgen Haber-
mas and C.B. Macpherson can become the starting point for such a proj-
ect. Each of these thinkers provides an approach to a critical theory 
of democracy that incorporates the claims of both self-determination 
and self-realization, claims that could provide the basis for a critical 
democratic theory that meets the challenges of neoliberalism. We reject 
the assumption that potential reforms are constrained by the demise 
of Soviet-style socialism and must be limited to slight modifications of 
the liberal capitalist model. We suggest that Macpherson’s notion of the 
net transfer of powers, whereby owners of capital can by virtue of their 
command of private property in the means of life and labour extract 
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benefit from those they employ, still has value as an approach to the 
workings of domination. 
 The second chapter is an attempt to reformulate the terms of criti-
cal theory in a post-Marxist environment. In essays such as “On the 
Problem of Truth,” “The Latest Attack on Metaphysics,” and “Tradi-
tional and Critical Theory,” Max Horkheimer, a founder of the origi-
nal Frankfurt School and a key architect of “first generation” critical 
theory, sought to clarify the meaning and significance of a critical 
theory – historical, materialist, and dialectical – in contrast to then 
dominant positivist and pragmatic currents of thought. Positivism 
 identified truth with value-free, timeless, and pure categories and 
concepts that successfully captured the objects of inquiry via the 
generation of testable hypotheses justified both by experience and 
by the exercise of a deductive logic seen as the science of the neces-
sary structure of human thought. Pragmatism identified truth with 
what was useful in achieving desired effects within the given con-
stellation of social and natural forces and possibilities. Horkheimer 
challenged the claims to truth of both approaches, however faithful 
they might have been to current possibilities as defined by the existing 
relations of power and domination. He wanted to demonstrate that 
the claims to reason, realism, and truth made by these theories made 
sense only in the context of a historical setting characterized by social 
pathologies that had been generated by the intensifying contradic-
tory developments of the capitalist form of social organization. These 
developments threatened to undo the real gains in freedom, justice, 
and the fulfilment of human needs that the emergence of bourgeois 
society had brought about. The contradiction between the promise 
of a modern era of enlightenment on the one hand, and the reality of 
the prospect of a descent into a new barbarism on the other, needed 
to be taken up by a critical theory not bound by the current demands 
of “realism.” In other words, reality and truth did not coincide: the 
whole was simultaneously “really existing” and “false.” Horkheimer 
believed that only a critical theory, one that owed a good deal to Marx, 
could successfully grasp the contradiction between the existing and 
the true. It assumed that the propositions of a critical theory that could 
not be immediately justified by the existing state of affairs could none-
theless lay a claim to truth precisely  because they sought to identify the 
necessary conditions for the realization of lives of freedom, reason, 
and happiness for all that had always served as the benchmarks for 
human thought and practice, including positivism and pragmatism. 
The power and claims of the given need not be and must not be the 
last word. 
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 Critical theory today faces a similar set of challenges. It too must 
confront currently dominant theoretical and philosophical perspec-
tives that are inheritors of the positivist and pragmatist positions that 
Horkheimer identified and criticized. Our approach in this chapter 
recalls Horkheimer’s position and commitments while attempting to 
move beyond the limitations of his original position. In retrieving the 
“spirit” of critical theory, we reconsider the diagnostic and emancipa-
tory dimensions of a critical theory that challenges the permanence 
and inevitability of the given constellation of social forces, while at the 
same time avoiding the temptations of metaphysics. As Horkheimer 
attempted to do, we emphasize participant’s understanding as the basis 
for a critical analysis of society. 
 In our approach we take up a version of interpretive social theory 
that employs the insights of hermeneutics, contemporary interpretive 
sociology, and elements of Habermas’s communicative theory in order 
to grasp more precisely the reflective and critical elements of every-
day understanding. In doing so, we hope to challenge the widespread 
assumption that the understanding of the theorist or analyst is anchored 
in a position that transcends that of the participant. We attempt, in other 
words, to reformulate a notion of emancipation that avoids the pitfalls 
of earlier formulations. If we succeed, we think we can offer critical 
insights into other contemporary approaches that either deny or limit 
emancipation. 
 We also therefore use this analysis to rethink ideas about power and 
domination. We try to situate our position in relation to the variety of 
debates over power that have emerged in recent decades, from the issue 
of non-decisions – that is, the capacity of dominant interests to ensure 
that questions of wealth and power are marginalized if not excluded 
altogether from the public realm – to feminist and post-structuralist 
perspectives. We attempt to reframe the terms of these discussions so 
that we might incorporate their concerns into our conception of the par-
ticipant’s perspective. Of course, the shadow of Michel Foucault towers 
over most contemporary discussions of power. In our discussion we 
provide an extensive critical evaluation of his contribution. 
 With this account as a backdrop, in the third chapter we offer an 
analysis of neoliberalism and its pathologies. As we noted earlier, 
while neoliberalism may  appear to represent a return to classical lib-
eral principles and a libertarian social philosophy, this perception is 
not entirely accurate. On the one hand, many neoliberals combine an 
economic philosophy of deregulation with a social conservatism that 
is in some respects illiberal; this goes back to Hayek’s combination of 
conservative traditionalism and a free market economy. Neoliberalism 
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requires a dismantling of the public sphere and employs highly concen-
trated forms of power to establish more traditionalist social norms and 
ideas. The neoconservative movement, and much of the social support 
for neoliberalism, rests on a defensive reaction to the challenges and 
demands of modern sociality. On the other hand, neoliberal political 
economy requires more than simply a return to a nightwatchman state. 
It rejects Keynesian economic policies while at the same time requiring 
large-scale corporate control over not just the means of production but 
also the means of reproduction and communication. This control is far 
less indirect. In this respect it is much closer to what Sheldon Wolin 
had in mind with his notion of inverted totalitarianism than it is to 
libertarianism. 
 One limitation of “first generation” critical theory was that it paid 
little attention to democratic theory, much less to a critical theory of 
democracy. Critical theorists saw liberalism largely in a negative light, 
believing that it was inextricably linked to capitalism. They were thus 
unable to recognize the possibilities for an enriched political and social 
life that liberal democracy promised, even if it failed by and large to live 
up to these promises. Jürgen Habermas, the key “second generation” 
critical theorist, has addressed this lacuna, as had C.B. Macpherson, 
who was writing more contemporaneously with the first generation. 
Like Macpherson, Habermas does not reject liberalism out of hand but 
has sought to integrate liberal rights into a critical theory of democracy. 
Nonetheless, the developmental requirements of a critical theory of 
democracy indicate that the realization of democracy is not compatible 
with the workings of capitalism and must create tensions. We explore 
why Habermas’s theory has not followed up on the insights his work 
has produced and explore some recent alternatives in critical theory, 
particularly as laid out by Axel Honneth. 
 In the fourth chapter we pursue the implications of our critique of 
Habermas by suggesting revisions to his account, and that of critical 
theory as a whole, by developing a treatment of key issues for a critical 
theory of democracy that builds upon the themes of deliberation, self-
interest, and solidarity. More specifically, we examine the unique way 
in which critical theory can combine justice with solidarity. Because of 
its intersubjective foundation, the theory of communicative action com-
bines individuality with sociability – that is, it allows for people’s capac-
ity to form and be formed by society – without at the same time embrac-
ing a notion of society as a unified body or as possessing a common 
ethos. Communicative action links mutual understanding as a binding 
force with solidarity. We argue that it provides an antidote to the anti-
solidaristic tendencies of neoliberal political theory and rational choice 
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approaches. This communicative approach must, however, be distin-
guished from individualist liberal and even radical theories, which seek 
to rehabilitate self-interest against what they see as an overly strong 
notion of agreement. As we noted earlier, a third tendency opposes an 
agonistic conception of society to consensus-based theory. However, 
agonistic theories miss the consensual character of social action as an 
intersubjective web of relations that form the background condition of 
individual action; as a result, they cannot account for the binding force 
of social action through both mutual understanding and care. 
 The fifth chapter takes up the question of democratic theory in 
Habermas’s work. We argue that despite changes to his theoretical 
framework, Habermas has been consistent in advocating a radical 
democracy based on popular sovereignty. Unlike his predecessors, 
particularly Horkheimer and Adorno, Habermas believes that a dem-
ocratic theory is a crucial feature of any critical theory of advanced 
capitalist societies. Politics would not disappear with socialism. Rather 
than a defence of existing liberalism, radical democracy is tied to a 
version of socialism that does not rely on the productivist paradigm 
or on notions of society as a singular subject. Popular sovereignty is 
rooted in the substratum of communicative interaction, which in turn 
feeds political and legal processes. It requires a widespread democ-
ratization of public life. We argue that Habermas’s notion of popu-
lar sovereignty is important to a democratic theory that opposes the 
neoliberal constriction of democratic institutions and the consequent 
diminution of democratic practices. The wide range of institutionally 
unbound public spheres, as Habermas understands these, would help 
guarantee that legal and governmental decision-making is open to all. 
The existence of these spheres could promote a deliberative formation 
of political will that would enable the critical examination of govern-
mental decisions. 
 We also focus on the notion of democratic autonomy that com-
bines elements of communicative freedom, self-determination, and 
self-development. Habermas has argued for the complementarity of 
private and public freedom, thus combining elements of both liber-
alism and republicanism. This formulation requires an egalitarian 
perspective. Habermas’s theory suggests the notion of participatory 
democracy; however, he is sceptical of some forms of participatory 
democracy, such as workers’ control. Also, he does not take account 
of some of the larger global issues involved in neoliberal threats to 
popular sovereignty. 
 In the final chapter, we attempt to bring together the issues we raised in 
the previous chapters by identifying and exploring what we believe are 
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key elements of a critical theory of democracy. More specifically, taking 
up the challenges of developmental individualism and communicative 
rationality and freedom, both of which demand an intersubjective and 
interactionist approach to democracy and democratic theory, we argue 
that a critical theory of democracy could build on two themes: participa-
tory democracy and social freedom. Anchoring our account in the semi-
nal work of Carole Pateman, C.B. Macpherson, and Carol Gould, we seek 
to show in contrast to Habermas that participatory democracy, which as 
a critical or radical account of democratic possibilities and requirements 
has in recent times given way to deliberative democracy, can incorporate 
a strong conception of deliberation as an essential dimension of com-
municative freedom. So understood, participatory democratic theory 
can move beyond most models of deliberative democracy by empha-
sizing the social constitution of individual agents, the developmental 
potentials they harbour, and the need to extend democratic will forma-
tion to all social spheres in which power is structured and exercised. 
In other words, a critical theory of participatory democracy highlights 
the need for fundamental social transformation that demands a critical 
appraisal of existing forms of both liberalism and democracy. Pateman, 
Macpherson, and Gould all explore various related dimensions of the 
challenges involved: Pateman, with a critique of the social contract as a 
basis for liberal democracy; Macpherson, with an account of the con-
tradictions of capitalism and the need for individuals to move beyond 
their self-consciousness as limitless consumers and appropriators if a 
participatory democracy is ever to be possible; and Gould, with a dis-
tinctive social ontology and an intersubjective theory of human rights. 
 We go on to argue that what unites these approaches to radical, 
participatory democracy is social freedom. With its roots in Hegelian 
thought, social freedom suggests that our freedom as individuals is 
established and secured in and through our relations  with others, not 
 over and (often)  against them. Social freedom involves a kind of mutual-
ity of self-determination and self-realization whereby not only are our 
actions imbricated – our aims, in other words, are intertwined and not 
simply overlapping – but so also is our constitution as agents. Social 
freedom, then, might be said to incorporate both positive (develop-
mental) liberty, as in Macpherson, and communicative freedom, as 
in Habermas. The contemporary critical theorist who has contributed 
most significantly to the development of the notion of social freedom is 
Axel Honneth, and we examine his ideas here as a complement to those 
of Pateman, Macpherson, and Gould. 
 Honneth in turn connects his conception of social freedom to a rethink-
ing and reinvigoration of socialism as an idea tied to the achievement 
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of a (radical) democratic form of life. The effort to reimagine what 
socialism can mean today links Honneth’s position to both the ideas 
of the Frankfurt School, particularly those of Horkheimer, Adorno, 
and Habermas, and to notions of radical, participatory democracy as 
laid out by Pateman, Macpherson, and Gould. To put it another way, 
Honneth’s work points to the need to restore the link between political 
economy and normative political philosophy, a link that throughout 
our study we have argued must be restored in the face of the patholo-
gies of a dominant neoliberal capitalism. 
 In confronting the challenges posed by neoliberal globalization, the 
Canadian political philosopher Frank Cunningham has recently revis-
ited C.B. Macpherson’s 1960s account of the “real” world of democ-
racy, in which Macpherson compared liberal democratic, communist, 
and non-communist Third World conceptions of democracy from the 
vantage point of the need for democracy to address and incorporate 
the demands and requirements of developmental individualism. For 
Cunningham, to be a realistic possibility, transnational or cosmopoli-
tan democratic advance requires the pursuit of more robust democracy 
 within states. As he sees it, those countries most able and committed 
to countering the possessive individualism of neoliberal globalization 
with the values and practices of developmental individualism would 
be in the best position to foster a robust democracy both within and 
beyond their borders and so offer the prospect of more successfully 
containing the frequently pathological consequences of the globaliza-
tion project. We concur, and hope that our own study will contribute to 
restoring a critical theory of democracy as a vital response to the chal-
lenges of our era. 
 At the same time, we continue to hold to Max Horkheimer’s claim 
that only the bad in history is enduring and permanent; all else is poten-
tially threatened. What may be objectively necessary may not be objec-
tively possible. So our own analysis as we attempt to lay it out in this 
study should be seen as tentative, if hopeful. This is not a counsel of 
despair but a quest for a kind of realism that is not to be identified with 
a commitment to things as they are. Or, rather, things as they are always 
and already point beyond themselves to something richer and finer. 
 
 
 This study seeks to combine elements of a developmental and com-
municative theory of democracy as the linchpin of a critical theory of 
society that can counter the challenges – and what we believe are the 
pathologies – of neoliberalism: its values, practices, and institutions. In 
a world in which existing forms of both liberal democracy and capital-
ist markets are presented not only as compatible with each other but 
also as essential dimensions of a free and fair society, any defence of a 
developmental alternative undeniably confronts significant demands 
and hurdles. So at the outset we want to lay out as clearly as possible 
what we see as the core components of our approach. We aim to com-
bine both developmental and communicative forms of power in order 
to provide a framework for making sense of the pathologies of neolib-
eralism and to stake out a viable alternative. 
 In the first sections of this chapter we focus on the developmental 
approach through the vehicle of Macpherson’s encounter with the early 
neoliberals of the postwar period: Milton Friedman and, to an extent, 
Isaiah Berlin. In the second half of the chapter we deal with the com-
municative approach developed by Habermas and his formulation of 
democratic theory that stresses the roots of popular sovereignty as an 
alternative to neoliberal constrictions. The connecting thread between 
these two formulations can be found in the search for alternative con-
ceptions of freedom that provide a counterpoint to neoliberal thought. 
 Foundations of Developmental Democracy 
 What is a developmental account of democracy that could serve as the 
basis for what we view as a critical theory of democracy? As noted in 
the Introduction, a developmental democratic theory shares common 
ground with both participatory and, more particularly, deliberative 
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accounts of democracy. However, as we also noted, what distinguishes 
developmental democracy from most currents of deliberative democ-
racy is that the developmental alternative assumes that political actors 
not only decide or deliberate about political options or choices but also, 
simultaneously, produce themselves  as deciders or deliberators by 
responding to and shaping the conditions and structures within which 
they necessarily act. Hence this developmental quality is empirical 
and normative at the same time. Through their actions people gener-
ate “measurable” outcomes – decisions are made, and institutions are 
created and re-created. But they also produce  themselves as agents of a 
certain kind. They give a rational and hence normative content that can 
be “read” off the decisions taken and the institutions thereby sustained. 
These define their relations to one another and their ties to shared, com-
mon practices. 
 At the heart of an account of deliberative democracy is what has 
often been called positive liberty, but which, following C.B. Macpher-
son, we prefer to identify as developmental liberty. As Charles Taylor 
succinctly notes, theories of positive or developmental liberty “are con-
cerned with a view of freedom which involves essentially the exercising 
of control over one’s life. On this view, one is free only to the extent that 
one has effectively determined oneself and the shape of one’s life.”  1  
This of course includes political life and hence carries with it the idea 
of a robust, active citizenship and what the American political theorist 
Benjamin Barber once called “strong democracy.” It holds that liberty 
or freedom does not consist exclusively of freedom  from politics; rather, 
to a significant extent, it means freedom  as politics. 
 Positive or developmental liberty, and hence a developmental account 
of democracy, has long been controversial. As noted in the Introduction, 
during the Cold War some saw in it a prescription for authoritarian-
ism, if not outright totalitarianism. In recent years, critics – especially 
those of a postmodern persuasion – have claimed that it suffers from 
the limits of subjective reason. It is held to represent the unfolding of 
some (completed) inner essence. For others, developmental democracy 
is inherently linked to outmoded socialist models that represent the 
demand for a democracy that is economic and social as well as political. 
But whatever the specific dimensions of such positions, they have in 
common – whether stated explicitly or not – the claim that a radical and 
developmental democracy threatens liberalism and its emphasis on the 
integrity and freedom of the individual. When linked to the current 
emphasis on the untrammelled virtues, if not inescapability, of “free 
market” capitalism, these criticisms provide considerable weight to a 
dominant neoliberalism. 
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 We call into question the claims that a developmental perspective is 
fatally flawed. We believe that such a perspective can avoid the appar-
ently disabling defects identified by its critics and in so doing provide 
the basis for a critical theory of democracy. Such a theory must do more 
than identify the gulf between democratic theory and democratic prac-
tice or offer a critique of subject-centred reason. That is, it must not only 
present a compelling vision of democratic norms but also develop a 
diagnosis of the problems and pathologies of democratic life and link 
these to the challenges faced by citizens who have the capacity to reflect 
upon the development of democracy as a process that has formed them 
and that might be changed by them to achieve a better future. And since 
such problems and pathologies invariably relate to the everyday situa-
tions confronting social actors, and since these problems and patholo-
gies involve the demands of economic life, in our view such a theory 
must also provide, beyond the (laudable) concern with distributive jus-
tice, a critical political economy: an account of the constraints, structural 
conditions, and historical possibilities associated with contemporary 
capitalism. 
 In this chapter we begin to explore the nature and potential of devel-
opmental democracy by focusing on the ideas of two thinkers who in 
our view have made significant contributions to the task at hand. In 
the burgeoning contemporary literature on democratic theory, includ-
ing progressive or radical accounts of the nature of democracy and the 
conditions required for it to flourish, the ideas of C.B. Macpherson and 
Jürgen Habermas are rarely discussed together in a systematic way. 
This is surprising. Macpherson and Habermas stood a generation apart 
and emerged from distinct theoretical traditions, yet they were familiar 
with and respected each other’s work. And they had similar aims: to 
“retrieve” (to use Macpherson’s term) democratic theory from its lim-
ited role as either a largely uncritical description of existing political 
reality or a narrowly focused exploration of governmental institutions 
and decision-making mechanisms, and to restore it to its place as an 
indispensable element of a critical diagnosis of current liberal demo-
cratic societies with all their tensions, conflicts, and limitations. 
 The ideas of Macpherson and Habermas offer powerful and largely 
untapped resources for such a project.  2  Each of these theorists confronts 
questions of self-determination and self-realization that are at the heart 
of a developmental account. And in so doing they challenge both neo-
liberalism and other proponents of radical democracy by addressing 
the task that Macpherson so eloquently laid out and identified as his 
own and that Habermas pursues as well: “to work out a revision of 
liberal-democratic theory, a revision which clearly owes a good deal to 
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Marx, in the hope of making that theory more democratic while rescu-
ing that valuable part of the liberal tradition which is submerged when 
liberalism is identified with capitalist market relations.”  3  
 More closely in touch with classical Marxism and the critical, reform 
liberalism of John Stuart Mill and his successors in the British liberal 
tradition, such as T.H. Green, F.H. Bradley, A.D. Lindsay, Ernest Barker, 
and, especially Harold Laski,  4  Macpherson emphasized the idea of 
self-realization as the core of a democracy understood not merely as 
a mechanism for choosing and authorizing governments, but also as 
a kind of society that ensures as much as possible the equal, effective 
right of individuals to live as fully as they may wish. At the heart of 
his understanding of the requirements of democracy is precisely the 
idea of positive liberty as this ability to live as fully as one would wish 
unconstrained by unnecessary internal and external impediments to 
exercising one’s distinctively human capacities – where the key source 
of such impediments is the institution of capitalist private property. In 
his view, this form of liberty complemented and enriched the classical 
liberal emphasis on negative liberty, that is, freedom from interference 
by others. 
 Attuned to more contemporary currents, which shy away from 
notions of self-realization that imply a specific, concrete “fulfilling” 
form of life (i.e., a “good” life), Habermas stresses a conception of self-
determination that revolves around securing the conditions for both 
private and public autonomy. Private and public autonomy secure 
the capacity for individuals both to achieve self-direction in carrying 
out their personal aims as little constrained by others as possible and 
to participate actively in the collective determination of the laws by 
which they are governed. One might think of this as Habermas’s own 
version of the relation of positive to negative liberty, one he believes 
more suited to the realities of modern, pluralistic societies. In light of 
this position, Habermas has developed a discourse theory of “consti-
tutional democracy” that attempts to synthesize the liberal value of 
individual freedom with the communal and democratic emphasis on 
popular sovereignty and collective self-determination through the 
maintenance of a vibrant civil society within which citizens are able 
to actively deliberate and so legitimate the laws by which they are 
governed. Central to both freedom and democracy is a conception of 
communicative rationality: a type of reason based on mutual under-
standing. This reason is explicitly social and intersubjective. It anchors 
a communicative freedom that secures both a  right to speak and the 
 ability to do so. In short, it addresses a concern that is so important 
for Macpherson: the impediments to the realization of those human 
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capacities which require and make possible both individual freedom 
and popular sovereignty. 
 Our attempt to bring Macpherson and Habermas together can pro-
vide elements of an alternative account of democracy and its require-
ments. It can also illuminate core elements and tensions in the theoretical 
positions of each, and the clarification of these can in turn bring further 
to the fore what is involved in a developmental model. Macpherson 
is, with some justification, seen as having always hewed closely to an 
avowedly Marxist account of democracy and capitalism (at least until 
his final published work,  The Rise and Fall of Economic Justice , in which 
he does address questions of human rights, for example). However, this 
judgment may be misleading. In elaborating his “non-market” theory 
of democracy, he lays out concepts that reflect a sensitivity to questions 
of law and the nature of the state, rights, agency, and the autonomy of 
the political more generally that belie any simple reductionism – even 
if he was likely oblivious to these contrapuntal dimensions of his work. 
 For his part, Habermas moved away from an emphasis early in his 
career on the need to recast the terms of historical materialism in order 
to focus on constitutional and legal issues. To that end, he explored 
the relation of knowledge to “human interests,” coupling this with a 
concern for the decline of the public sphere in the face of the forces 
of advanced capitalism. Thus he is understood, again with justifica-
tion, as having largely abandoned a Marxian-influenced perspective. 
But this too may be an excessively hasty generalization: an examina-
tion of some of his later work, notably  Between Facts and Norms , brings 
to light important continuities between his older Marxian and criti-
cal theory positions and his current preoccupations. Both Macpherson 
and Habermas, then, in their obvious differences and perhaps not so 
obvious similarities, in their moving away from and simultaneously 
towards each other, provide important elements of a robustly critical 
democratic theory of the present. 
 To help set the context for our account of developmental democracy, 
we pursue the question of positive or developmental liberty by revisit-
ing Macpherson’s encounter with Isaiah Berlin’s famous examination 
of negative and positive liberty, a treatment that has been enormously 
influential in shaping the unfavourable treatment that the idea – and 
ideal – of positive liberty has often received. Based on this encounter, 
Macpherson produced a striking and powerful reformulation of the 
problem of liberty or freedom that in our view can play an important role 
in rethinking developmental liberty and democracy. We then explore 
Habermas’s version of a radical democratic theory, one that combines 
self-realization with self-determination, private with public autonomy, 
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while suggesting both its strengths and some limitations that could be 
addressed by incorporating insights from Macpherson. We then exam-
ine another largely neglected aspect of Macpherson’s work, namely, his 
treatment of what he calls the “net transfer of powers,” and suggest its 
role in anchoring a critical, developmental account of democracy by 
representing a point upon which the distinctive but ultimately overlap-
ping positions of Macpherson and Habermas can converge and dem-
onstrate their power in illuminating the circumstances and challenges 
confronting both theory and practice in the contemporary period. 
 However, before we treat in greater detail the ideas of Macpherson 
and Habermas, and the relation of these ideas to developmental liberty 
and democracy, we want to identify and briefly discuss what we see as 
the core elements of neoliberalism and the challenges these pose to a 
developmental account. With this discussion we intend to indicate why 
the approach to democracy we seek to defend offers a counterpoint to 
what we believe are the deficiencies of neoliberalism with respect to 
democracy and its requirements in the current era. Our discussion here 
serves as a preliminary outline of our more extensive treatment of neo-
liberalism in chapter 3. 
 Neoliberalism and Contemporary Democracy 
 With its celebration of market values, neoliberalism emerged out of the 
collapse of Soviet-style socialism and the decline and market-driven 
transformation of the postwar welfare state and its associated theory 
and practice of democracy.  5  The welfare state varied considerably 
from country to country, and its numerous deficiencies have been well 
documented.  6  It purported to reconcile economic freedom and private 
property with mass democracy – to combine economic growth and 
efficiency with equality, social justice, solidarity, and meaningful, pop-
ular-democratic will formation. With the erosion of the socio-economic 
conditions that made it possible, the two components of the welfare 
state “consensus” – economic liberalism and social democracy, or the 
“free market” and democratic suffrage – split apart. Neoliberalism 
represents the triumph of the former over the latter, the “economiza-
tion” of politics as opposed to the (democratic) “politicization” of the 
economy. In both theory and practice, its impact has been immense. 
 The links between neoliberalism and counter-democratic tenden-
cies have been treated insightfully by analysts such as Naomi Klein 
and David Harvey.  7  Klein has identified a new form of crisis capital-
ism whereby crises are manufactured and manipulated so as to pro-
vide opportunities to restructure social and economic relations. This 
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restructuring is presented as inevitable and therefore beyond the 
bounds of widespread and potentially open-ended public discussion. 
Contemporary neoliberalism thrives on a permanent state of emer-
gency, which relies on fear rather than deliberation.  8  
 David Harvey, too, sees in the neoliberal project a coercive attempt 
to roll back the social and political achievements of the welfare state. 
While some critics see neoliberalism as a utopian project doomed to fail, 
Harvey views it as a by and large successful strategy for restoring the 
conditions of capital accumulation and hence the power of economic 
elites. The emphasis on the restoration of order brings out the conserva-
tive or even reactionary character of neoliberalism as a central phenom-
enon to be explained. 
 For other analysts, neoliberalism has led to a “risk society.” Instead 
of increasing security for all, neoliberal economic expansion has 
heightened social, economic, and environmental risks and transferred 
these to individuals and groups least capable of absorbing them. At 
the same time, states seek the support of those interests – financial, 
industrial, and electoral, and at times also labour – required for suc-
cessful governance.  9  As populations become more vulnerable in the 
face of economic crises, governments appear less willing or able to 
protect civil rights or to maintain social rights that would permit 
the vulnerable to develop their own powers as citizens. It is as if the 
Hobbesian–Lockean social contract covers fewer and fewer people, 
with ever larger numbers left to fend for themselves in what amounts 
to a “state of nature.”  10  
 Yet as noted in the Introduction, neoliberalism and its theoretical jus-
tifications do not represent merely a return to classical Hobbesian or 
Lockean themes. Combined with theories of social choice, neoliberal 
theories posit models of social action that comport with the behavioural 
demands of a large-scale market economy, in which the rationality of 
consumers is expressed and measured by a concatenation of choices. 
This methodological individualism has at best a weak link to the moral 
individualism that was also a feature of classical liberalism and its 
notion of limited sovereignty.  11  
 But at the same time, the commitment to methodological individual-
ism makes clear that neoliberalism is not just about the capacity for cap-
italist institutions and practices to limit democratic possibilities. It also 
involves its ability to entrench a possessive individualist understanding 
of human agency whereby individuals are self-interested maximizers 
who relate instrumentally to others in ways that undermine possibili-
ties for democratic solidarity. This significantly complicates the task 
confronting critical democratic theory. 
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 This same methodological individualism, with its ties to instrumental 
market rationality, has had a profound impact on contemporary demo-
cratic thinking, even where it eschews the harsher Hobbesian–Lockean 
elements of the neoliberal mix and assumes a critical perspective.  12  While 
it devotes considerable attention to the design of democratic institutions 
and their successful functioning, this sort of theorizing typically has less 
to say about the pathologies of democracy produced by neoliberalism. It 
lacks sufficient reflection on the genesis of existing conditions and con-
siders few alternatives beyond reform of the existing order – the idea 
of a democracy dedicated to the transformation of hierarchical power 
relations throughout the society appears to have withered, as has the 
idea of subjecting social forces to conscious regulation. Its conceptual 
commitments belie its critical intentions. 
 Thus Ian Shapiro, no fan of neoliberalism, nonetheless argues that 
while markets are the primary institutions shaping our notion of work, 
we should not be concerned about the relevance of their genesis for 
questions of democratic social justice. Such “counterfactual” specu-
lation is “antithetical to the spirit of justice, whose purpose is to find 
viable ways of democratizing existing social relations.”  13  For Shapiro 
this counsel of “realism” extends more generally to democratic theory 
as a whole. In his view, “much academic analysis in both the aggrega-
tive and deliberative traditions [of democracy] trades on some version 
of Rousseau’s identification of it with the search for a common good 
that reflects society’s general will. Despite their other differences, this 
way of framing the problem leads theorists in both traditions to har-
bour rationalist expectations of democracy on which it is impossible to 
deliver.”  14  
 In a similar vein, Joseph Heath, who applies game theoretical insights 
to critical theory, claims that in the wake of the collapse of the state 
socialist model, no viable alternatives exist to the market. Method-
ological individualism, rational choice, and a general rejection of the 
“totalizing” and utopian spirit of the French Revolution are central to 
his theoretical framework. Only moderate reform involving “mechani-
cal” institutional design seems possible given the unshakeable reality 
of individual self-regarding self-interest: “Rather than simply trying to 
legislate desirable social conditions, the goal … is to develop a set of 
rules that will indirectly constrain the conduct of individuals in such 
a way that it will be in their interest to promote desirable outcomes.”  15  
 To be sure, theorists such as John Dryzek and Nancy Fraser are not so 
bound by market rationality and attempt to connect politics, economics, 
and democratic theory in a more extensive critical account of the pres-
ent and the possibilities for radical change. Nonetheless, their efforts 
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have fallen short of the normative critical analysis of social conflict 
implied and required by their critical intentions. Dryzek, for example, 
recognizes the incompatibility between further democratization and 
the limitations imposed by liberal capitalism, but he makes no sus-
tained effort to develop an emancipatory theory. His work treats the 
questions of liberty that are central to Macpherson and Habermas as 
secondary and thus fails to provide a clearly articulated theory of the 
restrictions on developmental freedom that neoliberalism invokes and 
the possibilities for transformation that would release  the potentials 
 that developmental freedom offers for autonomy and self-realization.  16  
 Nancy Fraser includes elements of communicative freedom in her 
well-known dialectic of redistribution and recognition – elements on 
which Dryzek does not elaborate. At the same time, however, she fails 
to fully grasp the role of the politics of recognition in the neoliberal 
constellation. She seems to equate the rise of neoliberalism with the 
emergence of this politics and the consequent displacement of issues of 
redistribution. Questions of recognition open new zones of social con-
flict that are distinct from, but still elaborations of, developmental free-
dom. But struggles over recognition also intensify rather than displace 
conflicts over the social lifeworld. The lifeworld is now being impov-
erished as a result of the neoliberal “marketization” of social relations 
and the stifling of the potential for democratic participation and social 
freedom that has emerged in these zones of conflict.  17  
 We think that a developmental account of democracy can provide the 
basis for a more robust critical perspective. This account stresses active 
citizenship and views democracy as more than a procedure for collec-
tive decision-making. 
 Some Requirements of a Critical Theory of Democracy 
 A critical theory of democracy should do more than illuminate the 
inescapable connections between the economic and the political, 
between the structures of capitalism as a system of social power and 
formal political institutions – connections that neoliberal discourse 
strives to sever, deny, or obfuscate. It must also retrieve the normative 
core of democracy and its links with solidarity among agents bound 
together in a common situation shaped by and through processes of 
mutual recognition and mutual understanding. Radically reformed 
social institutions would arise from the transformative, developmen-
tal possibilities that individuals must be assumed to possess if the 
aspirations associated with alternatives to neoliberal politics are to be 
plausible. 
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 At the heart of these aspirations, and therefore of a developmental 
model of democracy, is a conception of freedom in the tradition of posi-
tive or developmental liberty. This conception combines self-realization 
and self-determination – that is, a “classical” understanding of positive 
liberty associated with the ideas of Macpherson – with communicative 
freedom; it also informs a robust conception of agency as intersubjec-
tive and interactive – a theme central to Habermas’s work. Neoliberal-
ism misses this account of freedom, and in our view, its critics do not 
sufficiently emphasize it. Macpherson’s analyses of two important pil-
lars of neoliberalism – Milton Friedman’s celebration of the free market 
and Isaiah Berlin’s defence of negative liberty – open the way to the 
kind of thinking we want to defend. 
 Macpherson on Friedman 
 First published in 1968, Macpherson’s appraisal of Milton Friedman’s 
influential defence of laissez-faire capitalism in his  Capitalism and Free-
dom presciently identified three elements of Friedman’s analysis that 
were to become central to the neoliberal position: “that competitive cap-
italism can resolve ‘the basic problem of social organization,’ which is 
‘how to co-ordinate the economic activities of large numbers of people’ … 
by voluntary co-operation as opposed to central direction by state coer-
cion … that competitive capitalism is a system of economic freedom and 
so an important component of freedom broadly understood … [and] … 
that capitalism is a necessary condition of political freedom (and that 
socialism is incompatible with political freedom).”  18  Macpherson lucidly 
examines each one. 
 Friedman defends the model of a simple market economy that 
assumes free and equal exchange among individuals and households 
who control the resources needed to produce goods and services. As a 
result, they have the choice of either exchanging goods and services or 
producing their means of subsistence themselves; hence all exchanges 
are voluntary because individuals and households only enter into them 
if they benefit. There is social cooperation without coercion. 
 For Macpherson, the flaws in Friedman’s position become clear when 
he moves to the real-world capitalist market economy. Friedman argues 
that in a complex economy, cooperation remains voluntary as long as 
enterprises are private and parties to exchange are individuals and as 
long as individuals are freely able to enter into or refuse any particular 
exchange. But as Macpherson sees it, voluntary cooperation requires not 
simply that individuals can refuse any particular exchange: they must 
also be free to refuse to engage in exchange at all. In a capitalist market 
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economy, the conditions of the simple model do not hold because the 
division between those who own productive resources and those whom 
they employ – that is, between capital and labour – leads to unequal 
power between the two groups and hence coercion by one over the 
other because there is “the existence of a labour force without its own 
sufficient capital and therefore without a choice as to whether to put its 
labour on the market or not.”  19  
 Friedman asserts that competitive capitalism provides the only firm 
guarantee of political freedom. Political freedom entails the ability to 
openly promote radical social change and requires those civil liberties 
that protect individuals from state coercion. According to Friedman, a 
socialist society (i.e., one in which positive or developmental freedom 
is central) could not provide those liberties because the government 
would be a monopoly employer and thus could deprive political oppo-
nents of their livelihood. Since it would be difficult if not impossible to 
promote transformation to capitalism, a socialist order could not meet 
the standard of political freedom. 
 Macpherson, though, does not focus on this account of socialist eco-
nomic relations. Instead he offers a subtle and complex response to 
Friedman’s treatment of freedom. And while he accepts that the capital-
ist economy is a system of power rooted in the relation between capital 
and labour, he does something equally vital for establishing the key ele-
ments of a developmental democratic theory: he takes up Friedman’s 
arguments (and by extension the neoliberal paradigm itself) on their 
own grounds. So understood, they fail in their own terms. Since Fried-
man understands freedom as negative liberty but does not recognize 
coercion where some control the labour of others, the claim that capital-
ism secures this freedom, and is in fact the only system that can do so, 
is at the very least questionable. 
 But there is another element of Macpherson’s position, one implied 
in his claim that the presence or absence of political freedom under 
socialism is a matter of political will and not an inevitable consequence 
of socialist economic and political structures, as Friedman argues.  20  As 
Macpherson sees it, while under capitalism the political and the eco-
nomic are intimately connected, they need not always be so in every 
conceivable circumstance. The problem with (neo)liberalism is not just 
that it emphasizes in theory the separation of the political from the eco-
nomic, a realm of coercion from a realm of freedom, while contradicting 
it in practice. In addition, it unwittingly reveals that in fact the political 
and the economic  should be separate but under capitalism  cannot be. 
 This accounts for the distinctive quality of Macpherson’s theory of 
radical democracy. The issue of will suggests that politics should be, 
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and ideally would be, autonomous; it also therefore means that individ-
ual civil and political rights would remain essential even in a radically 
transformed and more fully democratic social order. On the one hand, 
in a complex and technically advanced productive system there would 
still be the need for structures of rational authority, even if such author-
ity would no longer be subordinated to the demands of class power, or 
what Macpherson would later call extractive power. This is the Marxian 
or socialist dimension of Macpherson’s outlook. But while accountable 
to the political will of the society, the productive apparatus could not 
be directly absorbed into it; nor could political authority dissolve into a 
free association of producers. 
 Macpherson assumes there would remain the need for organized 
political authority to reconcile conflicting interests and to provide secu-
rity for individuals in the face of possible threats from others. However, 
this power would itself need to be held accountable because there is no 
guarantee against holders of political authority abusing their positions. 
This highlights the liberal or individualist dimension of Macpherson’s 
work, one often overlooked or denied by supporters and critics alike. It 
does not, though, stand alone in opposition to the Marxian dimension, 
because Macpherson sought to synthesize both. 
 Macpherson does simply dismiss Friedman’s conception of negative 
freedom. He seeks also to deepen and radicalize it by exploring those 
conditions under which it would be possible for individuals to escape 
all save socially necessary coercion. Macpherson did not fully develop 
this case in his analysis of Friedman’s ideas, but he did explicitly do so 
in his account of Isaiah Berlin’s theory of freedom. 
 The Limits of Negative Freedom: Isaiah Berlin 
 Isaiah Berlin’s famous discussion of positive and negative liberty for-
mulated in  Two Concepts of Liberty was more than a simple conceptual 
exercise. It served as a central text in the neoliberal attack on “collectiv-
ism.” Seen from this angle, Berlin’s critique was an implicit diagnosis of 
the crisis of the times. Liberal individualism needed to be restored – if not 
exactly in its original form – to stave off the crisis in Western democracy. 
That crisis had been triggered by the pathologies of collectivism found 
in socialist and social democratic states, here represented by theories of 
positive liberty. 
 As Berlin sees it, positive freedom is a theory of rational self-mastery. 
This means that as an individual I am “moved by reasons, by conscious 
purposes which are my own, not by causes which affect me, as it were 
from the outside … I wish, above all, to be conscious of myself as a 
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thinking, willing, active being, bearing responsibility for my choices 
and able to explain them by references to my own ideas and purposes. 
I feel free to the degree that I believe this to be true, and enslaved to 
the degree that I am made to realize it is not.”  21  For Berlin, this last 
sentence carries the key to understanding the dangers of positive free-
dom: I may not realize that I am unfree and so must be “made” to 
realize it by those who can see what I cannot. Charles Taylor believes it 
is possible to “second guess” an agent by pointing out what Macpher-
son called internalized impediments to the articulation and pursuit of 
one’s freely and rationally chosen purposes and thereby foster condi-
tions for self-development.  22  For Berlin, this instead becomes a recipe 
for domination, whereby the allegedly more fully rational can coerce 
those not (yet) fully rational and thus not aware of what their “real” 
interests require. It is a formula for forcing people to be free – for Ber-
lin, an evident logical contradiction that has had monstrous historical 
consequences. 
 The problem in Berlin’s eyes is that notions of positive freedom, 
which call forth the creation of “great, disciplined authoritarian struc-
tures [incorporating] the ideal of ‘positive’ self-mastery by classes, or 
peoples, or the whole of mankind,”  23  assume an ultimate harmony of 
human purposes and one “true” way of life, when in fact human goals 
are plural and often contentious. Since self-mastery, or self-government, 
and the ideal of harmonious human purposes can readily connect up 
with the ideal of popular sovereignty or the general will and thus radi-
cal democracy (as they are often seen to do in Rousseau), the key politi-
cal point to be drawn from the critique of positive freedom is that “there 
is no necessary connection between individual liberty and democratic 
rule … The desire to be governed by myself, or at any rate to participate 
in the process by which my life is to be controlled, may be as deep a 
wish as that of a free area for action, and perhaps historically older. But 
it is not a desire for the same thing.”  24  
 Much current democratic theory operates in Berlin’s shadow. This is 
the case in two respects. On the one hand, there is unease about assum-
ing the possibility of anything resembling a substantive general will in 
the face of the evident reality of social pluralism (this is particularly 
characteristic of the central place now assumed by questions of multi-
culturalism in political theory in general and democratic theory in par-
ticular). On the other hand, Berlin’s distinction survives largely intact 
in the differences characterizing contemporary conceptions of liberal 
versus republican forms of democracy.  25  Both liberal and republican 
theories seem to take for granted that indeed there is a gulf between 
“freedom from” and “freedom to,” between what Berlin had called 
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negative and positive liberty. In other words, according to these views 
there is, just as nineteenth-century critics of democracy claimed, an 
inherent and ineliminable tension between liberalism  qua individual 
rights and freedoms, and democracy  qua popular or collective sover-
eignty. With the rise of discourses of human rights and multicultural-
ism, liberalism so understood has won out, even among theorists who 
put democracy first. 
 No doubt Macpherson saw Berlin’s theory as a serious challenge to 
his own developmental theory of democracy – a challenge that would 
have to be addressed if such a theory were to be viable. With the hind-
sight of contemporary events, it seems he may have been ahead of his 
time in recognizing the extent of the neoliberal challenge. His response 
was interesting in that it combined two distinct dimensions. First, he 
argued that the apparent power of Berlin’s argument rests on its selec-
tive and stereotypical characterization of positive liberty. While some 
of Berlin’s points are valid, the power of his diagnosis rests on accept-
ing the circumscribed conception of positive liberty he presents. Sec-
ond, Macpherson argues that positive and negative forms of liberty are 
not mutually exclusive. For Macpherson, positive and negative free-
dom are closely linked because any discussion of freedom should not 
be restricted to deliberate coercion emerging from interference by the 
state, invasive behaviour by other individuals, or the pressures of social 
conformity in the area in which individuals should not be constrained 
or pushed around. It should also consider those impediments to both 
free choice and the determination to pursue one’s own conscious, ratio-
nal purposes that result from denial of access to the means of life and 
labour, that is, from the institution of capitalist private property and the 
workings of the market mechanism. 
 Berlin is cognizant of this, and as a supporter of the welfare state sym-
pathetic to efforts to ameliorate the inequalities of capitalism. However, 
he considers such impediments and their amelioration only conditions 
of liberty – they cannot define liberty itself. Macpherson thinks this 
is a mistake. It leads, in his view, to an impoverished and excessively 
mechanistic conception of freedom, one more appropriate to the world 
of Thomas Hobbes and Jeremy Bentham than to contemporary politi-
cal reality and its challenges. At the same time, he acknowledges that 
some notion of positive freedom can serve and has in the past served to 
justify authoritarian regimes that deny the reality of freedom under the 
guise of realizing it. However, the problem lay not in anything necessar-
ily intrinsic to the concept of positive freedom itself, but rather in two 
other areas: the unduly restricted understanding of its implications on 
the part of both certain theorists of positive liberty and Berlin himself; 
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and the political hurdles those committed to egalitarian and develop-
mental goals have historically confronted, specifically the unwilling-
ness of holders of political power in unequal, class-divided societies 
to concede ground to movements for fundamental democratic change 
except under the threat or reality of force. Both turn on the failure, 
inability, or unwillingness to consider impediments to liberty created 
by capitalist market relations – that is, in capitalist societies, the denial 
to most people of that access to the means of life and labour required 
for self-development. 
 Macpherson sees Berlin as having fused together three different con-
cepts of positive liberty into one, which he then contrasts with negative 
liberty and which he sees as the basis for authoritarianism in the name 
of freedom. One form “is individual self-direction or … self-mastery. It 
is the ability to live in accordance with one’s own self-conscious pur-
poses, to act and decide for oneself rather than to be acted upon and 
decided for by others.” A second, which according to Macpherson is 
logically distinct from freedom as self-mastery, is participation in the 
exercise of popular sovereignty or self-government, “the democratic 
concept of liberty as a share in the controlling authority.” 
 It is a third conception that, as Macpherson sees it, poses the problem 
and that makes Berlin’s position seem plausible. Although it appears to 
follow naturally from the idea of freedom as self-mastery, and indeed 
in Berlin’s eyes is virtually indistinguishable from it, in practice it is 
logically distinct historically and practically as well. This is the idea that 
“liberty is coercion, by the fully rational or by those who have attained 
self-mastery, of all the rest; coercion by those who say they know the 
truth, of all those who do not (yet) know it.”  26  This is of course a version 
of Rousseau’s dictum that men must be “forced to be free,” a dictum 
here given its least flattering interpretation. 
 That liberty as self-realization or self-mastery has been transformed, 
in theory and practice, into the debased form of supposedly rational 
coercion of the less by the more fully developed has, as noted above, 
been the product both in theory and practice of the failure to acknowl-
edge or address non-intended but necessary impediments to self-
realization thrust up by capitalist market relations. Idealist theories, 
such as that of T.H. Green, fall down because they attempt to reconcile 
individual self-development as the full, non-contentious development 
of human capacities with capitalist private property – or, if you will, 
cooperative with possessive individualism.  27  Historically, Macpherson 
sees Stalinism as an example of a putatively radical political movement 
committed to the egalitarianism needed for self-development embrac-
ing supposedly rational coercion, with authoritarian or even totalitarian 
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consequences. This outcome apparently ensues “only after long-continued 
and intensive refusal of the beneficiaries of unequal institutions, on a 
world scale, to permit any moves to alter institutions in the direction of 
more nearly equal powers.”  28  
 But it is not just radical left political movements that are prone 
to embrace a debased notion of positive liberty and to govern their 
actions accordingly. Macpherson also alludes to a conservative form 
of political movement committed to the goals of positive freedom as 
self-mastery and moral autonomy. By failing to recognize even to the 
extent that Idealist philosophers such as Green do, much less radical 
movements of the left, the impediments to self-realization that emerge 
from denial of access to the means of life and the means of labour, 
conservative movements for positive liberty are apt to become disillu-
sioned with the apparently intractable deficiencies of the people with 
whom they must achieve their goals. Believing that it nonetheless must 
be possible to realize the ends of positive freedom, such forces “are 
pushed into the position of holding that it can be done and should 
be done by an authoritarian elite using whatever coercive means are 
necessary.”  29  In other words, liberty as self-direction becomes liberty 
as rational coercion. 
 Macpherson offers no historical examples of conservative authoritar-
ian movements or states committed to some notion of positive free-
dom that end up exercising coercion on a mass scale supposedly in the 
interests of realizing this freedom. But it is not too much of a leap to see 
certain contemporary fundamentalist religious or cultural movements 
as exhibiting at least some elements of what Macpherson has in mind. 
(And such movements are not necessarily so far from mainstream liber-
alism, or ostensibly liberal values, as is usually thought.) 
 Obviously, Macpherson’s claims are contentious, particularly with 
respect to his reading of history. But we think his key point is to justify 
the view that negative and positive freedoms are not inherently at odds, 
as Berlin thinks. Indeed, he goes further: if properly understood, and 
under the right circumstances, these two forms of freedom are com-
patible and even mutually reinforcing. The critical elements here are 
impediments: where access to the means of life and labour is severely 
restricted, the range of negative freedom, that is, the area within which 
individuals cannot be interfered with, is likewise narrowed. In other 
words, inequality limits all freedom; and the deeper the inequality, the 
greater the limits. 
 There is no doubt that much contemporary democratic theory does 
take inequality seriously.  30  But Macpherson’s account is more radi-
cal and challenging and is crucial to his argument about the close 
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association between negative and positive liberty. For it is not just that 
inequality  limits freedom. Rather, inequality  constitutes unfreedom . If we 
understand Macpherson’s position here, inequality is not just about the 
distribution of goods, resources, or life chances. Given the realities of 
contemporary societies and their core patterns of social, economic, and 
political organization, relations of inequality fundamentally shape how 
human potentialities are both defined and denied. It is a modality of 
necessary and possible experience. Inequality does not express an unre-
lenting and unalterable human competitiveness that issues in a natural 
hierarchy of those who are more and those who are less successful in the 
struggle for eminence. Nor does it represent, however, a deviation from 
the supposedly natural sociability characteristic of a generic human-
ity. Rather, inequality has emerged in the face of a specific historical 
situation and predicament: the present and potential future (or more 
accurately futures) of human powers understood as capacities of a cer-
tain sort. For want of a better term, we would call these capacities for 
rational self-production, or better, self-constitution. 
 And this is tied to a critical account of the present that takes the form 
of a wager about the future. The wager is that what people have been 
driving towards, and could under appropriate conditions more self-
consciously and perspicuously articulate, is self-realization understood 
as the development and exertion of their distinctively human capaci-
ties, where this distinctiveness resides in these capacities being at least 
in principle non-contentious. 
 Contrary to Berlin, Macpherson holds that there is a difference between 
the idea of non-contentious human capacities and conscious purposes 
and the claim that under positive liberty “the ends of all rational beings 
must of necessity fit into a single universal, harmonious pattern.”  31  That 
is, “a proliferation of many ways and styles of life which could not be 
prescribed and would not conflict … is a necessary stipulation if a soci-
ety of positive liberty is to be worth striving for. But it is not the same 
as the postulate of a preordained harmonious pattern.”  32  This is not a 
dubious and dangerous utopian leap, but an essential dimension of any 
truly democratic society that claims to maximize the prospects for the 
equal development by all of their distinctively human capacities. “For 
what would be the use of trying to provide that everyone should be able 
to make the most of himself, which is the idea of a democratic society, if 
that were bound to lead to more destructive contention?”  33  
 And this conception of human capacities and the developmental idea 
of power as that which makes it possible to exercise them carries with 
it a specific understanding of individual rights: the rights that are mor-
ally justifiable on egalitarian (i.e., democratic) grounds “are only those 
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which allow all others to have equal effective rights; and …  these are 
enough to allow any man to be fully human.”  34  The first part of this 
claim is familiar enough. It is the second that captures in a nutshell the 
core of Macpherson’s critical account, his diagnosis of the present and 
his hopes for the future. His challenging claim is that a developmen-
tal democracy would maximize human powers, understood as those 
which facilitate the exercise of one’s distinctively human capacities, and 
furthermore, that only those capacities whose exercise does not prevent 
others from exercising theirs are truly human, genuine, and fulfilling. 
 It is for this reason that Macpherson sees negative and positive liberty 
as complementary and even mutually determining, and not antagonis-
tic. The area within which I cannot be interfered with – that is, have 
benefit from the use of my capacities extracted from me – both requires 
and facilitates my ability to develop my capacities under my conscious 
direction, and vice versa. To emphasize this connection, and thus 
ensure there is no theoretical space within which it would be possible 
to justify the debased authoritarian view of positive liberty (Berlin’s 
great concern), Macpherson suggests we dispense altogether with the 
terms negative and positive liberty. We should instead speak and write 
of  counter-extractive and  developmental liberty.  35  What connects them is 
the role played by those impediments thrown up by the denial of access 
to the means of life and labour. 
 Macpherson’s reformulation of the two concepts of liberty is chal-
lenging and suggestive, even more so because it seems to have had little 
impact on contemporary accounts of freedom. But notice: there still are 
 two notions of liberty. The “classical” liberal idea that people must be 
protected from invasion on the part of other individuals and political 
authorities remains central to Macpherson’s account. Whether he felt 
there would always be a need for both concepts – and those who view 
him as a utopian proponent of total harmony thought he mistakenly 
believed we could dispense with negative liberty – is not totally clear. 
He certainly appeared to doubt that the separation between the two 
was necessarily ontological and permanent rather than historical and, 
at least potentially, alterable. 
 Clearly Macpherson believed that the elimination of extractive power, 
tied to capitalist market institutions and property relations, was both 
desirable and possible; in any case, as already noted, this needed to be 
put on the agenda of any tolerably comprehensive theory of democracy 
committed to the idea that each individual ought to have the fullest 
right of and opportunity for self-development. In the current historical 
context, what makes the need for two concepts of liberty important is 
not just the real existence of or threat of invasion by other individuals 
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and by political authorities – that is, the actuality or threat of coercion 
from those clearly dedicated to quashing one’s liberty. It is also needed 
because the existence of impediments to the development and exercise 
of one’s distinctively human capacities has seemed to require – where 
those impediments have not been abolished (i.e., everywhere) – the use 
of political authority to limit the extractive power of those in a position 
to deny to others access to the means of life and labour. What Macpher-
son has in mind here is the twentieth-century welfare state and its efforts 
to regulate the free play of capitalist market forces, although his theory 
envisions a much more extensive challenge to capitalist institutions. But 
whether one is considering the welfare state or something more exten-
sive, the issue involves the need for and role of freedom-enhancing as 
opposed to freedom-denying coercion. 
 Macpherson sees this as a real problem and concern from the point 
of view of achieving a more richly democratic society because in the 
circumstances it involves limiting the powers of some in order to 
enhance the powers of others. But he suggests the difficulty is not 
insuperable if one does not restrict oneself – as Macpherson believes 
both Berlin and classical liberals do – to that excessively mechanistic, 
Hobbesian view of freedom, where it is identified with the absence of 
 all obstacles, all barriers to the realization of one’s desires. But there are 
obstacles and there are obstacles. In Macpherson’s view, establishing 
social ownership of capital may remove from the sphere of negative 
liberty those activities associated with “free enterprise.” But this might 
well enhance negative liberty overall “if the gain in liberty by those 
who had doors closed to them more than offsets the loss of liberty by 
those (relatively few) who had been in a position to take full advantage 
of market freedoms.”  36  
 Departing from the mechanistic view of freedom allows for a richer, 
more consistent conception and much more realistic grasp of negative 
liberty, for while liberals typically argue for freedom from all obstruc-
tion in principle, they obviously accept obstructions in practice. But 
departing from the mechanistic view also demonstrates why we still 
require such a concept and why we need to distinguish it from positive 
liberty. Macpherson himself accepts this need, even though he is obvi-
ously a staunch proponent of positive freedom. Redefining negative 
liberty as counter-extractive liberty clarifies what is at stake. According 
to him, Berlin seems aware of what is at stake as well. But Berlin cannot 
successfully address the issue because he defines freedom too narrowly, 
consigning to the category of conditions of liberty the removal of those 
impediments that Macpherson believes must be central to freedom 
itself. 
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 It appears that the need to argue in terms of gains and losses of 
freedom – in other words, in terms of obstructions to freedom that 
work to remove obstructions – reflects for Macpherson the histori-
cally situated tension between the dominant market form of liberal-
ism, or economic freedom, and democracy. This is not just a question, 
either, of the class conflict that capitalism generates and a that Marxian-
influenced thinker such as Macpherson understandably enough 
emphasizes. There are not only empirical political and sociological 
but also profound normative philosophical matters at play here.  37  
 As Macpherson recognizes, in the “real world” of actually existing 
liberal (capitalist) democracies, those who exercise extractive power 
have in the circumstances likely been able to transform this power 
into enriched forms of the very developmental power that democ-
racy is supposed to promote for all. This indicates two themes that 
are central to Macpherson’s position and to post-Marxist political and 
democratic theory and, beyond this, that are valuable in bringing cur-
rent mainstream democratic thought into fuller relief: that democracy 
exists yet remains to be realized; and that much of what democracy 
is and can be hinges on the claim that one can imagine that human 
capacities might be non-contentious, and indeed, that fully or genu-
inely human capacities simply  are those that are non-contentious. Oth-
erwise put, “it comes down to the postulate that a fully democratic 
society cannot permit the operation of any extractive power, and that 
a society without any extractive power is possible. The serious diffi-
culty about a democratic society is not how to run it but how to reach 
it.”  38  Problems that today exercise many theorists of democracy, such 
as how to rationally aggregate individual preferences to produce logi-
cally coherent outcomes, are on this view second-order problems, not 
primary ones. 
 As noted above, Macpherson is not generally seen as someone inter-
ested in the actual workings of political institutions and practices. Yet, 
in engaging Berlin’s argument around the question of freedom-enhancing 
obstructions he makes specific reference to the place of law and its dual-
istic character as state interference that at the same time can increase 
net aggregate individual liberty.  39  And he is clear that this is at the core 
of the counter-extractive liberty that makes positive or developmental 
freedom possible. 
 A dualistic conception of law, its origins and purposes, is very much 
at the heart of the work of Jürgen Habermas. And while he does not as 
explicitly lay it out or identify it, Habermas too engages the demands of 
positive freedom and the issues posed by developmental conceptions of 
democracy. To his account of democracy we now turn. 
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 Jürgen Habermas and Political Freedom: For 
and Against Macpherson 
 Developed through engagement with a wide variety of currents in con-
temporary political philosophy, including the ideas of thinkers ranging 
from John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin to Nancy Fraser and Charles 
Taylor, Jürgen Habermas’s discourse theory of constitutional democ-
racy has attracted considerable attention.  40  With its focus on law, rights, 
autonomy, constitutionalism, and deliberation, this theory illuminates 
core issues defining currently influential currents of democratic thought 
that have sought to develop fresh insights into democratic possibilities 
beyond classical liberalism and Marxism/socialism. Indeed, Habermas 
himself has explicitly set this out as his purpose.  41  
 Immersed in the continental tradition of political thought, Haber-
mas has always been more methodologically self-conscious than was 
Macpherson. Habermas dynamically connects method and content in 
ways that distinguish him from other current theorists, regardless of 
how much he might otherwise share with them. He is not always explicit 
about this and thus ironically shares a bit of the reticence that character-
ized Macpherson and that has contributed to the failure on the part of 
analysts to see more clearly and fully what he has been trying to do. But 
at the core of his position is the assumption – similar to Macpherson’s – that 
liberalism and democracy are compatible and that more radical under-
standings of each are essential if their full potential is to be realized. 
 Habermas’s discourse principle holds that “[j]ust those action norms 
are valid to which all possibly affected persons could agree as partici-
pants in rational discourses.”  42  In the form of “the democratic princi-
ple,” it “states that only those statutes may claim legitimacy that can 
meet with the assent [ Zustimmung ] of all citizens in a discursive process 
of legislation that in turn has been legally constituted.” This principle 
strives to articulate the performative meaning of citizenship under the 
conditions of modern democracy and the constitutional state: citizens 
engage in self-determination as “legal consociates who recognize one 
another as free and equal members of an association they have joined 
voluntarily.”  43  These “legal consociates” are such by virtue of their 
enjoying equally private and public autonomy, human rights and pop-
ular sovereignty, “the individual liberties of the members of the modern 
market society … [and] … the rights of democratic citizens to politi-
cal participation.” The “co-originality” and interdependence of private 
and public autonomy is such that citizens “can make an  appropriate use 
of their public autonomy, as guaranteed by political rights, only if they 
are sufficiently independent in virtue of an equally protected private 
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autonomy in their life conduct. But members of society actually enjoy 
their private autonomy to an equal extent – that is, equally distributed 
individual liberties have ‘equal value’ for them – only if as citizens they 
can make an appropriate use of their political autonomy.”  44  
 Under these conditions, citizens can be simultaneously both authors 
and addressees of the law. As Rousseau and Kant had it, citizens would 
enjoy self-government because “the legal guarantee to behave as one 
pleases within the law” permits “autonomy in the sense of  reasonable 
will-formation” whereby they “should bind their wills to just those laws 
they give themselves after achieving a common will through discourse.” 
So understood, self-legislation “engenders an internal relation between 
will and reason in such a way that the freedom of everyone – that is,  self -
legislation – depends on the  equal consideration of the individual freedom 
of each individual to take a yes/no position – that is, self- legislation .”  45  
 Although he does not use the terminology, Habermas provides an 
account of the relationship between private and public autonomy that has 
obvious parallels with Macpherson’s argument about negative and posi-
tive, or counter-extractive and developmental, liberty. It seems, however, 
that there are two distinct and important differences between the two posi-
tions. In the first place, while Habermas clearly intends his account of the 
interrelation of private and public autonomy to provide a counterfactual 
perspective on democratic possibilities rather than a purely empirical treat-
ment of actually existing liberal democracies, it is nonetheless still an imma-
nent reconstruction of the logic at work in existing institutions. While less 
self-conscious methodologically, Macpherson offered a similar reconstruc-
tive account. Yet, in Habermas’s analysis the gap between critical recon-
struction and empirical reality is significantly narrower; correspondingly, 
the demands of democracy for Habermas are either more fully realized in 
existing institutions or are (and must be) considerably more modest. 
 The second point of departure is connected to the first. Habermas 
shies away from providing an account of genuine human wants, needs, 
and purposes comparable to that of Macpherson. He does not believe 
that, properly understood, these wants, needs and purposes are in prin-
ciple non-contentious. The differences here go to the heart of Haber-
mas’s overall approach to the demands of theory generally and of dem-
ocratic theory in particular. 
 Communicative Reason in Between Facts and Norms 
 The work of Habermas comes out of an avowedly philosophical back-
ground, the critical theory of the Frankfurt School. This perspective 
emerged in the context of, and was shaped by, the momentous and 
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mostly horrific developments in the twentieth-century world, notably 
the rise of Stalinism and fascism (as well as the far less authoritarian 
but nonetheless reifying forms of mass liberal democracy in the “free 
world”), and therefore with certain practical/historical and theoreti-
cal problems of classical Marxism and socialism. In the face of these 
forces, the first-generation critical theorists, Max Horkheimer and The-
odor Adorno in particular, ultimately offered a deeply pessimistic and 
even despairing account of the triumph of an instrumental rational-
ity tied to the blind drive for raw self-preservation – the “dialectic” 
of enlightenment – and the consequent emergence of a rationalized 
Weberian “iron cage” in the form of a “one-dimensional” or “totally 
administered” society.  46  
 Habermas broke with the totalizing and pessimistic thrust of the 
original critical theory. His theory of communicative action and com-
municative rationality, which is at the heart of his democratic theory, 
has been his alternative to what he sees as the one-sided nature of the 
Frankfurt School’s account of the dynamics of modernity, as well as his 
own early treatment of the decline of the bourgeois public sphere. 
 Yet Habermas continues to hold fast to the idea of a philosophical 
politics. He remains vitally concerned with the theory/practice rela-
tionship in the context of a critical perspective on the contemporary 
world. He thus continues to hold to some conception of an emancipated 
form of life. However, this can only be undertaken in a fundamentally 
altered context that considers philosophically the need for what he calls 
post-metaphysical thinking. Such thinking challenges classical meta-
physical commitments as these emerged initially in ancient Greek, pri-
marily Platonic, thought and later were reworked under the rubric of 
the “philosophy of consciousness,” or “philosophy of the subject.” They 
included the idea of unity within the philosophy of origins (identity 
thinking); the equation of thought with being (the doctrine of Ideas); 
and the redemptive significance of the contemplative life (the strong 
concept of theory).  47  
 For Habermas, undermining the claims of transcendental philosophy 
(which of course was also, if differently and with different effect, the goal 
of Marx and the original Frankfurt School) both required and made pos-
sible a move beyond classical conceptions of revolutionary social change 
and hence classical socialist notions of democracy, according to which 
the proletariat was the ultimate “collective” subject. In this respect, he 
remains tied to the legacy of the Frankfurt School. For while he saw 
its account of the triumph of instrumental rationality as one-sided, this 
account nonetheless not only pointed to a real problem but also made 
it possible to demonstrate the limits of other critical perspectives on 
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philosophy and social life (such as that of Heidegger) that failed to 
account for the possibility of intersubjectivity and a common world, that 
is, the prospects for solidarity as a force for social integration. Haber-
mas’s turn to communicative rationality and communicative action – 
that is, action governed not by the dictates of strategic rationality but by 
the quest for mutual understanding – is central to his attempt to dem-
onstrate the lived reality of and possibility for solidarity under contem-
porary conditions. 
 It is in relation to this project that law as “fact” and as “norm,” partak-
ing of both facticity and validity, and the inner tension between them, 
finds its place. Like Kant, Habermas sees law as combining freedom 
with coercion. However, this can only come about democratically: “the 
concept of modern law, which both intensifies and behaviourally oper-
ationalizes the tension between facticity and validity, already harbours 
the  democratic idea developed by Rousseau and Kant: the claim to legiti-
macy on the part of a legal order built on rights can be redeemed only 
through the socially integrative force of the ‘concurring and united will 
of all’ free and equal citizens.”  48  
 In the context of his post-metaphysical framework, Habermas distin-
guishes himself from both Kant and Rousseau (and  inter alia Marx and 
the early Frankfurt School) and the idea each holds of the social contract 
as expressing this “concurring and united will” of the people in a way 
that successfully combines individual autonomy with popular sover-
eignty. A social contract can result neither from the institutionalization 
of natural, moral rights individuals bring with them from the state of 
nature, as in Kant; nor from the ethical idea of individuals constitut-
ing themselves through the contract as citizens oriented to the common 
good and so realizing a substantive form of life, as in Rousseau. Rather, 
in his deliberative reconstruction of popular sovereignty Habermas 
stresses the central role of democratic procedures that make possible 
multiple forms of deliberation. These in turn facilitate the maintenance 
of responsive parliamentary institutions and vigorous forms of politi-
cal pluralism, including competitive political parties and autonomous 
public spheres. On this basis, 
 [the] institutions of the constitutional state are supposed to secure an effec-
tive exercise of the political autonomy of socially autonomous citizens. 
Specifically, such institutions must accomplish two things. On the one 
hand, they must enable the communicative power of a rationally formed 
will to emerge and find binding expression in political and legal programs. 
On the other hand, they must allow this communicative power to circu-
late throughout society via the reasonable application and administrative 
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implementation of legal programs, so that it can foster social integration 
through the stabilization of expectations and the realization of collective 
goals. Government by law is designed to spell out the system of rights 
in terms of a constitutional order in which the legal medium of law can 
become effective as a power transformer that reinforces the weakly inte-
grating currents of a communicatively structured lifeworld.  49  
 The reference here to “weakly integrating currents of a communica-
tively structured lifeworld” points to the (rather submerged) critical 
dimension of Habermas’s position. For Habermas, successful fulfilment 
of the principles of the constitutional democratic state and the securing 
of private and public autonomy depend upon realizing the potential of 
modern communicative rationality; all hinges on the capacity to suc-
cessfully transform communicative into administrative power by means 
of law, which incorporates both coercion and freedom. Popular sover-
eignty and solidarity – successful social integration – cannot be secured 
either through (Kantian) morality, which is too motivationally indeter-
minate, or through a substantial general will or ethical community (à la 
Rousseau), which is no longer plausible in the face of social pluralism. 
 Stated somewhat differently, Habermas does not believe that success-
ful social integration can result from the operation of market mecha-
nisms that aggregate and coordinate self-interested individual actions 
behind the backs of these individuals. Moreover, such mechanisms 
could never foster the conditions of solidarity – that is, symmetrical 
relations of mutual recognition that secure individual identity by tak-
ing up and transforming the spirit of face-to-face encounters with con-
crete others – precisely  because they require people to treat one another 
instrumentally. Yet at the same time, there can be no “natural” organic 
community ensuring a frictionless fit between individual aspirations 
and communal purposes. In short, like Macpherson, Habermas engages 
the historically situated tension between negative and positive freedom. 
He, too, seeks a synthesis that both preserves the critical vantage point 
and indicates the historically informed tasks that must be undertaken 
in order to realize (private and public) autonomy and (communicative) 
rationality – that is, the promise of law itself. 
 Although he does not explicitly say so – and indeed seems at the out-
set to rule it out – this synthesis is decidedly Hegelian.  Between Facts and 
Norms has a structure reminiscent of the  Philosophy of Right .  50  In place 
of Hegel’s account of abstract right, morality, and ethical life, Haber-
mas offers the triad of the system of rights, the constitutional state, and 
procedural (deliberative) democracy as a system of public opinion and 
will-formation. Instead of absolute spirit by which a substantial ethical 
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life is realized as objective spirit, there is communicative reason (the 
discourse principle), where an inner connection is secured between the 
system of rights and the constitutional state, the rule of law and popular 
sovereignty. 
 And there is as well here a basis for a critique, reminiscent of Marx, of 
the  Philosophy of Right and its account of the state. Marx argued that the 
state as Hegel conceived it represented no concrete ethical community 
but was subordinated to civil society and its class-based antagonisms. 
In light of Habermas’s account, it could be argued that in contemporary 
society communicative rationality is all too often subordinated to the 
demands of instrumental rationality in that what are inherently moral-
practical questions are one-sidedly and misleadingly converted into 
technical ones (to use Habermas’s earlier formulations). 
 If this is so, there is here further evidence that Habermas’s ideas 
serve as a critical diagnosis of the present. What is specifically at issue 
here is the nature of a viable democracy that retains a connection with 
the normative/egalitarian impulses of classical democratic theory and 
classical socialist doctrine, while acknowledging the realities of soci-
etal complexity and pluralism with regard to concrete life plans and 
motives. At one level, the target is the various “realist” or “empirical” 
or “elitist” theories of democracy that draw their plausibility from the 
evident asymmetries of power in society and the existence of social 
complexity, which supposedly renders unrealistic popular discursive 
will-formation and normative direction of social processes by self-
conscious, acting individuals.  51  
 A key to Habermas’s attempt to distinguish his view of both tradi-
tional Marxist and social democratic conceptions of the state, on the 
one hand, and the neoliberal revival of classical liberal accounts of the 
relation of the state to (free market) society, on the other, is located in his 
treatment of three paradigms of modern law as these have emerged his-
torically, in Europe and elsewhere, over the course of the last three cen-
turies: formal liberal; material welfare state; and proceduralist.  52  This 
account too exhibits an Hegelian structure: Hegel’s three “moments” 
are here recast in terms of the relations among the three paradigms, 
with the proceduralist paradigm fulfilling the role of a concrete ethical 
life. It incorporates the claims of communicative freedom in the same 
way that ethical life embodied those of objective spirit. Of course, com-
municative freedom is not equivalent to objective spirit with its ties to 
the philosophy of the subject or consciousness but is linked instead to 
an account of intersubjectivity  qua communication and communicative 
rationality. The proceduralist legal paradigm is the “spirit” of a plural 
world in which the mutual recognition of subjects guaranteed by Hegel 
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only at the level of the fully realized universal reason of ethical life now 
takes the form of the legal guarantees of private and public autonomy 
as a system of rights among equal legal consociates who must order 
their relations within the framework of this-worldly positive law. This 
“spirit” of proceduralist law informs and rationalizes the institutions of 
political opinion and will-formation that are intended to secure a func-
tional separation of powers “which, at a different level of abstraction, 
governs the availability of various sorts of reasons and how these are 
dealt with. This logic requires the institutionalization of various dis-
courses and corresponding forms of communication that,  regardless of 
local context , open up possibilities of access to the corresponding sorts 
of reasons.”  53  Hence, 
 the social substratum for the realization of the system of rights consists 
neither in spontaneous market forces [i.e., formal liberal law  qua abstract 
right] nor in the deliberative measures of the welfare state [i.e., material 
welfare state law  qua morality] but in the currents of communication and 
public opinion that, emerging from civil society and the public sphere, 
are converted into communicative power through democratic procedures 
[i.e., proceduralist law  qua ethical life, here understood as establishing the 
identity of the modern democratic constitutional state in terms of which 
there is a necessary inner connection between private and public auton-
omy, justice and popular sovereignty].  54  
 Habermas’s conception of the interpenetration of private and public 
freedom provides a starting point for a critical democratic theory that 
recalls key themes in Macpherson’s account. Its critical quality resides 
in its ability to link concrete forms of life that are historical and social 
in nature to the pathologies of late-modern forms of capitalist global-
ization. As Macpherson and others have pointed out, and as Haber-
mas accepts, the liberal idea of basic rights is both atomistic and easily 
transformed into possessive individualism. It fails to account for the 
impediments to public freedom generated by an exclusive reliance on 
the market model, which produces inequalities of power and money. 
Unequal power leads to unequal public freedom. The achievement of 
equal private rights requires equal public freedoms and social rights. 
 Habermas argues, however, that public freedom involves not just 
the interventions of the social welfare state, which in isolation can lead 
to welfare paternalism, but also appropriate cultural conditions. In 
other words, he advocates a radical egalitarianism. While he does not 
fully develop this idea in his recent work on human rights, a radical 
egalitarian solution requires the establishment of an extensive network 
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of public spheres that enable participation and that feed into political 
action. 
 Habermas intends this account to express a dynamic process of devel-
opment that is conceptual  and historical, indeed conceptual  because his-
torical, just as Macpherson intended his account of negative and posi-
tive freedom to reflect dynamically a specific historical predicament. He 
wants to point to immanent possibilities in the present – possibilities 
that are also necessities if the demands of communicative rationality 
and freedom are to be realized – for the normatively informed direction 
of social processes that have come to take on the character of inexorable 
systemic imperatives. “Realist” theories of democracy and society are 
wrong to assume away the need for and possibility of normative direc-
tion. Yet at the same time, there can be no totalizing social agent with 
the power to “make” society as an immediately ethical community. 
Existing democratic forms should not be blindly celebrated, resignedly 
accepted, or simply and one-sidedly condemned. 
 Towards a Post-Marxist Critical Theory 
 Habermas offers a post-Marxist critical theory of democracy in order 
to address the challenge of anchoring communicative and hence nor-
mative possibilities for autonomy and self-development in the face of 
systemic imperatives that threaten these possibilities. The question is: 
which possibilities and which imperatives? In Macpherson’s language, 
we are now on the terrain of impediments to individual self-realization 
and the inner connection between the power to exercise one’s distinc-
tively human capacities (which Macpherson in one formulation called 
the ethical concept of power) and the institutions and values of capital-
ism and its property relations. 
 Undoubtedly Habermas sees the idea of essential and essentially 
human capacities – at least as formulated by Macpherson – as too inter-
twined with the philosophy of the subject, so this approach is closed 
off to him. But does this compel him to disavow the classical socialist 
critique of capitalism, suitably brought up to date, which requires that 
market forces operating in a nature-like way be subjected to conscious 
social direction by a body politic capable of developing a common inter-
est in ensuring the well-being of all its members? 
 We contend that in his recent writings on both global cosmopolitan-
ism and the contemporary crisis of the European Union, Habermas 
does not fully realize the potential inherent in his theoretical outlook. 
Notwithstanding a few nods in this direction, this recent work lacks 
a detailed diagnosis of the pathologies of neoliberal globalization, 
46 Critical Theory, Democracy, and the Challenge of Neoliberalism
although to be sure Habermas is highly critical of the market funda-
mentalism that he believes has come to shape the contemporary politi-
cal economy of Europe – with disastrous results.  55  Nor has he shown he 
is capable of taking up the complex problems of global development 
and underdevelopment at any point in his own biography.  56  But if one 
were to develop the latent threads of this diagnosis in conjunction with 
Macpherson’s intuitions, the result could provide a powerful critique of 
the barriers that limit the emergence of egalitarian global justice. 
 As we have noted, the classical socialist critique of capitalism argued 
that market forces which operated in a nature-like way needed to be 
subjected to a body politic capable of a common interest whose real-
ization would ensure the well-being of all its members. At least since 
the publication of  The Theory of Communicative Action , Habermas has 
tended to argue that the economic “system” characteristic of advanced 
industrial society (i.e., capitalism) can no longer, if it ever could, be sub-
jected to this kind of direction; it can only be indirectly steered.  57  
 But do the demands of his own theory call for more, as William 
Scheuerman suggests they do?  58  For Habermas also acknowledges 
the presence of unaccountable power emanating from the economic, 
political/administrative, and cultural systems of contemporary society. 
From the perspective of post-Marxist democratic theory, the key is to 
acknowledge the limitations of the classical socialist ideal without at the 
same time bowing to resignation in the face of the apparent inability to 
imagine alternatives to the existing order – without which any devel-
opmental account of democracy, including that of Habermas, falters. 
 We want to argue that C.B. Macpherson’s concept of the net transfer 
of powers provides insight into the importance of fundamental change 
and how such change should be conceived if it is to be plausible in 
the current social context. This concept can play these roles because it 
creatively combines political economy and political theory and indeed 
shows them to be inextricably intertwined. 
 Developmental Power and Extractive Power 
 The net transfer of powers is at the core of Macpherson’s work – not 
only his democratic theory but also his landmark study of possessive 
individualism; indeed, it illuminates the essential connection between 
them. It refers to the fact that in capitalist market societies, including 
those that are liberal democracies, “which [operate] necessarily by a 
continual and ubiquitous exchange of individual powers,” those who 
own capital, that is, the means of life and labour, control access to these 
for those who do not; yet all require such access if they are to achieve 
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their conscious human purposes or to maximize their powers to use 
and develop their human capacities. Given that liberal democratic soci-
eties justify themselves on the grounds that they facilitate individual 
self-realization, liberal democracy, in theory and practice, is caught up 
in a fundamental contradiction: “A society in which a man [ sic ] cannot 
use his skill and energy without paying others, for the benefit of those 
others, for access to something to use them on, cannot be said to maxi-
mize each man’s powers.”  59  The net transfer of powers and the problem 
of impediments at the core of Macpherson’s account of freedom entail 
each other. 
 Yet as central as the concept is, it has gone largely unanalysed if not 
unacknowledged. Where it has been noticed, by critics and defenders 
alike, it has usually been seen as Macpherson’s own Marxist equivalent 
to the theory of exploitation and surplus value – as interesting, perhaps, 
but not theoretically original.  60  
 This isn’t exactly wrong; indeed, Macpherson himself was sometimes 
apt to see it in these terms. But it is misleadingly one-sided. For in fact 
the concept has dimensions and implications that permit a fresh look 
at issues in democratic theory, issues that developmental, post-Marxist 
theories need to consider. It is neither pure classical Marxism nor abstract 
humanist liberalism. 
 As we have seen, Macpherson views democracy as more than a form 
of government. It is a kind of society within which all individuals have 
the equal ability to use and develop their essentially human capaci-
ties. At the heart of his conception of democracy is the maximization 
of human powers, with power understood as the ability to use and 
develop those capacities. As Macpherson seems to understand it, this 
power is both qualitative and quantitative: it can be both judged and 
measured. Power as the ability to use and develop capacities is a critical 
concept with practical intent, immanent or implicit in the actions and 
behaviour of real social agents, who might otherwise be consciously 
motivated by other purposes. 
 The core idea here is explicitly Marxian. In a society divided between 
owners and non-owners of capital – that is, a class-divided society – 
those who lack access to the means of life and labour transfer “both 
the ability to work and the ownership of the work itself; and, conse-
quently, the value added by the work.” This transfer is structurally 
determined in that it is “a continuous transfer between non-owners 
and owners of the means of labour, which starts as soon as, and lasts 
as long as, there are separate classes of owners and non-owners; not a 
momentary transfer occurring at the time of that separation.” And this 
is a measurable transfer: “it is the amount of exchange value (whether 
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in money terms or real terms) that can be added by the work to the 
materials on which it is applied, and be realized in the value of the 
product.”  61  
 Acknowledgment of this relationship and of the transfer involved 
can lead to the recognition that how production is conducted, and how 
products and labour are exchanged, are potentially worthy social and 
political issues. Fair treatment in the workplace and fair exchange in 
the marketplace can become objects of public policy; typically, this has 
been the case under the welfare state. In other words, this dimension of 
Macpherson’s argument may suggest a theory of justice, which of course 
is central to dominant currents of contemporary democratic thought. 
(And it is also why some radical and Marxist critics of Macpherson 
view him as “too” liberal.) 
 But Macpherson does not rest there. He goes on to indicate that 
what is at stake is not just the  transfer of powers but also the  diminu-
tion of powers. He distinguishes productive from extra-productive 
powers – that is, the ability to use one’s energies and capacities to 
produce material goods from the ability to engage in activities 
beyond the production of goods that provide opportunities to exert 
and enjoy one’s human capacities for their own sake. He argues that 
during the continuous transfer of one’s powers, one loses – beyond 
the value of this transfer – the fulfilment that comes from exerting 
one’s capacities according to one’s own conscious purposes, whether 
this take place within one’s productive activities or outside them. 
The problem is the same: people lose the (positive or developmen-
tal) freedom to consciously use their capacities for their own freely 
determined purposes. Where they lose their ability to direct their 
productive capacities, in a society in which production is a central 
fact, they cannot help but suffer impairment of their ability to do so 
beyond the sphere of production. People are deprived of the oppor-
tunity to become what they could be – to exercise their capacities for 
self-production or self-constitution. The process of identity forma-
tion is skewed by the requirements of what Macpherson calls extrac-
tive power and therefore, as he indicated in his critique of Berlin, 
negative liberty. Because Macpherson identifies  both the transfer  and 
diminution of powers and argues they are inextricably intertwined, 
his account suggests a theory of justice that necessarily also points 
to an account of the good life. 
 Nevertheless, while both productive and extra-productive powers, 
and thus our lives both in and outside the workplace, must be con-
sidered together, the transfer and diminution of powers within the 
sphere of production itself remains central for Macpherson, as they 
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had been for Marx, precisely because with respect to these powers 
questions of both justice and the good life emerge with particular 
force: 
 [A]lthough the seller [of one’s productive capacities] indeed transfers the 
whole of his labour-power, the whole control of his productive capacities, 
for the contracted time, he can transfer only part of the value it would 
have had if it had been able to keep it; the rest of that value is lost and 
is lost by virtue of the fact that he has to sell. If he were able to keep his 
labour-power and use it himself, its value would be the satisfaction value 
 plus the value which its application added to the materials on which it was 
applied.  62  
 In short, Macpherson addresses his analysis to both exploitation and 
surplus-value, and to the alienation of labour in its multiple dimen-
sions as Marx had laid it out in his early writings, namely, alienation 
from, respectively, the products of labour, the activity of labouring, the 
human essence and from other humans. His ultimate target, in other 
words, is the pervasive commodification of society characteristic of 
advanced capitalism. This puts him in closer contact with the Frankfurt 
School – and thus with Habermas. 
 What is important again to note is that while in his account of the 
net transfer of powers Macpherson builds upon fundamentally Marx-
ian themes, he does so  within a theory of democracy and not  outside it. 
Hence his position has several implications that are decisive for a devel-
opmental democratic theory. One in particular stands out against the 
backdrop of contemporary democratic theory and its specific concerns, 
and the developmental alternative. Macpherson connects his account 
of the net transfer of powers to the claim that a fully democratic society 
must work to maximize human developmental power, understood as 
the equal ability of all to use and develop their distinctively human 
capacities, and argues that abolishing this transfer would lead to fuller 
maximization of capacities that are ultimately non-contentious. It is easy 
to assume that the abolition of the net transfer (and consequent dimi-
nution of powers) would  mean or  just be the expression of distinctively 
human capacities, that the elimination of the class relations of capital-
ist society would mean a non-contentious society – in other words, a 
concrete general will. But Macpherson does not offer such a concrete 
picture. What is important is the  transfer and  diminution of powers, not 
the  powers themselves . Their specific content presupposes appropriate 
conditions for their formation. This content cannot be spelled out in 
advance.  63  Presumably, one of the conditions making for this spelling 
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out would be the opportunity to engage with others and deliberate 
along the lines of Habermas’s account. 
 This in turn suggests another issue. For Macpherson, the jus-
tificatory theory of liberal democracy has relied historically upon 
not just one maximization claim, but two. Along with the claim to 
maximize human powers, it has also offered the claim to maximize 
utilities. Macpherson sees these claims as inherently contradictory. 
This has plagued efforts to develop a defensible theory of liberal 
democracy that is faithful to democracy’s humanist aspirations. But 
what is interesting here is that it was in the context of this argu-
ment that Macpherson set out his two concepts of power, extractive 
and developmental. In an earlier formulation he had distinguished 
between a descriptive and an ethical notion of power. What made 
this latter way of identifying different notions of power significant 
for Macpherson is that the so-called descriptive concept – essentially 
Hobbes’s view that power was any apparent means to some future 
apparent good – was unable to even recognize much less quantify the 
net transfer of powers because it measured the power of individuals 
 after such transfer has occurred. 
 Arguably, even Habermas accepts this notion of power; hence his 
view that the exercise of communicative freedom can at best hold 
existing powers accountable. (Insofar as what is left of existing welfare 
states – for which Habermas provides a qualified defence – do so, they 
also regulate power that manifests itself after a transfer has occurred.) 
But what, then, is the communicative freedom that Habermas defends 
 about or  for ? What distinguishes it from the cybernetic feedback mech-
anisms of the various “realistic” systems theories he has criticized, at 
length and with eloquence? He seems to need something like the net 
transfer of powers and the conception of human capacities that under-
girds the critical account of the social and political conditions within 
which that transfer emerges and which it sustains. And acknowledg-
ing such capacities need not entail a return to the philosophy of con-
sciousness or the subject; they do not necessarily do so in Macpher-
son’s case. 
 Of course, as indicated earlier, Macpherson is clear that the maxi-
mization of democracy requires the abolition of extractive power, and 
this clearly entails, at the very least, substantial transformation of exist-
ing capitalist market institutions. In an era in which global capitalism 
seems triumphant, this seems impossible – but perhaps for that reason 
utterly necessary. The idea of abolishing extractive power and the insti-
tutions that embody and preserve it may well expand the reach of the 
democratic imagination, of our sense of the real and its possibilities. It 
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asks us to think more expansively about our models of democracy and 
how they fit the current circumstances. 
 Thus any attempt to theorize about democracy (or indeed any politi-
cal question of consequence) requires a sensitivity to historical loca-
tion, both one’s own and that of one’s ideas. The always dynamic 
and changing relation between democracy as a value and as a form 
of political practice, and the need to relate these to fundamental and 
unavoidable conceptions of human purpose, is at play in all accounts 
of democracy – it is a condition of their intelligibility, the inescapable 
hermeneutic dimension of their articulation. Failure or unwillingness 
to attend to this – and often this is the product of a quest for “realism” – 
unduly limits the sorts of questions that should be posed and may be 
unrealistic to boot.  64  Ironically, the quest for realism can widen rather 
than reduce the gap between theory and practice, between democratic 
models and democratic realities. 
 In defending his account of developmental, non-market democracy, 
Macpherson suggests challenging questions that this account will 
likely elicit: “For example, can the concept of power as ability to use 
and develop essentially human capacities be made precise enough to 
be of any use? Can we assume that all men’s essentially human capaci-
ties can be exercised not at the expense of each others’? Can the abil-
ity to exercise these capacities be sufficiently measured to entitle us 
to make its maximization the criterion of a fully democratic society?” 
He goes on to note that if the difficulties these questions pose are the 
result of conceiving democracy as the kind of society that maximizes 
human developmental powers, we should probably forget the whole 
idea. However, “the difficulties are inherent in any democratic theory: 
our formulation simply enables them to be seen more clearly and dealt 
with more openly.”  65  
 We need to have greater clarity and openness. Habermas, and espe-
cially Macpherson, can show us why and indicate how to proceed. They 
thus provide an important starting point for our consideration of demo-





 Chapter Two 
 Reason, Truth, and Power: The Challenges 
of Contemporary Critical Theory 
 In this chapter we explore from a broadly post-Marxist perspective 
what we see as key methodological requirements for a critical social 
theory that is adequate for a critical or radical theory of democracy. 
Our account is informed by the spirit of the critical theory of the Frank-
furt School, while departing from some of its key arguments. At the 
same time, while our position has affinities with “post-metaphysical” 
theories that distance themselves from both traditional Marxist and 
Frankfurt School perspectives, we part company as well with cer-
tain positions and commitments associated with these alternatives. 
In responding to both “classical” and contemporary positions we lay 
emphasis on the importance of the participant’s perspective as a cen-
tral element of an adequate critical theory. 
 There is no doubt that certain key assumptions and claims of what 
might be called “classical” Frankfurt School critical theory require 
reformulation in light of changed historical circumstances and pos-
sibilities. Nonetheless, its fundamental commitments, ultimately tied 
to the possibility of an emancipated, rational social order dedicated to 
the fullest realization by associated individuals of their capacities in 
an environment of freedom, equality and solidarity, remain crucial for 
social analysis and democratic theory in the present. The issues of rea-
son, truth, and power that were central to the work of the first genera-
tion of critical theorists are as relevant today as they were when the 
theory was originally formulated in the face of the momentous histori-
cal challenges confronting societies in the context of widespread social 
crises – war, revolution, and depression. 
 It is especially important to stress these issues precisely because 
contemporary reformulations of critical theory have been for the most 
part recast in line with the assumptions of “post-Marxist” democratic 
theory. Yet the relation of critical to democratic theory is often unclear 
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or as been underdeveloped, both by contemporary critical theorists and 
by their critics. For some, the postmodern rejection of totalizing “grand 
narratives” and scepticism about large-scale theories of politics, along 
with the collapse of actually existing socialism, have together provided 
grounds for the dismissal of critical theory’s Marxian commitments. 
New zones of conflict, such as those around gender and multicultural-
ism, have challenged its more rigid forms. 
 We contend, however, that a post-Marxist theory requires not a 
wholesale rejection of this tradition, but rather its critical renewal, one 
that respects the legacy of the original formulation of critical theory 
with its focus on questions of reason, truth, and power. At the core of 
this renewal is a non-dogmatic approach to Marxian categories that rec-
ognizes the limitations of traditional Marxism while at the same time 
seeking to draw on the continuing significance of these categories for 
illuminating the present. 
 We believe that a critical theory of democracy that builds on the 
insights of the tradition of the Frankfurt School and critical theory 
should have both a developmental historical-diagnostic and a self-
reflexive character. While it should analyse the origins and nature of 
social structures of power and authority in the context of a broad his-
torical trajectory, it should also, as a theory committed to the pursuit of 
enhanced freedom and equality, offer a critical diagnosis of the present, 
whereby the status of the theory’s concepts would depend upon their 
success in illuminating for potential addressees the realities and pos-
sibilities of their situation. 
 As suggested above, the Frankfurt theorists creatively revised 
Marxist theory in the face of dramatic changes to capitalism and 
world politics wrought by revolution, depression, war, and fascism. 
They identified key elements of a critical approach to social analysis, 
most notably the need for a dynamic theory with a practical intent to 
be both historically diagnostic and self-reflexive, and they pointed to 
the distinctive characteristics such a theory must possess. These were 
signal and indispensable accomplishments. However, their attempt 
to formulate more specifically a theory of democracy illustrates the 
need for a post-Marxist approach, particularly because the status and 
character of this kind of theory, and even its plausibility, have been 
called into question in contemporary debates. Hence the demands 
on contemporary critical theory have a double aspect: critical theory 
confronts changed historical and social conditions, but in turn it chal-
lenges, or should challenge, currently dominant paradigms of thought 
and especially democratic theory. It should take on board the task 
of identifying and exploring social pathologies that threaten if not 
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undermine the normative claims advanced by the dominant strains 
of democratic thinking. 
 Because we seek to demonstrate the continuing significance of criti-
cal theory for a radical theory of democracy, this chapter serves as a 
prolegomenon to our own efforts in subsequent chapters to suggest and 
develop elements of a theory of democracy adequate to the present situ-
ation. We thus begin with a summary discussion of key themes laid out 
by the first generation of Frankfurt School critical theory, specifically 
Max Horkheimer’s account of the problem of truth and its relation to 
the demands of scientific theory and Theodor Adorno’s attempt to for-
mulate an “emphatic” conception of truth that at the same time did not 
fall prey to the flaws of classical (idealist) metaphysics. We attempt to 
show what we believe remains valuable in these accounts, while also 
suggesting their limitations. 
 These limitations are specifically linked to the failure of the origi-
nal Frankfurt School thinkers to sufficiently develop a conception of 
intersubjective interaction adequate to their insights into the blind spots 
of orthodox or classical Marxism. The first generation recognized that 
these blind spots were a product of the Marxist commitment to an objec-
tivist understanding of social action and historical change and thus a 
positivist and scientistic understanding of knowledge and truth. But 
they did not fully or sufficiently follow up on their insights, although 
they had within their framework resources for doing so. It was left to 
“second generation” critical theory, and in particular the work of Jür-
gen Habermas, to take up the task of further exploring and developing 
the critique of classical Marxism by focusing on the underappreciated 
and underdeveloped role of communicative reason and communicative 
action in establishing the conditions and possibilities, normative and 
structural, for the recognition and realization of a democratic polity and 
society built on equality, and on social as well as individual freedom. 
We explore key dimensions of the “communicative turn” and its role in 
a critical theory of democracy, while also suggesting its own limitations – 
limitations emerging from a certain normative thrust detached from a 
thoroughgoing analysis of social structures and social pathologies. 
 Of course, the Frankfurt School’s early analyses as well as its most 
recent efforts take on the challenge of contemporary philosophy and 
social science, not just Marxism. Horkheimer, and later Habermas, took 
up the critique of positivism and an objectivist social science that sepa-
rated knowledge from the practices of social life. 
 The final part of this chapter deals with the relation of communica-
tive reason to the nature and role of power. The issue of power poses 
distinctive challenges to critical theory in general and to a critical theory 
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of democracy in particular. At the same time, critical theory potentially 
offers unique resources for an exploration of the dynamics of power 
in contemporary society that we believe other perspectives lack. These 
include the postmodernist or post-structuralist theories associated 
with the well-known and influential work of Michel Foucault. Focus-
ing on the relation between communicative and strategic conceptions 
of power, we suggest ways in which power could be understood, with 
Hannah Arendt, as the capacity for associated individuals to pursue 
common purposes through bonds of trust and solidarity – a key issue 
for any developmental theory of democracy that is committed to the 
idea and ideal of a society dedicated to the fullest realization by each 
and all of their distinctively human potentialities and possibilities. 
 The Idea of a Critical Theory: Max Horkheimer 
 For Max Horkheimer, knowledge was never a matter of an objective 
standpoint detached from the understanding of participants. Hork-
heimer rejected the “Cartesianism” he saw in much contemporary 
social science, which sought to find unchanging laws of action that 
had an independent status. The quest for a unified theory, a system of 
linked propositions, was of minimal value for Horkheimer because it 
bore little relation to social practice. For him, the aim of social theory 
was to transform society. The role of theory was to inform individuals 
about social conditions and possibilities for change. 
 Horkheimer was critical of many contemporary approaches to knowl-
edge that detached it from its social roots, but he was especially critical 
of positivism and pragmatism. Positivism figured prominently in his 
reflections on the relation of knowledge, and theories of knowledge, to 
the historical processes and the material relations of society. Though 
in his earlier work he tended to focus on all forms of positivism, he 
subsequently emphasized that version embodied in the logical empiri-
cism and logical positivism of his time.  1  This form had become one of 
the dominant philosophies of the 1930s. More than any other theory it 
challenged the very idea of a critical theory possessing an objectively 
partisan character that at the same time respected the demands of rea-
son and truth. Positivism reduced inquiry to a form of natural science. 
Logical positivists in particular claimed to understand human activity 
only through the lens of sense experience. They rejected the Kantian 
notion of a synthetic  a priori , indeed an active subject of whatever kind. 
They adopted instead Humean scepticism towards “innate ideas.” To 
be sure, logical positivists went beyond earlier versions of positivism 
in that they saw language or sentences about experience as the subject 
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of study. But they remained dubious about the notion of an indepen-
dent subject. The objections of logical positivists to idealism and its 
postulate of a pure mind that was free of the influence of sense data 
led them to reject any conception of an organized self that is capable of 
self-reflection. Ernst Mach, whose work offered a precursor to logical 
positivism, saw the self only as a bundle of sensations with no unity or 
centre.  2  Denying the ability to reflect critically on social processes and 
evaluate them, positivism reduced social theory to the acceptance of 
already established facts. 
 Logical positivists wanted to place philosophy on the firm ground 
of science, specifically natural science. The only valid philosophical 
statements were either propositions – that is, sentences that could be 
verified by observation – or logical truths. These versions of positivism 
separated facts from values, as well as philosophy from science. Science 
was restricted to the establishment and verification of facts. Only the 
evidence of experience or the analytic truths of formal logic counted 
as knowledge. Value judgments were viewed as irrational or emotive 
utterances and as unverifiable. One could not verify a value judgment 
by observation or logic. 
 The logical positivist ideal is based on a mathematical version of 
natural science. Positivists have sought a unified conceptual system in 
which all knowledge is deduced from the smallest number of axioms. 
And like physics, the system could be captured and made transparent 
and thus knowable by means of mathematical laws. This feature in turn 
is supposed to allow the scientist to explain the probability of any event.  3  
The positivist wants to extend this model from the natural to the social 
sciences. While admitting this is not yet possible, he believes that the 
human sciences, much like the natural sciences, will eventually be able 
to predict the course of social events. Positivism will determine what 
humanity really  is more definitively than either religion or speculative 
philosophy can. It takes an objective, neutral, non-normative approach 
to knowledge in which history and valuations are absent. The laws of 
society, just like the laws of nature, are permanent and unchanging. 
 Positivism fails because its extreme empiricism is unable to grasp 
the way knowledge is shaped by social context. Instead, positivists see 
knowledge as a set of isolated facts. Horkheimer was not entirely dis-
missive of empiricism or the empirical, which in his view played a role 
in a materialist critical theory. But sense perception is not itself basic. It 
is shaped by history, by material conditions and culture. In one of his 
earliest essays, Horkheimer noted that “sense experiences are indeed 
the basis of knowledge, and we are at every point referred back to them, 
but the origin and conditions of knowledge are not identically the origin 
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and conditions of the world.”  4  In his early studies Horkheimer cited 
the work of the gestalt theorists who influenced his mentor, Hans Cor-
nelius. Gestalt theorists noted that sense perception was not basic but 
rather was organized holistically. However, Horkheimer went beyond 
the idea that knowledge has a holistic contextual basis. He thought that 
holism was related not just to the organization of the mind but also to 
the practical nexus of knowledge. He rejected the pursuit of a disinter-
ested knowledge. All knowledge is engaged, caught up in the nexus of 
human interests. Knowledge is both self-reflexive and critical. 
 In contrast, Horkheimer contended that “the existing order is a prod-
uct of the life processes of society in which the individual is an active 
participant.”  5  He accepted the premises of German idealism since 
Kant that our perceptions are not basic or fixed but are themselves 
a product of our understanding. Anticipating to some extent Haber-
mas’s later work, as well as that of Charles Taylor, Horkheimer also 
accepted a key assumption of interpretive social science: that our per-
ceptions were mediated through language. Recognizing the work of 
the neo-Kantians, Horkheimer pointed out that “[t]he given is not only 
expressed by speech but fashioned by it; it is mediated in many ways.”  6  
However, he went beyond what he saw as the idealistic commitments 
of neo-Kantians. He saw the relations between self and society, which 
neo-Kantians hypostatized as fixed, as historically changing relations 
affected by social conflict. 
 Nor is science an independent, isolated activity; it too is embedded 
in social and material life processes. Scientists who think of themselves 
as reflexive and active when working as scientists, and then view 
themselves as passive agents acted upon by causal forces, are deny-
ing their own agency. Positivism denies not only the conscious will of 
the scientist who employs knowledge to create theory but also that of 
the social actor who puts the knowledge of such sciences into prac-
tice. Individuals and social groups must plan deliberately to achieve 
goals. Here Horkheimer saw ordinary social action as largely purpo-
sive. Positivists reduce the individual to a mostly passive product of 
casual forces whose generative force is independent of human will. In 
contrast, Horkheimer saw power as the ability to use one’s abilities to 
carry out aims and realize goals. 
 According to Horkheimer, the social functions of science apply to 
the whole of social life. Humans cooperate with or oppose one another 
in order to realize aims. They create their material and social worlds 
by engaging in what Horkheimer calls the material life process. More-
over, as he indicated, individuals hold notions of a decent life and 
assess their current circumstances in terms of those notions. They 
58 Critical Theory, Democracy, and the Challenge of Neoliberalism
experience deprivations and hardships and are often subject to domi-
nation by more powerful forces. Those forces are not always experi-
enced as blindly causal, though when faced with the overwhelming 
power of nature, people may understand them as such. Rather, they 
may come to be seen as the result of social arrangements. Clearly, then, 
participants do not experience values as mere individual preferences 
that are tacked onto action; rather, they see themselves as inhabiting a 
social world in which norms are central organizing features of social 
life. The theorist who ignores all of this cannot really understand the 
social ties and contexts of participants. This is because humans are 
capable of self-understanding and of having plans and purposes and 
so can conceive of their own fate and imagine conditions in which 
their lives would be better. In other words, they have conceptions 
of a good life. They can imagine and strive for greater freedom and 
happiness. 
 For the positivists this is merely a matter of emotion or feeling, which 
is extra-scientific and has no rational content. We can determine the 
goals of human action only through a neutral, non-normative inves-
tigation. For Horkheimer, however, a normative perspective is central 
to the type of theory he wants to formulate: a critical theory. Humans, 
he argues, have a basic need to seek happiness that can never be elimi-
nated. This is not to be sure simply a desire for pleasure or simple mate-
rial satisfaction. It is found in the hope for a better life. 
 Horkheimer took a post-metaphysical view of knowledge.  7  He did 
not think that truth was a matter of timeless or permanent knowledge 
outside the bounds of time and history. Rather, for him, truth was a 
historical and social entity. What we see as truth can change as society 
changes and as we acquire new knowledge of society and history. Facts 
and theories are socially constructed. They are part of a nexus of under-
standing whereby we make sense of the world. Science, and for that 
matter philosophy, is a social product. Yet Horkheimer did  not argue 
that the social and historical character of knowledge led to a relativ-
ism in which truth-claims were reduced to mere opinion. Truth is fal-
lible but that does not make it relative. Truth-claims represent our best 
understanding in the moment at hand. 
 While Horkheimer did not take what would now be called an inter-
pretive perspective, he did take a holistic view of knowledge that was 
not resolved into a totality. In his version of this position – which he 
called “dialectical” – there were no isolated facts or forms of understand-
ing, nor was there isolated consciousness. We understand entities in the 
world only in their relation to other things: “every insight is regarded as 
true only in connection to the whole body of theory.”  8  Understanding 
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rests on an entire set of conditions and background assumptions. As 
a consequence of understanding, both subject and object are modi-
fied. In more contemporary terms, we might say that facts are theory 
laden: they do not and indeed  can not exist as mere stand-alone entities; 
they only make sense in a theory that interprets them and brings out 
their tendencies. However, Horkheimer added to this understanding 
the idea that this holistic context is not closed on itself; furthermore, 
it is always changing and rife with conflicts and even contradictions. 
This conflict-laden process is what, for Horkheimer, defined the “dia-
lectical.” Concept and object (to use Adorno’s terms) do not fit together 
without remainder or contradiction. The object of knowledge – in this 
case, other subjects – may exist in a situation that contradicts the terms 
used to understand those subjects. This is especially true of key social 
and political notions such as freedom, which therefore can never be 
understood as transparently clear and self-sustaining facts capable of 
being subsumed under social causal laws (i.e., “traditional theory”). A 
critical theory aims to understand human action in relation to its devel-
opmental tendencies and possibilities, some of which are not and can-
not be realized. 
 In Horkheimer’s view, Hegel’s dialectical theory was undercut by 
its commitment to finality. Hegel’s dialectic relativized forms of under-
standing to take into account their historically limited and one-sided 
character and incorporated their relative truths into new forms of 
understanding, but his idealist premises necessarily led him to envis-
age an end to the dialectic. He sought a point of final knowledge and 
reconciliation. 
 Horkheimer rejected the idealist dialectic and its consequences; in 
particular, he rejected the notion of a final resolution of all contradic-
tions. A materialist theory is one in which, as noted above, concept and 
object, thought and reality, are never fully reconciled. Hegel’s view “has 
as its presupposition the basic postulate of idealism that concept and 
being are in truth the same, and therefore that all fulfilment can take 
place in the pure medium of the spirit … Materialism on the other hand 
insists that objective reality is not identical with man’s own thought and 
can never be merged into it.”  9  
 Thus we should not see dialectic as revolving around a simple logical 
schema of thesis/antithesis/synthesis. Dialectic, for Horkheimer, was 
more properly tied to the view that all knowledge is conditioned by his-
tory and commitment. The clash of these conditioned perspectives was 
what generated the dialectical movement. Such a movement was never 
completed or finished. The open-ended dialectic that Horkheimer pro-
posed meant that history was never finished or ended. 
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 Critical theory, then, rejects the idea that a theory is best understood 
as a systematically connected set of propositions. It falls into the domain 
of a social theory that begins in the attempt to make sense of the life pro-
cesses of a community with all its conflicts and contradictions and to 
determine its developmental possibilities. It is not an objective theory in 
the sense that the theorist can stand outside or hover above social com-
mitments. Horkheimer rejected the vision of the scientist who can sepa-
rate his work from his life – that is, that notion that the social scientist 
can be impersonal and disinterested in his work life while at the same 
time an active citizen in his private life. Social scientists are embedded 
in the social and material life processes that provide the context for all 
knowledge. Knowledge cannot be uncontaminated by social interest. 
The inquirer is a participant in society, just like the ordinary individual. 
She understands society as a participant. 
 Critical theory, for Horkheimer, does not aim to construct a system. It 
is “is a human activity which has society itself for its object.”  10  It seems, 
then, that he was seeking to understand society as a conflict-laden real-
ity, one that to date had not been the creation of rational individuals but 
that could be placed under the conscious control of humans. Human 
history has largely been filled with oppression and blind conflict. The 
critical theorist contends that individuals could bring society under 
conscious and deliberate control and thereby create a good and human 
life. Horkheimer saw a conflict between the individual ability to act 
with awareness and purpose and a society organized in such a way that 
conscious direction by most is precluded. Thus, in Horkheimer’s view 
critical theory did not seek to ameliorate the conditions of a capitalist 
society but rather to transform them. 
 The project of a critical theory, then, does not entail simply a change 
in the nature of inquiry. The subject is not a detached observer but an 
involved participant. Horkheimer noted: “Its opposition to the tra-
ditional concept of theory springs in general from a difference not so 
much of objects as of subjects. For men of the critical mind, the facts, 
as they emerge from the work of society, are not extrinsic in the same 
degree as they are for the savant or for members of other professions 
who all think like little savants.”  11  
 Put in slightly different terms, the material of inquiry is not extrin-
sic to the scientist or to the participant. The ordinary participant and 
the inquirer share the same social world and are involved in the same 
social life processes. Thus, social understanding is an intrinsic element 
of the participant’s perspective. The inquirer takes the perspective of an 
involved participant. The theorist’s aim is not to predict events but to 
serve as an agent in the practical transformation of society. The theorist 
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does not seek to control things but to engage in reflection on the relation 
between society and its possibilities and on the conditions that keep 
individuals from acting both individually and in concert to realize these 
possibilities. The reflexive relationship to the social world is the basis of 
a critical perspective on this world, that is, an implicit and sometimes 
explicit evaluation of the conditions of social life that is shared by both 
theorists and participants. Both try to make sense of the social world 
and its possibilities. These evaluations are crucial to the extent that they 
form part of the attempt to bring about social conditions that can cre-
ate human happiness and flourishing, reduce domination, and bring 
social processes under rational control. Critical theory “[is] not merely 
a research hypothesis which shows its value in the ongoing business of 
men: it is an essential element in the historical effort to create a world 
which satisfies the needs and powers of men.”  12  
 In opposition to positivism, then, a critical theory is inescapably nor-
mative. It can never eliminate conceptions of freedom, dignity, or hap-
piness. Critical theory is based on the search for better social conditions, 
and it is impossible to assess the workings of society without some con-
ception of what those conditions should entail. Without some norma-
tive assumptions, the positivist is incapable of making any normative 
assessments or of reflecting on the nature of society. He takes society as 
it is. In contrast, the critical theorist takes up these normative concerns 
as a way of analysing the conflicts and contradictions of the society of 
his time. 
 Unlike positivism, pragmatism does not make value-free social 
inquiry and a passive relation to the facts the key elements of a sci-
entific approach to society. Indeed, pragmatism seems to take up the 
engaged normative and activist commitments that also characterize 
critical theory. However, as he did with positivism, Horkheimer saw 
in pragmatism and its core assumptions an essentially affirmative and 
conformist orientation to a social order that denied or contradicted its 
rational potential. 
 Horkheimer’s encounter with pragmatism was conditioned in many 
respects by the time and place of its reception. By the late 1930s the 
roots of pragmatism in Hegelian thought, particularly in the work of 
John Dewey and George Herbert Mead, appeared to have withered or 
been covered over. They were in the process of being replaced by more 
analytic approaches. Dewey’s work too began to take on a more instru-
mentalist bent. This instrumentalism was at the heart of Horkheimer’s 
approach to pragmatism. 
 As essentially a form of means–ends rationality, pragmatism, like 
other philosophies of the time, left out any dimension of what  can be. 
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Note that at the time, a transformed social order seemed unattain-
able. With its emphasis on consequences, pragmatism subordinated 
reason to efficiency. Once efficiency emerged as the ordinary criterion 
of reason, it became a tool of domination rather than an element of 
freedom. It sought to control and dominate nature, both inner and 
outer. According to Horkheimer, whatever the political propensities 
of individual pragmatists, pragmatism reflected and represented 
a change in the social function of philosophy. Philosophy had long 
been associated with its critical role – that is, it asked us to examine 
the prevalent forms of understanding and social organization in light 
of other possibilities. However, if reason was now simply an instru-
ment for adapting to the demands of the existing irrational state of 
affairs, then the critical element in thought, the ability to think beyond 
the horizons of the existing social order, was lost. In  Eclipse of Rea-
son Horkheimer viewed this situation in terms of the transition from 
the objective reason at the heart of ancient philosophical thought to 
the subjective reason that characterized the modern understanding. 
Objective reason always looked to a source of reason and truth that 
was not confined to individual minds but existed in nature. As such 
it was concerned with the proper ends of human beings. By contrast, 
subjective reason was restricted to the coordination of means and 
ends. If ends were considered at all, this was solely in relation to the 
demands of self-preservation. Something was good if and only if it 
preserved and enhanced the self. Of course, Horkheimer did not sim-
ply advocate a return to objective reason, or even a complete rejection 
of subjective reason; rather, he saw the need for something that medi-
ated between the two. 
 Horkheimer never fully formulated this perspective. But he did 
draw on the notion of mimesis that Adorno also used. Here mimesis 
was akin to a process of imitation or adaption that creates similarities. 
It represented a non-dominating relationship to the  Other that in the 
view of Horkheimer and Adorno had been suppressed by instrumental 
rationality. It was, according to Horkheimer, a capacity that was always 
available to humans, even though there were no current (in their view) 
possibilities for change. 
 While the notion of a mimetic non-dominating relation to the Other 
has some promise, it never rose above the level of a theoretical intu-
ition; it was never developed into an explicit theory. Habermas’s notion 
of communicative reason amounts to a well-formulated attempt to 
redeem this intuition, although it takes a direction that Horkheimer and 
Adorno might not have followed and is not without its own problems 
and limitations. 
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 The Limits of the Early Frankfurt School’s Notion of Critique 
 For Horkheimer, as for most critical theorists, the values used to assess 
contemporary society were not timeless, nor were they to be found 
in an ideal realm of the kind the neo-Kantians of his time postulated. 
Rather, critique was immanent: it took the values of society, such as 
freedom and happiness, and measured them against the social reality 
in which they were embedded. Horkheimer contrasted the bourgeois 
idea of inner freedom and self-determination with the reality that most 
individuals had little freedom to carry out plans and determine their 
own lives. They lived in misery rather than happiness. Critical theories 
could use the resources of existing social science in an interdisciplinary 
fashion to make diagnoses of the conflicts in society. 
 While Horkheimer developed many of the basic features of critical 
theory, his version does suffer from the employment of a productivist 
framework. To be sure, Horkheimer used this framework to lay out a 
non-dogmatic account that incorporated psychological and sociologi-
cal elements, and he took a very broad view of materialism. The latter 
emphasizes the material element of values and culture. Nonetheless he 
still saw the social whole as largely structured by the mode of produc-
tion of a society. While we do not reject the importance of economic 
elements in a critical theory – indeed, a key theme for us is the extent 
to which the economic element has been insufficiently emphasized in 
dominant contemporary versions of critical theory – a theory of society 
cannot rest simply on a productivist basis. It is not possible to deduce 
the forms of mutual recognition and mutual understanding from a pro-
ductivist framework alone. 
 As is well known, Hegel employed a metaphysical notion of truth 
to fuse theory and practice. Truth was not simply epistemological or 
equated with certainty or adequate description. The true was what was 
“really real,” the instantiation of the Idea in the world. This notion of 
truth was inherently normative. Only when freedom and justice were 
realties could truth come into its own: “The idea is what is true in and 
for itself, the absolute unity of concept and object.”  13  
 Hegel’s emphatic notion of truth as the “really real” formed the 
backdrop for later attempts to connect theory and practice. But neither 
Marx nor, later, the Frankfurt School accepted Hegel’s idealist solution, 
which seemed to require the postulate of a transcendental subjectivity. 
Yet the Frankfurt School theorists were hesitant to entirely abandon his 
emphatic concept of reconciliation. 
 Horkheimer retained the idea that emancipatory social movements – 
in his case, the workers’ movement – could bring about justice and 
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freedom. But these achievements could never be perfect or final. The 
emphatic notion of truth and Hegel’s idealism were true only in a nega-
tive way.  14  As noted above, Horkheimer’s early work and indeed that 
of the first generation of critical theorists were strongly influenced by 
classical Marxism, and especially the work of Georg Lukács. 
 Among the original members of the Frankfurt School, Adorno was 
more definitive in challenging this model. But while he rejected the 
Hegelian conception of the absolute, he nonetheless remained commit-
ted to the emphatic notion of truth as that which can never be recon-
ciled: “After everything, the only responsible philosophy is one that no 
longer imagines it had the Absolute at its command; indeed philosophy 
must forbid the thought of it in order not to betray that thought, and at 
the same time must not bargain away anything of the emphatic notion 
of truth. This contradiction is philosophy’s element. It defines philoso-
phy as negative.”  15  
 Adorno’s notion came to the fore when, in the wake of the failure of 
the workers’ movement to achieve social emancipation in the face of 
fascism, critical theorists became sceptical of emancipatory movements 
as such. For them, the basis for a rational reconstruction of society had 
lost its immanent foundations. The radical injustice of a society that 
was instrumentally regulated could only be criticized from without. In 
a totally administered society the hopes for freedom, justice, and hap-
piness could be kept alive only from the perspective of reconciliation, 
however negatively conceived. 
 Yet this strategy proved difficult to maintain for critical theory. As 
Albrecht Wellmer argues with respect to Adorno’s position, “[i]n a strict 
sense no merely human practice could ever reduce the unbridgeable 
gap that separates the historical world from the condition of salva-
tion.”  16  In Adorno’s work the link between a critical diagnosis of society 
and social action, between theory and practice, is severed. 
 Axel Honneth has tried to rescue the intuition supporting the dialec-
tic of enlightenment by rethinking the critical impulse behind the cri-
tique of instrumental reason.  17  He contends that Adorno’s and Hork-
heimer’s formulations can be reclaimed by way of a world-disclosing 
critique.  The dialectic of enlightenment should be read as a proposal 
to take up a different way of viewing the world in which new pos-
sibilities for change are disclosed. Since from the interpretive stand-
point we know the world as mediated though language, our sense 
of the world also structures the way we understand potentials and 
possibilities. In a manner reminiscent of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal 
Mouffe, Honneth stresses the power of disclosure to structure reality. 
This position is clearly tied to his recent attempt to recast reification as 
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the forgetting of an initial, precognitive, affective relation of recogni-
tion to the Other.  18  
 While Honneth’s suggestion is interesting, it suffers from two serious 
difficulties. In the first place, it is not entirely faithful to the intuitions 
of Adorno and Horkheimer. The idea that any form of world disclosure 
could capture an adequate relation between theory and reality does not 
seem to coincide with the view of the later Adorno that language itself 
is inadequate to the emphatic idea of truth. 
 In the second place, his suggestion recapitulates the same problems 
that plagued the analysis in  Dialectic of Enlightenment , but now on the 
level of linguistic disclosure. World disclosure is detached from every-
day communication. What would make participants accept or gain 
insight from the world that the theorist would propose? If the world-
understanding of subjects in late capitalism is restricted, then a new 
world-forming proposal has no basis for actualization or even accep-
tance. We believe that a more feasible solution would start not from 
the world-forming power of language but rather from the ordinary 
understanding of subjects in the lifeworld, one that could give rise to 
the synthetic power of acting in concert. 
 Our position here, with its focus on the competences of subjects as 
participants in their lifeworld and their capacity to develop forms of 
power tied to acting in concert, suggests that the normative dimen-
sion of communicative reason and the possibilities for developmental 
democracy are – and must be – inherently linked. To this connection, 
and what it means for both critical and democratic theory, we now turn. 
 From Developmentalism to Communicative Action 
 To realize the potential of the developmental account of democratic 
theory that we elaborated in the first chapter, we have to supplement 
a developmental approach with a communicative one. Because social 
reality is constructed intersubjectively and dialogically, we only under-
stand one another through processes of acting in common. To be sure, 
the developmental account also shares the notion that human nature 
is essentially social and requires the backdrop of a world shared with 
others. The developmental theorist rejects the atomism of the liberal 
theory of Hobbes and others and grasps that the realization of human 
powers, plans, and purposes requires a shared social world. The idea 
that an individual can be grasped prior to society, whether logically or 
ontologically, is an illusion. In contrast, developmental and communi-
cative theorists rely on Aristotelian and Hegelian notions of the social 
character of human action. More than neo-Aristotelians, however, 
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communicative theorists are more closely connected to the Hegelian 
notion of the social development of reason. 
 In this latter respect, developmental theories – at least those that take 
their bearings from Aristotle and neo-Aristotelian thinking – do not 
fully articulate a complete version of the dialogical character of human 
action. For contemporary neo-Aristotelians, reason is not so much a 
social relation that involves interaction as it is a process that in the first 
instance takes place behind the backs of individuals. For example, Ron-
ald Beiner in  What’s the Matter with Liberalism views social life as a set of 
dispensations that issue in an ethos that exists prior to the individual.  19  
If we take the use of the term dispensation seriously, social life is subject 
to basic rules that are revealed to individuals. In religion, of course, this 
has the broader meaning of laws and promises revealed by a god who 
relates to humanity in certain way in a certain era. Dispensation here 
refers to a forming or granting of power from without; the role of indi-
viduals in dialogue is subordinated to the disclosing power. 
 In opposition to the neo-Aristotelian notions of community, in which 
the communal formulations are prior to the individual, a modernist 
notion of development that draws its inspiration from Hegel and Ger-
man idealism sees the individual as a participant in social processes, 
within which along with others the individual determines her life 
through acting in common with others. Such a view anticipates notions 
of intersubjectivity without elaborating all of its aspects. Developmental 
theorists such as C.B. Macpherson look at the individual as an exerter 
of powers. Individuals are capable both of self-determination – that is, 
of forming their own life plans and purposes – and of self-realization 
whereby these goals are achieved through exercise of their own capaci-
ties. In opposition to the world-disclosing force of a dispensation or 
an ethos that is in some way beyond individual creation, this second 
modern strain of developmentalism sees human action as a form of 
social construction, which comes about through the participation of 
individuals in the social world.  20  As noted above, these capacities are 
social; they only manifest themselves in the world we share with oth-
ers. The formation of individuals capable of determining and realizing 
their own plans can only take place in the social world. Developmental 
theories are less successful in dealing with the ways in which individu-
als are linked together in the social world and why their plans are con-
nected. Some formulations have simply assumed that in a non-coercive 
society the self-realization of individual plans and goals would be rela-
tively unproblematic. To be sure, we need not think there is an auto-
matic harmony (although he was often criticized for this, neither did 
Macpherson). However, once we shift focus to the medium in which 
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coordination, linkage, and socialization take place we encounter a new 
set of problems. These involve the normative nature of social action. 
 Social action takes place in a medium of communicative action in 
which individuals are linked through mutual understanding. This sug-
gests that we coordinate our actions by means of a dialogical process. 
Some thinkers, such as John Stuart Mill, posit a dialogical conception 
of reason in which debate and discussion figure centrally, and combine 
this with a conception of self-realization without necessarily presenting 
self-formation as a communicative process. Mill did not extend the dia-
logical notion, which he used philosophically, into a medium of social 
action. He agreed with the criticism of the atomism of liberal theories 
of natural rights (as did Marx), whereas the more Hegelian T.H. Green 
saw value in rights as social and based on the moral personality. This 
relation of rights to the moral personality was rooted in the ability of 
individuals as active subjects to take up the common good and make it 
their own. Here rights, which were reciprocally recognized by others, 
were anchored in a practically oriented conception of the powers of 
humans.  21  With his Hegelian background, John Dewey also came close 
to finding the link between the two conceptions with his understanding 
of the communicative basis of everyday life. For Dewey, social life was 
transactional or interactional. He saw processes of communication and 
education as central to self-formation and development.  22  
 Dewey’s instrumentalism, however, was a limiting factor in his under-
standing of the social interactive perspective he developed. Instrumen-
talism cannot fully account for how interaction between participants is 
connected by understanding and thus institutes both reason and social 
order. Dewey’s conception is more like a theory of strategic action ori-
ented to accomplishment than it is of understanding. More to the point 
is G.H. Mead’s theory of the self. Also drawing on a Hegelian back-
ground, Mead integrates the perspectives of mutual understanding that 
are not clarified in Dewey’s instrumentalism. For him both action and 
understanding seem to have a dialogical structure. Not just interchange 
but the reciprocal constitution of the self and other is understood as 
coming into being though consensual forms of action. These consensual 
forms of social action and rationality are the modality of social life. 
 The idea that society is constituted through the medium of communi-
cative action in which we are bound by forms of mutual accountability 
and mutual understanding suggests a different approach to the concept 
of reason. As it was formulated by Jürgen Habermas, communicative 
reason is closely linked to practical social action. It is less the quest for 
a truth outside of or beyond human action than for a truth embedded 
in the social world. 
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 For Habermas, and we agree, the broadest conception of rationality 
is found in the notion of accountability. When asked, we can give an 
account of our actions to others. This form of rationality is reflexive. It 
requires an awareness on the participant’s part of her own relation to 
herself and others. This takes place in a context of a lifeworld shared 
with others. However, communicative reason refers specifically to 
those forms of reason that are concerned with the creation and renewal 
of a common intersubjective horizon of action. It is characterized by 
the binding force that comes about through agreement. Communica-
tive reason, like communicative action, is evident when we act with 
someone to reach an understanding about something in the world. 
This form of rationality is centred not on accomplishing things in the 
world but on making a common world in which we act together. It is 
not just agreement about something; rather, it is part of the constitution 
and renewal of the lifeworld. It forms the horizon within which we act. 
Seen in this way, communicative rationality is closely connected to self 
and social formation. We create and renew who we are as individuals, 
but also the social identity we share with others within this horizon 
of action. This is the horizon within which actions for which we can 
be held accountable take place. Here communicative power is the abil-
ity that participants acting in common possess to create these forms of 
common understanding. 
 It has become commonplace to view Habermas’s approach to ratio-
nality as essentially Kantian. This interpretation, however, is based 
mainly on a reading of his tendency to endorse a theory of justice that 
does in part have its roots in Kant. Critics see this as the rehabilita-
tion of the notion of the transcendental subject who stands outside of 
social life and makes universal judgments. The idea that there can be 
universal judgments does not necessarily rest on the assumptions of a 
disembodied subject, nor does a communicative theory have to assume 
a transcendental subject. We want to emphasize those elements of com-
municative theory that are more Hegelian in inspiration. The theory of 
communicative action that Habermas develops, and his theory of com-
municative reason, both begin from the participant’s perspective. He 
notes: “There is no pure reason that might don linguistic clothing only 
in the second place. Reason is by its very nature incarnated in contexts 
of communicative action and in structures of the lifeworld.”  23  
 Habermas’s communicative approach to reason is an interpretive 
one. It also draws from Hegel, contemporary hermeneutics, and other 
sources to create a theory of consensual social action. Our aim here is not 
so much to provide a complete history of these ideas and their develop-
ment in Habermas’s corpus – this has been done elsewhere – nor is it to 
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provide a theory that is completely faithful to his formulation; rather, 
it is to use his insights combined with others to outline a conception of 
communicative reason that is compatible with the project of a renewed 
democratic theory. In elaborating some elements of this project, we will 
see, however, that communicative reason is not just a theory of knowl-
edge but a moral/political and normative theory as well. 
 Interpretation and Critique 
 Charles Taylor’s approach can provide a first link in the connection of 
the developmental and interpretive approaches. Taylor sees humans 
as self-interpreting individuals, as language animals who inhabit a 
linguistic dimension. We make sense of our world and our place in 
it – who we are and what we want to be.  24  This interpretive element 
in human activity links Taylor’s account to the communicative model. 
We conduct our social life and carry out our individual aims through 
the medium of language, that is, through interpretation. We only have 
access to our world through interpretation. We understand both our 
own life and the lives of others through our reflexive understanding 
of self and other. Mental states are not just an individual possession. 
They are formed in interaction. Taylor, however, also seems con-
cerned with identity because of its role in developmental processes. 
We can form and realize plans and develop our own identity. This 
way of looking at the self-interpretation of subjects via communica-
tive action also entails a broader conception of self-determination. 
We are not simply choosers who decide among alternatives through 
attempts to satisfy preferences; our plans of action and choices take 
place against a backdrop defined by the quest for an understanding 
of who we are and who we want to be. This essentially ethical con-
ception of self-determination suggests that communicative reason in 
practice requires a practical moral sensibility as the basis of our sense 
of knowing the world. 
 Taylor’s conception indicates that we look at these processes of inter-
pretation from the participant’s perspective. Social actors are situated 
as engaged participants in the social world. They relate to others and to 
the natural world through a series of involvements and commitments. 
We only have access to the world through the perspective of a partici-
pant, never from the perspective of an outsider or observer. We only 
come to understand the world through our involvements in it and our 
normative orientation towards it. 
 Critical theories have always recognized this aspect of knowledge. In 
formulating his now classic distinction between traditional and critical 
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theory, Max Horkheimer followed Marx in his analysis of material 
life processes. As we have already noted, the knowledge of the theo-
rist is part of the lifeworld of participants and does not presuppose 
the “Cartesian” position of pure mind or outside observer. Facts are 
always embedded in these material life processes. Social actors as well 
as theorists are embedded as participants in these life processes. Thus 
the reflective knowledge developed by critical theory is meant to be 
practically effective. 
 Contemporary critical theory shares the orientation to the standpoint 
of a participant who has an equal standing with other members of soci-
ety. Horkheimer argued that while it takes society as its object, critical 
theory changes the relation of the “subject” to the “object” of inquiry. 
Critical theory maintains a reflexive relation to the social subjects who 
are at the same time the objects of the theory. Here Horkheimer is seek-
ing to overcome the dualities of the social sciences of his time that seek 
an “objective” perspective and that separate the supposedly detached 
theorist from the citizen. For critical theory the social inquirer is both 
analyst and member of society. The aim of theory is not to achieve sys-
tematic purity but to elucidate the social process in its interconnections 
and developmental tendencies. Like subjects who engage in practical 
activity, theory seeks a better life. It is “not just a research hypothesis 
which shows its value in the ongoing business of men; it is an essen-
tial element in the historical effort to create a world which satisfies the 
needs and powers of men.”  25  Thus critical theory is not concerned with 
the accumulation of knowledge by itself, but seeks to promote freedom 
from unnecessary restraint and thereby empower individuals to freely 
pursue self-development. 
 In order to place Horkheimer’s insights in a contemporary context we 
have to look more carefully at the way communicative action informs 
the interpretive elements of the participant’s perspective discussed 
above. A critical theory must begin from the participant’s perspective. 
Here social action is in the beginning practical. We can only come to 
know the world of ourselves and others by participating in it. We can-
not know this world objectively, so to speak, from the outside; we can 
only do so through these involvements and commitments. From the 
participant’s perspective we are always concerned with the world. Indi-
viduals interact with one another through processes of mutual under-
standing and structures of mutual recognition. These are not theoretical 
accomplishments; they are  practical . But they are not simply forms of 
knowing, they are also forms of acting. We constitute ourselves through 
processes of mutual understanding and at the same time regulate our 
actions. 
 Reason, Truth, and Power 71
 Communicative reason, then, does not begin from the permanent 
structures of an individual mind, as Kant might have said, but builds 
from the ground up. Our conceptions of the world are sedimented in 
a series of background understandings upon which we draw to ori-
ent our action. These understandings contain not just shared notions 
of truth or validity but also shared expectations about how we conduct 
our lives together. There is no hard and fast boundary between theoreti-
cal and practical reason; rather, theoretical reason is an element of  prac-
tical reason. Forms of reason, both theoretical and practical, intercon-
nect in the social world. The insights of the social and political sciences 
become embedded in everyday understanding and shape our practical 
expectations. 
 The mundane actions of individuals in the lifeworld demonstrate 
that our everyday actions are not detached from social solidarities and 
identifications. We are members of groups to which we have varying 
degrees of attachment and commitment. We share common sentiments 
and sensibilities with which we identify with others. It would be a 
mistake, however, to see these primarily as unreflective forms of what 
Max Weber called traditional social action. Traditional social action is 
largely unreflective – we are, for example, a member of a nation or a 
religion because we have always been so – whereas in modern societies 
even our identifications have become reflexive. They depend upon rea-
sons and accounts. Modern subjectivity incorporates elements of self-
criticism. We cannot simply identify with our country, right or wrong; 
we can only do so on the condition that our fellow countrymen are 
doing the right thing. We can become alienated from our families, our 
social institutions, or our nation while maintaining a certain attach-
ment to them, or we may become so alienated that our attachments are 
broken and sentiments are no longer shared. 
 The anchoring of communicative reason in the participant’s perspec-
tive also has a bearing on the relation between experts and citizens. 
Experts do not take a position that is above and outside the ordinary 
understanding of citizens. Rather, their understanding is on the same 
level as that of the participant. Experts may have more knowledge or 
a level of skill in a specific area, but their knowledge is not separate 
from that of the participants. Claims of expertise must be demonstrated 
through discussion. 
 The above considerations, then, concern in different ways the ques-
tion of what a reflexive reconsideration of our beliefs and their legiti-
macy requires. In one sense, discourse or deliberation is a special form 
of social action. While there is already a reflexive element to all social 
action that makes deliberation possible, discourse – be it formal or 
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informal in structure – requires a certain withdrawal from action. To 
examine our own commitments, we have to step back from them to a 
certain extent and take a reflexive approach. We may, as Habermas once 
said, suspend our immediate connection with action. Here, however, 
we only suspend specific commitments, beliefs, identities, norms, or 
sentiments and make them thematic, so to speak, in order to engage in a 
more elaborate form of (social) self-reflection. We do not, however, sus-
pend our role as committed beings who depend on interpretive access 
to the social world. This is the basic flaw in the first iteration of John 
Rawls’s theory of justice. We can never discover the basic features of 
human needs or goods from the standpoint of a disinterested observer 
who stands outside the fray. We can only do so from the standpoint 
of a reflective participant for whom problematic elements of the social 
world have become thematic. 
 For a theory of communicative action, knowledge has a discursive 
or dialogical character. This component, however, does not need to be 
interpreted as a purely formal or procedural one, although procedure 
can play a role. All social action is constituted though mutual account-
ability. We regulate our actions through being accountable to others and 
by renewing the expectations that others have of our actions. Of course, 
accountability entails the ongoing accomplishment of a social order that 
we constantly reproduce and renew through our actions. However, we 
do not simply reproduce that social order in a narrow or conforming 
manner. We renew our social world through interaction, and thus we 
can change it by challenging our accepted understandings. Dissonant 
experiences and unsettling accounts are always possible and can cause 
us collectively or singularly to create new accounts of action and create 
new norms and expectations for action. 
 Here the notions of accountability and expectations are linked. When 
called upon we can give an account of our actions to others, explaining 
why we took a certain course of action or made a certain judgment. 
Our implicit understanding can be made explicit. However, sometimes 
these accounts are not acceptable to us or to others. Our experiences 
may even contradict our own understandings. Things do not go as we 
expected, or people fail to act in the ways we anticipated. This can go 
all the way from someone betraying us in an interaction to a social or 
political choice we see as risky or wrong-headed. What is important to 
remember in these processes is that while there can be challenges to the 
nature of the world, to what things are and how they work in the world 
we have in common, there can also be challenges to our own identity – 
who we are and what we believe. In the most extreme cases, dissonant 
experiences can create a sense of phenomenological rupture akin to a 
 Reason, Truth, and Power 73
natural or social disaster in which our expectations are shattered and 
our taken-for-granted reality is thrown into disarray. These crises in 
mutual accountability could under certain conditions bring about iden-
tity crises, for what we reproduce through interaction is not just the 
outside world but also our sense of ourselves. In these situations, we 
require processes of learning, repair, and reconstruction. We have to 
find new norms and beliefs and new kinds of mutual expectations to 
make sense of the situation we have encountered. Because our lifeworld 
is structured around these forms of accountability, what we learn or fail 
to learn in these situations takes a discursive form. 
 Our proposal here is that the interpretive and communicative 
approach to social theory developed through the conception of the par-
ticipant’s perspective is the best one for reconstructing the foundations 
of a critical theory. It links the practical character of action to a reflexive 
and critical understanding of the world. 
 As noted earlier, many contemporary critical theorists view Haber-
mas’s account of communicative reason as primarily a Kantian project, 
especially as it relates to ethics and his attempt to link his theory of 
justice to Kantian themes. Thomas McCarthy, for example, sees Haber-
mas’s theory as continuous with Kant’s project: “Habermas’ idea of a 
‘discourse ethics’ can be viewed as a reconstruction of Kant’s idea of 
practical reason in terms of communicative reason. Roughly speaking, 
it involves a procedural reformulation of the Categorical Imperative: 
rather than ascribing to others as valid those maxims I can will to be 
universal laws, I must submit them to others for purposes of discur-
sively testing their claim to universal validity.”  26  
 At the same time, McCarthy in an extended comparison of Habermas 
and Rawls recognizes that in opposition to Rawls, Habermas develops 
his theory from the standpoint of the participant and not either the tran-
scendental subject or the impersonal observer. In addition, Habermas 
considers elements of “public reason” to include many informal pro-
cesses and public spheres that are not in the strict sense formal. 
 Looked at from the standpoint we develop in this work, these ele-
ments of the participant’s perspective refer to the ongoing processes 
of maintaining, renewing, and transforming social life in the process 
of acting. This conception of the social world seems to us more like 
that of Hegel and later German idealism, which stressed the histori-
cal character of understanding. This way of reading the lifeworld is 
certainly not alien to Habermas, who at times interprets his own cor-
pus through a Hegelian lens. For example, in his essay “Morality and 
Ethical Life,”  27  Habermas sees the complementarity of an ethic of care 
and a Kantian theory of justice; and in a later essay, “From Kant to 
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Hegel and Back Again,”  28  Habermas stresses the Hegelian elements 
in his work. 
 The major problem in approaching Habermas’s theory is the status of 
what he calls the moral point of view. He argues that theories of justice 
must remain neutral about theories of the good. When we deliberate 
about these questions, he argues, we must not and cannot consider any 
particular conception of the good. However, is this strict separation of 
the good and the right consistent with the other considerations that 
derive from the participant’s perspective? 
 The essay on morality and ethical life offers one of Habermas’s most 
sustained efforts to find the linkage between the lifeworld and moral-
ity. Here he sees participants in the lifeworld as ethically connected 
through concern and care. Because we are dependent on one another 
and vulnerable to harm, we are concerned not just about our own life 
but the lives of others. We only develop as individuals through social-
ization, yet every act of individuation through socialization makes our 
own identity more densely interwoven in social networks. A complex 
identity while strong in one sense is also dependent on a series of social – 
we might even say developmental – conditions. 
 While an ethic of care stresses the vulnerability involved in ethical 
life, Habermas sees the element of morality as based in the protection 
of individuality. It elevates respect for the integrity of personhood to a 
central place. Both identity and self-determination need moral consid-
eration and protection. 
 Habermas believes that Hegel’s thought is central here because his 
notion of  Sittlichkeit is not simply a return to an Aristotelian position, 
it is a modernist notion of situated moral actors. In Habermas’s view 
Hegel rejects the one-sidedness of both individualist notions, which 
issue in an abstract universalism, and what he sees as the concrete par-
ticularism of the Aristotelian tradition. The element of care and concern 
for others is as universal feature of ethical life as the rights and duties 
that protect the integrity of subjects. Hegel’s notion of intersubjectivity 
as developed in his early writings is rooted not in a particular ethos but 
in the general characteristics of all social action. For Hegel, then, we 
cannot neglect either duty or care. 
 Habermas thinks, however, that some of Hegel’s criticisms of Kant’s 
formalism either are misguided or do not apply to a discourse ethic 
based in the situation of participants in the lifeworld.  29  A communica-
tive theory relies neither on the individual subject engaged in isolated 
self-reflection nor on Kant’s conception of the moral will. The major 
problem in Habermas’s reformulation is the idea that we can separate 
in a strict sense the right and the good, agent-neutral and agent-relative 
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considerations, in our treatment of moral theory, and that we can there-
fore be noncommittal with respect to a theory of the good. Can we dis-
count all conceptions of the good life when considering questions of 
justice while still maintaining our character as situated participants? 
 Habermas sees the development of knowledge in a post-metaphysical 
framework as consistent with a reading of Hegel that is largely what 
he calls “deflationary.” When confronted with the conflicting perspec-
tives of participants we are faced not simply with differing interests but 
also with differing understanding of how things are. What Hegel sees 
as the “struggle for recognition” in his Jena work and in the master–
slave dialectic can be understood as steps in the formation of a wider 
intersubjectivity and a more comprehensive standpoint. He sees this as 
the transition from consciousness to self-consciousness – that is, to our 
place in a world shared by others. Self-consciousness requires that we 
differentiate our lives from those of others with whom we share a com-
mon world and that we find our own identity. When faced with con-
flicting perspectives we must find a third perspective – a mediation, if 
you will – in which we can gain a richer understanding of the situation 
and greater cognitive resources, on pain of falling into violent conflict. 
Put in more contemporary terms, we seek a higher-level intersubjectiv-
ity. There are no objective or final perspectives available to participants, 
simply better or more comprehensive ones. 
 We could view Habermas’s attempt to formulate a revised moral 
point of view as an attempt to follow this process and to propose that 
conflicts over the various forms of the good life can only be resolved 
within a higher-level moral intersubjectivity. Whether this formulation 
can fully resolve the problems to which his position gives rise is a ques-
tion we will take up in later chapters. 
 Critical Inquiry and the Participant’s Perspective 
 Inquirers and participants, as we noted, are on the same level. The 
inquirer has access to the social world of others only in her role as a 
fellow participant in that world. The participant’s perspective is also a 
performative one. We have a mental representation of the world, and 
moreover, we manifest our understanding through forms of interaction 
that have binding force. For example, a promise is not just a belief; it is 
performed in the act of making it. This performance is also reflective. 
We are knowledgeable agents who know what we do while doing it. 
 The inquirer is also a participant, one whose own analyses are not 
detached from contexts of actions. To understand the meanings that 
others give to their actions, she must be able to evaluate those actions. 
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This can mean the ability to reconstruct the contexts of actions or the 
background conditions under which they make sense, as well as the 
validity of those actions. To understand them the inquirer must be able 
to evaluate them. This process is similar to the one that characterizes 
the stance of ordinary participants in interaction. When we interact 
with others, we assume that we share a common world in which those 
others are being sincere and telling the truth about their beliefs and 
norms. When their actions do not make sense, we ask them to account 
for their actions, to show why they think what they say is true or why 
their norms are valid. For example, the inquirer cannot understand the 
participant’s judgment that authority is legitimate without ascertaining 
whether the participant believes this for good reasons or whether she 
is merely accepting that legitimacy out of habit and conformity – or is 
adopting an ironic and therefore critical stance toward authority. The 
participant may also accept something for the wrong reasons or misun-
derstand some of the practices she is participating in, or perhaps under-
stand them in a non-standard way. Otherwise the inquirer cannot really 
make sense of the lifeworld he is examining. This capacity is identical to 
that of the participant, who can judge the validity and sincerity of other 
participants through interaction and discussion. Understanding others 
means being able to grasp the stance they take towards the world. 
 A communicative theory of reason, then, sees reason as an elaboration 
of the everyday competencies involved in processes of mutual account-
ability. It thematizes and refines the analysis of the features of reflection 
that we employ in such accountability. It does not, then, seek a source of 
reason that transcends our own standpoint. Reason is internal to under-
standing. Discourses in which we reflect on our own understanding 
can never be completely detached from our involved and engaged life-
world activity. We can if we choose participate in an informal dialogue, 
or even a formal discussion of these beliefs and norms. Embedded in 
our practical activity are those senses of what is true or right that we 
use to orient our actions. These are practically oriented evaluations that 
both make sense of our lives and allow us to carry out our activities in 
common. However, participants can also criticize and transcend con-
texts of action and create new norms or forms of understanding. 
 The formal characteristics of communicative reason are derived in 
important respects from the features of the modernist notion of self-
determination that we have already discussed. We can assume that sub-
jects who take up the world are capable of independent evaluation of 
standards of truth and validity and can make their own assessments. 
Of course, these assessments are never unbounded or pure – reason is 
both pure and impure at the same time – and we can never strip reason 
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of all external impediments. Nor is it possible to remove reason from 
our interests and commitments, for we only know the world though 
our involvement in it. This said, the notion of self-determination refers 
to the capacity of situated actors to take up the world through their 
own understanding and make it their own, to accept it or transform it, 
and to forge their own identities and plans within that world. This ethi-
cal understanding of reason and discourse can help us understand the 
more formal elements of communicative rationality. 
 For a subject to be self-determining, her judgments have to be car-
ried out under conditions that enhance or at least exhibit freedom in 
the processes of reflection. Deliberations cannot be coerced or subject to 
undue pressure. These conditions hold for all participants, who must 
be treated equally and have an equal opportunity to contribute to dis-
cussion. The conditions represent formalizations of the intuition that 
a legitimate agreement should result from a fair process in which the 
freedom to consent is guaranteed. 
 Of course, these conditions rarely apply perfectly, although they can 
be approximated in formal debates. A bigger problem comes into play 
when we consider the actual abilities of some individuals to engage in 
discussion. Thus, in addition to the conditions of self-determination, 
we also need to stipulate conditions of self-realization. There also needs 
to be consideration of the conditions under which deliberations take 
place. These might include material conditions, or an educational set-
ting. They are not meant to exclude participants from discussion but to 
ensure they have the resources to participate equally. This does raise 
questions concerning the fairness of large-scale deliberations on social 
and political issues: Would a political decision be fair under conditions 
of gross inequality, severe educational stratification, or material need? 
 At times Habermas seems to think that large-scale deliberative pro-
cesses such as a democratically elected parliament or congress come 
close to his conception of fair deliberations. In some cases, they may do 
this. But if we look, for example, at the United States, with its gerryman-
dered electoral districts, closed parties, voter suppression, and “dark 
money” financing of political campaigns, it is difficult to see how these 
bodies reflect communicative freedom. A good deal of fundamental 
political and social reform would be required to make the United States 
and similar jurisdictions effective locations for the exercise of popular 
sovereignty or ideal deliberative processes. 
 Still, we think the basic intuition behind communicative rationality 
has force. We can only understand truth and validity as tied to com-
municative processes in which subjects come to agreement about some-
thing in the world. 
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 The social inquirer too must engage in this evaluation in order to 
understand the groups she is studying. Whether as a member of a soci-
ety examining a set of practices or a virtual participant in that society, 
the inquirer who seeks social scientific understanding cannot avoid 
evaluation. Like the participant, the inquirer can only understand oth-
ers when she can ask questions about the misunderstanding those indi-
viduals have. 
 Since interpreters are on the same level as participants, inquiry is bet-
ter seen as a dialogue between the two rather than as a form of objec-
tive knowledge. The inquirer must evaluate the practices of members 
of a society; by the same token, those participants have the capacity to 
evaluate inquirers. For the critical theorist this yields a notion of mutual 
critique, which we discuss below. 
 Social critique grows out of the ordinary capacities of individuals 
and inquirers. Everyday action is itself reflexive. We are aware of what 
we are doing in the course of doing it. Because interaction is intersub-
jective, we can only understand our own actions in the context of our 
reflexive understanding of self and other. We are reflexively aware of 
how our meaningful actions and statements are grasped by others. As 
a result, we carry out these actions with what Anthony Giddens calls 
forms of reflexive monitoring. 
 Social scientific theories are themselves practical. They “constitute 
moral interventions in the social life whose conditions they seek to clar-
ify.”  30  This insight takes two different directions. First, since the social 
researcher is always a participant who takes a performative attitude 
towards communication, the results of inquiry have a practical dimen-
sion that affects not only the knowledge of the researcher but also her 
understanding of herself and her world. Second, the results of research 
are taken up into the lifeworlds of participants and become part of their 
everyday knowledge, thus changing their understanding of them-
selves. In both cases, participants have a reflexive relation to forms of 
knowledge. They are aware of what they do while doing it and engage 
in ongoing evaluation of their plans and projects and the norms they 
use to evaluate them. 
 The power of social critique grows out of this reflexive capacity, which 
is inherent in ordinary interaction. When dissonant experiences upset 
our normal expectations, we can reflect on these dissonances. We need 
to make sense of them in order to restore our common sense of what is 
going on and to regain or even reconsider who we are. Of course, not 
all situations of dissonance result in social critique. Some may be easily 
resolved or be attributed to personal failures, natural forces beyond our 
control, or even simple misunderstanding. Only when we interpret our 
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troubles as social problems do we reflect on whether social processes are 
the basis of the dissonances we experience personally. This reflection, 
however, takes place  within the participant’s perspective, not outside of 
it. To the extent that the critic seeks to make sense of these social prob-
lems, she is engaged in a cooperative process with participants who 
themselves need to make sense of their troubles. For instance, when the 
critic and the participant seek to understand these problems by exam-
ining their history, they attempt to grasp those common understand-
ings and identities that have arisen. Histories are always internal to 
the understanding of the participants. Participants then formulate diag-
noses that may identify structural problems or question institutional 
norms and practices. But these structural and institutional factors, too, 
require participants’ perspectives. Such perspectives are reflexive, how-
ever, in that they require us not just to re-examine our understanding 
of social issues but to re-evaluate them and seek alternatives. Thus, to 
the extent that theorists engage in social critique they offer interpreta-
tions that participants must accept as valid, and these too are subject to 
criticism. They have no objective validity separate from these processes 
of mutual understanding. In fact, most social critique is an ongoing dia-
logue between the insights and experience of participants and those of 
inquirers. 
 Interpretation and Deliberative Democracy 
 Communicative and interpretive conceptions of reason and action have 
been important factors in the rise of what has been called deliberative 
democracy. Many commentators have seen Habermas’s theory of com-
munication as the basis for deliberative democratic thinking. Delibera-
tive or discursive democracy stresses the ways in which processes of 
accountability are central to democratic decision-making. Theories of 
deliberative democracy vary widely, however, in their purpose and 
structure as well as in their use of notions of deliberation. Deliberation 
is often seen as justifying liberal democracy and majority rule. In one 
frequently cited formulation by Amy Gutman and Dennis Thompson, 
deliberative democracy is defined as reason-giving, as public and acces-
sible to all, and as aimed at producing a result that is binding on all and 
that is dynamic – that is, that recognizes that deliberation is an ongoing 
process. It can succeed or fail in any circumstance and be reopened for 
future consideration.  31  In their own words, “combining these four char-
acteristics, we can define deliberative democracy as a form of govern-
ment in which free and equal citizens (and their representatives), justify 
decisions in a process in which they give one another reasons that are 
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mutually acceptable and generally accessible, with the aim of reaching 
conclusions that are binding in the present on all citizens but open to 
challenge in the future.”  32  
 Seen in this way, deliberative democracy is compatible with notions of 
the participant’s perspective. It draws upon the communicative power 
of participants to come to an agreement over matters of common con-
cern. But it adds formal constraints to deliberations – constraints that 
are meant to ensure a fair procedure. We should, however, pay attention 
as well to the more informal procedures of everyday deliberation. 
 Some versions of democratic theory are more limited than the one 
provided by Gutman and Thompson. These tend to focus almost exclu-
sively on outcomes. For example, in a somewhat different concept of 
deliberation, James Johnson and Jack Knight focus solely on outcomes 
as a measure of democracy. They view consensus from an external per-
spective, as a result, not a process.  33  From this primarily instrumentalist 
position, democracy is largely useful for what it does and not for its for-
mative powers. Deliberative democrats who take this perspective argue 
that democratic deliberation could produce the best result by motivat-
ing participants to change their preferences through discussion and in 
the process create the most rational outcome. 
 An internal approach to democratic theory, however, would stress 
the self-formative power of democracy. In the tradition going back to 
Aristotle, participation in politics is central to human flourishing. Par-
ticipation fosters processes of self-formation that are important for the 
development and exercise of fundamental human capacities. It is a cen-
tral element of self-determination. It is not just an effect – it is crucial to 
the kind of person we want to be. To the extent that discourse theory 
takes up the demands of communicative reason as laid out by Haber-
mas, it must draw largely on this second understanding. This has impli-
cations for a theory of deliberative democracy that we will take up in 
later chapters. 
 Clearly, Habermas’s version is focused less on outcomes than on 
ideas of popular sovereignty. The political sphere thus cannot be 
identified with a concatenation of interests or viewed as an instru-
ment for an end that is strategically deployed but is itself a mode of 
communicative action. This will, as we note in later chapters, distin-
guish it from the agonistic view of politics as an intractable conflict 
or contestation. 
 But differing conceptions of the nature of the political sphere, the 
character of will-formation, and the role of interests raises the question 
of power and how it relates to communicative reason and action. In the 
next section of this chapter, we turn our attention to questions of power. 
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 Rethinking Power: Some Discourse-Theoretical Considerations 
 Power is a central issue for social and political theory. Critical theorists 
analyse the conditions of domination, oppression, and disrespect that 
characterize contemporary society. They see their work as integral to 
any movements to change present-day society. Power, though, cannot 
be understood as an objective force that can be analysed independently 
of participants. Since the social world is one in which authority and 
influence are integral to social life, the theorist, like the participant, 
must evaluate these relations not just in terms of their impact, or as an 
external observer, but also in terms of their normative rightness and 
justifications. Critical theory seeks to identify those relations in which 
power limits the possibilities for freedom or can be used to develop 
greater freedom. 
 Critical theorists must also look at domination and oppression from 
the perspective of the social and intra-psychic processes that institute 
domination and make individuals prone to accept and even consent 
to it. Critical theories seek to show how domination works and how 
it maintains its hold over individuals. Most applications of power in 
advanced societies are subtle and often invisible. Domination is the 
smooth surface of a well-functioning social order. Because of its sub-
tle yet pervasive nature, questions of power and domination are not 
straightforward. That is why they have become contested terrain in 
recent theory. 
 Classical liberal theories drawn from Thomas Hobbes and John Locke 
often have difficulties with questions of domination. They hold that 
individual interests and preferences are beyond doubt or challenge. 
Typically, they argue that critics who claim that we do not know our 
own (real) interests assume an objective and authoritarian standpoint.  34  
However, this argument mistakes both the nature of the claim and the 
nature of self-understanding. It supposes first that subjects know their 
own interests and needs transparently and immediately. It implicitly 
employs a subject-centred notion of understanding in which inner 
nature is directly known by an individual consciousness. However, even 
self-understanding is interpretive. We do not understand our needs 
or interests immediately, but only through language and interaction. 
Thus, knowing ourselves, and even our innermost nature, requires self-
interpretation. Needs require need interpretations. We have no choice 
but to use vocabulary and communicative resources that are current in 
our society and in the intersubjective context in which interpretation 
takes place. Even on a basic level we could, as Charles Taylor pointed 
out some time ago, misinterpret our own needs. It is possible to “second 
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guess” an agent by pointing out internalized impediments or barriers 
to the articulation and pursuit of one’s freely and rationally chosen pur-
poses, and so foster conditions for self-development.  35  This problem is 
more complex when relations of power create not just impediments to 
interpretation but also internal limits to self-interpretive abilities. In the 
circumstances, processes of mutual accountability are restricted. 
 One influential interpretation of power views it as fundamentally 
purposive or strategic. When freedom is viewed in purposive terms 
as the unimpeded ability to pursue and achieve goals, then power is 
seen as the capacity to achieve goals or to prevent someone else (or 
some other group) from achieving  their goals. Max Weber starts from a 
purposive view when he defines power (here in the sense of domina-
tion) as “the  probability that one actor in a social relationship will be in 
a position to carry out his will despite resistance, regardless of the basis 
on which this probability rests.”  36  
 Weber’s formulation is explicitly social. Power, for him, required the 
mutual influence of one person or group over another. This formulation 
has been applied and modified by others to explain how social power is 
employed to both facilitate and impede the will of social actors. Weber 
often saw politics in strategic terms, as the struggle for power and influ-
ence on the national or world stage; however, he also saw it as the cre-
ation of community through legitimacy. The latter feature was often lost 
in later discussions. 
 Viewed in this way, power is largely strategic. Strategic action can 
be distinguished from communicative action because in contrast to 
communication, it seeks to bring about an effect, not to bring about 
understanding. Strategic action can be defined as the notion that people 
can be influenced to act through various means – means that run the 
gamut from reward, to suggestion or persuasion, to fear and coercion 
and threat of punishment. Strategic action is always social action. It is 
concerned with the actions of others and by nature is not consensual. In 
strategic action we do not view the other person as a partner in a dialog-
ical or consensual social world, but as one to whom we react. Although 
it draws on our capacities as meaningful social actors embedded in 
interaction, strategic action bypasses structures of mutual accountabil-
ity. It is concerned less with the normative justification of courses of 
action than with success in achieving desired effects. Strategic power, 
then, is simply the power to influence the other to act without seeking 
agreement over the validity of an action. 
 Weber’s notion of power was employed by American pluralists in the 
1950s in the service of a behaviouralist methodology that was alien to 
Weber’s interpretive methodological outlook. For Robert Dahl, power 
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is the capacity to get someone to do something they would not other-
wise do.  37  In Dahl’s methodological outlook it is an instrument to trig-
ger certain forms of behaviour, and not simply a device for achieving 
goals. This behaviouralist conception, which Dahl shares with David 
Easton, Nelson Polsby, and others, interprets power using a physicalist 
model of force. Power is conceived as a causal relation.  38  For Herbert 
Simon the fact that A has power over B means that A’s behaviour causes 
B’s behaviour. Of course, such approaches, which equate human action 
with physics, have problems explaining intentionality. The behavioural 
theorists viewed power as an empirical property that could be observed 
in specific acts. They used behavioural theory ideologically to reinforce 
a liberal view of democracy in which power was evenly distributed 
throughout a well-functioning democratic system with civil rights and 
freedoms for all. Thus, Dahl argued that power in the United States 
was polycentric and essentially plural. The social power of groups is 
transmitted through political parties and elections into the legislative 
and administrative processes. According to pluralists, there were many 
social groups that had a roughly equal ability to get their aims car-
ried out despite differences in income and social status. Inequalities in 
power were viewed as either non-existent or insignificant. 
 Methodological and political criticisms were merged in the behav-
ioural critique. Dahl criticized power elite theorists such as C. Wright 
Mills and community power theorists such as Floyd Hunter for their 
use of subjective methods, such as reputational analysis and social 
cohesion. Pluralists attempted to eliminate those elements of power 
that involve domination or oppression by reducing power to empiri-
cally observable decisions. 
 Ironically, pluralist theory suffers from serious empirical and meth-
odological problems of its own. It was hard to sustain the assertion of 
a well-functioning pluralist democracy against the elite theorists, given 
the apparent inequalities in economic and political power in the United 
States.  39  William Domhoff’s re-examination of Dahl’s work on New 
Haven showed flaws in Dahl’s approach and yielded a picture closer to 
that of the elite model.  40  For the purposes of this discussion, the meth-
odological flaws are more important. The idea that power  over others 
or power  with others can be grasped from the standpoint of a detached 
or outside observer is problematic. Studying decisions already involves 
the observer in the assessment of reasons employed in deliberation that 
can only understood from a participant’s perspective. It is never simply 
the observation of an “outcome.” Furthermore, the interpretive analy-
ses of power resorted to by community theorists as well as by Mills 
illustrates how power has a symbolic dimension. Besides being used 
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to manipulate others, it establishes unequal access to resources and 
can shape sensibilities; it also establishes unequal access to positions of 
authority that can affect decisions. Interpretative theory recognizes that 
we act with one another in relations of mutual accountability. Thus we 
must look at the reasons participants use power, or fail to use it, as well 
as the accounts they give, in order to understand how they interpret 
power. Power moves along a continuum from obedience to conformity 
to command to consent, even if such consent is coerced. It cannot sim-
ply be a physical motion or physical state. 
 It is in fact impossible to treat power simply as a physical relation. 
We only know if A employs power in getting B to carry out an action 
when we know what A intended and what B meant by her actions. If A 
wants B to consent to an order of an authority, she may try to convince, 
influence, persuade, or even coerce B to act. Each of these actions can 
be grasped only from the perspective of the participant who acts in 
the world. They cannot be observed in the same way one observes a 
physical process. If, for example, B conforms to a norm or carries out an 
action that has the desired result for A, it cannot be considered an exam-
ple of power in the behaviouralist schema if B carries out the action or 
conforms to a norm for reasons other than A’s influence. Once again, 
we cannot tell if A exerts power over B unless as participants we have 
access to the reasons for B’s conforming actions. Even in limiting cases 
of force, whereby A issues a threat to B that B will be subject to sanctions 
or punishment if B does not obey, B’s act will still be intentional. 
 Critics of behaviouralist theory such as Peter Bacharach and Mor-
ton Baratz identified this problem. They introduced a second dimen-
sion of power that did not cast it in the mould of observable effects of 
power. Instead they examined what they called non-decisions.  41  Power 
is exerted 
 when A participates in the making of decisions that affect B … But power 
is also exercised when A devotes his energies to creating or reinforcing 
social and political values and institutional practices that limit the scope 
of the political process to public consideration of only those issues which 
are comparatively innocuous to A. To the extent that A succeeds in doing 
this, B is prevented, for all practical purposes, from bringing to the fore 
any issues that might in their resolution be seriously detrimental to A’s set 
of preferences.  42  
 In any decision-making process, not all issues may be raised for dis-
cussion. The control of agendas works inconspicuously to exclude top-
ics and may involve rhetorical strategies to limit discussion. Perhaps 
 Reason, Truth, and Power 85
one does not raise an issue during a deliberation if one knows that that 
issue will not be considered. Thus, those who hold positions of author-
ity in a political or social organization may be able to set the agenda 
or block certain groups or ideas from the discussion by preventing 
questions from being raised so that decisions on some issues are never 
made. Failing to allow a question is a form of suppression or exclusion. 
Bacharach and Baratz borrow the term “mobilization of bias” from E.E. 
Schattschneider to indicate the ways organizations employ prejudg-
ments that permit some issues to be articulated while others are left 
out.  43  
 At times, however, Bachrach and Baratz accept the empiricist notion 
of “observation” as a suitable criterion for inquiry and simply want 
to include non-decisions as material for observations and subsequent 
empirical judgments that can be validated according to the canons of 
empirical social science. However, within the framework that Bachrach 
and Baratz adopt, non-decisions can be identified only where there are 
“observable” grievances that cannot be expressed in deliberation. This 
framework is unable to accommodate situations in which grievances 
cannot be articulated at all.  44  However, once we consider decision or 
deliberation, we are already on the terrain of interpretation. We under-
stand the types of reasons given in deliberation or those elements of a 
situation where power is at stake that have been excluded from consid-
eration. We are concerned with mutual accounts that can be given or 
that are not allowed. So to adequately conceptualize the problem we 
need a model of deliberation or discourse within an interpretive frame-
work rather than the empirical language of observation. 
 The second face of power conceived as non-decision-making is 
encountered in works such as Matthew Crenson’s  Unpolitics of Air 
Pollution (1972)  45  and John Gaventa’s  Power and Powerlessness (1982).  46  
Gaventa’s work especially raised the question of power as domination: 
he examined why miners in an Appalachian town acquiesced to author-
ity that seemed so obviously to run counter to their own interests. In 
Gaventa’s view, powerlessness and acquiescence stem from the sense 
that nothing can be done, as well as from exclusion from public partici-
pation. In the latter case, knowledge of political processes is restricted, 
which generates ineffectiveness and leads to political apathy. The domi-
nated tend to adopt the rationales found in the dominant discourse. 
 Gaventa comes close to taking an interpretive position when he cites 
the phenomenological sociology of Peter Berger and Thomas Luck-
mann as illustrating how meaning is socially produced – although, in 
his view, they do not take the effects of power into account. Like others, 
he views power in terms of its directly observable as well as indirectly 
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accessible effects, when he should be looking at discursive accounts and 
self-formative processes. 
 We would do better to view formulations of the second dimension 
of power as positing ways that power works to limit the communi-
cative processes though which we seek mutual understanding. For 
example, regarding the ability to set the agenda of public discussion, 
actors employ strategic means to limit access to discursive forms so that 
certain individuals either cannot participate or have limited opportuni-
ties to do so. Power is also exerted when certain kinds of accounts are 
excluded from discourses. This is the case, for example, when socialism 
is treated as if it were an unrealistic or morally repugnant alternative 
independently of any specific rationale. Public discussion can also be 
characterized by censorship or repression when certain topics or themes 
are excluded. In other cases, individuals lack access to resources, both 
material and symbolic, to formulate options or develop capacities. 
 In each of these cases, influence, persuasion, coercion, or even threats 
may be applied strategically to shape communicative practices. If pow-
erful interests threaten to pull advertising from a media outlet, or take a 
stand in favour of global warming and thereby shape discussion, or hire 
their own researchers to generate fake studies and testimonies, these 
dampen the possibility of open communicative action. In such cases, 
those exercising power are more interested in creating an effect than 
in mounting a reasonable agreement. When the results of such activi-
ties become deeply embedded in the lifeworld, they can form the back-
ground assumptions of individual actors and thereby define the situa-
tions that individuals share, on the basis of which an issue can become 
a topic for discussion or action. In this way the “common sense” of a 
society comes to be determined. 
 Steven Lukes developed a third dimension of power to show how 
individuals or groups like Gaventa’s Appalachian miners could act in 
opposition to their own interests.  47  Lukes at first saw his position in 
terms similar to those of Marx. Individuals had a false consciousness 
of their own interests, and with the proper theory they could come to 
identify their real interests. His notion of objective interests was rooted 
in a counterfactual intuition: What would B do under ideal democratic 
conditions if A did not interfere? When interpreted in its strongest 
terms, this seems to imply a theory of objective interests accessible to 
the theorist but not to the participant. Here he comes close to Georg 
Lukács’s idea of an imputed consciousness. Yet these objective possi-
bilities remain observational. 
 Lukes has subsequently amended this formulation to address struc-
tural power. He argues that individuals may be constrained by their 
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institutional roles. Jeffery Isaac takes up this idea to suggest that power 
is not exerted when A constrains B, but rather when each takes their 
assigned institutional roles. The institution exerts causal power on 
the individual. In taking this position he employs Anthony Giddens’s 
notion of structuration. As he notes, however, social institutions and 
their roles and rules exist only in and through individuals and their 
relations. They are reproduced though the activity of social subjects. 
While they may well contain constraints, they are still reproduced by 
the mutual accountability of participants. Thus, in order to identify 
these constraints we have to look at the reasons they employ in acting, 
the ways they interpret their own needs, and the attitude they assume 
towards the possibilities they find in the world. The problem with any 
notion of objective needs is not that individuals can misinterpret their 
own needs; rather, it is the notion that objective needs could be identi-
fied by means of a structural analysis alone. We need an interpretive 
social theory to construct these accounts. More specifically, the prob-
lem with the objectivist view that Lukes employs is not that we can 
be wrong about our needs, but that he operates with a decidedly lim-
ited view of our interpretive capacities. The analyst cannot judge needs 
from a purely external standpoint any more than the behaviouralist can. 
Thus we need to engage participants’ reflexive capacity to understand 
pathologies as manifested in their own everyday experience. The dis-
course about needs is a dialogical one. Any need interpretations pro-
vided by the theorist must be accepted as valid by participants. 
 Power inevitably has a symbolic dimension. Pierre Bourdieu has 
contributed significantly to our understanding of the symbolic aspects 
of power. He begins from questions of unequal access to linguistic 
resources. In social settings, he notes, some can speak with more author-
ity than others based on their positions and their mastery of language. 
He focuses on the symbolic power involved in the right to speak or the 
right to be recognized as authoritative in a contested field. He criticizes 
not only Saussurian linguistics but also theories such as those of Noam 
Chomsky and to some extent Jürgen Habermas, whom he sees as taking 
an impersonal approach to communicative competence. 
 Language is more than an instrument of communication or even 
knowledge. It is also an instrument of power. One seeks not only to be 
understood but also to be believed, obeyed, respected, distinguished, 
where the complete definition of competence involves the right to speak – 
that is, the right to the legitimate language, namely, the language of 
authority. Competence implies the power to impose recognition.  48  
 Bourdieu sees society as a  habitus or a lifeworld in which action in 
embedded. A  habitus is a “system of durable, transposable dispositions, 
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structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, 
that is, as principles which generate and organize practices and repre-
sentations … without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an 
express mastery of the operations.”  49  The social lifeworld is a symbolic 
order that is not owned or controlled by anyone. It holds sensibilities 
and dispositions that are necessary in order to exert power or be subject 
to power. Power is exerted not just when A gets B to do something but 
when A can establish her claims as authoritative and B recognizes those 
claims as authoritative. 
 Much as with interpretive social theoretical conceptions of the life-
world, Bourdieu thus sees social action as taking place against a back-
ground of shared understandings and practices. In a  habitus , individu-
als learn certain dispositions and authority relationships that are the 
result either of socialization or of institutional structure. Bourdieu, fol-
lowing Aristotelian usage, calls this  doxa , or common sense. 
 If you are in an educational setting, Bourdieu argues, you are in an 
authority relationship in which the teacher is recognized as the author-
ity. Consequently, social institutions can support forms of power 
through a disposition that leads one to accept forms of authority. The 
region of the lifeworld that Bourdieu calls a field also requires forms of 
know-how that allow access and power. To participate in politics effec-
tively, according to this view, one must know how to play the political 
game. In other cases, knowledge of rules and norms is a condition of 
being accepted as a legitimate participant. 
 Here Bourdieu’s work bears comparison with Giddens’s conception 
of structuration. Both theorists share a concern with the interdepen-
dence of agency and structure. Agents are in part constitutive of struc-
ture, which they reproduce through their own actions. Structures for 
Giddens involve a recursive form of action in which institutions create 
roles and rules that persist through time and across social space. They 
shape expectations for interaction that are relatively stable. In one sense 
these exist  above individual actions. Even so, they can only be repro-
duced and renewed through the actions of individuals. We can look at 
the ways these rules and roles embed asymmetries and inequalities in 
resources and access, besides fostering forms of deference. More so than 
Bourdieu, however, Giddens stresses the reflexive quality of action and 
thus the possibility for transformation. 
 Bourdieu often views society more in strategic terms. He uses the 
model of a market exchange as the template for symbolic interaction. 
Here cultural capital with its overtones of Marxian analysis is meant to 
convey the way in which such capital functions as a resource that can be 
employed to establish power through facility with language, familiarity 
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with art and high culture, and educational credentials that define sta-
tus. These resources are symbolic. Symbolic capital is a “credit”; it is the 
power granted to those who have obtained sufficient recognition and 
are in a position to impose recognition on others.  50  
 Here symbolic power is the ability to employ meaning to asymmetri-
cally establish a dominant relationship. Power is transformed primarily 
from the threat of physical violence and harm to symbolic forms of dom-
ination. Inequalities are maintained and enforced though rankings and 
hierarchies embedded in symbolic structure. These provide resources 
in Bourdieu’s terms that can be used to gain influence and authority. 
In general, these are ways of establishing distinction and social status. 
Symbolic power is primarily concerned with status and prestige. 
 The problem with Bourdieu’s works stems from his separation of 
understanding and authority, strategic and communicative power. 
Authority becomes more a matter of staging, or a presentation of the 
self in Erving Goffman’s sense of the term. Authority is simply the 
power to be taken seriously: one’s claims trump those of others with-
out regard to their truth. In Bourdieu’s sense here, authority becomes 
more like the power to influence others rather than a quest to reach an 
agreement with them. 
 However, we can make a clear distinction between forms of author-
ity that are legitimate or authorized and those that are illegitimate or 
unjust. This is not simply about belief or power; it also has to do with 
power’s exclusive authority to be recognized. This involves under-
standing that has binding force for individuals and groups. Power is 
exerted through the ways in which understanding can be structured 
to limit or shape what can be said, asserted, or justified. Communica-
tive power is relational and situated. It is not so much exercised by one 
party over another; rather, it is an element of a relationship in which 
there are unequal chances to engage in forms of understanding. 
 The limitations of Bourdieu’s theory point to a broader conception of 
what he terms symbolic power. Hannah Arendt suggested a notion of 
power that Habermas termed communicative power. Hers provides a 
better account of linguistic understanding and power. 
 Weber’s conception of domination contained other elements that 
pointed to another dimension of power. When he spoke of legitimate 
domination, he was referring to the belief that a certain political order 
is legitimate or worthy of acceptance. Weber inserted a meaning-
constituting communicative relationship into the question of power. 
Power is often based on the belief in norms of behaviour, where these 
norms shape the expectations of individuals. Still, Weber’s conception 
often remained at the level of  de facto legitimacy. That is, his account 
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involved norms that are generally accepted, and it did not employ a full 
version of the participant’s perspective in which individuals are mutu-
ally accountable. However, notions of legitimate order are inevitably 
open to justification. 
 What these meaning-interpretive theories point towards is the autho-
rizing force of language. Political legitimacy requires an authorizing 
force understood not simply as the existence of authority but also 
as the force that generates a form of collective power acting in com-
mon. (This also applies to social interaction in public life.) Adapting 
Arendt’s notion of power as distinguished from violence, and defining 
it as communicative power, Habermas seeks to develop his position 
on meaning-interpretive foundations. In these terms power exists, as 
Arendt noted, when humans gather together to act in concert. And it 
only exists when these publics exist. Communicative power does not 
belong to anyone. It cannot it be stored or preserved like an instrument. 
It can only be created and renewed though our acting together. The 
authorizing force of communicative power derives first from the delib-
erative character of action. In Arendt’s formulation a plurality of sub-
jects come together to deliberate, discuss, and make decisions. Subjects 
form opinions, which lead to a will to act or, more precisely, provide the 
motivations for action. In Habermas’s formulations, this deliberative 
element is refined and elaborated into processes of giving and assess-
ing reasons for action. Its authorizing force stems from this ability to 
generate a will to act for good reasons. However, it would be a mistake 
to see deliberation in communicative action as merely cognitive – that 
is, as detached from motivation that aims at deliberating. It is a practi-
cal activity that forms a “common will,” if not a unified or singular one, 
and thus attempts to guide action. However, this will is not an ontologi-
cal entity that exists in a reified form prior to action. It exists only in the 
interactions of participants. In short, communicative power stems from 
the communicative freedom of citizens and participants. It provides a 
basis for the political freedom and autonomy of a group. 
 Communicative power therefore must be distinguished from stra-
tegic power. Communicative power is not the power A has to get B to 
do something, nor is it A’s power to develop her capacities. Rather, 
it is the power that arises out of the generative capacity that A and B 
have together to authorize an action. Because strategic action lacks 
the capacity to generate norms or laws or norm-laden practices, it 
cannot produce the motivation to act in common. It can only shape 
or direct it. In Arendt’s theory this problem is somewhat difficult to 
conceptualize. Arendt understands communicative forms of generat-
ing power as tied to the capacity to achieve uncoerced agreements. 
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But she does not have a clear way of deciding when agreements are 
coerced rather than uncoerced. Habermas’s theory provides more 
resources for that task. 
 The exercise of strategic power could in fact lead to subtle forms of 
coercion, which, as we have seen, limit alternatives or shape commu-
nicative actions. This form of power can shape action, or it can shape 
understanding and identity and thereby ensure obedience. Communi-
cative power can explain better than strategic power the workings of 
non-decisions. Those who are able to exclude issues from consideration 
that could put into question existing patterns of power and authority 
can exert control over others through their ability to control the agenda 
of a discussion and thereby shape the terms under which such discus-
sion can take place, if at all. Thus, communicative power could allow 
individuals or groups to create and maintain power by labelling some 
reasons or sensibilities as illegitimate, or by barring topics or even 
groups from public discussion. 
 Communicative power affects not only the social rules but also the 
interpretive capacities of participants, and hence their communica-
tive freedom. As self-interpreting beings we make sense not only of 
our world but also of our place in it. Our interpretive capacities and 
the meanings available to us are elements that condition our personal 
and collective identities. When the scope of our interpretations and 
our reflexivity are restricted or shaped and directed, our individual 
and social identities are constrained. For example, in the cases studied, 
power over non-decisions relies not just on the agenda-setting capaci-
ties of individuals or groups but also on the participants’ orientation 
towards their interaction in political or social institutions. 
 Theories of hegemony draw on the interpretive capacities of indi-
viduals in their analyses of power relationships; notions of the lifeworld 
often figure as well. Such theories are rooted in the taken-for-granted 
background understandings and commitments of the participants. 
However, they view the “common sense” that participants share as con-
stituted by relations of domination – relations that nonetheless create 
consent on the part of the populace. Domination is not simply a matter 
of one person or group imposing their will on another. It requires some 
degree of active consent and participation on the part of the dominated. 
This common sense comes to define the scope of accepted agreement 
and disagreement; it also declares who establishes the agenda, who 
provides authoritative definitions of the social world, and who inter-
prets needs.  51  As an example, in a setting dominated by a neoliberal 
outlook welfare programs come to be looked on as reflecting a patho-
logical dependency. 
92 Critical Theory, Democracy, and the Challenge of Neoliberalism
 For the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci, with whom the term is often 
most closely associated, hegemony referred mainly to the class struggle – 
a view that in this day seems too narrow. Nonetheless, his theory as he 
originally expressed it did illustrate that the interpretive capacities of 
subjects that are in play in instances of hegemony are not simply effects 
of power. Although it can be restricted, we have the power to say “no” 
or “yes” to claims advanced by those with the capacity to define the 
situation we share as well as the ability to take an existential position 
towards those claims. I can exercise resistance by overtly rejecting a 
claim to authority or, more indirectly, by showing disrespect. The same 
communicative power that is a required to obtain consent can become 
the communicative freedom to reject “common sense.” We cannot sim-
ply do away with or eliminate the communicative capacities of subjects 
unless social order becomes a function of mere force. This is crucial to 
critical theories of domination: that we have the capacity to take up 
interpretations and to be accountable to others means that we can take 
up the world. 
 The notion of communicative freedom suggested here also has 
advantages over Philip Pettit’s conception of freedom as non-domination. 
In this view, the concept of non-domination offers a superior alterna-
tive both to notions of positive liberty and to Berlin’s purely negative 
conception of liberty as freedom from observable interference. Here, 
domination consists in a situation in which (1) someone has the capac-
ity to interfere (2) on an arbitrary basis (3) in certain choices that the 
other is able to make.  52  However, communicative power is also a gen-
erative power. It is not just the capacity to choose but precisely this 
generative power that is at issue in any conception of domination. In 
domination or oppression, the generative power of participants acting 
in common is restricted or shaped in ways that limit the possibility for 
free agreement. 
 We hope we have provided here a sufficiently comprehensive 
account of communicative freedom and power to suggest their cen-
tral place in a contemporary critical theory of democracy and society. 
However, we would be remiss if in our consideration of critical the-
ory and power we did not consider the highly influential position of 
Michel Foucault. Foucault’s reflections on power, which offer impor-
tant insights into the mechanisms by and through which power is gen-
erated and exercised, share concerns with the form of critical theory 
to which we are committed, while departing in some fundamental 
respects from the analysis we have attempted to offer. In the final sec-
tion of this chapter we consider Foucault’s legacy and its relevance 
for our position. 
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 Foucault and Power 
 Some recent attempts by critical theory to develop a conception of 
power can be of use in an approach to Foucault’s work. Martin Saar has 
identified two strains of thought about power in modernity. One strain, 
which derives from Benedict Spinoza, involves a reworking of the 
ancient notion of power as potentiality. The second, which derives from 
Thomas Hobbes, is more of an instrumental notion of power where one 
controls another person. The first view, which Saar associates with the 
work of Arendt, is a constitutive conception. It concerns the power to 
create and change that is inherent in nature. It is, if you will, ontological. 
The latter is a kind of action- theoretical notion in that its instrumental 
or strategic focus entails a conception of constitutive power. This two-
sided understanding may also remind the reader of C.B. Macpherson’s 
notions of developmental and extractive power, although they are not 
identical. 
 This is an interesting suggestion, but because it views the action-
theoretical conception of power in the strategic terms of Weber’s con-
ception of action, it leaves out the constitutive features of some types 
of action. As we noted earlier, this is a difficulty in Arendt’s position as 
well. In her distinction between action and speech she views action pri-
marily as purposive. However, in the version of communicative action 
that we are employing, action is not simply purposive but is closer to 
what Arendt had in mind by speech. These intersubjective processes 
in which participants are engaged in mutual understanding are them-
selves constitutive or generative. They do more than create meaning; 
they also generate validity and authorize action. The ontological fea-
tures that Saar tries to locate in a realm outside of action seem to be 
located  within it. 
 These processes of intersubjective interaction are constitutive in 
another sense. They produce and reproduce, and even transform, the 
social world through acts of mutual understanding. We should distin-
guish between the strategic uses of power that influence and induce 
but are not  per se constitutive, and communicative power that creates 
meaning and understanding. We have seen this problem in our earlier 
analyses of treatments of power that do not take account of the relation 
between strategic and communicative power. 
 More germane to our concerns, Axel Honneth has attempted to char-
acterize power as the struggle for recognition between participants in 
the social world.  53  Like others, he has been critical of what he sees as 
an idealistic element in the theory of communicative action, which he 
sees as especially evident in an idealized conception of agreement and 
94 Critical Theory, Democracy, and the Challenge of Neoliberalism
an overly cognitive notion of ethics. Hobbes saw social struggle as a 
war of all against all stemming from the competition for goods under 
conditions of scarcity. Honneth, by contrast, posits that social conflict is 
not merely over access to goods to satisfy our needs, but over who we 
are. We cannot realize our plans or interpret our needs without a sense 
of who we are and a sense of respect. These require a self-relationship 
that is acquired socially. Like Hegel did with his notion of interpersonal 
struggle, especially as developed in his famous dialectic of master and 
slave, Honneth gives priority to the struggle for respect and recognition. 
The injustice of the master is that he fails to recognize the personhood 
of the slave. The master’s domination of the slave is rooted in an ethical 
struggle. Because the slave is reduced to something less than a person, 
the master can treat him in an unequal manner. For Honneth, this serves 
as the template for all social struggles. Subordination entails disrespect 
and lack of recognition of the humanity and equality of others, and 
he sees respect, and thus recognition, as central to social progress. He 
views history at times as an agonistic struggle for recognition between 
social groups in which we cannot necessarily appeal to an ideal goal. 
 Honneth’s notion of struggle has some important elements that must 
be incorporated into a critical theory. However, he sometimes leaves out 
the other elements of communicative action that are relevant for power. 
For communicative power includes not just the formative power of 
personal identity but also a background understanding and sense of 
community regarding common norms forms of knowledge, as well as 
a widely shared stock of sentiments and expectations. Forms of power 
do not operate simply on the level of unequal respect; they also oper-
ate when expectations, norms, and forms of knowledge are shaped by 
strategies of power employed by dominant interests. They have a shap-
ing effect on powers of constitution. 
 From this standpoint the model of mutual accountability can provide 
resources not available to Honneth’s version of mutual recognition. Our 
conception retains from Habermas the model of communicative action 
as a form of consensual social action but emphasizes the contingent, 
post-metaphysical elements in consensual action. Because the lifeworld 
is always subject to contestation, it is always a possible site of social 
struggle. But it is not for that reason agonistic. 
 It is in this context that we consider Foucault’s influential treatment 
of power. As we see it, his most significant contribution resides in his 
attempt to work out an alternative conception of generative power. As 
is well known, Foucault argued for a productive conception of power. 
He contended that power is not something that simply restrains or pre-
vents one from doing something, it also produces or generates effects 
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and unequal social arrangements. In one sense we can see how this 
operates. Strategic actions and strategic power, as we noted, can cajole, 
persuade, coerce, or otherwise influence or induce another to act. Fou-
cault seems to have in mind situations of domination in which power 
is exerted over others. This is less clear, however, in the case of norms. 
In what sense can strategic actions generate norms? They can only do 
so in a  de facto sense. Normative social action is consensual, not strate-
gic. It requires the valid consent of participants. In contrast, Foucault 
comes to see this generative power as, variously, a world-disclosing 
force, a socializing force, or a strategic force. His inability to recognize 
the communicative aspect of generative power leads to ambiguities in 
his account of power. 
 Foucault’s earliest work does not explicitly engage notions of power, 
but it does contain elements of a constitutive conception of it. His work 
here is associated with his archaeological phase. In the interpretive view 
he develops here, power constitutes knowledge, values, and norms. The 
strong version of constitution theory holds that power constitutes sub-
jectivity and hence shapes domination. In some his earlier work Fou-
cault conceived of constitution as a regime of truth. A regime of truth 
establishes a “general politics of truth … the types of discourse which 
it accepts and makes function as true, the mechanisms and instances 
which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means 
by which each is sanctioned, the techniques and procedures accorded 
value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged 
with saying what counts as true.”  54  
 Here, in his archaeological period, Foucault gives generative power 
to these structural forces, which are independent of individuals. His 
work here is strongly anti-subjective. Regimes of truth form individuals – 
not the other way around. Discourses work to determine the limits of 
what can be said and understood. In opposition to subjective models of 
history, Foucault argues that the rules of a discourse are not shaped by 
logic or by deliberate action; rather, they represent an anonymous his-
torical unconscious. He sees discursive formations as having a power 
to create structures and shape individuals. In some respects, Foucault’s 
theory points to the same issue raised by interactionist theories such 
as those of Anthony Giddens or Pierre Bourdieu, and their accounts 
of social institutions. However, Foucault takes a different approach. 
Rejecting the idea that the subject or the ego speaks, Foucault argues 
that we are enunciated – or, more properly, articulated – by discourse. 
While he recognizes that as participants in a social world we are shaped 
by social forces, he does not seem at this point in his work to recognize 
the reflexive power of subjects. 
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 Here, though, Foucault still has some elements in common with the 
repression model. Such regimes of truth deny reason to the other. Fou-
cault sometimes refers to this in terms of subjugated knowledge, that 
is, knowledge that is considered insufficiently scientific in character or 
rationality. 
 At this archaeological level of analysis, the status of the inquirer is 
ambiguous at best: Is the archaeologist an objective observer who uses 
his method to grasp elements not accessible to participants, or is he a 
participant like others? If the latter, the theorist seems to enjoy a reflex-
ivity that is unavailable to ordinary participants. 
 In his later work Foucault corrects this approach to a degree. He 
addresses several issues that are not sufficiently dealt with by the 
archaeological approach. The archaeological approach is mostly static. 
From this vantage point Foucault cannot explain historical change or 
the transition from one episteme to another. Nor, as noted, does he 
explain why subjects take up and are taken up by power. Although 
Foucault later comes to see continuity in all his approaches, in fact he 
makes a rather abrupt change. Rejecting the idea that he is attempt-
ing to go beyond the question of the subject, he later comes to see his 
work primarily as outlining three modes of “objectification.” In addi-
tion to archaeology he employs genealogical methods that look at the 
formation of the subject from the viewpoint of both the individuation 
of individuals through institutions like prisons and schools in which a 
new form of individuation is practiced – something he calls dividing 
practices – and from the perspective of how subjects shape themselves 
according to this mode of individualization. Each of these is connected 
to the larger notion of governmentality. In both cases he is concerned 
with a modern form of pastoral care in a modern state that has taken 
over many forms of self-care. Modern care concerns itself not with 
saving the soul but rather with bodily health, mental health, punish-
ment, and education. The state, in Foucault’s view, has taken on these 
functions. 
 Here Foucault focuses on micro-processes through which compliance 
is secured. Rather than looking at the formation of subjectivity from the 
top down, so to speak, Foucault wants to study power processes from 
the ground up. He looks at how institutions like the family, organized 
medicine, and systems of punishment shape the individual. As in the 
model of confession, the subject is necessary to find the truth about the 
self. But as these confessional discourses are basically administered by 
the new social sciences, they are forms of objectifying and normalizing 
subjectivity. Foucault claims that we should oppose not just government 
power but the new forms of subjectivization that are brought into play. 
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 In this genealogical approach, Foucault maintains that power is 
productive – that it creates meaning. However, he basically applies 
the Weberian notion that power, in the sense he wants to use it, is 
social. Against the view that power is always anonymous, Foucault 
now contends that power is exercised only over those who are free. It 
requires recognition that the other – that is, the one over whom power 
is exerted – is a person capable of a response. It concerns the power 
of A to get B to do something. In this sense, power brings about a 
certain state of affairs. It can also be influenced by institutional rules 
and settings. As Foucault’s famous analysis of the panopticon shows, 
institutional practices are structured so as to strategically shape the 
responses of institutions as modes of control. 
 While Foucault’s notion of strategic power as productive helps illus-
trate the ways in which others are influenced, persuaded, intimidated, 
or threatened into acting in a certain way, this notion, as noted above, 
falls short of illustrating how power works from the participant’s per-
spective. We need to look at the ways in which strategic power impacts 
the communicative power of subjects. Without a fuller explication of 
this relationship, Foucault’s conception of the nature of power and 
resistance remains incomplete. It is difficult to know how to under-
stand the participant’s perspective on power without accounting for 
her embeddedness in forms of communicative action. 
 The forms of strategic power that Foucault identifies do not simply 
want to induce people to act in a certain way. They also seek the con-
sent or agreement of participants to the kind of norms that support 
the regimes of surveillance he identifies and the conceptions of the self 
he lays out. The forms of surveillance Foucault marks out, first with 
respect to prisons, but later in other institutions such as education and 
medicine, indicate new modes of accountability, both within the sub-
ject’s relation to itself and in the rules and roles of social institutions. 
This involves changes in the background conditions and definitions of 
the situation within which people act. But there is considerable ambigu-
ity in his treatment of these new forms of accountability. 
 Sometimes he adopts a model close that of Friedrich Nietzsche. 
Rejecting the idea that there is an inherent transcendental or ideal struc-
ture of morality or cognition in the subject, Foucault sees the creation 
of higher forms of subjectivity as a result of work on the self. However, 
this work is seen too often on the model of purposive or strategic labour. 
It becomes a form of self-objectification and a projecting of oneself onto 
the world through one’s own will. 
 This conception, however, does not really explain the processes 
whereby we gain our identities by means of structures of mutual 
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understanding and mutual accountability. It is not simply a matter 
of willful self-shaping. If we want to understand the pathologies of 
accountability that are brought about through the kind of colonization 
of the lifeworld that Foucault’s analyses imply, as well as the modern 
self that he rejects, then we need to look at how the communicative 
power of subjects is shaped by institutional power. However insightful 
Foucault’s analysis of modern institutions and forms of knowledge, his 
theory cannot fully explain these processes. Strategic power does not 
create meaning. The generative power that creates meaning is a matter 
of communicative action and communicative power. So we need to ask 
how forms of strategic power can shape or direct the generative powers 
of communicative action. 
 Post-structuralist Considerations 
 The legacy of the kind of analysis identified with the pivotal work of 
Michel Foucault, often labelled “post-structuralist,” can clearly be seen 
in what have come to be called postcolonial studies. Writers in this 
field have been particularly concerned with the ways in which Western 
cultural imperialism defines the colonized as “other” – here meant as 
subaltern – in relation to Western cultures. In this respect they have not 
only questioned the supposed universality of these cultures but also 
formulated the most wide-ranging criticisms of the oppressive nature 
of “Western reason.” Thus they play an important role in evaluating 
some of the achievements and failures of the post-structuralist critique 
of reason. 
 We cannot do justice here to the variety of perspectives that fall under 
the rubric of postcolonial thought. We are primarily interested in some 
significant proponents of post-structuralist thought who have applied 
their insights to this arena of struggle. 
 Using perspectives drawn from both Foucault and Jacques Derrida, 
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak has argued that the “colonial subject” 
is constituted as radical “otherness” defined primarily by its lack of 
presence or pure difference. The colonial subject cannot be placed 
within the imperialist discourse and remains voiceless. Spivak has 
in mind a form of domination in which the colonizer’s indigenous 
cultural forms of writing, speaking, and acting are devalued and sub-
ordinated to the point that they can make no claims to validity. The 
colonized is defined entirely in the negative, that is, by a lack of reason 
and a lack of voice. He or she has no ability to speak or raise claims 
in the dominant discourse. The colonized may “speak,” but what 
they say appears meaningless or irrational. In the context of colonial 
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production, according to Spivak, those who are subaltern are without 
history or voice.  55  
 Spivak interprets this process using Foucault’s notion of “subju-
gated knowledge.” Subjugation involves an act of epistemic violence 
against indigenous forms of knowing. As we have seen, these forms of 
knowledge are disqualified in relation to advanced models of reason. 
Moreover, their articulation is often met by opposition and suppres-
sion. Spivak does not interpret this form of structural violence through 
the lens of a theory of mutual recognition. Much like Ernesto Laclau 
and Chantal Mouffe, she sees the development of epistemic domina-
tion along the lines of a theory of hegemony. The hegemony of a social 
formation is the result of a central form or a transcendental signifier 
that organizes knowing and acting. Such an institution creates its own 
standards of right and wrong, good and evil, and this forcibly excludes 
all other forms of understanding. Dominant standards must, by defini-
tion, be closed or complete. From this standpoint, oppression is carved 
into the very act of creating standards of reason. Epistemic violence is 
inherent in any instituting practice. 
 Spivak’s position has been taken to task for failing to conceive of 
resistance to domination. The thesis of epistemic violence as formu-
lated by Spivak postulates a closure more radical than that of the one-
dimensionality of the Frankfurt School. 
 Not all of those who write in the post-structuralist mode agree that the 
transcendental signifier is fully closed or even that it exists. Against Spi-
vak’s argument, Homi K. Bhabha has argued that the epistemic struc-
tures Spivak describes must also allow for the possibility of resistance. 
Bhabha agrees with Spivak that the colonialist discourse amounts to a 
closed system that has its own forms of authority and recognition and 
that aims at transparency. Bhabha argues that “the acknowledgment 
of authority depends on the immediate – unmediated – visibility of its 
rules of recognition as the unmistakable referent of historical neces-
sity.”  56  Following the post-structuralist interpretation of the philosophy 
of the subject, Bhabha implies that the colonial discourse is rooted in a 
teleological philosophy of history in which Western society is the meta-
subject. The colonized is by definition excluded from this teleology. It is 
not the subject, but only a justifiably subjugated outsider to this logic of 
development. Participation in history requires acceptance of these fated 
forms of “reason.” 
 From these assumptions about Western reason it is easy to see how the 
colonized are interpreted as radically other. However, Bhabha dissents 
from the analysis given by Spivak in that he holds that this teleology is 
inherently ambivalent. The discourse of colonialism aims to impose a 
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homogeneous form of “reason” onto the colonized; thus the colonized 
must disavow that homogeneous authority “as they articulate the signs 
of cultural difference.” These articulated differences between colonizer 
and colonized means that the model of power used by Foucault to anal-
yse bourgeois societies of the nineteenth century must be transformed. 
Foucault’s account of the panopticon is based on an immediate and 
transparent model of authority. All power and all actions are made vis-
ible under the gaze of authority. According to Bhabha’s reading, how-
ever, the panoptic model of authority fails since authority cannot be 
transparent in colonial societies. Colonial society cannot be rendered 
transparent. It is not a “stable unitary collectivity.” In short, disciplin-
ary power is not fully effective on the colonized because they are not 
subjects to begin with. 
 Like Spivak, Bhabha rejects the model of the “struggle for recog-
nition” to explain this process and sees it as a structural version of 
psychic “doubling” or fragmenting as the “condition of subjection.” 
If authority needs to be “essential” – that is, if it has to employ a uni-
tary notion of a race or a nation or tradition to render its authority 
transparent – then the colonized are split from that unity. The notion 
of the double draws from psychoanalysis the idea of the hidden other. 
In colonial society the question of authorization involves the decla-
ration (and naming) of a colonized other, who is not a member of a 
unitary race or nation. This ambiguous space is that within which the 
colonized can resist in much the same way that African Americans con-
structed their own roles and relations as a means to expose and in their 
own way resist authority. 
 Notwithstanding their differences regarding the nature of resis-
tance, Spivak and Bhabha agree with Foucault that social formations 
are regimes of power/knowledge. As such, they provide authorized 
modes of validity exemplified by forms of transparent and immediate 
authority. Seen in this way they are internally impermeable. Spivak and 
Bhabha are correct when they point to communicative dimensions of 
domination and note that forms of power never operate purely though 
violence but employ communicative power to structure forms of truth 
and validity and to systematically exclude claims that might challenge 
the dominance of hegemonic groups. Nonetheless, Spivak and Bhabba 
short-circuit analyses of these communicative powers. That social for-
mations are themselves essentially hegemonic and closed limits the 
communicative freedom of participants. As formulated by postcolo-
nial theorists like Spivak and Bhabha, there is no essential distinction 
between domination and freedom. Resistance is based not on commu-
nicative power but simply on counter-hegemony. 
 Reason, Truth, and Power 101
 The phenomenon of colonial domination could also be explained 
using the framework of the pathology of communicative freedom. 
This model would explain the power of resistance through reference 
to the freedom of participants to take a position on the interpretations 
imposed by colonial dominance. This power cannot be entirely sup-
pressed so long as participants engage in some form of communica-
tive action. Resistance is not just a form of counter-hegemony, it is 
also the power to affirm or deny, a power that is inherent in language. 
Rather than conceiving of radical otherness as the complete exclusion 
from discourse, a model of the suppression of communicative freedom 
would focus on the social mechanisms – such as socialization processes 
and institutional arrangements – through which colonizers excluded 
the colonized from participation in authority, as well as the power to 
develop their own interpretations in a context in which they could 
be taken seriously. It would focus on the uses of forms of power that 
restrict communicative freedom. 
 Here, some of the processes analysed by Foucault could be incor-
porated. These social practices might for example operate in the way 
that Foucault describes, as rules that exclude forms of knowledge as a 
whole, or they might more narrowly exclude specific kinds of claims, 
such as claims about collective goods. They might also operate through 
restrictive conceptions of social normality that label behaviours as crim-
inal or deviant (among other things). In this way they can claim they 
have the consent, be it tacit or explicit, of subjected populations. 
 Finally, we want to briefly consider the contribution of post-
structuralist feminist accounts of power. Judith Butler has pro-
vided one of the best-known and most influential defences of post-
structuralist feminism.  57  Unlike some feminists who look to notions 
of the feminine as the essential basis for a feminist theory, Butler 
rejects any form of essentialism as rooted in a foundationalist con-
ception of identity. All such attempts to find a fixed identity are 
metaphysical. They entail an independent notion of the self as an 
“agent” from whom acts originate. 
 The foundationalist reasoning of identity politics tends to assume 
that an identity must first be in place for political interests to be elabo-
rated and, subsequently, for political action to be taken. Our argument 
is that there need not be a “doer behind the deed” and that the “doer” 
is invariably constructed in and through the deed. 
 In place of “metaphysical” theories of the self, Butler proposes a “per-
formative” conception. The self is constituted in its performances. She 
also argues, however, that these instituting performances are forms of 
hegemonic power. But in her view, such hegemonic forms are transitory 
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and changing. All forms of identity are fleeting; they represent the ebb 
and flow of power-driven interests. 
 Despite her seeming radical critique of feminism, Butler’s position 
is not as radical as it appears. It does not cut to the core of questions of 
identity. While it is true in one sense that the doer cannot be separated 
from the deed – that is, that there can be no metaphysical self prior to 
the participant’s perspective – this does not mean that the only viable 
solution is a power-based conception of “performance.” Like her post-
colonial counterparts, Butler neglects the dimensions of communicative 
freedom entailed in her own notion of performance. 
 Butler’s work shares with communicative theory an emphasis on the 
formative power of language. However, her conception of language is 
too limited to account for the dimensions of communicative freedom. 
She argues that agency and selfhood are properties of “significations.” 
Here, signification means the communicative power of the production 
of signs, which carry rules for usage, rather than a process of mutual 
understanding through which action in concert is coordinated. Butler 
sees the production of signs as form of “repetition,” or, more properly, 
as a kind of repetition compulsion, whereby compliance with produced 
signs is induced. 
 Indeed, when the subject is said to be “constituted,” this means sim-
ply that the subject is a consequence of certain rule-governed discourses 
that establish the intelligible invocation of identity. The subject is not 
determined by the rules through which it is generated because signifi-
cation is not a founding act, but rather a regulated process of repetition 
that both conceals itself and enforces its rules through the production of 
substantive effects. Butler argues that agency is the possibility of varia-
tion of repetition. Like Bhabha, she argues that systems of signification 
are imperfect or insufficient. They always leave room for variation. 
 While Butler aims to avoid charges of determinism, it is not clear 
that her notions of institution through signification are rich enough to 
account for identity-forming processes. While the exact identity of the 
subject may not be determined, one can say it is the product and never 
the producer of its structural articulations. In some respects, Butler 
thereby reintroduces the distinction between the doer and the deed. 
The systems of signification may not determine us but they do produce 
us and our performances. Our doing is not really a taking up but rather 
an inducement to act through signification. 
 If our conceptions of identity are to have any significant implica-
tions for a theory of society, they need to be tied to notions of what we 
want to be and how we take up that identity in relation to the world 
we encounter. Identity and communicative freedom are linked. Unless 
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subjects can critically take up their life histories and make them their 
own, they cannot be said to have social identities at all. Once again it 
is the power to affirm, deny, and otherwise take a position on this life 
history that allows us to form identities. The communicative power to 
develop these identities has to be employed in the context of communi-
cative freedom if we are to take them up in a meaningful fashion. 
 The communicative theory we have advocated builds on the insights 
of pragmatic theorists and integrates these insights with hermeneutics. 
The self is clearly not a substance or an unchanging subject, but it  is a 
point in a web of relations. However, identities do not simply represent 
temporary points of fixity, held in place by hegemony. They emerge 
out of the orientation of a person towards the social world. This indi-
cates those important evaluations – what Charles Taylor calls strong 
evaluations – that a person holds. These do not come before the self. 
They  are the self, which is brought into being and is renewed in its 
communicative relations with others. 
 Our account in this chapter of communicative reason and truth, and 
the related issues of freedom and power, is intended to pave the way 
for an engagement with the challenges of a critical theory of democracy 
itself. However, before we go on it is essential to relate key issues of 
critical theory to the contemporary socio-economic and political context 
in which this theory, and a theory of democracy, must be situated. This 
context is that of neoliberalism, its values, institutions, and practices. In 
the next chapter we treat the relation of critical theory to neoliberalism. 
 
 Chapter Three 
 Critical Theory and Neoliberalism 
 Critical theories of society are diagnostic. Rather than describing soci-
eties as they exist in a non-normative fashion, they have a practical and 
evaluative dimension. Critical theories identify the deformed subjec-
tive and intersubjective forms of life in modern societies along with the 
institutional and structural features that generate and maintain rela-
tions of domination and oppression, and that present barriers to real-
ization of greater freedom, equality, and solidarity. Diagnostic theories 
evaluate impediments to human freedom in the conditions of modern 
life from the standpoint of emancipation from domination. The critic 
who diagnoses social pathologies is not like the doctor or clinician who 
diagnoses individual ills. The critic is less an expert observer than a co-
participant who understands social pathologies through an involve-
ment in social life that others share. Fellow participants are also able 
to interpret and assess, and often share, the diagnoses forwarded by 
the critic. 
 In its classic form, critical theory linked critique to a (primarily) 
political-economic analysis. Social pathologies stemmed overwhelm-
ingly from the economic structure of society – that is, from capitalism. 
While the first generation of the Frankfurt School certainly recognized 
the intermediation of culture and even psychology with the economic, 
they still held that in the last instance, the economic was determining. 
More recent critical theories have emphasized the limits of the model of 
political economy formulated by Marx and have emphasized concerns 
rooted in the new social movements. Many of these attempts have for-
mulated an independent line of development of subjectivity and inter-
subjectivity that is not strictly dependent on the economic sphere, but 
they have for the most part pursued commitments to justice, equal-
ity, and freedom. In the work of Jürgen Habermas and Axel Honneth 
this has led to the development of an independent logic of mutual 
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understanding based on our capacities for intersubjective interaction 
and recognition. These elements have sometimes been interpreted as 
raising claims for inclusion and equality upon which questions of polit-
ical economy are seen to have a limited bearing. 
 The diagnostic element of critical theory, then, is closely related to 
immanent critique. A critical theory takes the ideals that are internal 
to a society and confronts them with the diagnoses it has made of the 
pathologies emerging out of contemporary social structures, with the 
intent to invoke reflection. In carrying out this commitment to foster 
reflection it relies not on some ideal or utopian possibilities, but on 
those tendencies that while present in contemporary societies have yet 
to be fully actualized. 
 While questions of equal respect and inclusion continue to play a cen-
tral role in critical discourse, the rise of neoliberalism has been accompa-
nied by a new set of social pathologies that pose a challenge for critical 
theories. Such pathologies exacerbate problems of social and economic 
inequality, vulnerability, insecurity, and precarity not only among the 
poor classes but also among the middle classes. These conditions are 
having a decisive effect on the personal and political freedoms of sub-
jects in neoliberal societies. 
 Thus a critical theory of contemporary society must establish itself 
against the dominant neoliberalism of our times. However, as we argued 
in the previous chapter, this cannot involve a straightforward retrieval 
of an unreconstructed Marxism, or a simple defence of or return to the 
welfare state. Of course, critical theories have been sensitive to the limi-
tations of the welfare state and highly critical of the bureaucratic ratio-
nalization of social life. Critical theorists oppose the colonization of the 
lifeworld by bureaucratic imperatives and the education of citizens as 
clients who are to be shaped by experts. As we have also argued, critical 
theory must provide revised conceptions of freedom and equality; this 
is especially crucial if we are to understand the problems with neolib-
eral capitalism. The challenges of neoliberalism require us to formulate 
more complex notions that do not so easily fit into the Keynesian wel-
fare state paradigm. A critical theory must do this while still recogniz-
ing the need for state action to regulate an economy rendered more 
unstable by neoliberal policies and practices. 
 The fall of the Soviet Union and the Communist Bloc in 1989 led to 
a triumphalist mood in the decades that followed.  1  The idea that there 
could be alternatives to capitalism, even to an unfettered capitalism, 
seemed hopelessly out of date. For example, Charles Lindblom argues 
that markets have come to dominate in almost all contemporary soci-
eties and are inherently superior to command economies.  2  Even some 
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critical theorists have claimed to see no alternative. To take one exam-
ple, Joseph Heath has attempted to fuse critical theory with rational 
choice. He rejects the view that there are viable alternatives to markets, 
specifically capitalist markets. His ideas about a market socialism are 
little more than capitalism under another name. He seems to welcome 
the end of ideology and even compares the contemporary work of Jür-
gen Habermas to Francis Fukuyama’s paean to the triumph of mar-
ket liberalism.  3  He contends that the primary if not only task left for 
social theory is to undertake a technical design of the game theoretical 
structuring of institutions to constrain behaviour in order to achieve the 
right outcomes. 
 Of course, this is an extreme version, one held by very few critical 
theorists. But the “third way” model associated with thinkers such as 
Anthony Giddens illustrates the dilemma of critical and social demo-
cratic theories in the post-1989 period. Giddens has tried to combine 
the social democratic commitment to justice and equality with market 
liberalization.  4  He believes that the traditional appeal to class politics 
is outmoded. Like critical theorists, Giddens recognizes that some of 
the consequences of the welfare state can be harmful, and he rejects 
what he deems an excessively statist conception in favour of decentral-
ized economic processes. In the United States, President Bill Clinton’s 
version of the third way tended to promote the agenda of neoliberal-
ism. Pursuit of this agenda entailed the deregulation of major sectors 
of the economy such the media and the banking system, as well as a 
commitment to international free trade agreements. The welfare reform 
policies undertaken by the Clinton administration looked to replace 
government support of the poor with workfare programs that stressed 
the personal responsibility of participants for their fate. Far from liber-
ating individuals from excessive and intrusive government monitoring 
and the consequent shaping of identities, neoliberal policies have made 
them more vulnerable and open to market manipulation. While pur-
porting to promote the interests of civil society, third-way politicians 
and the policies they support have ended up weakening it. 
 Critical theorists such as Habermas have been slow to grasp the 
renewed role given to economic conflicts. Habermas, too, has at times 
embraced the view that the most viable alternative is not a rejection 
of the market, but the political restraint of it. In a 2009 interview he 
stated: “Since 1989–90 it has become impossible to break out of the uni-
verse of capitalism; the only option is to civilize and tame the capitalist 
dynamics from within.”  5  Still, it would be a mistake to count Habermas 
among the triumphalists, as Heath does. Habermas recognizes that the 
fall of the Soviet Union did not represent the triumph of capitalism. The 
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collapse of the Soviet Union and the demise of Soviet-style socialism 
did, however, give a boost to the dynamics of a neoliberalism that was 
already on the rise. And Habermas continues to view his legal/political 
theory as socialist – a point we take up in the following chapters. 
 Up to and including  The Theory of Communicative Action , Habermas 
had argued that capitalism and democracy were in conflict.  6  He still 
appears to hold this view, but his conception of the role of markets 
makes the realization of his putatively socialist vision ambiguous. Part 
of the problem arises from his view that markets are a functionally nec-
essary feature of modern societies. Thus the challenge for Habermas 
is to prevent markets and administrative functions from invading and 
colonizing the everyday lifeworld of participants, a lifeworld main-
tained through mutual understanding. His notion of the colonization 
and reification of the lifeworld remains a potent concept for analys-
ing the pathologies of neoliberalism, but we think that his notion of 
the functional necessity of markets does not sufficiently recognize the 
extent to which democratic political processes impact what he sees as 
the independent logic of markets. He has been sceptical about demo-
cratic control of the economy, and unlike Macpherson and other the-
orists, he does not offer a clear statement about social property. His 
notion of taming the market remains too vague, in that he does not 
specify exactly which elements need to be tamed so as to align the mar-
ket with his notion of socialist democracy. Would taming the market 
involve a fundamental reorganization of society so that control of the 
economy served social purposes, or would it merely require an exten-
sive redistribution of goods as in social democracy? Can we conceive 
of notions of social property and social ownership that are democratic 
and decentralized and not simply a return to the  dirigiste notions of 
Soviet-style socialism? 
 These ongoing tensions are found in Habermas’s major statement on 
global capitalism,  The Postnational Constellation .  7  Here he stresses the 
political consequences of globalization as a challenge to the sovereignty 
of the nation-state. He thinks that the problems of global capitalism can 
no longer be solved on the national level but require a regime of interna-
tional human rights. Here, neoliberalism is primarily a movement that 
corresponds to the breakdown of state authority. For Habermas this 
development is part of a larger dialectic of modernity in which wider 
and more inclusive identities are shaped.  Drawing on the ideas of Karl 
Polanyi, he characterizes this development as a dual movement. The 
opening of new markets frees individual identities for greater elabo-
ration by breaking the bonds of provincial identities; but at the same 
time, it leads to new closures, that is, to new and more inclusive notions 
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of solidarity.  8  Thus the major cleavage introduced by globalization has 
been the struggle for these larger forms of post-national solidarity com-
bined with a transnational legal framework of human rights. 
 Perhaps from the heights of the theory of social evolution, such a per-
spective has merit. However, the kind of dialectic that Habermas identi-
fies is by no means guaranteed. In fact, it does not seem to square with 
his earlier statements on the contradictions of capitalism and democ-
racy, in which markets also erode the lifeworld. Although it may hold 
in a distorted way the potential for wider solidarities and identities, 
neoliberal globalization works primarily to diminish these potentiali-
ties. Habermas has not been sufficiently attuned to the serious patholo-
gies generated by neoliberalism. Referring to the effects of neoliberal 
globalization, Habermas argued in  The Postnational Constellation that “in 
themselves these trends don’t imply any damage to the conditions for 
functional and legitimate democratic processes.”  9  More recently, he has 
admitted that he was taken aback by the strength of the recent populist 
movements, and he now acknowledges some elements of new patholo-
gies. Still, he does not see a general rise of authoritarian movements in 
the new populism. 
 We disagree with Habermas’s formulation of the problem. We view 
contemporary neoliberalism as a social, political, and economic process 
that blocks the very democratic expansion of rights and solidarities that 
Habermas sees as extending the limits not just of the sovereignty of 
nation-states but also of individuals within nations or other groups. 
Neoliberal formations, then, seek to limit the political authority of citi-
zens and tend to generate their own forms of illiberal democracy. This 
leads to the creation of versions of managed democracy that can go 
even beyond this to the establishment of quasi-authoritarian mecha-
nisms. Increasing inequality fosters not only material deprivation but 
also social and political powerlessness. The loss of steady jobs and 
security generates an increasing sense of vulnerability. In advanced 
capitalist societies, neoliberalism limits the developmental possibilities 
of subjects and lowers the expectations of participants. Far from being 
libertarian, neoliberalism must actively eliminate the challenges posed 
by developmental and communicative democracy through rearguard 
and reactionary social and cultural policies that suppress developmen-
tal possibilities and indeed democracy itself. 
 There is scant discussion of the notion of property in Habermas’s 
 Between Facts and Norms , and the result is a certain lack of clarity in 
his view of how to tame capitalism. If markets – primarily capital-
ist markets – have a strong functional role, then some questions go 
unasked: Does the capitalist market model have the capacity to solve 
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the problems posed by its own dysfunctional effects? Can this goal to 
be reached solely through the redistributive measures of the welfare 
state? Even if in principle this would be sufficient, is the rehabilitation 
of the welfare state viable in a period of restraint and retrenchment? Or 
does this reconstruction require a wider notion of publicly owned or 
social property to limit the concentrated power of large corporations? 
We agree that the model of political economy that sees the economic 
as determining all other spheres of life is theoretically and practically 
flawed; nonetheless, it remains true that democratic control of the econ-
omy requires that we consider the role of private property and not just 
markets. 
 What Is Neoliberalism? 
 As the devastating effects of neoliberalism have become more appar-
ent, there has been a revival of criticism that focuses on its social and 
economic injustices. The renewal of interest in political economy has 
sometimes been associated with the rehabilitation of more traditional 
Marxist categories and a renewed emphasis on class. Thomas Piketty’s 
massive study,  Capital in the Twenty-First Century , stresses the inevitabil-
ity of large-scale inequalities in capitalist society.  10  Piketty argues that 
the Keynesian era in which inequality was reduced was something of 
an anomaly. Over the course of its history, capitalism has tended to cre-
ate increasing concentrations of wealth and social inequality. While he 
does advocate a global wealth tax, he is more sceptical than Habermas 
about the possibility of taming capitalism. Such scepticism has led theo-
rist Sanford Schram to write of a return to “ordinary” capitalism.  11  Sch-
ram also thinks that the welfare state has not proven to be a permanent 
solution to the crises of capitalism, as in its wake we have witnessed not 
only a return to deepening economic inequality but also the increasing 
impoverishment of everyday life. 
 David Harvey provides what is the standard definition of neoliberal-
ism: it is a form of governing that stresses individual initiative, property 
rights, unfettered capitalism, and limited government: 
 Neoliberalism is in the first instance a theory of political economic prac-
tices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by 
liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an insti-
tutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free 
markets, and free trade. The role of the state is to create and preserve 
an institutional framework appropriate to such practices. The state has 
to guarantee, for example, the quality and integrity of money. It must 
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also set up those military, defense, police, and legal structures and func-
tions required to secure private property rights and to guarantee, by force 
if need be, the proper functioning of markets. Furthermore, if markets 
do not exist (in areas such as land, water, education, health care, social 
security, or environmental pollution) then they must be created, by state 
action if necessary.  12  
 While helpful in identifying key elements of neoliberalism in prac-
tice, this characterization of it is too limited. Far from a return to a 
pure free market system, neoliberalism exhibits a tension between 
free market ideology and the corporate reality of neoliberal political 
economy.  13  As American New Deal economists noted as early as the 
1930s, corporate property is already a form of socialized property. The 
corporate structure separates ownership from control. Stockholders 
have little real control over the direction of the modern corporation. 
Given its size and power, a corporation is often too big to fail, with 
the result that risks are socialized and often redistributed to the worse 
off. The state, then, not only creates the conditions for accumulation 
but also guarantees these socialized risks. The government has been 
the bank of last resort for enterprises too big to fail. Far from creat-
ing a realm of individual freedom, both corporate power and govern-
ment regulation of the poor and vulnerable exert a coercive power on 
individuals with the goal of shaping them into entrepreneurial selves: 
“[Neoliberalism] is a self-consciously reactionary ideology that seeks 
to roll back the status quo and institutionalize (or, on its own under-
standing, re-institutionalize) the ‘natural’ principles of the market. In 
other words, it is transformative.”  14  This contradiction between indi-
vidualist ideals and corporate reality leads to dysfunction and crises, 
including weakened growth, intense inequality, and coercion. Cor-
porate control has eroded working conditions and created a sense of 
contingency and precariousness that narrows the scope of individual 
self-determination and self-realization. 
 More recently, some critical theorists have turned their attention to the 
economic and political crises generated by neoliberalism. Nancy Fraser, 
for example, characterizes third-way liberalism as species of “progres-
sive neo-liberalism,” which consists of an alliance between financial and 
knowledge industry capitalism, and new social movements that cham-
pion diversity and multiculturalism.  15  Thus it combines privatization, 
deregulation, and the reduction of the social safety net with a liberal 
progressive outlook on diversity and social equality – but not economic 
inequality. Fraser includes some forms of feminism in this process. 
Those forms seek equality and diversity essentially for the social elites, 
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even while the life conditions of women in the rest of the population 
have grown more precarious. 
 Fraser agrees with many others that under the auspices of progres-
sive neoliberalism and the conditions of post-1989 politics, the critique 
of capitalism has been replaced by forms of identity politics, that is, by 
struggles to strengthen the rights of groups long excluded from equal 
participation in both politics and social life. She thinks that with the 
election in 2016 of Donald Trump as president of the United States, this 
era has ended. We now face a transitional era in which the economic 
instability that has affected much of the population could lead in dif-
ferent political directions.  16  However, whether neoliberalism has in fact 
run out of steam has yet to be determined. 
 While Fraser welcomes the return of economic critique within criti-
cal theory, she holds, as we do, that this critique must be employed 
in a non-reductionist fashion. The political and social realms must be 
viewed as independent spheres with their own internal logic rather 
than as derived from the economic. They can interact with the economic 
in complex ways. Social, political, and legal norms and practices form 
the preconditions for the emergence and maintenance of the capital-
ist economy. As Max Weber noted, the development of normative reli-
gious structures preceded the formation of the economy. At the same 
time, however, these norms and practices can conflict with, and form 
the basis of, criticism of the direction and outcomes of the economy. At 
the same time, capitalist economic processes can have a strong impact 
on the direction of social and political practices as well, something that 
critical Marxists since Lukács have often pointed out. Such a position, 
however, challenges any neat and simple dichotomy between an eco-
nomically oriented critique and a politics of recognition. A critical the-
ory must be able to incorporate both dimensions. 
 Like Fred Block and Margaret Somers,  17  Fraser looks to the work of 
Karl Polanyi for a possible alternative. Polanyi argued that disembed-
ding markets from social connections led to a social deficit. While the 
market claims it is self-regulating, historical evidence shows it is not. 
It requires support from the government, as well as a stable financial 
system established by the government. Furthermore, Polanyi argued, 
the market left to its own devices cannot provide for the basic social 
goods needed to sustain it, such as education, health care, the provision 
of social goods, or even work. He thought that the attempt to convert 
non-economic goods into market ones led to the creation of “fictitious 
commodities.”  18  Fraser to be sure accepts much of Polanyi’s critique, 
but as noted thinks that any return to a traditional welfare state risks 
the problems associated with bureaucracy. 
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 Writing from a standpoint sympathetic to critical theory, Wendy 
Brown has attempted to assess the losses suffered as a result of the tri-
umph of neoliberalism. In her view, in its all-encompassing rationaliza-
tion and marketization of everyday life, one that goes beyond the scope 
of the late capitalist welfare state, neoliberalism is a sustained attack on 
the notion of the  demos , the people. Using a Platonic analogy, she is con-
cerned with the way that neoliberalism shapes the state and the soul. 
Neoliberalism, then, is a project concerned with eroding the foundations 
of democratic control in politics. The new political economy is attack-
ing not only the structural features of the state but also the social and 
psychological setting in which participants operate.  19  Similarly, Sanford 
Schram sees neoliberalism as a project in which the state continues to 
support accumulation while submitting ever more areas of life to the 
logic of the market.  20  Rather than countering the market, the state sup-
ports it. Instead of protecting vulnerable individuals, it subjects them to 
monitoring and shapes them so that they are required to respond to the 
market’s demands. However, neoliberalism is not simply a return to a 
laissez-faire philosophy. While it advocates deregulation, it also relies 
on government support for the conditions of accumulation and on the 
wielding of state power to shape subjects as entrepreneurial ones. 
 The Rise and Decline (?) of Neoliberalism 
 The transformation of neoliberalism from a philosophy with limited 
practical import to the dominant economic practice of our time was 
a response to the crises of the welfare state – that is, it was seen as 
the solution to the contradictions of democratic capitalism in the post-
Keynesian period. Neoliberalism established itself as the dominant 
force in economic and social policy, but it has not proved to be a long-
term solution to the problems of the welfare state. As we briefly noted, 
it is rent by its own internal tensions. Thus, neoliberal policies have 
resulted in a series of short-term solutions that have only postponed 
crises. If anything, the neoliberal era has been even more prone to crises 
than was its Keynesian predecessor.  21  
 In the post–Second World War period from 1945 until about 1974, 
Keynesianism was the dominant economic outlook in Western indus-
trialized countries. Keynes analysed the problems that led to the Great 
Depression as the result of structural instabilities in capitalist economies 
that classical theories failed to identify. Where classical economics pos-
tulated a stable equilibrium between supply and demand, Keynes held 
that demand could be unstable, especially in times of depression. The 
instabilities of the market required extensive government intervention, 
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including monetary policy, government spending to stimulate demand, 
and industrial policy. 
 Keynes’s theory, then, employed what was termed “embedded liber-
alism.” It combined a commitment to free markets and free trade with 
state policies that focused on full employment, economic growth, and 
expanded social welfare protections for individuals. State power could 
achieve these goals either by supplementing or by substituting for mar-
ket processes. In this respect states often intervened in industrial policy 
while promoting the idea of a social wage through social welfare poli-
cies that created national educational systems, health care, and other 
benefits.  22  
 Keynesian economics was thus a political economics. In pursuing 
the goals of full employment, prosperity, a social wage, and protec-
tions against capitalist dysfunctions such as periodic unemployment, 
it supported social democratic aims and worked to pacify class con-
flicts. Keynesianism, then, was compatible with a kind of class compro-
mise in which groups such as trade unions that represented the work-
ing classes had a voice in policy. “A broader consensus existed among 
economists and policymakers of the need for government intervention 
to stabilize the overall economy, prevent recessions, and maintain full 
employment.”  23  Corporations accepted unions and collective bargain-
ing, while unions accepted management’s authority over production 
in exchange for wage increases and health and retirement benefits; the 
government protected citizens from the ravages of unemployment and 
other shocks and set up various forms of social security. The creation 
of governmental and bureaucratic agencies for the purposes of regula-
tion, however, cut into profits, for those agencies required resources in 
order to regulate and stabilize the economy. Keynesianism was a form 
of corporate governance, with labour, business, and government col-
laborating to maintain prosperity. 
 The Keynesian compromise, however, also rested on a corporate-
driven, elite democratic order. Elite democracy feared popular move-
ments as essentially authoritarian and resisted those movements’ 
demands for greater participation. It was social democratic only in a 
limited sense. 
 The linkage of the political and the economic in advanced capitalism 
led, according to Habermas, to a type of legitimation crisis not found 
in classical capitalism.  24  Once the state took on the tasks of managing 
and intervening in the economy, it had to justify those interventions on 
political, often social democratic, terms while maintaining a commit-
ment to a well-functioning capitalist economy. Legitimation is a feature 
of all modern democratic societies. Authority does not stem from God 
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or tradition but from the consent of the governed. This means that gov-
ernments must justify their efforts to gain consent. While in classical 
capitalism such justifications often revolved around civil freedoms and 
the maintenance of the conditions for economic expansion and pros-
perity, in late capitalism the state must also provide for the manage-
ment of economic crises and social welfare functions. It needs to pro-
vide resources to protect citizens from the side effects and dysfunctional 
consequences of the capitalist economy.  25  
 While in classical capitalism it may have been sufficient for govern-
ment to establish the legal conditions for a market economy and to pro-
tect the rights of individuals to freely contract and reason, advanced 
capitalism is required to fulfil demands for social justice in order to 
compensate for the side effects and dysfunctional consequences of the 
capitalist economy. Claus Offe departs (as does Habermas) from the 
view held by the earlier Frankfurt School, which argued that admin-
istrative control of the economy had successfully addressed and stabi-
lized the crisis-filled nature of capitalism. Advanced capitalism must 
seek to balance legitimation with successful accumulation. While the 
Keynesian compromise rested on this elite consensus, it also generated 
political demands that went beyond this formulation. The rise of the 
new left, the civil rights movement, and the women’s movement in the 
1960s and early 1970s extended demands for political and social justice, 
greater participation in political decisions, greater social protections, 
and a more vital civic and public life. As we will discuss in chapter 6, 
the new left called for participatory democracy. The political and social 
demands made by the new left and the new social movements went 
beyond extensions of the social justice protections of the welfare state – 
they exceeded the bounds of elite consensus. 
 The crisis of the welfare state was both economic and political. Civil 
society is more than an expression of market relations. Normative struc-
tures have a logic that in many respects is independent of economics. 
They also, however, provide the normative glue that allows the econ-
omy and the state to act. Governments must foster loyalty and social 
cohesion in order to govern. They need the consent of the governed. 
Consent to a form of rule is based on ideals, on conceptions of a good 
or just life that are not simply contained by existing arrangements. Nor-
mative conceptions of legitimate government, then, are not reflections 
of the economic system and indeed are often critical of them. On the 
other hand, they can be influenced by these systems as well. 
 The elite-driven political systems of the postwar period rested on 
forms of mass politics and the concomitant generation of mass loyalty. 
Mass loyalty so understood involves assent based on often spurious 
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appeals to sentiments, such as patriotism or other values, to which in 
a passive and reactive manner people are expected to respond (“my 
country right or wrong”). Often such appeals draw on political sym-
bols that condense experiences (the flag, an imagined past or future).  26  
The use of symbols may not always be negative, but when they are 
used simply to arouse or reassure people without any further reflec-
tion or deliberation, politics becomes a mere spectacle, one designed 
to manipulate. Legitimacy requires some reflective assessment of rea-
sons as well as active participation in political processes. Rather than 
gathering citizens together to deliberate and so form a public opinion, 
a mass politics of legitimation merely seeks to mobilize the population 
in support of policies formulated by elites, without input or evaluation 
by those so mobilized. 
 The tensions in legitimation also involve a conflict between mass 
democracy and more democratic involvement and participation. It 
seems that the developmental possibilities generated by welfare state 
capitalism have created the prospect not just of taming capitalism but of 
transforming it radically. Radical democrats criticized the consumerism 
of late capitalist societies and the civic privatism that pacified citizens in 
the name of a version of civic and public life that was generally missing. 
 By the mid-1970s the Keynesian compromise had broken down. The 
state could no longer successfully balance the claims for democratic 
legitimacy and capital accumulation, at least from the perspective of 
securing simultaneously economic growth, full employment, and social 
protections. The decline of the steady growth of the postwar period 
led to crises, for without sufficient growth the contradiction inherent 
in state regulation of the economy reaches a dangerous level. The very 
tools the state uses to stabilize the economy and provide the basis for 
accumulation can work as brakes on accumulation. These tensions were 
first manifested in the simultaneous rise of inflation and unemploy-
ment. The inverse relation between inflation and unemployment that 
Keynesians had postulated broke down, even as the rate of profit also 
fell. If profit was sufficient, then businesses would accept the costs of 
the welfare state; when profits declined, however, capital no longer 
agreed to the compromise. Hence, the tensions in the welfare state came 
to the fore. These tensions reflected the difficulty of balancing profit-
ability and social welfare functions, that is, balancing administrative, 
economic, and normative imperatives in capitalism.  27  
 The legitimacy of postwar capitalism rested on creating a standard 
of living that pacified the working classes. At the same time, it had to 
provide the conditions for successful accumulation of private profit by 
capitalist enterprises. In a capitalist economy firms must accumulate 
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capital: they must make profits and reinvest them to maintain and 
expand operations. When firms either fail to make profits or have no 
incentive to invest, the economy slows and goes into a recession that 
leaves enterprises closed and people unemployed. 
 Administrative functions of government also conflicted with eco-
nomic ones. Administrative agencies used tax revenues for what busi-
nesses came to see as unproductive purposes. These forms of regula-
tion and taxation, as well as increased labour costs, were increasingly 
viewed a burden on businesses that limited accumulation. Businesses 
can fail to invest or to build due to limited profits. If governments are 
committed to the support and preservation of capitalist property, Claus 
Offe argues, these problems are always possible. Just as labour can go 
on strike for higher wages and better working conditions, businesses 
can engage in capital strikes by refusing to invest.  28  
 The Neoconservative Interregnum, Democratic 
Deficits, and the Neoliberal Reaction 
 While the breakdown of the Keynesian welfare state compromise may 
have begun with economic issues, what came to be called neoconser-
vatives mounted a political response. Critical analyses of legitimation 
crises in the 1970s were taken up by neoconservatives to explain the 
problems faced by the welfare state. They took this conflict between 
legitimation and accumulation in a very different direction – they 
sought  less democracy, not more. In their view, capitalist democracies 
were becoming ungovernable. Samuel Huntington and his colleagues 
developed one of the best-known versions of this thesis in their report 
to the Trilateral Commission.  29  Huntington diagnosed the distemper 
of democracy as a consequence of excessive demands by groups for 
equality and social justice. These demands generated a crisis because 
they delegitimized authority and trust in government; they also under-
mined claims to expertise. The push for an unsustainable equality also 
put a fiscal strain on the economy. People demanded that resources be 
distributed for the purposes of social equity in areas such as education 
and social security, at the expense of defence spending and more pro-
ductive support for capital investment. 
 From the neoconservative perspective, conflicts over resource allo-
cation were not the product of economic contradictions, as Marxists 
argued. According to Huntington, they were the result of claims for 
greater participation and more democracy. Huntington took the left-
wing critique of the difficulty – some might say impossibility – of com-
bining capitalism with democracy (in the robust sense) and gave it a 
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more conservative twist. He acknowledged the conflict between social 
justice and the economy but contended that democratic capitalism must 
be maintained despite this conflict. 
 Huntington described a situation in which the institutions of the wel-
fare state were no longer fully effective. They lacked sufficient resources 
to carry out their normative imperatives. Because the political system in 
Huntington’s view could not accommodate more radical demands for 
democratization, it constituted an internal limit of institutional struc-
ture. It was not an external force that could be eliminated. For Hun-
tington, this meant that the expansion of political democracy had to be 
checked. 
 Huntington and his colleagues employed a functionalist notion of 
politics that limits its usefulness. They viewed the political system as a 
mechanism for processing subjective demands. They understood these 
demands, and the preferences that drive them, simply as interest posi-
tions involving claims for goods and services, or even for money and 
power. They do not involve questions of the good or the just. Once 
reduced to demands for scarce resources, issues of social justice can 
easily be dismissed as expressions of selfishness that need to be limited 
and contained. 
 Neoconservatism illustrated the inability of the liberal version of 
elite democracy to accommodate the developmental possibilities that 
had been given voice by the protest movements of the 1960s and early 
1970s. Many neoconservatives, such as Daniel Moynihan, were chas-
tened liberals who had supported the New Deal and the welfare state 
but felt threatened by popular democratic initiatives. Huntington was 
a lifelong Democrat who was liberal on many issues. These old liberals 
believed that the elite directed social change; when their science failed 
them, they became sceptical about social progress and so moved in a 
conservative direction.  30  
 Neoliberals have taken the crisis identified by neoconservatives, and 
in one sense critical theorists, in a more reactionary direction. Neocon-
servatives wanted to tame democratic impulses but still supported some 
elements of the welfare state. Neoliberals, by contrast, strive to sharply 
reduce or eliminate the social safety net. They seek to change the legal 
structure so as to free a natural, spontaneous form of social order that 
has been blocked by government bureaucracy and to forcefully restruc-
ture both institutions and individual expectations. The idea of social 
rights rooted in a developmental understanding of freedom that is an 
achievement of advanced capitalist societies must be set aside. This will 
require social “unlearning,” which is to be enforced by authoritarian 
measures and the administrative monitoring of individual conduct. 
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 The neoliberal political economy has little use for popular democ-
racy and has employed austerity to alter the nature of political account-
ability.  31  The demands of markets rather than popular initiatives have 
the upper hand in deciding what states do. Now that neoliberalism 
has consolidated itself, the state faces it with a diminished capacity 
to mediate between the rights of citizens and the imperatives of capi-
talist accumulation. Neoliberals generate their own form of legitima-
tion crisis through the creation of an austerity state that is no longer 
accountable for a wide variety of government activities. The neoliberal 
“solution” to the legitimation problems of democratic capitalism seems 
largely to work to minimize forms of democratic legitimacy and the 
demands for accountability associated with the deliberative elements 
of democracy. In the process, individuals are overburdened with risk 
and precariousness. 
 Wolfgang Streeck has provided a convincing analysis of the trajec-
tory of neoliberal economic development from the fiscal crises of the 
1970s up to the present. The state has been the key battleground on 
which conflicts have been played out. Streeck sees a set of shifting 
policy commitments that have attempted to stabilize economies. Each, 
attempt, however, has created new barriers to the very stabilization it 
was intended to provide. Specifically, he sees a trajectory whereby the 
classical tax state, which reached a kind of pinnacle with the maturing 
of the Keynesian welfare state, gave way to the debt state as bourgeois 
resistance to democratic encroachments on market freedoms began to 
build. The resulting fiscal crisis led after the 1980s to the emergence 
of the consolidation state and its commitment to austerity; in various 
ways this form of state has remained in place down to the current era. 
This entire period has also witnessed the increasing financialization of 
capitalism, one element of which has been the explosive growth of pri-
vate debt, both corporate and individual, that led to the global financial 
crisis of 2008 and after.  32  
 The end of the Keynesian era was characterized by an attempt to use 
inflation to balance growth and rising wages. This strategy failed when 
the expected trade-off between inflation and unemployment no longer 
seemed to exist. In the United States, Paul Volker, chair of the Federal 
Reserve, instituted restrictive monetary policies that had a deflationary 
effect. In concert with attacks on unions, and along with deindustrial-
ization, this policy shift represented the end of the era of rising wages. 
 A second strategy involved state fiscal crises. States wanted to main-
tain social programs and other spending, but the idea of increased 
taxes in times of wage stagnation was not politically appealing. Thus, 
in the 1980s states engaged in borrowing from capital markets, which 
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they had previously liberalized. We might call this strategy “privatized 
Keynesianism.” Streeck argues that this approach worked for a time 
to maintain social programs, but by the 1990s financial markets and 
private investors had rebelled and governments were forced to cut 
back. Privatization of government services and further deregulation 
were employed to balance budgets, but without tax revenues the state’s 
power was reduced. 
 The third strategy that was employed in the later 1990s was the 
offloading of debt from public to private sources. Deregulated financial 
markets led to a massive increase in private debt, which along with 
speculation on tech stocks was responsible for the boom of the late 1990s. 
This strategy included the financialization of subprime mortgages that 
led to the crash of 2008. In the years since, central banks have bought 
up debt from failing banks and given out loans to these banks in order 
to stabilize markets and add cash. Austerity has kept inflation in check 
by restricting demand, and low interest rates and quantitative easing 
(i.e., the injection of money by central banks through the purchase of 
financial instruments) have been used to encourage investment. These 
have had a stabilizing effect and have produced satisfactory economic 
growth. Meanwhile, however, states plagued by debt, such as Greece, 
have experienced severe fiscal and social crises. 
 Each of these strategies has become exhausted, and it is not clear how 
much longer the current strategy will be effective as central banks have 
continued to embrace quantitative easing, which may bring back a cer-
tain amount of inflation. The stagnant wages of the last thirty years 
have not risen in any meaningful way. 
 Thus, Streeck sees an ideological shift that is not only transforming 
the social interests influencing the state but also creating a deeper dem-
ocratic deficit. The debt-based state of the first stages of neoliberalism 
has been replaced by the austerity-centred consolidation state. The con-
solidation state places the needs of debt reduction over public services 
and the public good. It has in large measure transferred the costs of 
debt to private citizens in the form of taxes as well as reduced services 
(which must now be paid for through private expenditure). No longer 
is a balance sought between the needs of accumulation and those of 
legitimation; accumulation itself has become the primary justification 
for economic policy. (Elements of this transformation of accumulation 
into legitimation were already present in the 1970s, when what was 
called by neo-Marxists at the time the fiscal crisis of the state began to 
make itself felt.) The political demands for the correction or mitigation 
of the dysfunctional effects of advanced capitalism are economically 
(and politically) impossible to meet. Yet despite a series of measures 
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that have shifted the balance in favour of business – such as privatiza-
tion, deregulation, outsourcing of debt to the public, low interest rates, 
and the weakening organized labour – the economy has not recovered. 
The austerity state is legitimized as a necessity, and this justifies the 
impoverishment and punishment of the socially vulnerable. 
 Other theorists, agreeing with Wendy Brown and Sanford Schram, 
emphasize the role of the state in neoliberalism. Werner Bonefeld and 
Jamie Peck, for example, both stress the need for a strong state in neo-
liberalism, though it has taken different forms in different nations.  33  
Neoliberalism, as we noted above and discuss below, does not employ 
a model of the state as simple nightwatchman. Neoliberals do not fully 
endorse the idea of the invisible hand that would benignly shape the 
market without intrusion. To the contrary, neoliberalism requires a 
strong state to shape and guarantee the workings of the free market 
and to defend the market against the dangers and challenges of social-
ism. The neoliberal state uses the creation of austerity and crisis to force 
changes that benefit the interests of corporate capitalism even while 
creating precarity and debt. 
 The construction of the strong state, and the priority it gives to eco-
nomic over political freedom, is an important element in the authoritar-
ian tendencies in neoliberalism. Bonefeld has used the term “authoritar-
ian liberalism” to describe one version of neoliberalism.  34  Increasingly, 
forms of political participation by ordinary citizens are being restricted. 
 Deregulation and Marketization as Political Interventions 
 The market, and especially the capitalist market, was far from a return 
to spontaneous social order, as Hayek claimed; it did not arise sponta-
neously but rather through deliberate political action.  35  Capitalist mar-
ket society, as theorists from Marx to Weber to Polanyi have shown, 
was the result of a long struggle to implement the required institutions 
and social norms. For the capitalist economic order to operate there 
must be, at a minimum, state-sanctioned property rights, enforceable 
contracts, and a currency of exchange. The state supports the capitalist 
market society through economic policies, infrastructure, legal order, 
and regulation of competition. It is in all respects an instituted order. Of 
course, as Weber well noted, these initiatives must be accompanied by 
cultural changes as reflected in religion, ethics, and personality struc-
ture. Though these developed in many ways independently of the mar-
ket, they clearly work to support it. The world of individual freedom 
in which we are free to pursue our economic self-interest in the mar-
ket is one that has been created through social and political struggle. 
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Neoliberalism is not a return to spontaneous order but itself an insti-
tuted order founded on certain normative ideas. While we must follow 
the ways in which neoliberalism has rolled back forms of the welfare 
state, we also must be clear that neoliberalism is the result of deliberate 
policies – policies that are themselves the product of political forces and 
that by no means eliminate all types of regulation or government action. 
 If the capitalist market is not a natural phenomenon but one that is 
politically and socially constructed, it is reasonable to consider eco-
nomic deregulation and marketization not simply as policies to restore 
profitability but simultaneously as political interventions. In the same 
way, the task of steering political decisions is partly privatized. 
 Deregulation and marketization shift decisions from the realm of 
public, political deliberation to a private realm where choices that 
affect the political fate of others are made without popular engagement. 
Especially in the United States, several sectors of industry have been 
deregulated, including transportation (airlines, railways, and truck-
ing); energy (natural gas and electricity); communications (television, 
radio, telephone, the internet); and the financial and banking indus-
try. In addition, many regulatory agencies have been captured by the 
industries they regulate and have become ineffective in carrying out 
existing rules. 
 Deregulation is aimed at reducing the costs of government action 
on business and supposedly allowing for greater efficiency. This has 
political implications. Deregulation means that, for example, decisions 
concerning the fairness of economic competition, the public interest 
obligations of radio, television, telephone, and now internet services, 
the health and safety of consumers (including protection from harmful 
or deficient products), and the safety of drugs and medical products are 
increasingly limited or eliminated altogether. Enterprises are no longer 
accountable to the populace for the side effects of capitalist economic 
activities. 
 A second neoliberal strategy is privatization. Publicly run business 
services and utilities are sold to private enterprises, while other sec-
tors are opened to private competition. In Europe and in other places 
where there has been a history of public ownership, there has been 
more extensive privatization on the national level. In the United States, 
however, much of the impetus for privatization has taken place on the 
state and municipal level. Services from towing and garbage pick-up 
to social provision have been outsourced, and more recently this has 
extended to state institutions such as prisons. Charter schools, which 
are also licensed by the state, are another example of the outsourcing 
of public services to private enterprises. Such services are said to be 
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more efficient and responsive to consumer demand. According to their 
proponents, deregulation and privatization, along with other measures 
such as reduced taxes, are supposed to unleash investment and innova-
tion and create jobs. Deregulation, it is claimed, leads to lower prices 
and better and more efficient services. 
 Related to but distinct from deregulation and privatization, marketi-
zation refers to the conversion of non-market sectors to market impera-
tives. A prime example of this process is found in education.  36  The edu-
cational system no doubt has produced students who can fit into the 
economy in various roles, but it is their usefulness that provides the 
value. In addition, students have often developed critical capacities that 
may lead to dissent. The marketization of higher education is exempli-
fied in the use of private sector management models at universities and 
the transformation of the student–teacher relationship into one between 
a service provider and a consumer. But more than this, universities 
are increasingly conceived as organizations whose main purpose is to 
facilitate profit-making, for both the university and private industry. 
Universities sell patents, provide consulting services, and launch pri-
vate companies; in addition, they have become increasingly involved in 
leisure and conference services, much like private enterprises. 
 Marketization, then, is a process that brings to mind what Habermas 
called the colonization of the lifeworld. Here social relations, which are 
rooted in normative structures, become commodified. It is not just work 
relations that are turned into commodities, but relationships central to 
social reproduction. At this point, however, colonization becomes not 
just an economic process but a political one as well. As one observer 
notes, it is difficult to avoid concluding that marketization is as much 
about social engineering as economic concerns. In practice, a quasi-
market in higher education propped up by state subsidies and micro-
managed through government intervention coexists with genuine 
market-driven activities. 
 The Decline of Political Parties and Participation 
 Under the terms of neoliberal economics, governments have much less 
control over economic processes. The interests of finance and large cor-
porations predominate over questions of social rights and welfare. As 
alternatives are increasingly dictated by economic interests, the manoeu-
vrability of political parties has become limited. In the United States, for 
example, the cliché that the two main political parties are largely the 
same comes close to reality. Under these conditions, faith in the demo-
cratic system as a force for change is diminished and participation in 
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politics declines. Writers such as Colin Crouch and Jacques Rancière 
have used the term post-democracy to refer to a situation in which there 
are the formal conditions of democracy such as elections, congressional 
or parliamentary representation, and competing parties, but these insti-
tutions have little or no influence on actual political decisions.  37  Real 
policy is made in private. For Crouch, politics has become a “strictly 
controlled show, organized by professional experts and limited to a few 
topics chosen by these experts, while most inhabitants have only been 
assigned a passive role.”  38  
 Where participation is possible, it is relatively fruitless. Elites, espe-
cially economic elites, now almost completely dominate legislative 
affairs. Benjamin Page has noted the effects of this situation: even as 
public interest groups have arisen, it is the case that “contrary to what 
decades of political science research might lead you to believe, ordinary 
citizens have virtually no influence over what their government does 
in the United States.” Martin Gilens and Benjamin Page have called 
this “economic elite domination”; Sheldon Wolin has characterized it 
as managed democracy.  39  
 Wolin developed the idea of inverted totalitarianism to describe the 
notion of a market state ruled by an economic elite. While his historical 
analysis is somewhat flawed by a tendency to collapse postwar late cap-
italism into neoliberalism, he does capture something important about 
the structure of authority in contemporary politics. The possibility of 
democracy in America (and, as we are seeing, in Europe as well) has 
been significantly diminished. Indeed, we may have reached a crisis 
point from which we could easily lose any possibility of meaningful 
democracy for a generation or more. 
 Neoliberal Theory and the Problem of Popular Sovereignty: 
From the Threat of Totalitarianism to the Dangers of 
the Welfare State 
 Writing in the shadow of the Second World War and the ensuing cold 
war, Friedrich von Hayek and Karl Popper held that the central chal-
lenge facing Western democracies was the threat of totalitarianism. 
By this term they meant not only fascism and authoritarianism more 
broadly, but also communism, socialism, and even social democracy. 
Democracy could only flourish in a capitalist economy. The free market 
was the crucial buttress against these modern forms of tyranny, which 
in their collectivist orientation subordinated the freedom of the indi-
vidual to a central authority. For Hayek especially, economic freedom 
was more crucial than political freedom.  40  
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 Here democracy was understood negatively. It was seen primarily as 
a protection against tyranny rather than as a positive achievement that 
ensured people’s sovereignty. Neither Popper nor Hayek was enam-
oured of popular sovereignty. The former worried that the popular will 
would oppress minorities, that the majority would be undemocratic, 
indeed despotic. The latter felt that political authority was legitimated 
not by popular sovereignty but by unchanging natural laws that pre-
scribed the fundamental norms of society. More than natural rights, 
these laws formed the basis of a permanent order of things, one that 
could not be superseded by the popular will. 
 For Hayek, social order is a spontaneous natural process, not a mat-
ter of social construction or central state action. Reminiscent of Adam 
Smith’s invisible hand, his position held that order comes into being 
through the unintended coordination of intentional action. This idea 
of unintended coordination applies not only to the market but also 
to other aspects of social life. Thus, sovereignty does not arise out the 
deliberate actions of subjects but because of certain laws and structures 
that secure the freedom of spontaneously acting subjects. There is no 
common good for Hayek, only a set of formal conditions for freedom. 
 However, even given their reservations about or even hostility 
towards democracy, theorists of neoliberalism, such as Hayek and later 
Friedman, did not conceive of the state in classical nightwatchman form. 
They understood that the mid-twentieth century conditions required a 
different approach. The state has become the guarantor and protector 
of the economy. State power not only secures the conditions of success-
ful accumulation through regulation of banking and trade but also has 
become the power of last resort that when called upon steps in to shore 
up the market against failures that have become all too common in the 
neoliberal era. The early neoliberals did not reject the use of state power 
even as they preached privatization and deregulation. 
 This commitment to a strong state buttressing a “free market” econ-
omy has both historical and theoretical roots. Ordo-liberalism, which 
developed in Germany in the 1930s, employed the notion of a social 
market economy that recognized the role of the state in creating the con-
ditions of a market economy but combined this with a minimal notion 
of the welfare state. Rejecting pure  laissez-faire , ordo-liberals wanted 
to use state power to oppose monopolies and promote some degree 
of social justice. They recognized that whatever its virtues, capitalism 
could have destructive effects. Such views were also held by postwar 
neoliberals such as Karl Popper and Isaiah Berlin, as well as members 
of the Chicago School, including Henry Simons, the teacher of Milton 
Friedman.  41  Even Hayek, who opposed the ordo-liberals, accepted 
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some limited forms of welfare. In  The Road to Serfdom he argues that 
“[t]he only question here is whether in the particular instance the 
advantages gained are greater than the social costs which they impose. 
Nor is the preservation of competition incompatible with an extensive 
system of social services – so long as the organization of these services 
is not designed in such a way as to make competition ineffective over 
wide fields.”  42  This somewhat vague statement was criticized by John 
Maynard Keynes, who pointed out that this formulation failed to draw 
a clear demarcation or limit on intervention. Hayek’s position could 
thus justify a wide variety of state interventions that he did not intend 
to justify. Since in this period he was primarily concerned with oppos-
ing totalitarianism, he did not pay great attention to this problem. How-
ever, later neoliberals would take a more radical turn. 
 Although not totally opposed to welfare measures, neoliberals 
rejected the New Deal and the Keynesian conception of social rights.  43  
Hayek, for example, viewed the state in legal rational terms. It could 
only make general rules that did not favour ends. He echoed the criti-
cism that the welfare state tried to guarantee substantive ends or goods 
and thus distorted the free market. Like Berlin, he could only conceive 
of a state that protected negative rights. Positive rights violated the 
terms of the legal rational state. Social services would have to protect 
negative rights or at least be compatible with them. 
 The next generation of neoliberals, led by Milton Friedman, was 
much more concerned with the internal problems of the welfare state 
than with the totalitarian threat to the open society. These neoliberals 
departed from the assumptions of the earlier thinkers in several ways; 
the most important for our purposes was that they accepted monopoly. 
Unlike earlier theorists such as Ludwig Von Mises and Hayek, Fried-
man did not see monopoly as a problem for a market economy. The ills 
of monopoly were explained away either as the result of government 
actions or, if not, as insignificant. For their part, however, labour unions 
were guilty of bad market behaviour: they restrained competition and 
distorted market outcomes. 
 This later generation of neoliberals provided a rationale for the exis-
tence of large corporations that had enough power to influence if not 
control markets. They did not seek to break up the large corporations 
that dominated the economy. (Henry Simons, however, was a staunch 
proponent of anti-trust measures; in this sense he was much closer to 
the ordo-liberals.) Contemporary neoliberal theory is often quite com-
fortable with monopoly or oligopolistic conditions. Richard Posner 
has argued that monopoly conditions do not lead to monopoly pric-
ing. Others have claimed that competitive conditions exist even under 
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monopoly or duopoly if the conditions of entry are not onerous. Thus, 
analysts ought to be careful about too easily assimilating neoliberalism 
to classical liberalism. The establishment and maintenance of market 
fundamentalism requires a more activist state than the classical liberals 
envisioned. 
 In 1951 Milton Friedman outlined the positive functions of the state. 
While rejecting what he called collectivism, like the ordo-liberals he 
argued that a pure  laissez-faire approach fails as well. In addition to the 
functions of a nightwatchman, the state has an important role to play 
in economic regulation of, for example, the money supply. Though he 
accepted monopoly, he recognized that businesses could gain the power 
to coerce individuals and that in a complex society the government has 
a minimal obligation to aid the poor: 
 Neo-liberalism would accept the nineteenth century liberal emphasis on 
the fundamental importance of the individual, but it would substitute for 
the nineteenth century goal of laissez-faire as a means to this end, the goal 
of the competitive order. It would seek to use competition among produc-
ers to protect consumers from exploitation, competition among employ-
ers to protect workers and owners of property, and competition among 
consumers to protect the enterprises themselves. The state would police 
the system, establish conditions favorable to competition and prevent 
monopoly, provide a stable monetary framework, and relieve acute mis-
ery and distress. The citizens would be protected against the state by the 
existence of a free private market and from each other by the preservation 
of competition.  44  
 While Friedman accepted charity for the poor, for him this did not entail 
an acceptance of social entitlements. 
 Where the earlier neoliberals saw some role for social services, Fried-
man saw little. His fundamentalism extended to marketizing social ser-
vices. He was a strong supporter of school vouchers and the privatiza-
tion of all social services – for example, through housing vouchers and 
work-for-welfare programs. Friedman argued that such private services 
are inherently more cost-effective and responsive to consumer demand. 
These reforms, however, still require a strong state – not a mere watch-
man. The state must still administer programs and enforce compliance. 
Individuals or groups must be monitored, measured, and shaped to 
conform to the idea of market subjects who display the appropriate 
motivation and work discipline. 
 Freidman also doubts the power of popular sovereignty. Since eco-
nomic freedom is the precondition for political freedom, capitalism is 
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the necessary condition of personal and political freedom. Where there 
is no economic freedom there can be no political freedom.  45  
 In giving priority to economic freedom over political freedom, Fried-
man argues that under certain historical conditions there can be free 
markets without subsequent political freedoms. He cites Bismarck’s 
Germany, Japan before the First World War, tsarist Russia, fascist Spain, 
and fascist Italy as examples of capitalist markets without political free-
doms. Whatever their limitations, Friedman considers these societies 
superior to “totalitarian” societies in which there is no economic free-
dom: “Even in those societies [i.e., authoritarian states] the citizenry 
had a good deal more freedom than citizens of a modern totalitarian 
state like Russia or Nazi Germany, in which economic totalitarianism is 
combined with political totalitarianism.”  46  
 As examples of this “freedom” Friedman cites tsarist Russia and 
other countries where one could change jobs. Private property pro-
vided a check on the power of the state. This sort of freedom, how-
ever, is a purely private. Even the role of civil rights is unclear. Public 
freedom, which includes the ability to act in common and deliber-
ate with others, is ignored. We can see here the basis of Friedman’s 
statement that he preferred dictatorship to socialism – recalling his 
view of the 1973 coup in Chile. Structural adjustments imposed by 
outside powers can be defended because they create the conditions 
for freedom. 
 Capitalism for Friedman is thus the basis of the good life. It guar-
antees prosperity and freedom for all. In fact, Friedman predicted that 
when neoliberal policies were put in place, prosperity for the common 
worker as well as for the plutocrat would result. (Thus far his prediction 
has not been fulfilled.) Friedman sees the primacy of the economic as 
a way of decentralizing authority and taking it out of the orbit of state 
control. Because he is tone deaf to the effects of concentrated economic 
power, he has no sense of its inequality-generating force. 
 Friedman employs a limited notion of freedom. The subject is the pri-
vate individual who chooses alternatives in the context of the choices of 
others. Social order is the coordination of these choices. Yet this notion 
of freedom is incapable of accounting for the very ends that Friedman 
supposes: the creative entrepreneurial subject who creates new ideas 
or products; and the democratic subject that he claims is the result of 
economic freedom. What Friedman provides is a form of freedom with-
out autonomy. It privileges the freedom to exchange and choose over 
the freedom to reflexively guide one’s own life. It lacks any concep-
tion of the notion that social and public–political freedom is central to 
autonomy. 
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 In the postwar period, the emergence of neoliberalism as a politi-
cal force was closely related to the rise of rational choice theory. Of 
course, rational choice and neoliberalism are not equivalent. Yet they 
both shared a concern with welfare economics and with the problems of 
popular sovereignty. Economists and political scientists such as James 
Buchanan, Gordon Tullock, and William Riker expanded the market 
assumptions of rational choice economics to political theory.  47  They 
drew on and extended the work of Nobel Prize–winning economist, 
Kenneth Arrow, who held that no model of collective choice could be 
derived from the premises of individual choice. Like earlier neoliberals, 
Arrow held that his conception of the sovereignty of consumer choice 
was a vital buttress against the threat of collectivism. Arrow’s theorem 
posed a real challenge to Marxist and republican theories like that of 
Rousseau, which stress the importance of a popular will. 
 These premises had great appeal to political scientists who sought 
to put their discipline on a secure scientific basis and at the same time 
counter the challenge of “collectivist” or socialist political and economic 
thought. Using Arrow’s theorem, they rejected theories of the general 
will or popular sovereignty as the basis of political legitimacy. From the 
standpoint of rational choice theory, William Riker was very sceptical 
of ideas of the general will – for him, the latter was simply an illusion. 
In line with Hayek and Popper, rational choice theorists equated such 
conceptions with socialist and totalitarian systems that put the group 
ahead of the individual. The basic legitimating principle for politics was 
the same as that of economics – individual consumer choice. The con-
ditions of democracy could be fulfilled or only when individuals were 
afforded the freedom to choose. 
 However, this whole edifice rested on a questionable first premise: 
the idea that individual consumer choice can serve as the basic feature 
of politics. It provided the equivalent of a logical  simple in this system, 
which was unchanging and unaffected by other conditions. It was in a 
sense a purely independent variable. 
 We believe this premise is incorrect. Our choices and preferences are 
not independent of social arrangements but are affected by a whole 
set of conditions, such as the normative background and structures of 
power in society. Moreover, as a social theory it flounders on the prob-
lem of order. It cannot explain how individuals are bound together as 
members of a society. The systematic aims of rational choice theories 
mean that they cannot avail themselves of Hayek’s notion of spontane-
ous social order but need to construct the bases of social order from the 
ground up. They cannot account for the intersubjective bases of social 
life rooted in mutual accountability that we discussed in chapter 2. 
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 Neoliberal and rational choice theories question the bases of dem-
ocratic legitimacy. Voting is seen as an essentially irrational act and 
popular deliberation as irredeemably collectivist. Gordon Tullock and 
James Buchanan reconceive the constitutional system as a market trans-
action. Following a social contract model, they claim that people give 
their obedience to government because they benefit from the rule of 
law. The amount of authority they surrender is the subject of cost–ben-
efit analysis. They interpret this as a form of consumer sovereignty and 
reject notions of social welfare altogether. In opposition to majority rule, 
which they find inefficient and unjustified, they believe that basic rules 
need unanimous consent. 
 William Riker ultimately argues that voting is only irrational as a 
form of populist expression designed to establish a common will. It 
can be rational, however, when exerted as a veto power, that is, as the 
negative liberty to vote someone out. Rational choice sees this as a con-
straint on the behaviour of leaders who will not want to lose power.  48  
This exerts constraints on the coercive authority of government. Such a 
theory does not seem to explain, however, the workings of power both 
in the formation of leaders and in the capacity to change the rules and 
rig the system. 
 By contrast, James Buchanan interprets the rise of bureaucratic power 
in a neoliberal manner. He argues that legislatures have limited con-
trol over bureaucracies and holds that we should view government as 
a competition between prospective monopolists (parties) that seek to 
maximize their own ends instead of serving sovereign consumers, as 
would a purely competitive market system. Seen in this way, govern-
ment is not a mechanism for citizens to obtain collective goods and ser-
vices, but an exploiter. Government has gotten out of hand. Buchanan 
thinks that constitutional limits must be placed on it. He viewed his 
own work as providing an important major contribution to the process 
of establishing such limits.  49  
 Even these constructions, which are aimed at limited government, 
seem to us to leave questions of the scope and extent of authority in the 
lurch. The notion of consumer sovereignty leaves a great deal open for 
arbitrary authority. Neoliberalism in practice requires a larger and more 
ominous source of political power than most of its proponents realize, 
or, if they realize it, than they are prepared to admit. 
 Both positions discussed here reject any idea of popular sovereignty 
as the ground of democratic political authority. These theories accept 
notions of individual choice but are incapable of addressing questions 
of  how individuals create binding social relations through intersubjec-
tive action. Many of the active characteristics of citizenship are lost in 
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the process, such as the ability to deliberate and act in concert. Individu-
als are little more than isolated consumers who are at best aggregated as 
choosers without a common orientation. This is the neoliberal perspec-
tive on democracy. Citizen-consumers are passive spectators presented 
with alternatives brought forward by elite providers of political goods. 
 Neoliberalism and Authoritarian Liberalism 
 While elite democratic theories held that voters choose leaders who 
then formulate policies initiated by elites, they also retained a pluralis-
tic conception of pressure groups that influence policy. Of course, elite 
democrats, like the neoliberals, rejected the notion of widespread par-
ticipation in political deliberations and decisions. Pressure groups were 
understood in terms of self-interest, and widespread participation ran 
the risk of encouraging the growth of populism, whereby the unedu-
cated masses would rule. Elite theorists were not, however, necessarily 
opposed to the welfare state. 
 The neoliberal conception diverges from the elite pluralist model in 
that it fundamentally rejects the notion of pluralism associated with 
democratic elitism. In contrast to pluralist thinkers, neoliberal theorists 
move in the direction of a more aggressive, disciplinary liberalism, 
whose origins can be traced to the political, economic, and social crises 
of the Weimar Republic in Germany in the 1920s and early 1930s. The 
legal scholar Hermann Heller used the term authoritarian liberalism to 
refer to Carl Schmidt’s conception of a state that was both strong and 
weak: strong when required to protect capitalism and private property 
from popular, pluralist democratic forces pursuing redistribution; but 
weak insofar as it permitted the market as an ostensibly self-regulating 
and self-directing source of freedom and prosperity to function with 
little or no political intervention, even though political authority was 
essential for the institution of market relations themselves. 
 Thus, authoritarian liberalism clearly supports a strong state when 
it comes to the regulation and control of subjects. As Wolfgang Streeck 
notes in his commentary on Heller, 
 the freedom of the market from state interference that defines a liberal 
and indeed, a liberal-capitalist economy is not a state of nature but is and 
needs to be politically constructed, publicly instituted and enforced by 
state power. The depoliticized condition of a liberal economy is itself an 
outcome of politics, in the sense of a specific use of the authority of the 
state for a specific political purpose – it is a political construction that 
must be politically defended against the possibility of political authority 
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falling into the hands of social forces that might use it for non-liberal, mar-
ket-subverting objectives.  50  
 The market economy was, then, a social construct. For authoritar-
ian liberals, it did not exist independently of state power but was the 
 creation of that power. At the same time, the strong state was needed to 
guarantee that those who might wish to undermine or subvert the mar-
ket through redistributive policies, or who threatened private property, 
were kept at bay. 
 For authoritarian liberals, the state must exercise coercion to suppress 
and shape the behaviour of those who pose a threat by advocating for 
democratic reforms that would also regulate the market. Neoliberal 
authoritarianism is more subtle: cloaking themselves in calls for free-
dom, neoliberals seek to reward winners and punish those who lose in 
free market competition. In this respect, it suggests similarities to Wendy 
Brown’s account of the shaping of the state and the self. Streeck detects 
a similar outlook in German ordo-liberalism, which we discussed ear-
lier – although its idea of the social market would seem to provide some 
room for a limited welfare state, just as Hayek had done. Streeck sees 
this as a development that runs counter to the position developed by 
the earlier Frankfurt theorists, who as we have seen believed that the 
emergence of extensive state intervention to address the problems and 
contradictions of capitalism meant there could be no return to a market-
guided economy. 
 The contemporary version of authoritarian liberalism, according to 
Streeck, is found in neoliberalism. And although ordo-liberalism has 
been broadly more accommodating of state intervention in the capital-
ist market economy to secure some measure of social protection, Streeck 
nonetheless still views it as crucial for the rise of neoliberalism, in both 
theory and practice. In his view, ordo-liberalism has built “a bridge 
from the authoritarian liberalism of interwar Germany, as conceived 
by Schmitt and analysed by Heller, to the neoliberalism that began to 
dismantle the post-war political economy in the 1980s.”  51  So for Streeck, 
 [t]oday’s post-democratic, or better perhaps: a-democratic Hayekian 
capitalism, after the victory, or almost-victory, of neoliberalism, may be 
regarded as a historically updated version of ordo-liberalism. What it has 
in common with it is the insulation of a politically instituted market econ-
omy from democratic politics, an insulation because of which both the 
neoliberal state and the neoliberal economic regime qualify as authoritar-
ian in the sense of Schmitt and Heller … [T]he language of authority being 
out of fashion in today’s Europe, it must be replaced with a mixture of 
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technocratic claims to superior expertise and resigned submission to the 
“realities” of globalization.  52  
 What is particularly disturbing for Streeck is precisely the fact that, 
as noted above, Hermann Heller developed his account in response to 
the position of Carl Schmitt. More specifically, Heller identified authori-
tarian liberalism as Schmitt’s counterpoint to what Schmitt saw as the 
Weimar “total state” with its strongly interventionist and in his view 
potentially dangerous democratic presence throughout the economy 
and society. Ordo-liberalism and (now) neoliberalism thus have unset-
tling historical antecedents in fascism. Indeed, as Streeck sees it, with 
the rise of Nazism Schmitt himself in effect abandoned the authoritar-
ian liberal model, which with the triumph of fascism was no longer 
needed. And Schmitt’s critique of the “total state” foreshadowed com-
parable attacks on excessive state intervention that accompanied the 
emergence of neoliberal opposition to the postwar Keynesian welfare 
state – yet another disturbing implication of Schmitt’s position. 
 The political character of economic distribution that characterized the 
Keynesian era is reversed but still held in place by political structures, 
while at the same time individuals are subject to market discipline. The 
idea of a totally “free” market, a kind of pure state of nature, is a chi-
mera. However, to get at the processes that operate in contemporary 
neoliberalism we need to examine how initiatives such as privatization 
and deregulation create an increasingly risky and precarious situation 
for individuals. 
 Guy Standing provides a more precise definition of the what has 
come to be called the precariat: it refers not just to the vulnerability that 
many people feel, but to the formation of a new social class that differs 
from the traditional proletariat. The traditional working class lacked 
ownership of the means of production and thus was required to sell 
its labour, whereas the new “class” is characterized by permanent and 
structural underemployment and forms of unpaid work.  53  The precariat 
can include workers displaced by globalization, or those with no skills 
and no future, as well as young professionals in highly industrialized 
societies with scant chances for employment in their fields. But it can be 
found in all parts of the global economy, even in developed industrial-
ized societies where access to a profession increasingly requires unpaid 
apprenticeships or other low-paid forms of work, and social connec-
tions besides. Possession of formal academic or technical credentials 
often means little.  54  
 For Standing, the problem lies in the new ideas about work in the neo-
liberal era. Not just neoliberals but even welfare state liberals adopted 
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the idea that “labour market flexibility” was required to keep costs 
down and to prevent capital from fleeing to low-cost countries. But 
this meant that labour conditions became more insecure. Here Stand-
ing’s ideas call to mind the notion of fluid modernity, although he has 
a narrower focus. The precariat is not simply a more flexible middle 
class; rather, its members have no security or benefits. With Ulrich Beck 
he sees the risks in social life being passed down to those who must 
somehow find by themselves the resources needed to mitigate these 
risks. For Standing, this insecurity is the result not of technology but of 
economics. 
 From Authoritarian Liberalism to Reactionary Populism 
 Neoliberals have difficulty accepting democratic authority. Since they 
see economic freedom as prior to political freedom, they will sacrifice the 
former to the latter. However, consent for neoliberal initiatives requires 
a new form of mass politics in which the underclass, immigrants, and 
other outsiders are used as scapegoats to justify anti-democratic poli-
cies. Far from a simple return to a state of freedom, whereby the removal 
of restraints and government programs will lead to a spontaneous and 
free order, neoliberalism adopts revanchist or reactionary mass politics 
to win approval. 
 American politics is becoming more authoritarian and less open to 
public deliberation. The political system is no longer a vehicle for citi-
zen participation. Many observers have noted the increasing polariza-
tion of political parties in America. For example, a recent survey by 
the Pew Foundation suggests that the increasing polarization of politi-
cal views is reflective of other social changes.  55  Citizens with different 
political viewpoints are becoming more and more polarized; they get 
their news from different sources and live increasingly segregated lives. 
Up to half of all committed conservatives get their news exclusively 
from one source: Fox News (liberals seem more likely to use multiple 
sources). Most analysts see more ideological division and a declining 
centre. They see fewer points of contact between opposing groups. 
Rather than a public sphere in which people are exposed to diverse 
ideas, they see restricted and indeed almost privatized publics that 
get information only from outlets expressing and legitimizing similar 
perspectives. 
 Morris Fiorina provides a forceful dissent to this thesis.  56  He argues 
that if there were polarization there would be more Democrats and 
Republicans; but in fact, there are more independents. Thus, he claims 
that most individuals’ preferences have not changed. However, Fiorina 
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makes a problematic assumption: that those who are independent are 
necessarily in the middle of the political spectrum – which is not always 
true. The bigger problem arises from the fact that Fiorina focuses on the 
majority of populace and not on the elite; thus, he misses the power 
of elites to set the agenda for politics. In Christopher Lasch’s phrase, 
we face a revolt of the elites.  57  Significant elements of these elites have 
essentially given up on the vision of a democratic America and have 
increasingly separated themselves economically, culturally, and politi-
cally from the lower classes. 
 It is here that analysts see a significant change in politics and in the 
psychological bases of politics. For Marc Hetherington and Jonathan Wei-
ler,  58  these developments are the correlate of world views, sets of value 
orientations, and beliefs that are “connected to a visceral sense of right 
and wrong.” In other words, we should look at the lifeworld of the par-
ticipants, and their sense of that world, to get a grip on contemporary 
forms of polarization. That sense includes not just politics but other social 
practices, such as childrearing and gender roles. Hetherington and Weiler 
argue that it is not just the beliefs of partisans that determine the extent 
of authoritarian politics; it is also the style of these world views and the 
ways they orient people to the world. They see an increasingly authoritar-
ian style, especially on the right, one that is driven by fear and insecurity. 
Authoritarians see the world as a fragile and besieged place and often 
see their supposed opponents as radically “other” and thus threatening. 
Authoritarians tend to separate the world into “in” and “out” groups and 
to be hostile towards those others who do not share their views. Thus 
they tend towards more combative relations with enemies, who must be 
destroyed or put down. They also tend to lack affect and sympathy for 
those in subaltern groups who do not share their views. 
 American political scientists and historians has tended to focus on 
the authoritarian potential of mass democracy and populism. For Rich-
ard Hofstadter, writing with a post–Second World War sensibility, all 
populism is linked to the threat of dictatorship.  59  One of the greatest 
threats to the political system is that the less educated masses will, 
through their fears of “status anxiety” and irrational thinking, respond 
to populist appeals and open themselves to demagogues like Joseph 
McCarthy (and, presumably, Donald Trump). Hofstadter identified a 
paranoid style in politics, a mindset in which conspiracies abounded. 
While he was by no means a pure apologist for liberalism, he underes-
timated the progressive potential of populism in American life, as well 
as the potential strength of elites. 
 Elites exhibit a greater tendency and need for ideological coherence 
and greater interest in, and involvement in, government. In the process 
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of becoming political activists, participants often must take on a more 
explicit ideology – and for conservatives, increasing ideological rigid-
ity. In Europe and the United States, significant elements of these elites 
with authoritarian sympathies have been attracted to the ideologies of 
the new right. Others, less radical, have nonetheless moved towards 
a more coherent version of activist conservatism that seeks to restrict 
popular participation in the name of economic freedom. 
 Yet Hofstadter, who was also influenced by more progressive think-
ers like C. Wright Mills and Theodor Adorno, has turned out to be cor-
rect in one respect.  60  A conservative form of populism that manifests 
elements of the paranoid style has become a feature of mainstream 
politics in America. The everyday experiences of significant segments 
of the population have been shaped by the declining fortunes of the 
middle and working classes, whose increasing vulnerability and pre-
carious status have led them in the direction of a reactionary populism. 
People in this situation can come to feel powerless and alienated from 
political institutions and to blame their problems on elites who ignore 
them. Along with many on the left, they object to the negative effects of 
neoliberal policies on the economy – in particular, they object to “free 
trade” agreements and the concomitant export of jobs. 
 The crises of neoliberalism are not just economic. The precarious 
character of contemporary life and the offloading of social risks onto 
the backs of the middle and under classes has led to a sense of griev-
ance, powerlessness, and danger among segments of the population. 
Some have reacted to the situation with an awareness of the power 
relationships that are at the root of these problems. For other groups, 
however, the vulnerabilities that have been magnified under neoliberal-
ism are not just economic; they also trigger often unconscious cultural 
anxiety about pollution and purity, about threats posed to national or 
cultural identity by external forces and internal enemies. The sense of 
powerlessness leaves segments of the population open to the appeal of 
demagogic leaders. 
 The members of the first generation of the Frankfurt School were aware 
that authoritarian tendencies were found not only in Germany but also in 
democratic countries such as the United States. In the work of agitators 
like Father Charles Coughlin, who, based in a Detroit-area church, built 
a following in the 1930s using radio, they saw many of the main themes 
found in fascist rhetoric.  61  While such agitators remained decidedly on 
the margins of American society, the Frankfurt theorists worried that this 
could change. Writing in 1970 with Richard Nixon and George Wallace 
in mind, Herbert Marcuse warned that the tactics of such agitators were 
now part of the mainstream. This seems true today as well. 
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 What does increasing polarization mean for the political system? The 
notion that the “vital centre” is being lost is perhaps too much of a 
hangover from the days of liberal consensus. It is not simply the fact 
of polarization but its style and what the polarization represents. We 
argue that polarization is a serious problem in the political system but 
that it is merely a symptom of the larger conflict – some might say contrast – 
between neoliberalism and democratic self-government. Neoliberalism 
as a response to the neoconservative crisis of governability has simply 
deepened this crisis rather than resolving it. 
 Democracy and Civic Life 
 Questions about the nature of civic life illustrate the conflict between 
the economy and the scope of democratic social life. Neoliberals and 
rational choice theorists tend to reject, or at least are sceptical about, any 
notion of a common interest or public good. From their vantage point, 
civil society and civil life must limited in scope for the market to fully 
operate and thereby guarantee freedom and efficiency. Yet capitalism 
rests on a background of legal norms, common understandings, and 
social sentiments and solidarities that underpin social life. Unrestricted 
capitalism tends to impoverish the very civic life it requires. Thus civic 
life offers a key vantage point from which the conflicts and contesta-
tions of a neoliberal economy can be viewed. 
 The notion of civil society has become an important element in con-
temporary discussions of political life. Civil society represents a sphere 
of intermediary, often voluntary, non-governmental institutions that 
stand between government authority and citizens. It represents a sphere 
in which social interests take shape and political will is expressed. Insti-
tutions of civil society include clubs and voluntary associations, sports 
groups, churches, and educational bodies, but also political parties, pri-
vate foundations, and policy groups and even social movements, such 
as environmental and consumer groups. 
 For some theorists, civil society is simply an expression of a liberal 
social order. It represents the sphere of private life that is separated from 
government and public life. Here, as in the liberal conception, civil society 
is a bulwark against interference in the freedom of subjects to pursue their 
goals. By contrast, the republican understanding, which is exemplified in 
the work of Hegel, sees civil society as a space for creating social bonds 
and solidarity.  62  It protects individuals and also creates social relations and 
possibilities. It is the source of the communicative relations among people. 
 Broadly speaking, there are two distinct ways that the second (Hege-
lian) version of civil society is approached. One approach stresses the 
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formation of sensibilities conducive to solidarity and identity. The other 
stresses the deliberative democratic and political nature of the public 
sphere. These two approaches are not necessarily opposed and can even 
be complementary. Both address the lacuna in classical liberalism. The 
first emphasizes the socially integrative elements of civil society that 
shape sensibilities and create moral bonds. On this reading, civil society 
can include our interpretations of others and our own identities. The sec-
ond identifies civil society as a source of political deliberation and con-
testation. The emphasis here is on the role of social movements, political 
parties and clubs, and extra-parliamentary debate in the public sphere. 
 According to Robert Putnam, civic life is in decline.  63  As is well 
known, Putnam looks at the decline of common social activities, such 
as bowling, in which individuals from different walks of life can par-
ticipate. Like Alexis de Tocqueville, he sees the unique core of American 
life and its democratic ethos in widespread participation in the volun-
tary associations of civic life. Participation in groups and associations 
leads to greater reciprocity and cooperation, as well as stronger trust 
and solidarity – in other words, social integration – among members of 
a community. But Putnam, unlike Tocqueville, does not include politics 
as an element of civil life, seeing it instead as a divisive force. Thus he 
does not view political parties and social movements as components of 
civic life. Social capital in contemporary society is declining not because 
of changes in the economy and work or related social conditions, but 
because of television. 
 Robert Bellah’s analysis of civic life takes the second path; for him, it 
is a source not only of social integration but also of political legitimacy. 
Civic virtue does not simply provide the moral support for society. 
Because the norms of civic life often conflict with the demands of the 
market, they raise issues related to the political justification for market 
pressures and outcomes. Therefore, in his account of civic life, Bellah 
stresses not just voluntary associations but also the moral dimensions 
of social and political rights. The creation of civic life requires moral 
and political obligations to others that cannot be fulfilled by market 
forces – for example, our sense of justice and fairness and concern for 
the welfare of others.  64  These norms are part of a shared American ethos 
or a civil religion that unifies the nation.  65  In this respect, Bellah is closer 
to Tocqueville than to Putnam. He fears that individualism rooted in a 
market mentality erodes civic life. He retains a republican standpoint 
of a single shared ethos (however weak), an American civil religion that 
reduces the pluralistic quality of modern societies. In contrast, much 
political debate seems to centre on the conflicting ideas of the good and 
just life and does not always suppose a shared ethos. 
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 Still, there is an element of truth to the republican version of the pub-
lic sphere. It highlights crucial elements of social and personal integrity 
of the lifeworld that need to be maintained. It is often overlooked that 
Jürgen Habermas in  The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere 
also analysed the literary public sphere.  66  This was a space within which 
sensibilities and solidarities could be formed. Later, these concerns re-
emerged in Habermas’s analysis of the lifeworld. We need to be careful, 
however, in separating the notions of reason and emotion arbitrarily. 
The formation of sensibilities is intersubjective. Sensibilities are not 
merely inner emotions that rest wholly within the self; rather, they rep-
resent an orientation towards the world – a judgment on it. They must 
be grasped though forms of mutual understanding. Our ways of being 
in the lifeworld are central to our ideas of the good life, our conceptions 
of solidarity with others, and our identities. Given the decline in read-
ing, the literary public sphere is withering. It is however reasonable 
to speak broadly of a cultural public sphere. This would involve the 
mass media, including television, radio, movies, and now the internet 
and other digital forms; but also, much of what is called popular cul-
ture. Popular culture helps define the scope of the lifeworld and con-
sequently our engagement with questions of the good life, its meaning 
and purposes. 
 Studies of economically besieged Middle American towns illus-
trate the cultural and social disintegration generated by the impact 
of neoliberal economies on public life. Arlie Hochschild in her study 
 Strangers in Their Own Land shows how families and communities 
have become fragmented and destroyed by stagnant wages, deindus-
trialization, and loss of a sense of community and place.  67  They have 
become alienated from an American Dream that no longer holds the 
promise of a better life. Bellah’s notion of the American civil creed has 
become emptied of meaning. Far from voting against their own inter-
ests, individuals seek ideologies and views that make sense of their 
situation, in which the common strands of culture in the lifeworld are 
beginning to snap. The lifeworlds of working classes are becoming 
fragmented and desiccated, and their attempts to make sense of this 
are leading to alienation from those they see as big government liberals 
who benefit from a state that has abandoned them and crippled indus-
try. To be sure, the conclusions they reach in making sense of their 
situation are not always well founded. Hochschild gives the example 
of Mike, a supporter of the right-wing and ostensibly populist Tea 
Party, who lived near a sinkhole caused by the activity of a lightly 
regulated company. He decried government regulation and doubted 
that global warming existed. He berated big government even though 
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his state was receiving among the highest per capita levels of support 
from the federal government. His understanding of his own lifeworld 
was filled with paradoxes. 
 Similarly, in  Hillbilly Elegy J.D. Vance describes the tangle of patholo-
gies facing poor families who move from Appalachia to the Midwest to 
find jobs.  68  Instead of finding the American Dream, they face difficult 
obstacles, including their own past of spousal and substance abuse. 
They live in a culture of despair, hopelessness, and, sometimes, denial. 
While Vance writes from a conservative point of view that stresses char-
acter flaws rather than structural power, we can give his observations 
a more generous reading: these are problems of social disorganization 
that stem from the impact of the loss of industrial and agricultural 
employment. Such disorganization recalls Gaventa’s work  Power and 
Powerlessness to which we earlier referred, which traces the sense of 
acquiescence in an Appalachian town.  69  Forty years later, the situation 
is worse. Now, with few jobs available, their culture is mired in drug 
abuse, disorder, and deeper despair. 
 Neoliberals are sceptical about the ideals of public service and volun-
tary sector activity. They cannot for the most part conceive of motives 
that are altruistic or even deontological. Only self-interest counts. Thus 
they cannot make sense of the social solidarities or ethical motives of 
actors in the public sphere and the voluntary or not-for-profit sector. 
Public choice theorists James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock argue that 
there is no distinct set of ethical motives that public sector actors have. 
Like market-based actors, they only pursue self-interest.  70  Similarly, 
they see public servants as self-serving bureaucrats who act to maxi-
mize their interests by increasing their salaries and the scope of their 
power. From the standpoint of public or rational choice, of course, ideas 
of social welfare and other social objectives are incoherent. 
 The social solidarities that Putnam and Bellah identify fit uneasily in 
the neoliberal framework. Attachments that bind members of a society 
through mutual respect and understanding are viewed as either pre-
political or irrelevant. For rational choice theorists and neoliberals, it is 
sufficient that actions are coordinated through self-interest. Yet as we 
have seen, a capitalist economy requires a moral substructure to sup-
port it, one that places accumulation and profit over other goods and 
puts a value on work as a vocation. The terms of morality under the 
conditions of an advanced capitalist economy cannot simply be a rein-
stitution of the Protestant ethic – the side effects and contradictions of 
this economy are grasped tacitly or explicitly by all. There is an expec-
tation among many that government must intervene to protect society 
against these side effects. 
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 Civil Society and Communicative Power 
 When civil society is conceived as a pluralistic public sphere, struc-
tures of mutual accountability through which participants can reach 
understanding on matters of public concern assume a central place. 
As outlined in the work of Habermas and others, the public sphere 
emerged as an arena in which citizens met in clubs and coffee houses 
to read newspapers and discuss the issues of the day, in the process 
forming their political and social views. This was a sphere of indepen-
dent public opinion that could be critical of existing authorities. Over 
time the public sphere has come to include social movements, political 
parties, and other informal vehicles of democratic discussion. It is a 
forum for political debate, not just for the creation of an ethos. It takes 
up questions of the good and just life that are in dispute in pluralistic 
societies. We do not always have to share ideas of the good to engage in 
public debate. To the contrary, it is the condition of plurality that brings 
us to debate and deliberate on these matters. Citizenship on this view 
requires the capacity for participation in the public and political affairs 
of the community. Civil society is one source of the communicative 
power that is generated when participants come together to form the 
will to act in concert on an issue or problem. But forms of communica-
tive power – albeit weak – can also be found in situations where agree-
ment is achieved. Even when it does not result in agreement, discus-
sion about public issues can foster cooperation or engender trust that 
individuals can carry on interaction in the face of disagreement. 
 To be sure, the extent and adequacy of the public sphere in capitalist 
societies can be contested. The actual character of the public sphere has 
been far from ideal. It has often excluded groups from participation 
and can be found in multiple forms that do not always work in concert. 
Nonetheless it still represents an important structural element of mod-
ern politics that needs to be realized in democracy. 
 Rational choice theorists do not see deliberation as a central feature 
of public life. They lack a notion of communicative power that is inter-
subjectively generated. They cannot conceive of a political will created 
through acting in common, but only a concatenation of individual 
choices that can be aggregated. Rational choice theories can at best 
establish a market model of political initiative: elite political actors are 
the producers of alternatives and programs, while ordinary citizens are 
consumers. 
 Neoliberal attacks on the public sphere take two distinct but related 
directions. The first is the conversion of the social relations of the public 
sphere according to the demands of market rationality. Human activity 
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is reduced to issues of profitability and, as we will see in the next sec-
tion, the constriction of the rational economic subject. To the extent that 
the public sphere is reduced to calculation and self-interest, however, 
those elements of mutual accountability and deliberation needed to 
form both common sensibility and public opinion disappear. When 
decisions are based on economic imperatives, public reasons or com-
mon sentiments have little place. As we will discuss at the end of this 
chapter, neoliberalism is characterized by the colonization of the life-
world and the replacement of communicative processes by economic 
imperatives. In eliminating these elements of communication, neoliber-
alism has introduced pathologies into civil society. The conflict between 
the social, political, and cultural rights of development has led to crises 
in social and cultural integration. Individuals no longer see themselves 
as part of common society or a cultural tradition. 
 From the State to the Soul: The Fate of the Individual 
 Contrasting the embedded liberalism of the welfare state with forms 
of disembedded liberalism, critics have noted that liberalism so under-
stood destroys the reservoir of social welfare (in the broad sense) and 
trust and solidarity in every sphere of social life. However, contempo-
rary versions of disembedded liberalism have to establish dominance in 
different contexts. Calling to mind once again the work Wendy Brown, 
disembedded liberalism promotes the use of the disciplinary power of 
the state to construct an entrepreneurial subject. 
 Neoliberal arguments about the superiority of the market as a mech-
anism for distributing all social goods often flounder on the realities 
of income inequality and unequal distribution of the risks and benefits 
of social life.  71  Deregulation is central to neoliberalism because in its 
view it frees businesses to respond to the new conditions of global 
capitalism. This “new” capitalism requires flexibility to quickly meet 
changing market demands and conditions throughout the world. In 
the eyes of both its defenders and its analysts, this fast and agile capi-
talism requires constant change. It must shift priorities and resources 
quickly to find supplies and new markets. It constantly seeks new 
opportunities. 
 The individual also must learn to adapt to the world of fast capital-
ism. She must be flexible. She must adapt to the changing job market 
and be willing to change jobs or move to meet the market demand. Rich-
ard Sennett draws on Zygmunt Bauman’s notion of liquid modernity 
to describe this feature.  72  The world of seemingly solid jobs and stable 
conditions has given way to more unstable conditions of personal life. 
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 This new constellation of subjectivity has fostered the fragmentation 
of everyday life in the neoliberal era. Since a significant amount of work 
in neoliberal times is contingent employment, it requires constant adap-
tation. According to Sennett and Bauman, we learn to ignore our past 
identity so that we might “go with the flow.” Stable identities become 
more difficult to maintain. In short, “liquid modernity” implies both 
economic insecurity and social instability. Neoliberalism creates new 
risks that are financial, social, and ecological and then distributes them 
asymmetrically since many of the wealthy can insulate themselves from 
some risk and privatize the risks for the less well-off. Individuals must 
negotiate a new environment in which they face new constraints on 
time based in short-term relationships and marketing of the self as a 
“brand” for potential economic gain. These developments have desta-
bilized the sense of a narrative of the self so that a continuous identity 
is difficult to establish. 
 Neoliberalism promises prosperity and freedom but has created its 
opposite – a state of constant social insecurity and unfreedom. As the 
conditions of work in neoliberal society have become casualized and 
contingent, individuals have lost their stable mooring in the social 
world. This new “flexible” world in which people are required to con-
stantly adapt to labour markets and changing conditions benefits few. 
The modern economy has taken on a “winner take all” character. The 
winners get big rewards, the losers little or nothing. 
 Just as jobs have become more unstable, elements of the social safety 
net have been shrunk or restructured. The costs and risks of social life 
that are the result of forces the individual did not create have become 
burdens the individual has to bear. Privatized education is a good 
example of this. When education becomes financed primarily by stu-
dent loans, for example, what is essentially a social good in redefined as 
a private risk. The costs of education become mostly a private matter. If 
the public system of K–12 education is dismantled, individual families 
will be forced to accept substandard education or pay exorbitant costs. 
The rhetoric of personal responsibility often means that individuals are 
cast aside to bear the side effects and even unintended consequences of 
a capitalist economic system over which they have little personal con-
trol. The downloading of the risks of social life often makes individuals 
feel more vulnerable and renders their lives more precarious. 
 A related argument has been made by French sociologists Luc 
Boltanski and Eve Chiapello in  The New Spirit of Capitalism .  73  They, too, 
have noted the shift from a production system based on relatively per-
manent industrial jobs and a hierarchical workplace to a flexible work-
place that champions individual initiative. This type of capitalism 
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has incorporated the critique of the conformism of corporate culture 
developed in the 1960s and created a new, more or less hierarchical, 
collaborative and project-driven workplace. This new form of capital-
ism is best embodied in the ethos of Silicon Valley and in corporations 
such as Google. Boltanski and Chiapello see the rise of a new ideal – a 
new spirit of capitalism in the vision of the unencumbered individual 
who is free to create his or her own life. Of course, this formulation is 
limited in scope. The rise of flexible corporate culture has been accom-
panied by hyper-exploitation in the less developed world as well as 
the degradation of work for those who have lost industrial jobs. While 
beneficial for a few in the short run, such developments have greatly 
increased the precarity of the clear majority. The people studied by 
Hochschild and discussed by Sennett are quite alienated from the fluid 
entrepreneurial self. They seek community, continuity, and security in 
permanent jobs to counter the meaninglessness and vulnerability of 
their lives. 
 What Marx once wrote characterizing the power of capitalism – 
namely, that “All that is solid melts into air” – has been reinforced dra-
matically in neoliberal capitalism. The individual under neoliberalism is 
not the optimistic and self-interested actor of classic liberal theory who 
creates a harmonious social order; rather, she is constituted through 
insecurity and fear. The entrepreneurial subject is not a construct of 
nature but requires a kind of negative individualization, which rather 
than establishing identity within a community separates the individual 
from social connections and from public life. The project of using one’s 
time and freedom to create a coherent plan of life through which to 
express one’s own deeply held commitments is far more difficult when 
subjectivity is circumscribed in a world of risks that threaten to over-
whelm our ability to cope with them.  74  
 Michel Foucault similarly argued that neoliberalism was not a the-
ory that sought a return to a natural state but rather a social construc-
tion of subjectivity, in this case an entrepreneurial self. In his interpre-
tation, the classical idea of economic man is based in the satisfaction 
of needs and rooted in a productivist model. Wendy Brown notes: “We 
come to the market to offer what we have (labor and goods) for what 
we need.” The entrepreneurial self is, in contrast, a mode of subjectiv-
ization, the creation of a subject who sees himself as “being for himself 
his own capital, his own producer, the source of his earnings.”  75  What-
ever his role, whether producing, selling, or consuming, he produces 
his own satisfaction. Foucault, however, does not link this entrepre-
neurial self to the offloading of social risk or to the increasing sense 
of precarity that many people are now experiencing. To be sure, he 
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speaks of “responsibilizing,” a circumlocution for the internalization 
of personal responsibility; but at times he seems to embrace the sense 
of risk. 
 Foucault’s distaste for governmental intervention in personal life and 
his assumption of the necessity of risk lead him to oppose much of the 
modern welfare state. He does not distinguish clearly between those 
elements that convert citizens into clients and those that provide neces-
sary conditions for human flourishing and compensate for the effects 
of the capitalist market. This has led some commentators to think that 
Foucault, who wrote his lectures on neoliberalism in the late 1970s, was 
enamoured with the libertarian elements of the doctrine as an alterna-
tive to Hegelian Marxism.  76  Whatever the limits of his analysis, how-
ever, Foucault did recognize that neoliberalism is a social formation 
distinct from classical free market economics. 
 The precariousness of everyday life is reinforced by the increasing 
disciplining of subjectivity.  77  For example, to qualify for welfare in the 
United States it is no longer sufficient to be in distress; one must show 
the proper attitude towards work and be actively seeking employ-
ment, no matter what the situation. In the United States, large groups 
of men – especially African American men – are incarcerated for minor 
offences that seem to represent resistance to this discipline. Instead of 
eliminating bureaucracy, these new disciplinary practices create new 
bureaucratic structures. In many areas of life, individuals are increas-
ingly monitored and shaped to conform to the demands of neoliberal-
ism and to accept the risks inherent in the culture of the new capitalism. 
Information is monitored and mined for data that is then used to shape 
subjectivity. Some of the organizations engaged in information mining 
are not government bureaucracies, yet the vast power they exercise is 
as invasive as that of any government. 
 The disciplinary state created under neoliberalism illustrates the 
dilemmas raised by its moral standpoint. The supposedly libertarian 
element that preserves personal freedom requires a punitive moral-
ity that eliminates freedom for many. The undeserving poor must be 
disciplined, monitored, and punished, not given freedom to choose. 
A good illustration of this is the debate over a neoliberal approach to 
welfare that took place in the later 1980s.  78  The neoliberal approach 
takes the position that welfare causes dependency by removing the 
incentive to work. Reflecting the view that the Clinton administration 
adopted in part, Lawrence Mead in  Beyond Entitlement argued that the 
welfare state placed too much emphasis on rights and entitlements at 
the expense of duties.  79  If the latter were emphasized over the former, 
receiving benefits would depend on carrying out work obligations and 
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adopting drug hygiene. Mead contended that once welfare was linked 
to work, necessary changes in character would follow. Charles Mur-
ray, for his part, argued that for moral as well as fiscal reasons, the 
welfare state should be more extensively dismantled.  80  Individuals in 
need would be thrown back on the voluntary sector – on churches, 
families, and not-for-profit organizations. He thought these would 
be more likely to influence the moral behaviour of individuals. Any 
unequal outcomes would be a private matter and not the concern of 
the government. 
 Both Mead and Murray see the poor as constituting an underclass, 
one that exists below the traditional working class and is characterized 
by inadequate living and working conditions, low-paying jobs, and 
lack of education – although others note that the underclass can contain 
well-educated but discouraged people. In the work of these theorists, 
however, the underclass becomes a moral category. The members of the 
underclass lack character and self-control as well as basic life skills. For 
example, Mead contends that 
 [t]he underclass is most visible in urban slum settings and is about 
70 percent non-white, but it includes many rural and white people 
as well, especially in Appalachia and the South. Much of the urban 
underclass is made up of street hustlers, welfare families, drug 
addicts, and former mental patients. There are, of course, people who 
function well – the so-called “deserving” or “working poor” – and 
better-off people who function poorly, but in general low income and 
serious behavioral difficulties go together. The underclass is not large 
as a share of population, perhaps 9 million people, but it accounts for 
the lion’s share of the most serious disorders in American life, espe-
cially in the cities.  81  
 Mead’s remedy for welfare dependency would require extensive gov-
ernment control and bureaucratic monitoring. Thus it would run into 
problems typical of all administered programs. Many neoliberal initia-
tives to discipline the poor suffer from this problem. Murray’s policy 
proposals, for their part, are descriptively inaccurate and are restricted 
by the limits of private charity. Charities no longer depend on a few 
donors, nor are they run privately. They deliver outsourced govern-
ment social welfare services, and the dependence of not-for-profits on 
both governments and corporate donors for funds has led to signifi-
cant changes in operations – they, too, have become marketized and are 
appraised by market and corporate standards of fiscal accountability 
and measurable outcomes. 
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 New Forms of Reification 
 The emergence of social and political pathologies within neoliberal-
ism poses a challenge to Jürgen Habermas’s claim that we can still – 
even in the current situation – tame capitalism. Repairing the rifts in 
the social fabric, and rebuilding reserves of trust and solidarity, under 
conditions of increasing inequality and the decreasing political power 
and influence of the population at large would seem to require at the 
very least radical reforms to the neoliberal order that are not currently 
on the horizon. Instead, we see the rise of authoritarian elements and 
moral dogmatism. These are being reinforced by the inculcation of the 
entrepreneurial self throughout the population and by a strengthening 
of the disciplinary state. Nonetheless, the developmental possibilities 
and competences generated by late modernity remain latent resources 
to draw upon for political change. We still believe there are possibili-
ties for change. However, the reforms needed will go beyond what we 
think of as taming capitalism. Habermas’s political theory can provide 
a conception of radical democracy, but his analysis of the market and its 
role seems to limit the kinds of changes he wants to make. 
 We suggest, however, that Habermas’s analysis in his earlier work 
can show the limits of his more recent work. Specifically, his diagnosis 
of social pathologies in modern societies as developed in his  Theory of 
Communicative Action points to the contradictions between capitalism 
and democracy and so can provide an alternative critical framework 
to that at play in his recent writings. More precisely, we think that the 
notion of reification, to which he devoted significant attention in the 
earlier work, can illuminate not just the problems of the welfare state 
but the pathologies of the neoliberal era as well. 
 The concept of reification has a long history in Western Marxist 
thought. Georg Lukács adopted Max Weber’s notion of rationaliza-
tion as a central process in modern societies.  82  Production processes 
that rely increasingly on science and the demands of modern admin-
istration also require a calculative rationality. In a society driven by 
capitalism, science and technology, reason was primarily viewed as 
instrumental rationality, a form of rationality that was concerned pri-
marily with efficient means to reach pre-established ends. Reason was 
largely a matter of calculation and of strategy. By contrast, forms of 
value rationality that rested on the validity and worth of the ends 
were subordinated. Weber famously warned that the predominance 
of instrumental reason would create an iron cage in which humanity 
would become imprisoned, a victim of its own mechanisms for carry-
ing out its purposes. 
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 Weber felt that the capitalist economy was the unsurpassable basis 
of human freedom and held that socialism was inimical to freedom. By 
contrast, Lukács recognized that the commodity form of capitalism was 
becoming generalized throughout society and that it structured social 
relations. Weber stressed the interplay of culture and economy in the 
formation of rationality, while Lukács stressed the role of the capitalist 
economy in rationalization. He used the term reification to describe the 
processes whereby relations between humans were reduced to com-
modity relations between things.  83  Under Lukács’s conception of reifi-
cation, far from providing the basis of freedom, the fundamental pro-
cesses of capitalism impede autonomy. 
 Reification disembeds and separates individuals from those concrete 
social relations that Hegel and his followers identified as the core of 
ethical life. However, more than simple alienation, reification is a trans-
formation of human action into a mechanism that restricts if not elimi-
nates freedom. 
 Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno took up Weber’s diagnosis in 
the form of a critique of instrumental rationality.  84  For Horkheimer and 
Adorno, modern instrumental rationality was primarily subjective rea-
son. It reduced reason to the status of an instrument for achieving arbi-
trarily chosen ends. It eliminated the critical facility of humans to reflect 
on their ends and purposes. Reason was no longer guided by ends that 
pointed beyond the isolated subject. As we argued in chapter 2, in posi-
tivism we find the clearest example of a philosophy that views reason 
simply as an instrumental logic and the choice of ends as irrational and 
emotive. The rationalization of society extends to the bureaucratic ratio-
nalization of social life. For critical theorists, then, the welfare state did 
not represent the extension of social democratic ideals; rather, it was an 
intensification of the reification in advanced capitalism. By directing 
the economy, the state meant to eliminate the economic crises that had 
plagued capitalism; but this also meant that areas such as education 
and public opinion fell under state control and bureaucratic regulation. 
 Habermas takes up the question of reification from a standpoint that 
recognizes more complexity than did earlier theorists. He does not 
equate rationalization with reification; instead he recognizes dimen-
sions of rationality within capitalist modernity that are not grasped in 
earlier theories.  85  He also challenges the idea that we can re-embed the 
market in social relations in the way that Karl Polanyi, for example, 
believes is necessary to counteract the destructive consequences of dis-
embedded markets. 
 In opposition to the idea that reason has become primarily instru-
mental in modern societies, Habermas took up the spirit of Weber’s 
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value rationality and, as we have already seen, developed the notion 
of communicative rationality as a rationality that seeks mutual under-
standing and mutual accountability, each with its own logic. Against 
the idea that forms of understanding and normative reasoning have 
been eliminated, Habermas holds that capitalist economies still require 
sources of mutual understanding for the legitimation needs of the wel-
fare state. Capitalism must maintain the assent of citizens. Moreover, 
against Horkheimer and Adorno, Habermas argues that welfare state 
appeals to notions of social rights, no matter how limited, indicate pos-
sibilities for social change, even if they do not and cannot point beyond 
the welfare state itself. Thus rather than a simple unidirectional course 
of rationalization leading to instrumental reason, there are contradic-
tory processes of rationalization occurring in capitalist modernity: one 
leads to greater normative rationality and awareness of social rights, 
while another reifies forms of social action and turns communicative 
processes into instrumental or strategic imperatives. We must to avoid 
a one-sided critique of the welfare state that views it solely as a form of 
state power and control. The protection of human life from some of the 
vulnerabilities of industrial capitalism is also a condition for the devel-
opment of social freedom and personal autonomy. 
 We can get a better sense of the genesis of these contradictory pro-
cesses by examining the second criticism that Habermas levels against 
the earlier theories of reification. Along with Weber, Habermas sees the 
differentiation of society, and the separation of the economy from other 
forms of social life, as developments that cannot be reversed. Differen-
tiation is more than simply a matter of instrumental reason or strate-
gic reason. It also marks the emergence of the relatively self-contained 
economic spree that characterizes capitalist modernity. There is a limit 
to the ability to re-embed the economy in the social world.  86  Of course, 
Habermas holds that the economy can be regulated and shaped by 
norms and values; however, he thinks there is a limit to this process. 
 The differentiation of the economy from social life also has positive 
features. When we are relieved of some of the burdens of material repro-
duction and of the requirement to produce more goods, both devel-
opmental and communicative possibilities are released. New forms of 
self-realization, as well as new forms of autonomy, emerge. Put in more 
traditional Marxist terms, capitalism represents an achievement over 
the older, feudal mode of production. But this achievement does more 
than increase material wealth, it also heralds the possibility – to be sure 
not always realized – of greater freedom. 
 For Habermasian critical theory, then, reification is not a mat-
ter of rationalization  per se but the illegitimate extension of forms of 
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instrumental and strategic action into realms of social life that can 
only be successfully regulated communicatively. When the processes 
of mutual understanding are reduced to instrumentalities, the social 
world is subject to pathological developments that limit the freedom 
and autonomy of participants. These can be political, social, or (in many 
cases) psychological. Reification creates contradictions between the 
developmental tendencies of late-modern societies and the demands 
of a profit-making economy that seeks to submit more forms of life to 
instrumental imperatives. Habermas calls this impinging of instrumen-
tal (and later system) imperatives on the lifeworld the colonization of 
the lifeworld. And like political colonization, it entails forms of domina-
tion and oppression. 
 Thus, Habermas’s demarcation of the boundary between a differ-
entiated economic sphere and the lifeworld is both a normative and 
a critical standard. The role of the economic sphere is limited by the 
need to protect the autonomy of citizens, but also by the integrity of the 
lifeworld, which provides the conditions under which human freedom 
can flourish. The imperatives of economic rationality must not intrude 
on the developmental possibilities, conditions for human flourishing, 
that the lifeworld incorporates and that should ultimately govern the 
economic realm. 
 Habermas may have formulated his diagnosis of social pathologies 
to account for the contradictions of the welfare state; in turn, that state 
can provide a resource for grasping the social processes that created the 
pathologies of neoliberalism. Neoliberalism can be seen as increasing 
the pressure for the colonization of the lifeworld. It extends the intru-
sion of economic imperatives into lifeworld settings.  87  
 Critical theories must pay attention to those struggles over the integ-
rity of the lifeworld that have emerged in neoliberalism in the form of 
populist movements of the right and the left. By replacing normative 
coordination with a continuing expansion of the commodity form, mar-
ketization impacts the boundary between system and lifeworld, to once 
again use Habermas’s terms. Marketization emphasizes cost–benefit 
analysis, that is, the use of price or quasi-price mechanisms and stan-
dards of measurement such as return on investment. At the same time, 
the social structure of the norms governing an institution or process 
needs to conform to the behavioural expectations of markets – that is, 
the forms of socialization change. These could lead to political struggles 
over the nature and scope of that expansion and the changes in norma-
tive structures, or they could be absorbed by bureaucratic institutions 
as a means to restructure policy goals. For example, the privatization 
and marketization of prisons in the United States has led to a situation 
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in which they are evaluated not so much according to whether they are 
good or bad but whether they are cheap, safe, or legal; that is, marketi-
zation imposes the goals of bureaucratic rationality in place of norma-
tive ones.  88  No doubt this occurred to some extent even with respect 
to public prisons; the point here is that once detached from political 
processes of deliberation, the private prison is less open to intervention 
by citizens. For that reason, they may serve other policy purposes that 
have become associated with the carceral state as a mechanism for the 
segregating and disciplining of segments of the population, without 
much public discussion or debate once the aims of public institutions 
become private. At the same time, of course, prisons and prison popula-
tions can also become commodities and treated like marketable goods. 
 The Problem of Markets in Habermas 
 In accepting Weber’s notion that the economy had become indepen-
dent of normative and moral regulation – that is, a norm-free sphere of 
action – Habermas has often been viewed as arguing for an acceptance 
of the capitalist market. David Ingram exemplifies this view. While 
Ingram thinks that  The Theory of Communicative Action contains a cri-
tique of capitalism, he contends that in his subsequent work Habermas 
has become “a liberal defender of the rule of law and its functional 
base: an efficient market-driven economy that accords individual free-
dom pride of place.”  89  While Ingram’s analysis has a point, we think he 
overstates the case. As we argue, Habermas sees markets and admin-
istrative rationality as ideally having a limited sphere of operations. To 
the contrary, his notion of the colonization of the lifeworld refers to the 
reification of spheres of social action that are impinged upon by eco-
nomic or administrative imperatives. To recall, for Habermas societies 
are held together by structures of mutual understanding and account-
ability. Moreover, social integration in Habermas’s terms requires social 
solidarity, which is threatened by colonization. Thus the invasion of the 
lifeworld by economic and political imperatives is pathological. With 
its tendency to reify spheres of everyday life the capitalist market has 
inherent pathologies. Colonization means that citizens are turned into 
consumers of goods and clients of bureaucracies. Clearly, then, Haber-
mas is not simply a theorist of liberal or libertarian individualism. He 
recognizes the vulnerability and dependency characteristic of human 
action as well as its potentials for autonomy. These capacities need to 
be protected. 
 Yet despite these qualifications, Habermas’s theory still leaves us with 
questions about the extent to which he hopes to limit market intrusions 
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into everyday life. Obviously, he believes that markets are superior to 
command economies. In his view they are more efficient and effective 
in producing goods and services. In addition, he is sceptical of work-
ers’ control of production and management. He has little to say about 
the new forms of organization and hierarchy in the workplace analysed 
by Luc Boltanski and others. Although he clearly thinks that capital-
ism needs to be restrained, he apparently is not concerned about the 
increase in rapacious behaviour on the part of business and corporate 
leaders. He thinks that capitalists are simply being rational in seeking 
to maximize profit. 
 Can the limited version of the market that Habermas proposes pro-
vide the protections of the lifeworld that he proposes are necessary for 
a non-reified social order – one that advances developmental possibili-
ties instead of impeding them? While we realize there is no absolute 
theoretical resolution to this problem, we remain sceptical whether the 
restrictions Habermas proposes are sufficient to provide the protections 
his theory requires. Even the augmented and regulated market of the 
Keynesian era rested on democratic elitism and a kind of state corpo-
ratism, not to mention an intrusive welfare state that frequently turned 
citizens into clients. In the end it failed to successfully balance accumu-
lation and legitimation. A renewed Keynesianism would require more 
intervention into the economy and greater democratic participation. It 
is hard to see how this would not entail another pushback by capital. 
Even if it were possible, short of another Great Depression it is hard 
to see how it would overcome the great accumulated power of global 
capital in the twenty-first century. A revised notion of property is also 
needed to address the concentration of economic power. 
 We think that a suggestion made by C.B. Macpherson could help. 
Macpherson realized that conceptions of property are neither natural 
nor essential; they are  political formulations.  90  Property, he noted with 
Morris Cohen, is not a thing but a relation between persons (often 
about things). It is normative and legal in character; it is a creation not 
of nature but of the state. Property relations are either themselves justi-
fications for human flourishing or are indissolubly linked to these. 
 The form of private property typically used by classical economics 
was developed by John Locke. He thought that private property was 
based on labour. Property was created by mixing one’s labour with 
the products of nature. The ideal of the possessive individual found in 
Locke’s theory was well suited to justifications for the capitalist econ-
omy. Property was the exclusive domain of the individual, who had 
the right to dispose of what he owned and to exclude others from the 
use or benefit of it. This understanding of property was also considered 
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central to the notion of a private sphere in which the individual was 
free to choose his own course of action without interference by other 
individuals or by the state. 
 This image of the isolated individual who has rights in a state of 
nature is a convenient fiction, and its assertion of natural right neglects 
the socially constructed character of law. Property is a form of power 
and sovereignty. The “free labour contract” is asymmetrical.  91  The 
worker who needs a job to pay rent or feed a family and is dependent on 
an employer has little choice about the conditions of employment. The 
modern regime of private property is in Macpherson’s terms a system 
of extractive power – that is, power over others – rooted in the exclusive 
ownership of property.  92  What Macpherson indicates with this idea is 
something like what Weber meant by domination: “Extractive power 
points to the ability to use, along with one’s own power, the power of 
others to achieve one’s purposes.”  93  An unregulated market economy 
leads to forms of domination and oppression, not the individual free-
dom it promises. In capitalist societies an exclusive focus on private 
property leads to the extraction of power from the least well-off by the 
most well-off and to the creation of inequalities of wealth and power 
and the ability to use and exert capacities. Macpherson also viewed 
extraction as moral activity, and one by no means free from evalua-
tion. In a developed capitalist economy, property involves more than 
just production. In financialized capitalism, stockholders depend upon 
returns on investment to gain wealth, not on direct ownership of pro-
duction or material property. This form of property fits uneasily with 
the labour theory of acquisition. 
 There is, however, no logical or other necessity for conceiving 
property primarily as exclusive ownership, that is, as the right to 
exclude others from the use or benefit of something. Macpherson 
suggests that a theory of property can be tied not simply to indi-
vidual ownership or possession but also to the ability to use and 
develop one’s powers – and, we suggest, to communicative rights 
as well. This would entail a very different notion of property, one 
that included private property and even state property as well as 
common or social property. There is a crucial difference, however, 
between social property and state property. The former represents 
property held in common; the latter can be state-owned property, 
with the state functioning in a capitalist fashion. Looking at prop-
erty relations as social constructions that are creations of the state 
reminds us that systems of property are embedded in justifications 
for forms of human life, conceptions of the good life. Property rela-
tions can be modified as social needs change. 
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 Market fundamentalists argue that a private property system and the 
market are the optimal institutions for allocating goods and services, 
yet these institutions have failed to fulfil this promise. In a post–wel-
fare state environment, allocation is not simply consigned to private 
individuals or to the market. The state has a large role to play – even 
the professions are not allocated through the market but rather through 
standards provided by the state. These matters lead to another issue 
in Habermas’s conception of markets. While he clearly would endorse 
extensive reallocation and redistribution of resources in society, he also 
clings to the idea that markets are the most efficient way to produce 
goods. 
 Habermas does acknowledge in some of his more recent interviews 
that the problems of a financialized capitalism are significant ones and 
that capitalism has “taken on a life of its own.”  94  Yet he still does not 
see the changes in the economy as the main issue. Referring especially 
to the European context and to the development of a supranational 
European union, which has become largely a technocratic instrument, 
Habermas feels that the central problem is political: it is the failure of 
political elites to have the courage to assert universal human rights 
against the forces of nationalism. While this argument has elements of 
truth, we think Habermas neglects the changes in economic outlook 
that are necessary to bring about the universalism or cosmopolitanism 
that he desires. Conceptions of social and collective property are based 
on a universal notion of justice and access for all, and not just political 
considerations. Habermas fails to resolve the tension between his cri-
tique of the pathologies of capitalism and his acceptance of markets. In 
the conclusion to this study we will revisit the question whether Haber-
mas’s positive view of certain features of markets is as defensible as he 
believes it to be. 
 Conclusion 
 We have emphasized the need for an account of the pathologies of neo-
liberalism that addresses the lacunae in Habermas’s later work. If a 
critical theory is to maintain its relevance in the contemporary setting, 
it needs to confront the dominant pathologies of the time. While some 
critical theorists have taken up this task, Habermas has not developed 
their insights, and his own, into a critical theory of neoliberalism. To 
the contrary, he has appeared surprised by the emergence of these new 
pathologies. 
 In one sense, Habermas’s account of pathologies remains tied to 
his earlier analysis of late capitalism. While economic crisis remains a 
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problem, the major issues concern the political legitimation of the wel-
fare state compromise. When he does address neoliberal globalization, 
it is in the context of the need for a transnational universalism. Once the 
political compromises of the welfare state broke down, economic inse-
curity and instability increasingly became the rule. The economic insta-
bility of many, however, has been accompanied by de-democratizing 
tendencies and individual fragmentation and cultural alienation. While 
this is not just a return to ordinary capitalism, it requires more focus on 
the political-economic dimension of critical theory. 
 These pathologies, we argue, entail a more profound threat to dem-
ocratic life and forms of developmental and communicative freedom 
than Habermas seems to recognize. It not likely that a universal identity 
will emerge under the conditions of neoliberalism; nor is it likely that 
we can return to the compromise of the welfare state without address-
ing the problems of democratic elitism and administrative control. 
Addressing these problems would require that we take a more radical 
approach to changing capitalism. Preserving democracy requires more 
fundamental economic reforms then he is willing to formulate. These 
include much greater democratic control over production and social 
property that can be used to produce collective goods. 
 At the same time, we believe that Habermas’s later writings, particu-
larly  Between Facts and Norms , can serve as a basis for radical democratic 
reforms of law and politics if suitably conjoined with radical economic 
reforms. In the next chapter we turn to the ways in which Habermas’s 
communicative theory formulates an alternative to neoliberal notions 
of reason and their conception of the social world, and thus provides an 
alternative to the dominant discourse of self-interest in political theory. 
These considerations set the stage for chapter 5, in which we examine 
more fully Habermas’s version of democratic theory. 
 
 Chapter Four 
 Towards a Critical Theory of Democracy: 
Deliberation, Self-interest, and Solidarity 
 At the end of the previous chapter we noted that the pathologies of 
neoliberalism are especially evident in the anti-solidaristic and anti-
communicative marketizing of cultural spheres. For thinkers who high-
light such pathologies, challenging them requires the equivalent of a 
de-reifying critique of neoliberal values. However, for another group of 
theorists, who have been influenced by the post-1989 collapse of “really 
existing” socialism, the problem is different. These analysts view criti-
cisms of the anti-solidaristic character of neoliberalism as reflecting 
republican or neo-republican nostalgia for a fused community. They 
also believe that self-interest, or in other cases dissensus, is necessary 
to keep at bay the dangers of a fused community that would stifle plu-
rality. These criticisms have a point in stressing the necessary role of 
self-determination and disagreement, which would be threatened by 
a fusion of wills under a unitary common good; even so, they can be 
said to miss the forest for the trees. In assimilating the critique of a 
fused community to that of communicative reason, they fail to see how 
individuality and community are integrated in communicative reason. 
They miss the biggest threat to a democratic social order posed by neo-
liberalism’s attack on the necessary sources of both social freedom and 
solidarity: the creation a new form of reification in place of the old one. 
 In this chapter and the next, we explore how a critical theory of 
democracy can confront the challenges of neoliberalism – and, more 
specifically, why the implicit and explicit theoretical commitments and 
assumptions of such a theory provide a uniquely powerful way of re-
establishing and reinvigorating the case for a radical democracy with 
developmental aims and aspirations. At the core of our analysis in these 
chapters is the work of Jürgen Habermas. As he approaches his ninth 
decade, and even as other critical currents have sought to supplement if 
not challenge his positions, Habermas remains a central and important 
156 Critical Theory, Democracy, and the Challenge of Neoliberalism
figure. His ideas continue to provide a focus for reflection on the pos-
sibilities for democracy in the face of neoliberal ideas, institutions, and 
practices. They remain informed by the prospect for a better future 
even in the face of those contemporary forces that call into question 
the very possibility of a radical democracy that, in the words of C.B. 
Macpherson, would enable all individuals to equally develop and exer-
cise their distinctively human capacities. In what follows we highlight 
the strengths and limitations of Habermas’s work and how this work 
requires supplementation by a renewed emphasis on political economy 
and a reconsideration of the powerful and insightful ideas of his prede-
cessors and teachers, Horkheimer, Adorno, and Marcuse. 
 Habermas’s theoretical work, up to and including the theory of com-
municative action, always admitted its debt to a Marxian framework, 
albeit a fundamentally revised one. He saw a contradictory relation-
ship between democracy and capitalism. The realization of democracy 
required a rejection of capitalism. As will see in the next chapter, there 
is no indication that Habermas has abandoned this view, but his for-
mulation of the problem has become more ambiguous. At the least, it is 
consigned to the background. However, we think that a reconsideration 
of this work, which incorporates some of the insights offered by Axel 
Honneth and more recent criticisms, could provide another direction. 
 If democracy can be defined broadly as a political order in which 
the people exercise rule or sovereignty, a critical theory of democracy 
potentially provides a distinctive way of confronting both the question 
of who “the people” are and by what means, and for what purposes, 
they are to “rule.” This is particularly crucial when popular sovereignty 
is linked to a conception of radical democracy whereby individuals are 
enabled to freely and equally develop and exercise their distinctively 
human capacities, as opposed to one in which democratic participation 
is limited to elections and voting, perhaps with interest group activity 
serving as a supplement to electoral politics. From the perspective of a 
critical theory of democracy, we need to look at the implications of com-
municative action for democratic thinking through the lens of a theory 
of society that is not final but provisional and historical. It is in this con-
text that we seek to explore questions of freedom, justice, and solidarity 
and so attempt to chart a path beyond neoliberalism. 
 Deliberative Democracy and Communicative Action 
 The theory of communicative action that Habermas developed, and 
which we treated briefly in our discussion of reason and rationality 
in chapter 2, rests on the idea that we coordinate our actions through 
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mutual understanding. Our knowledge and our sensibilities are formed 
in this intersubjective context. As George Herbert Mead argued, mind 
is social.  1  In social life we are actors who inhabit a lifeworld of shared 
understandings and mutual expectations. We can give accounts of our 
actions to others when commonsense understanding breaks down or 
our expectations for action are not fulfilled. These can be reasons for 
actions, explanations or even excuses that we may be challenged to 
justify, with the result that we may even revise our views. This ele-
ment of rationality in everyday life means that our interactions have not 
only a dialogical but also a deliberative structure. Individuals do not 
act solely out of instinct or naked self-interest. They also have frame-
works of understanding that incorporate their values through which 
they make sense of the word they inhabit. They monitor their actions in 
life situations with a certain degree of everyday reflexivity. Thus, what 
we call discourse is really a more formalized and elaborated practice 
of mutual accountability. When we reflect on problematic knowledge 
claims, norms, or the authenticity of actions, we attempt to reconstruct 
the conditions and elements of mutual understanding. In this respect, 
although theories of discourse use idealizations, they are not idealist. 
They require neither a transcendental subject nor a social world based 
on full agreement. 
 Questions of mutual understanding also have a bearing on issues 
of political sovereignty. For the forms of mutual understanding are 
not simply means of discussion; they also generate a communicative 
power that is the basis for a democratic notion of sovereignty. While not 
every instance of communicative power generates political sovereignty, 
democratic sovereignty always involves communicative power. When 
individuals act in concert to authorize public action, they generate this 
power. Neoliberalism fails to recognize either the importance of mutual 
understanding or the generative power of communication to establish 
sovereign political authority. 
 In chapter 2 we briefly mentioned the concept of deliberative 
democracy. Habermas’s theory of communicative action has been 
one of the most influential in the formulation of such deliberative 
theories. For deliberative theories, democracy is a consensual process 
whereby participants come to discuss alternative possibilities under 
conditions of fairness – that is, conditions of freedom and equality. 
Participants in deliberation are to have an equal chance to discuss all 
issues and are free to present any alternatives or considerations. Of 
course, this is an idealized situation that is difficult to fully meet, but 
it does provide a critical standard for evaluating public and private 
argumentation and deliberation. For example, if a manager and an 
158 Critical Theory, Democracy, and the Challenge of Neoliberalism
employee discuss a matter of work policy, implicitly or explicitly the 
manager’s reasons may be given more weight by the parties in the 
discussion. If so, the agreement they might reach about work policy 
could be open to criticism and revision because the employee (or 
employees) did not have an equal chance to put forward their own 
reasons or to challenge the reasoning of the manager. Similarly, pub-
lic debate in a democratic political order should include all relevant 
participants and ensure they have a chance to propose ideas or poli-
cies, give reasons for their positions, and criticize the reasoning of 
others. Such a debate would also include evaluating the norms that 
guide them in the formulation of policies or proposals, the sincer-
ity or honesty of participants, and even unconscious mechanisms of 
self-deception. 
 The notion of deliberative democracy, however, also rests on a con-
ception of communicative freedom. As we noted, the participants in 
a deliberative process are not self-interested actors who pursue their 
own ends or purposes. Although deliberation contains an element of 
self-development and identity – which as we shall see is crucial in some 
circumstances – it also requires a third notion of freedom that is inher-
ently linked to our relations with others. On the one hand, communica-
tive freedom means the capacity to freely use symbolic means to make 
sense of and reason in the world. It involves the capacity to transcend 
a particular understanding or even self-conception in interaction. On 
the other hand, communicative freedom also requires a relation of self 
and other, a relation of mutual recognition. We recognize the other as 
a potential partner with whom we can reason and discuss, but also as 
a source of otherness with whom we can experience discord or differ-
ence. Communicative power consists in the ability to find sources of 
consent through dialogue and to authorize actions among individuals 
who deliberate together. 
 Communicative power is a binding force. It is not just cognitive but 
volitional as well. It is a generative force that motivates action. Like 
communicative freedom it has a self-constitutive element. Individuals 
create themselves and their social world through both ordinary interac-
tions and specialized discourses. 
 The communicative model offers more than an account of democratic 
deliberation. It can also provide an element of a critical theory of society. 
A discourse theory deals not only with a situation in which participants 
enter into discourse to address a dispute or disagreement but also with 
the conditions and capacities that participants possess when they enter 
a discussion. While an agreement that is fair is always possible, for there 
to be a society in which such democratic deliberation is widespread, 
 Deliberation, Self-interest, and Solidarity 159
individuals require not just the capacity for self-determination but also 
and equally the possibility of self-realization. (Habermas raises this 
issue in his later work.) To be useful for the practice of democracy, self-
realization must be linked to some notion of a good society or an insti-
tutional structure, if only in outline.  2  
 However, consensual understandings about action that partici-
pants reach are also practical. They generate communicative power. 
In the political realm, as Habermas notes in his appropriation of Han-
nah Arendt, communicative power is an intersubjectively constituted 
authorization to act. It creates motivations, not just intellectual agree-
ment. While discussion may suspend the connection between action 
and understanding, an agreement creates communicative power in the 
form of a will to authorize action. 
 Less attention has been paid to Habermas’s use of the notion of 
solidarity. Morality is derived in part from the situation of individu-
als in society. It is not, as some argue, just the biological vulnerability 
of individuals that brings them together into society; also, and indeed 
more importantly, it is social and cultural vulnerability and depen-
dency. Individuals are not self-sufficient: they only become individuals 
through socialization, that is, through participation in an intersubjec-
tively shared lifeworld. Yet this lifeworld is also reproduced through 
the actions of individuals. From the beginning, individuals need at least 
a minimal degree of reciprocal regard as one element of mutual recog-
nition. As Habermas interprets this, it requires both equal respect for 
others as beings capable of individuality and a certain care and concern. 
This comes out of an awareness of the conditions of vulnerability, in 
oneself and in others. 
 To get at the core of Habermas’s notion of justice we must note how 
he differentiates it from the ethical standpoint.  3  The ethical standpoint 
is a conscious plan of life based on orientations to deeply held values – 
that is, a conception of human flourishing. An ethical standpoint is con-
stituted through reflection on a life history through which we locate our 
identity as an authentic expression of who we are and who we want to 
be. This standpoint cannot be seen simply as a form of prudence or an 
expression of preferences, as both can suggest an essentially egocentric 
point of view. Ethical life, as Hegel well understood, is a social creation. 
An individual’s life history should be seen in the context of a shared set 
of traditions in which that person finds a unique identity. Thus, against 
rational choice theories our preferences and our goals are embedded 
in our social and ethical lives and are subject to deliberation. They are 
elements of self-understanding that can be altered as our own sense of 
who we are changes through experience and reflection. 
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 The limits of the ethical standpoint emerge, Habermas believes, when 
we encounter those with fundamentally different conceptions of the 
good life. In such cases, conflicts cannot be resolved within the bound-
aries of a shared conception of the good. Nor does he think that any 
overarching conception of the good can or will be found. He thinks 
that such a conception would fail because it would either be exces-
sively paternalistic (e.g., Westerners’ assumptions that their values are 
the ones that should and must be accepted by others) or too empty of 
content (e.g., theories of basic needs). Here he thinks that ethical consid-
erations become transformed and incorporated into higher-level moral 
thinking; this is what he means when he argues that questions of moral-
ity are impersonal. Questions of what is good for all transcend ques-
tions of what is good for us or for me. We must suspend or bracket our 
own shared conception of human flourishing so that we may ask what 
is good for all, including for those who are not part of our community. 
 In this light, Habermas wants us to ponder what principles we can 
employ when considering issues of justice that are, in Kant’s fashion, 
moral as opposed to ethical. Habermas thinks that for this purpose jus-
tice must take priority over any conception of the good we may hold. 
He conceives of this priority in the strong sense of a duty-based moral 
theory. In moral reasoning our understanding of what is right and our 
duties to others always count more than any conceptions of our own 
good. Matters of justice are never just one element in our ethical reper-
toire but are pre-eminent. 
 Habermas thinks he can draw the principles that a theory of justice 
requires from the features of communicative action rather than from 
any specific notion of human flourishing. We cannot avoid the moral 
point of view when we confront certain problems, even if our inter-
pretations of these problems diverge. Habermas, however, contends 
that we can derive general and universal principles of morality from 
the basic conditions of intersubjectivity and mutual recognition. Here 
his claim that his theory of justice requires an impersonal standpoint 
has sometimes been criticized for taking an outsider’s perspective. By 
abstracting from our ethical commitments and attachments, it is argued, 
the theorist transgresses the boundaries of the participant’s perspective 
and takes the role of a detached observer. 
 We do not think this interpretation is warranted, although we suggest 
that finding a term other than “impersonal” could more fully clarify 
Habermas’s position. Here we must address the linkages between jus-
tice and solidarity. In Habermas’s argument the moral point of view 
does not leave the participant’s perspective behind but  redefines it. 
When we adopt the moral point of view, he argues, we still maintain 
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some remnant of the ethical commitment. The good for all is an ideal-
izing extension of the ethical standpoint, one that applies to all mem-
bers of any community. Rather than standing outside of community 
and commitment, it  enlarges community and strengthens the bonds that 
link individuals together. Here justice and solidarity are connected. The 
basic situation of justice concerns the vulnerability and dependency of 
humans who win their identities in social interaction through mutual 
recognition. These relations of recognition can be disrupted and need 
to be protected. Principles of justice are therefore also critical standards 
to which we can appeal and that are not fully bound to a notion of the 
good. 
 Not enough attention has been paid to questions of solidarity in 
Habermas’s work. Justice and solidarity are complementary, but the 
claims of solidarity imply that we see the other person from the per-
spective of an inclusive and non-dominating otherness where we can 
also take the position of the other: 
 If we interpret justice as what is equally good for all, then the “good” that 
has been extended step by step to the “right” forms a bridge between justice 
and solidarity. For universal justice also requires that one person should 
take responsibility for another, and even that each person should stand 
in and answer for a stranger who has formed his identity in completely 
different circumstances and who understands himself in terms of differ-
ent traditions. The remnant of the good at the core of the right reminds 
us that moral conscience depends on a particular self-understanding of a 
moral person who recognizes that they belong to a moral community. All 
individuals who are socialized into any communicative form of life at all 
belongs [ sic ] to this community.  4  
 From this perspective the standpoint of justice retains, if in a weak 
fashion, a version of the participant’s perspective. We are involved in 
recognitions of others insofar as they are participants in communicative 
interaction. Justice can never transcend the intersubjectivity involved in 
mutual recognition and  cannot be understood from the vantage point 
of an objective observer. The notion of an impersonal standpoint only 
refers to the denial of any privileged conception of the good. 
 Axel Honneth proposes a complementary notion of solidarity, one 
that he derives from a threefold account of social relations and forms 
of recognition. As opposed to love, which requires intimacy, solidarity 
reflects a broader social pattern of intersubjectivity. In the first instance, 
solidarity emerges when members of a status group see themselves 
as having equal honour or respect. Honneth thinks this first develops 
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collectively when individuals identify themselves as members of a 
group who share a similar identity. In late-modern societies, however, 
such respect is individualized (i.e., as self-respect). We are esteemed, 
and we esteem ourselves, because of our accomplishments, not those 
of our group, and we feel damaged when we are not respected. Solidar-
ity extends in an egalitarian way to all members of society, although 
Honneth does not specifically say that this must be in the direction of 
respect for persons. We can respect people even if they fail, especially if 
social conditions make success difficult. But more generally we respect 
persons regardless of who they are or what they are. We recognize a 
universal component of mutual recognition that extends to all.  5  
 This account of Habermas’s notion of solidarity can address several 
persistent criticisms of the communicative approach – in particular, 
the main objections to his version of deliberation. For communitar-
ians and other strong contextualists, Habermas’s conception of justice 
is “impersonal” – that is, it does not allow for any consideration of 
the theory of the good.  6  On its face, the idea that justice is impersonal 
seems to contradict the theory of communicative action. In terms of 
the theory, action is committed in nature. We have the capacity to 
understand others only because of our involvement in the world as 
participants. We can never take the position of an observer in relation 
to others. It appears to critics that Habermas, like John Rawls, steps 
outside or above the position of the participant and sees justice from 
the standpoint of an external judge or impartial spectator. One could 
make a case for this in Rawls’s theory, but a more sympathetic inter-
pretation of the deliberative standpoint would hold that in considering 
questions of justice our notions of the good are taken up in relevant 
ways. Habermasian theory is different from Rawls’s account on this 
point. It does not argue (as Rawls does in his first formulation of the 
original position) that we can have no knowledge of the good of oth-
ers. Questions of justice arise at the point where theories of the good 
life conflict and people need protection from domination and oppres-
sion. We protect people in such cases by recognizing the condition of 
any individual and their inherent vulnerability. For example, all are 
entitled to equal rights, but this is not because of any specific notion 
of the good – it is because they are participants. However, this does 
not fully solve the problem, since (among other reasons) it assumes 
that even within cultures or subcultures, individuals learn to consider 
questions of justice from this expanded awareness and enlarged hori-
zon. Whatever the logical structure of deliberation, it still rests on prac-
tical conditions that cannot be reduced to the formal requirements of 
deliberative interaction. 
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 Communicative Action and the Problem of Solidarity 
 Because we are participants in common social worlds, we are always 
already bound to one another through often taken-for-granted forms 
of mutual understanding. A second set of related problems concerns 
the relation between justice and solidarity: Why is there any motiva-
tion to enter into discussion at all or to continue it if understanding is 
not reached? In the abstract it appears that individuals have no special 
motive to engage in discussion. They must bring their motives from 
another source. In his discussion of discourses, Habermas often spoke 
of a rationally motivated consensus. The rationality of the process 
yields a normative commitment that is itself binding upon participants 
in a discussion. We think that Habermas’s later usage of communica-
tive power as an authorizing power is a more fruitful way of under-
standing this point, for it is communicative power that is generated by 
such agreements. However, this still leaves open questions with respect 
to situations where no agreement is reached: Why would individuals 
enter into such a procedure with no guarantee of agreement? 
 Habermas’s more recent reflections on solidarity provide a basis 
for dealing with this issue. Participants already have attachments and 
social relations that allow for forms of solidarity. These constitute what 
Durkheim called the pre-contractual foundations of the social contract.  7  
In order to engage in a contract, one must trust that the contract will be 
upheld. 
 We can construct a similar scenario with questions of discourse. 
To enter into a deliberation, individuals must suspend their ordinary 
frame of actions and reflexively consider contesting claims that may 
upset their received understanding. We could even end up alienated 
from those with whom we enter into discussion. Deliberation could 
more than break down – it could result in conflict or withdrawal from 
interaction. 
 We think that participants who come to discourse must do so with at 
least a weak sense of solidarity. They must have a willingness to carry 
on in the face of disagreement; they need to trust that their partners 
in discourse want to continue to seek agreement. This trust is comple-
mented, as Habermas notes, with a sense of justice. When we treat 
others as free and equal participants we consider them not just as for-
mally free subjects but as members of a moral community worthy of 
our respect. However different they may be from us, we treat them as 
worthy of inclusion. Here we assume that they have been or can be 
capable of gaining and holding our respect and recognition, and we 
theirs, even when we are unable to reach agreement. Respect requires 
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a higher generalized ability to identify with others even if they hold 
fundamentally different perspectives and may even seem to be radi-
cally “other.” In this way discourse comes close to the idea of dialogue 
in which co-participants are seen as “concrete others” with whom we 
form wider intersubjective bonds. 
 By contrast, we can think of cases of mistrust in which claims that are 
reasonably established through discussion and inquiry are denied by 
others. This seems to emerge in discussions about climate change. In 
such cases some parties lack trust in the claims of those defending the 
idea of potentially disastrous climate change and refuse to engage in 
discourse when challenged. When employed by those with power, this 
kind of refusal can be a form of oppression. However, when it becomes 
a facet of ordinary communication it entails a breakdown of trust and 
solidarity. 
 In contemporary democratic societies like the United States, the 
weakening if not collapse of solidarity presents a radical threat to dem-
ocratic practice. This is not, however, simply or primarily about a loss 
of common values, as both left and right communitarians sometimes 
argue. The anti-solidaristic tendencies in these societies break down the 
discursive and deliberative mechanisms whereby we create communi-
cative power. Individuals lack the willingness to engage others as equal 
participants who are sincere is their commitment to the truth. In situa-
tions where many get their information from selective sources, they are 
likely to seek confirmation in a non-discursive manner and so reinforce 
already fixed positions. Such individuals view the world through the 
lens of self-interest and tend to mistrust the motivations and reasoning 
processes of others. 
 Towards a Democratic Notion of Solidarity 
 The notion of solidarity can be employed in both democratic and non-
democratic contexts. An authoritarian populist state could be character-
ized in certain circumstances as having a high degree of solidarity; so 
could a fundamentalist religious group whose members see themselves 
as having a common religious/political mission. However, the most 
significant challenge to the scope of democratic solidarity comes from 
the republican tradition. Its version of solidarity rests on the ideal of a 
unified community. Solidarity here does not, however, involve merely 
an ethical bond. On the one hand, it refers to relations of reciprocity and 
mutual expectations. In situations of interdependence or conditions of 
vulnerability we have obligations and expectations of mutual aid and 
support, although we typically do not use the term solidarity to refer to 
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close relationships between family members who may have strong ties 
to us. However, Émile Durkheim did use the term mechanical solidarity 
to refer to less complex societies integrated though kinship relations. 
For modern societies Hegel characterized these kinds of relationships 
as  Sittlichkeit . They refer to a common ethical bond that applies not just 
to the family but to the nation seen as an ethical unity. This bond has its 
roots in a pre-existing community that is linked to the past. 
 The modern understanding of political solidarity has roots in the 
French revolutionary notion of fraternity but even deeper roots in 
monotheistic religious traditions. Since Weber, we have recognized 
that these religions rest on conceptions of the brotherhood of all believ-
ers and in the possibility of a universal community that transcends 
national or ethnic boundaries. During the Enlightenment this impulse 
was transformed into a secular notion of the unity of humanity. The 
revolutionary idea of fraternity shares with the religious tradition a 
redemptive dimension. The humanity that would constitute human 
solidarity does not yet exist and must be brought into being though 
deliberate human action. This notion of solidarity is of course weaker 
than kinship or ethnic obligations, yet it remains central to political 
bonds and legitimacy in modern societies. It is both future-oriented 
and inclusionary. It can serve in this context as a critical standard. It 
stands in opposition to the tendencies of market-based societies to 
erode solidarity and prevent its development in the universal forms 
foreseen by the revolutionary tradition. In chapter 6 we will return 
to the ideal of fraternity as it emerges in Axel Honneth’s attempt to 
rethink and reimagine the socialist project. 
 To be sure, we cannot return to the understanding of pre-modern 
solidarity. The very processes of capitalist modernization are also a con-
dition, albeit an external one, for the expansion of our understanding of 
fraternity. In capitalism we are linked in ways that were not possible in 
pre-capitalist societies. But the same modernization processes that cre-
ate the social (though not the cultural) conditions of a universal society 
also create a universal bond in the form of a market society.  8  Thus it has 
a contradictory set of effects. 
 The kind of communicative solidarity we outline is in many ways 
analogous to the political concept of solidarity outlined above. It is 
not based on the trust, a shared ethos, local attachments, or ties of kin-
ship. It is based instead on the universality of linguistic understanding, 
which links all who participate in dialogue. Like democratic solidar-
ity it is future-oriented and based – albeit more weakly than its politi-
cal analogue – on common humanity. Such a common humanity does 
not exist at all times and in all discourses, but when we do engage in 
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deliberation and dialogue with others, especially those who are socially 
and culturally distant and with whom we disagree, we must employ 
weak solidarity in communicative action. 
 In this conception we are close to the idea of solidarity among strang-
ers that also is employed in a political context. Democratic solidarity 
involves ties among strangers that are created in democratic citizen-
ship. Citizens gain solidarity through participation in democratic pro-
cesses in a democratized public sphere and a democratic civil society. 
Notions of solidarity no doubt take hold in lifeworlds and cultural tra-
ditions, but they are also embedded in democratic practices based on 
equal respect for all: 
 The counterpart to this social-theoretical program in moral and legal 
theory is a universalism that is highly sensitive to differences. Equal 
respect for  everyone is not limited to those who are like us; it extends to 
the person of the other in his or her otherness. And solidarity with the 
other  as one of us refers to the flexible “we” of a community that resists 
all substantive determinations and extends its permeable boundaries 
ever further. This moral community constitutes itself solely by way of 
the negative idea of abolishing discrimination and harm and of extend-
ing relations of mutual recognition to include marginalized men and 
women. The community thus constructively outlined is not a collective 
that would force its homogenized members to affirm its distinctive-
ness. Here inclusion does not imply locking members into a community 
that closes itself off from others. The “inclusion of the other” means 
rather that the boundaries of the community are open for all, also and 
most especially for those who are strangers to one another and want to 
remain strangers.  9  
 To be effective in a society, however, this notion of democratic par-
ticipation and solidarity cannot be legally compelled. Participation in 
democratic processes should be mobilized through the guarantees of 
communicative freedom. Individuals must be motivated to act politi-
cally. This requires cultural norms and practices that respect democratic 
processes and ensure that individuals can both participate in demo-
cratic will-formation and enjoy basic protection, not only of civil rights 
but of social rights as well. Habermas sees this kind of solidarity as a 
constitutional patriotism, one in which citizens are willing to sacrifice 
for those they do not know but with whom they share a bond of equal 
respect. We can also see this as a type of weak reciprocity based on a 
suitably limited notion of mutual aid. This broad respect for individuals 
is the precondition of solidarity. 
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 Deliberation and Self-interest 
 As we indicated in the introduction to this book, our view of delibera-
tion and of democracy itself is different from that of Jane Mansbridge 
and her colleagues. They contend that theories of deliberative democ-
racy oppose strategic actions such as bargaining, negotiation, and the 
exercise of power. In contrast, they contend that “self-interest, suitably 
constrained, ought to be part of the deliberation that eventuates in a 
democratic decision.”  10  For Mansbridge, situations where deliberation 
is incomplete or disagreement is intractable call for a different set of 
procedures. Non-deliberative mechanisms such as voting, aggrega-
tion, and bargaining have to be used, and these involve coercive power. 
Mansbridge and others who stress self-interest believe that recognizing 
its central place is a way of incorporating plurality and diversity into 
deliberation. At the heart of this argument is the view that the discourse 
ethics of Habermas are based on a conception of the common good or 
social unity, that a discourse theory favours a model that seeks conver-
gence on a single answer. 
 The situations Mansbridge takes as paradigmatic involve questions 
about how to act in the circumstances in which agents find themselves 
in conflict over courses of action. Mansbridge gives the example of a 
discussion in the 1960s over the protest tactics adopted by faculty at a 
school. While the group thinks that a certain course of action is correct, 
one participant objects that he is afraid to carry out this action for fear of 
being fired. So the members pursue another tack. In another example, a 
couple face a situation in which they have competing job offers, one in an 
East Coast city and another in the Midwest. They cannot decide what 
is good for them as a unit (the family), and they must also consider their 
self-interest – or, more properly, their well-being. Mansbridge sees these 
sorts of arguments, among others, as undermining the logic of agreement. 
 Mansbridge’s examples do not establish the priority of self-interest in 
these situations, and thus pinpoint issues that a Habermasian theory of 
deliberation would fail to consider. In other words, these examples do 
not simply involve pure self-interest; they also raise ethical issues that 
can become thematic in discussions. This is even clearer in the case of 
collective action. The example of the faculty protest involves not just the 
self-interest of the wavering participant but also the question of exis-
tential commitment, which is at heart an ethical issue. As Mansbridge 
ought to know from the protest movements of the 1960s, standing up 
to authority requires such a commitment and is not without risk. It 
involves not just a participant’s self-interest but his or her identity and 
personal integrity as well. We cannot say in advance of a discussion 
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whether all will have the courage or will want to take the risks that 
necessarily accompany some forms of protest. Thus, consideration of 
risks and consequences is not outside the scope of discourse ethics as 
Habermas originally formulated it. There are many possible decisions 
that could be made. Members could decide on an action that all could 
undertake. They could pursue an option that leaves out the dissenting 
member, or they could ask the participant who harbours concerns for 
his well-being to reconsider his existential commitment. Perhaps the 
injustice in the situation is so great that it requires an existential risk. In 
this specific case, the members decided on a less confrontational option 
that would allow all to participate. In so doing they showed respect for 
the participant who feared the action. 
 Let us look now at the second case now, which also seems to involve 
the ethical self-understanding of the participants. The questions facing 
the couple are not just about self-interest but also about identity. They 
raise questions of what kind of person we want to be and how elements 
of our social situation support or do not support our aims. Is our com-
mitment to our partner the more important element? Can we maintain 
our career commitment in some way other than by moving, or will we 
have to give up on our ambitions? We may feel that we cannot give up 
our career without losing elements of our identity and that will make 
our life together unhappy and unfulfilling. 
 This case, then, involves a situation in which the couple’s common 
expectations are called into question. Their sense of solidarity and 
mutual care is challenged if not threatened. Their expectations must 
be renewed or revised if the shared sense of the relationship is to be 
sustained. But of course, one’s own sense of who “I” am is also called 
into question. While such issues of identity and even shared identities 
are self-regarding in some sense, it is a strain to call these manifesta-
tions of self-interest or to see conceptions of our identity as rooted in 
preferences. Rather, they are ways by means of which we establish our 
relationship to the larger social world as distinct individuals within the 
group. Such an example would be a challenge to theories of discourse 
such as that of Habermas only if one assumed that all social relations 
and all deliberative processes followed the model of impersonal delib-
erations on justice. But there is no indication this is true. To the contrary, 
Habermas recognizes that issues of identity and even self-interest play 
a role in social life and places a good deal of stress on questions of indi-
viduation via Mead and German Idealism. Questions of justice apply to 
only a small, albeit crucial, set of issues. 
 These arguments and the examples provided by Mansbridge and her 
collaborators seem to imply a rigid and moralistic version of deliberative 
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reason. We can distinguish between deliberations that are concerned 
with establishing correct moral or ethical principles and those that are 
concerned with the right thing to do in a situation.  11  To elide one with 
the other is to make a serious mistake. 
 Let us say we are faced with a policy question around equal pay for 
work of equal value. According to analysts, women receive about 78 
per cent of the wages of men for the same jobs. The first question is 
one of justice: Is it fair? When we engage in a moral discourse we are 
called upon to inquire into the principles of justice or fairness that stem 
from the recognition of equality and equal respect for all; it is not just 
a question of material gain. At least for Habermas, issues of justice are 
not based on a notion of the common good of a community but rather 
on principles that apply to all. Such principles of course require that 
equality and freedom be recognized in all deliberations for participants 
to reach a fair agreement. Moral discourses aim at establishing valid 
norms, not social policies or practical problems of action in concrete 
situations. 
 The principles of justice are not, however, rigidly applied in all cir-
cumstances. We concur with Habermas’s position that only in “their 
application to particular concrete cases will it transpire which of the 
competing principles is the most appropriate in the given context.” 
Moreover, Habermas identifies three different forms of practical rea-
son: moral, ethical, and pragmatic. While the first deals with questions 
of justice and the second with questions of the good life, the third deals 
with strategic and technical means to reach a pre-established end. There 
is no debate over proper norms or goals here. In this case we have a 
fixed goal and we seek to realize it. Returning to our example, a group 
of people agree that equal pay for equal work is a desirable goal. While 
they could try to raise consciousness and shape identities, they could 
also seek strategies to get a law passed. Here deliberation might be con-
cerned only with strategic action around how to get a bill before a leg-
islative body and how to lobby or convince legislators. Of course, some 
lobbying might involve appeals to justice as well, but there is no reason 
to think that such actors either eschew conflict or deny the presence of 
strategic elements. Getting a bill passed might require compromise or 
negotiation. We might not win all we wanted but we could come to feel 
that we have obtained a reasonable bargain. This is all perfectly com-
patible with a critical theory of deliberation. 
 A second line of argument concerns the problems of coordination 
through self-interest. Following game theoretical approaches, Mans-
bridge and her associates want to argue that coordination can be car-
ried out through self-interest alone. This type of coordination would be 
170 Critical Theory, Democracy, and the Challenge of Neoliberalism
independent of mutual accountability in almost all respects. The reflex-
ive sense of order is achieved through a reconciliation of preferences. 
These preferences are ultimate units. 
 Mansbridge gives the example of a hypothetical policy decision in 
which the common good is achieved through a set of discrete group or 
individual preferences. The hypothetical legislator supports the deci-
sion, not out of normative concerns but because it benefits her constitu-
ency. But this position too has weaknesses. Even here, where the focus is 
on material benefits, the legislator refers to some form of human flour-
ishing that the constituents share, not just unmediated self-interest. 
 Aggregation, Deliberation, and Coordination 
 The question of the binding character of rational choice theories was the 
topic of a debate among thinkers who to varying degrees were commit-
ted to rational choice assumptions and analysis. Neo-institutionalists 
rejected rational choice fundamentalist arguments that the aggrega-
tion of choices could yield a stable order. This problem had already 
been raised though examples showing the irrationality of voting and 
ordering of preferences. Arguments around the rationality, or irratio-
nality, of voting are well-known and will not be restated here.  12  Neo-
classical theories assume a well-functioning if imperfect market system; 
they also assume widespread acceptance/compliance with this system 
and with the basic structures of economic and political life, including 
presumably stable property rights and intact media of exchange. As 
we noted in chapter 3, markets are not spontaneous occurrences; they 
require background conditions that both make possible their existence 
and maintain their stability. 
 In focusing on just those questions that neoclassicists have taken for 
granted – that is, the establishment of market conditions and institutions – 
rational choice theorists address the genesis of and change in institu-
tional design. Here, questions of cooperation and coordination of action 
are central. Neo-institutionalism aims to explain how institutions lead 
actors to work together and why there are stable sets of rules. For neo-
institutionalists, these are normative questions. Focus on the coordination 
of action connects them to the problems of traditional moral theory as well 
as to sociological questions about the rise of normative structures. Jack 
Knight and Itai Sened note that the “key to understanding the importance 
of social institutions lies in the role they play in the formation of expec-
tations and beliefs. The problem here is one of establishing expectations 
about the actions of the other players in the game: the formation of such 
expectations is a prerequisite for making a rational choice.”  13  
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 Although some neo-institutionalists try to derive institutions from 
self-interest, they too must acknowledge beliefs that are derived from 
mutual understanding and the trust between participants. It is diffi-
cult to defend the creation of order through aggregation. The order that 
Mansbridge presupposes rests on prior institutional arrangements that 
can be called into question in deliberation. 
 Furthermore, it is not even clear that the example of aggregation – 
voting – that Mansbridge employs can be seen simply as raw prefer-
ence. If in fact voting is a result of some deliberative procedure where 
one considers the reasons for voting, then it becomes a normative 
action, an expression, however muted, of a collective process. Voting 
is also a means whereby we can express our membership in a political 
community. 
 Democracy, Disagreement, and Rational Choice 
 Employing a pragmatic interpretation of rational choice theory, James 
Johnson and Jack Knight take the criticisms of Mansbridge and her col-
leagues further.  14  Rather than seeing strategic action as an element of 
deliberation, they view discourse  in toto as a form of strategic action: 
its basic aim is to persuade or induce others to undertake an action. 
They do see that certain specific forms of action and the stability of 
democratic institutions do not rest simply on preferences expressed 
through voting. These also require discussion, which plays a crucial 
role in forming preferences and in limiting the scope of alternatives. 
However, they are at pains to divorce their position from that of delib-
erative democrats (especially Habermas) who base deliberation on a 
strong notion of agreement and achieved consensus. This, they claim, 
is unrealizable and unrealistic. Johnson and Knight seek to redefine the 
distinction between communicative and strategic action to the benefit 
of their notion of strategic action. 
 For Johnson and Knight, social action is not primarily consensual. 
In place of a notion of consensus based in mutual understanding, they 
believe deliberation is simply a matter of argument. As they see it, con-
sensual action reflects a failure to accept conflict and indeterminacy, 
while, by contrast, strategic action aims to limit (rather than end or 
avoid) disagreement. Political argument is strategic: it includes persua-
sion, cajoling, negotiating, and providing incentives. It does not rely 
on the force of the better argument. Johnson and Knight contend that 
self-interested modes of argument are sufficient to coordinate action. 
Reaching the outcome we desire does not depend on “agreement” over 
norms.  15  
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 Like other theorists of rational choice, Johnson and Knight employ a 
desiccated notion of social action. For them, cooperation is only desir-
able because it is personally profitable. To be sure, they do not actu-
ally want to reject all norms, although their attachment to a strategic 
model makes comprehending norms difficult. Like Mansbridge and her 
colleagues, they want to solve problems in which a plurality of norms 
do not admit of consensus. However, in one respect they go further: 
they promote the idea that we can and should try through incentives to 
induce or persuade others to do what we want. This does not, however, 
solve the problems of social order they pose. 
 Imagine a social world that is coordinated entirely through incen-
tive and inducement. While Johnson and Knight see a happy outcome 
where all cooperate strategically, or at least where cooperation is suffi-
cient, what happens when these incentives fail or if some people begin 
to gain substantial advantages over others? Then it would become dif-
ficult to trust others or to maintain an unproblematic notion of strat-
egy as non-antagonistic. What happens when someone is in distress, ill 
or troubled, or lacks resources? We need to invoke questions of justice 
or even ethical notions of the good to understand and approach these 
problems. 
 When we see argument and deliberation as essentially strategic, we 
lose the bases of social order in mutual understanding. We lose the 
capacity for solidarity. Neither norms nor practices of solidarity are 
means for strategically achieving ends; they are instead modes of relat-
ing to others. They express who we are as individuals, as well as the 
social identity of participants. We do not just seek to fulfil preferences 
or to relate means to ends that are merely given. We strive to realize 
purposes and to create conditions that are compatible with the kind of 
person we believe we are or would like to become. 
 When I view another from the point of view of strategic action, I regard 
this person not as one with whom I am bound by ties of accountability 
or solidarity, but instead as a means to my ends, even if those ends are 
themselves benign. Even when we are trying to induce cooperation or 
to find incentives that avoid domination, the other person is still not one 
with whom we share bonds of respect and care, who needs to be treated 
as free and equal. So long as we stay within the horizon of strategic 
action we have no way to make the distinction between good and bad 
uses of such action. Thus, the proposals by Mansbridge for the incor-
poration of strategic action and the more radical position of Johnson 
and Knight are caught in a dilemma. Either they are unable to explain 
the non-dominating elements of strategic action or they are forced to 
incorporate assumptions from the communicative use of deliberation. 
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For once we consider the other person as worthy of enough respect to 
deliberately avoid dominating via the resort to strategic action, we have 
left the realm of strategy and have begun to employ norms that require 
and shape reasoned agreement. Once we see the other as a free and 
equal participant, and not merely a strategic partner, we consider that 
individual as someone who is both due just treatment and accountable 
for her actions. This type of ethical or moral accountability is not pos-
sible within the framework of strategic action. 
 We cannot generate a theory of democracy based entirely on strategic 
action. Strategic action is not sufficient to generate a normative social 
order on its own. Arguments employing strategic action often tacitly 
draw upon the background conditions of the social lifeworld in order 
to circumscribe its legitimate scope. This form of action relies on the 
prior existence of norms of accountability as well as on the trust and 
solidarity, however weak, of the members of that world. Try to imagine 
a world in which solely strategic actions were the basis of order. How 
would we deal with questions of unjust distribution of goods or distri-
bution of power? It could deal neither with questions of personal and 
social identity, nor with the ways that preferences are formed in the 
context of these background conditions. 
 Antagonism and the Basis of Politics: Against Consensus 
 The idea that liberal politics is either apolitical or anti-political has a 
long pedigree in twentieth-century political thought. The critique of 
behaviouralism developed by the Caucus for a New Political Science in 
the United States in the 1960s held that this approach eliminated poli-
tics from political science. In seeking a value-free social science, behav-
iouralism lost sight of the significance of problems and was guided 
simply by methodological concerns.  16  A value-neutral social science 
left out questions of the good life. As a result, behavioural approaches, 
whatever the political outlook of their practitioners, were inherently 
conservative. They provided no tools for opposing the existing order. 
 In addition, liberalism has often been criticized for its interest group 
politics, which like behaviouralism lacks any overarching conception of 
the good life. If political actors act largely in terms of private interests, 
questions of the public good are difficult to address. Especially as seen 
in rational choice theories, there can be no conception of the general will 
or common interest. 
 Postmodern thinkers extend the criticism of the anti-political char-
acter of political theory to the very conceptions of the good life that 
earlier theorists used to criticize behaviouralism. In their view, it is not 
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just a value-free or interest-based approach to politics that generates 
an anti-political conception of politics. Postmodern theorists reject the 
very notion that there are norms of order or ideals of the good life. They 
consider any attempt to establish such norms as a means of promoting 
conformist attitudes and practices that fix behaviour and deny conflict. 
As they see it, theories of deliberative democracy stand on the side of 
conformity. They rely, according to this critique, on forms of consensus 
that eliminate politics. Radical democracy requires the acknowledg-
ment of the inevitability and permanence of conflict, struggle, disagree-
ment, and dissensus that transgresses existing orders and generates 
radical change. For these thinkers, politics is essentially agonistic. To 
think otherwise is to deny politics altogether. 
 For Bonnie Honig, much of contemporary political theory denies or 
displaces politics. She finds this tendency in a wide variety of contem-
porary positions from liberalism to republicanism to communitarian-
ism, which “converge in the assumption that success lies in the elimina-
tion from a regime of dissonance, resistance conflict, struggle.”  17  These 
theories are essentially conformist because they reduce forms of politics 
to settled terms. They are concerned with stability, order, regulation, 
and law. They eliminate conflict. In contrast, Honig’s version of ago-
nism proposes a politics of destabilization and transgression as a form 
of permanent contestation. This politics aims to upset fixed political 
norms and identities. Only such a “transgressive” politics can unleash 
the freedom-creating potential of human action to begin anew and cre-
ate new forms of social life. 
 William Connolly develops a related version of agonism.  18  A demo-
cratic ethos, he argues, must encompass a permanent agonistic struggle 
of conflicting commitments. He sees the conflict over viewpoints to be 
undecidable and resistant to any closure or finality. Following Friedrich 
Nietzsche, he sees agonistic struggle as guided by the mutual respect 
of adversaries. Much like the idealized  agon of Nietzsche’s thought, the 
great men of the  agon strive for glory in the competition of great ideas 
against the tragic backdrop of finitude. 
 Chantal Mouffe, sometimes in collaboration with Ernesto Laclau, differ-
entiates her version of agonism from those of both Honig and Connolly.  19  
Mouffe begins from a rejection of Marx’s idea of a non-antagonistic soci-
ety. According to this position, Marx eliminated politics. He employed the 
idea of a harmonious post-capitalist society without division or conflict. 
Antagonism was only a feature of class-divided societies. Because Marx 
saw civil society as little more than a reflection of bourgeois power, he had 
a limited notion of public life, one that ironically echoed the very liberal-
ism he subjected to critical attack. 
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 For Mouffe, recovering the political involves overcoming Marx’s har-
monistic and economistic assumptions. Unlike critical theorists, Mouffe 
takes the postmodern route to the return of politics. She follows Carl 
Schmitt’s earlier critique of liberal politics without rejecting all elements 
of liberalism. Schmitt rejected liberal theories of deliberation and dis-
cussion as empty and politically impotent. Parliamentary democracy 
operated via the mediation of plural interests though compromise and 
indecision. It was incapable of dealing with a crisis by protecting the 
commonality of the nation. Mouffe accepts Schmitt’s delineation of the 
friend/foe distinction as at the root of politics. She rejects universalist 
notions of right. Politics is always rooted in antagonism. Being “for” 
something always means being “against” something or someone. Con-
flict is thus an ever-present possibility. 
 In place of consensus, then, Mouffe holds that the basis of social order 
lies in relations of power. Contrary to the views of Honig and Connolly, 
for Mouffe there is no standpoint of mutual respect among antago-
nists that keeps struggle within bounds. Instead, power and order are 
founded in hegemony. There must be a dominant power that precedes 
rationality. The dominant forms of understanding that define what is 
right and wrong, good or bad, are established through hegemony. While 
this position borrows from Gramsci, unlike Marxian views it rejects any 
notion of rationality with which forms of hegemony can be evaluated. 
The establishment and acceptance of norms is based on “persuasion” 
rather than conviction. Mouffe thinks that the rationalism of theorists 
such as Habermas and Rawls occludes the emotion and sentiment at the 
heart of citizenship. She thinks that political theory must be concerned 
with shaping the  feelings of citizens so that they have a sense of solidar-
ity with others. Here, however, she seems to employ a sense of virtue 
that Honig would reject. 
 Coming at the question of politics from a somewhat different though 
related angle, Jacques Rancière views politics as dissensus.  20  His focus, 
however, is on a specific form of disagreement. Disagreement always 
occurs as a break with order and conformity. It is a rupture that cre-
ates a new world, a different outlook. Politics, then, is an extraordinary 
activity that is distinct from ordinary ones, and in fact Rancière gives it 
a privileged ontological position. Politics is distinct from policing. The 
latter is a consensual form that reinforces the exclusion and division that 
always exists in ordinary life. Politics comes into play when a group that 
has been excluded asserts that it is in fact equal, that is, when it breaks 
with the existing order of domination. Thus, politics always involves a 
wrong; it breaks from the consensus that excludes and puts in its place a 
dissent in which a group that is excluded declares it has an equal place. 
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 Rancière’s view of democracy is a radical one.  21  Democracy is not 
just a form of social life or a specific form of government, but the form 
of politics itself. The political is a creative force that has the power to 
institute new forms of social life. Democracy thus does not refer to a 
specific community constituted through exclusion; rather, in counting 
the uncounted it creates a space in which the included and excluded are 
one. Such a process generates a new public, a new sense of a “we,” that 
includes the oppressed and those who stand in solidarity with them. 
The sense of “we” is in Rancière’s view created when a collectivity 
asserts its equality. It also relies on a new sensibility that allows these 
new social identities to arise. Paradoxically, this inclusion of the other 
occurs only through dissensus. Contestation is not simply a conflict of 
interests or values but a dispute over what is given and about the frame 
within which we sense that something is given. It encompasses both 
who we are and how we understand who we are. 
 Sheldon Wolin takes up some of the problems that Rancière raises 
through a less ontologically tinged and more historically oriented 
notion of boundary-breaking experiences.  22  Wolin too sees the political 
embodied in the extraordinary experiences in which political actors 
unite to revolt against domination. The major threats to political action 
are not so much ontological as historical. Wolin is concerned with the 
survival of democratic initiatives in the face of state and administra-
tive powers that tend to overwhelm them. As Wendy Brown correctly 
notes, his approach is neo-Weberian.  23  He is more concerned with 
Weber’s notion of the rationalization of power than with, for exam-
ple, that of Marx. He is however a  neo -Weberian who does not accept 
Weber’s strictures about the need for representative democracy. For 
Wolin, like most radical theorists, representative democracy is limited. 
This bureaucratically circumscribed form of politics is primarily con-
cerned with management of behaviour. We will return to this issue in 
the next chapter. 
 In a manner reminiscent of Max Horkheimer, Wolin is concerned 
with a persistent Cartesian influence that reduces the search for social 
practice to a form of natural science. Instead, the emphasis in participa-
tory democracy on local decision-making makes clear that Wolin sees 
politics as located basically in conflict or in contestation over power. 
 Wolin is concerned primarily with democratic processes as forms 
of renewal that are meant to break the boundaries of existing politics 
and reinstitute democratic demands. His normative model is a form 
of radical and popular democracy that transcends the bounds of the 
managerial politics that characterize late-capitalist societies. In protest 
movements such as the civil rights and environmental movements, 
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and in groups such as Solidarity, the Polish trade union, he sees social 
forces that seek to reinstitute popular sovereignty and thereby renew 
the promise of radical democracy inherent in that idea. However, Wolin 
thinks this process is limited in modern society. Democratic popular 
actions emerge only sporadically and in response to social problems, 
and to inequalities and injustices. Democracy here acts more as a cor-
rective or even a renewal of a republican spirit, but it still seems to 
acknowledge limits to radical democracy. 
 Radical critics of deliberative democracy see the quest for consensus 
in metaphysical terms. They often see order in terms of a permanence 
and certainty that is ontologically ensured. However, the post-meta-
physical conception of reason and action that we develop here does not 
require that mutual understanding be identified with the certainty or 
even harmony that critics claim to find in it. 
 If, however, we begin from the perspective of participants in a social 
lifeworld, then we base our analysis not on a metaphysical certainty 
that things are fixed but rather on the institution and reproduction of 
the forms of mutual understanding, recognition, and accountability 
that are central to social order. We look at deliberative democracy not 
simply as a decision-making procedure but as a key element within a 
theory of society. While participants in the lifeworld do assume that 
what they believe is true and that the norms they hold are correct, they 
are also reflexive participants who can provide accounts of their actions 
when called upon. Seen from this angle, the process of mutual under-
standing in the lifeworld is not simply based on the need to decide but 
is part of the process of constant renewal of the social world though 
mutual understanding. As reflexive participants in this social world, 
however, individuals are capable of critically understanding the norms 
they follow. 
 An ontological notion of the social order as a fixity that is opposed 
to dissent and disagreement reifies the open character of communica-
tive action, which presumes a reciprocal relation between reproduction 
and renewal. What we more formally call discourse comes into play 
not primarily in situations of social order and maintenance but when 
norms or other features of social life are called into question. Of course, 
it is true that social forms can become ossified and difficult to change. 
Individuals too can form rigid identities and authoritarian personality 
structures. These challenges, however, are as Wolin argues historical, 
not metaphysical. Radical democracy no doubt implies openness to 
social transformation. It always holds out the possibility of new forms 
of social relations; but that openness is an element of ordinary under-
standing and cannot be ontologically opposed to order. 
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 Nor can we see norms or forms of social order simply as policing or 
disciplining subjects. Clearly some forms of social life and some institu-
tions can be enabling, if not always so. Families can be both oppressive 
and supportive; educational institutions can promote conformity, or 
they can foster critical reflection. As long as we human beings are vul-
nerable and dependent, we rely on personal and institutional arrange-
ments to develop and use our capacities. While there is no doubt that 
politics is distinct from administration, citizens do act in concert not 
only to reject or rebel against rules but also to bring about new forms 
through authorization. The communicative power exercised by citizens 
acting in concert can both create new institutional forms and bind indi-
viduals together. Again, order and transformation are not ontologically 
separate. They create a new consensus. From this standpoint, it is dif-
ficult to see politics as constituted solely by struggle or by agonistic con-
flict. For example, if a legislature passes a law guaranteeing equal pay 
for equal work, creating a society in which this is accepted may not be 
a matter of policing or administrative rationality alone. It still requires 
a political commitment to equality, not just technical or instrumental 
reason. 
 Against post-structuralist arguments, contemporary critical theory 
seems to accept the plurality of values and conceptions of the good life. 
Theories of justice, then, are called into play when conflicts over values 
or the good life affect the basic rights and capacities of subjects as par-
ticipants. To be sure, the notion of pluralism employed by such theorists 
does not satisfy all agonistic thinkers; nonetheless, it is an exaggeration 
to speak as if pluralism is denied. However, there are points of contact. 
For example, where William Connolly speaks of the mutual respect that 
contestants have in the  agon , he draws on the same sources of respect 
and recognition that critical theories of justice employ. In his view the 
contest between participants in the  agon for recognition and glory is 
itself limited by these principles of respect for self and others. Similarly, 
critical theories of justice are based on conceptions of solidarity that 
entail the inclusion of others in ways similar to what Rancière and some 
post-structuralist theorists argue. Theories of “consensus” are rooted in 
these conceptions of a consensual social order that require a broad read-
ing rather than a narrow one. 
 The most widespread criticism of the discursive account is that it 
is unable to deal with situations of conflict.  24  Mouffe argues that such 
situations are constitutive of politics and involve more than just dis-
agreement – they also involve opposition. In such cases the opponent 
is treated not with respect but rather, as in cases of war (hot or cold), 
as an existential threat. For Carl Schmitt the idea of the enemy as an 
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existential threat was the basis of a politics that saw the executive, not 
the legislature, as the true authority and sovereign. The popular will 
is replaced by the will of the dictator, who embodies the pre-thematic 
unity of the people. 
 Mouffe does not adopt Schmitt’s proposal for a unitary power through 
which friend/foe relations are defined; instead she tries to recast it in 
terms of a tempered antagonism within a democratic society that is an 
“agonistic (rather than antagonistic) public space in which there is the 
possibility for dissensus to be expressed or different alternatives to be 
put forward.”  25  She sees social formations as necessarily bounded. A 
democratic society conceives of itself as a body of equals within a social 
order that is defined as different from others. Even within democratic 
societies, however, there is an irreducible plurality of positions that 
never cohere into a single unity. Mouffe believes hers is a conception of 
radical democracy because it extends democratic practices into all areas 
of social life, but without any “transcendent” notion of unity. 
 This theory runs into difficulties, however, in determining where and 
how sovereignty lies. While a radical theory would seem to say that 
sovereignty rests with the people and with the communicative power 
of creating understanding, the theory of hegemony that Mouffe and 
Laclau develop leaves the status of sovereignty uncertain. For author-
ity is in some sense constituted by the hegemonic powers from which 
notions of good or bad, right or wrong, come into being. Subjects, then, 
do not come to an understanding about matters of importance; rather, 
they are persuaded in the rhetorical sense of the term. It is a matter of 
creating emotional commitment, not mutual understanding. To be sure, 
Mouffe looks to the establishment of public spaces in which contesting 
views are aired. However, to the extent that social order is a matter of 
hegemony, the question of sovereignty remains dependent on strategic 
rather than communicative power. 
 It is, we think, a mistake to see mutual understanding, as Mouffe 
often does, as a rationalist conception that operates from the top down. 
Rather, rationality is built into mutual understanding from the ground 
up through notions of mutual accountability. Subjects who engage in 
understanding are caught up in a world of involvements and commit-
ments. Once we begin to see rationality as internal to processes of social 
life, the rigid opposition between reason and emotion or justice and 
solidarity gives way to a more complementary set of relations. 
 Axel Honneth provides one helpful account of the dynamic relation 
between private and public that casts into relief the important questions 
involved here. The key is to recognize that, like freedom and auton-
omy themselves, “private” and “public” are not so much properties as 
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practices. They are forms of social interaction. Basing his position on 
pragmatist themes in the work of John Dewey, Honneth writes: 
 Social action unfolds in forms of interaction whose consequences in the 
simple case affect only those immediately involved; but as soon as those 
not involved see themselves affected by the consequences of such inter-
action, there emerges from their perspective the need for joint control of 
the corresponding actions either by their cessation or their promotion … 
The term “public” is attributed to that sphere of social action that a social 
group can successfully prove to be in need of general regulation because 
encroaching consequences are being generated; and, accordingly, a “pub-
lic” consists of the circle of citizens who, on the basis of a jointly experi-
enced concern, share the conviction that they have to turn to the rest of 
society for the purposes of administratively controlling the relevant inter-
action. 
 For Honneth, then, following Dewey, the “public” is “a discursive 
medium of cooperative problem solving under democratic conditions,” 
in effect a form of rational practice rooted in and reinforcing a commu-
nicative form of freedom.  26  
 Here we can see that the practice of policy deliberations necessar-
ily implicates us in a public at the point at which it becomes a matter 
of concern to us that the effects of these actions have bearing on us. 
The point is that private concerns become public issues. The “public” 
should not be understood as involving a prior ethical substance existing 
independently of its relational character. Such relations form and re-
form in the context of a “relevant interaction” that generates “encroach-
ing consequences.” 
 Honneth’s position is part of a larger argument that seeks to establish 
the basis for social cooperation in the division of labour and the practi-
cal encounters that associated individuals as problem-solvers have with 
the constraints of nature and social life. This larger argument need not 
concern us here. However, his definition of the “public” and its implicit 
relation to the “private” suggest core elements of both self-reflexivity 
and a critical diagnosis of the present in the face of social pathologies. 
On the one hand, where those involved see the consequences of others’ 
actions as affecting them and thus call for more general regulation in the 
“public interest,” there is the commitment to publicize, as it were, these 
interactions. This involves mobilizing others who may also be affected 
but who may not notice it. But it also entails engaging with those whose 
“private” interactions have triggered public consequences. The possi-
bility of doing both defines the conditions for rational self-reflection, 
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where there can be no assumed natural harmony of interests but rather 
the potential achievement of agreement that responds to the needs and 
interests of each and all. Both those interacting and those affected by 
these interactions can enrich their appreciation of the multiple dimen-
sions of social conflict and cooperation: the original agents, by coming 
to a recognition of the (perhaps originally suppressed or obscure) pub-
lic quality of their acts; and those affected, by seeking to make public 
their position and thus implicitly engaging the actors as communica-
tive equals whose private autonomy must be respected (as opposed to 
simply “muscling” them as opponents in a process of making their own 
narrowly private interests prevail).  27  
 Honneth and Social Freedom 
 Honneth’s account of social freedom, to which we will return in greater 
detail in chapter 6, highlights a central idea: that since participants in 
everyday life are mutually accountable, they must accept at least mini-
mal obligations to others. We have shared expectations that regulate 
how we respond to them. Of course, not all of these expectations are 
directly connected to rationality. We expect that when we say “hi,” the 
other person will greet us in return. However, in most areas reason is 
central. We believe that others will act in accordance with what we see 
to be true or normatively right. When our mutual expectations are vio-
lated, we seek an explanation. We might initiate a discussion, or at least 
a conversation, and find that we have strong disagreements about a 
norm, for example. As we have argued, what allows us to continue or 
even pursue discourse at all is that we share at least a certain amount 
of trust and a weak solidarity with others – we need to believe that the 
other person will be sincere and willing to carry on with the discussion. 
This is not to devalue the quest for validity or truth, but rather more 
specifically to indicate that trust and solidarity are complementary. 
 These same two elements are central, too, in cases where we do not 
reach agreement. In the face of diverging expectations on the part of 
participants with respect to the way they carry out actions and plans 
of life, we need to retain a certain amount of trust in order to continue 
interaction where there is a significant disagreement. We can think of 
many examples of this in social life. A husband and wife may disagree 
on some important issues such as money, childrearing practices, or even 
politics and still maintain their relationship. We frequently interact with 
others of diverse political and social views in a cooperative spirit. We do 
not have to agree completely to have a functioning social order. How-
ever, when trust breaks down, cooperation in the face of disagreements 
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can be difficult. In the United States, to take an example, this trust is 
badly frayed. 
 For these reasons we do not think that strategic action is sufficient to 
generate trust. The examples given by Jane Mansbridge and others rest 
on the creation or maintenance of trust and solidarity as background 
conditions. For example, a political situation in which individual inter-
ests and not general interests are considered rests on the prior sense 
that we respect the individual’s right to pursue a good life – that is, 
that individuals are due equal respect and consideration. This consider-
ation extends to their choices of the good life, though such plans can be 
criticized. Without this moral element individual plans do not gain the 
recognition needed to make them elements of an agreement.  28  
 Moral understanding and solidarity are also closely linked. They 
require a wider understanding of and identification with others. We do 
not have to use the term “empathy,” but clearly the idea of, for example, 
equal respect requires something like empathy as a precondition for the 
kind of universalistic moral framework that theorists of justice – includ-
ing and perhaps especially critical theorists – require. These forms of 
moral consciousness and solidarity can even be part of our identity, 
 The above considerations also require a modification of Honneth’s 
(and Dewey’s) conception of politics as collective problem-solving. No 
doubt this is a central feature of politics. But politics also involves the 
creation of a common will to act and an accompanying social identity; 
indeed, Honneth’s more recent elaboration of the idea of social freedom 
and its relation to socialism, which we also examine in greater detail 
in chapter 6, seems intended to take the issues of a common will and 
social identities more fully and explicitly into account. It is we who 
must act together and authorize the group and in some cases provide 
the motivation to act. This “we,” however, is not a stand-alone entity or 
essence that exists apart from its articulation through the very process 
of generating a common will. 
 The securing of the conditions of rationality for this kind of social 
order, one of cooperation and interdependence, is thus at the core of 
democracy. The key point, which can only be outlined here, is that this 
rationality is inextricably tied to the articulation of a common will that 
must be viewed as a practical accomplishment of individuals bound 
together such that the freedom and autonomy of each is tied to that of 
all. Democracy is the realization of a Hegel-like system of “right”: “the 
steps needed to be taken for the free will of each individual to attain its 
actualization in the present”; or “the social preconditions for the actu-
alization of the free will” under conditions whereby “the specifications 
of morality and law can only be considered justified to the degree that 
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they bring the individual autonomy of human self-determination to 
expression.”  29  
 From this vantage point, negative and positive liberty – liberalism 
and democracy – would be not antagonistic but rather complementary 
elements of a complex practice of freedom, where freedom would con-
sist in the ability both to be left alone and to be with others. To use 
Jürgen Habermas’s formulation of this relationship, democracy under-
stood in terms of a rational social order would maintain and respect 
both private and public autonomy – that is, the securing of a personal 
space free from interference  and the provision of opportunities to par-
ticipate in collective will-formation (i.e., the determination of the laws 
under which one is governed). The autonomy of each is dependent on 
the autonomy of all, and vice versa. 
 But if negative and positive liberty are not inherently incompat-
ible, they are not naturally harmonious, either. (This was a key flaw 
of orthodox Marxist conceptions of democracy: eliminating the con-
ditions alleged to both necessitate and establish negative freedom as 
freedom from the community does not automatically secure the well-
being of each and all.) Hegel famously identified “concrete” freedom 
as being with oneself in another, where “we are not one-sidedly within 
ourselves, but willingly limit ourselves with reference to another, even 
while knowing ourselves in this limitation as ourselves.”  30  Determinacy 
and indeterminacy, universality and particularity, are necessary for full 
freedom; but neither can absorb the other without destructive conse-
quences. To be sure, Hegel himself may have thought they could be 
readily reconciled in a concrete and perhaps even self-evident ethical 
life of “objective spirit” (interpretations around this issue are diverse, 
to say the least; again, Honneth’s work on social freedom contributes to 
a clarification of the issues involved). We cannot be so confident about 
this. So the question of how to be at home with another, which might 
be considered another way of addressing what we view as the key ele-
ments of democracy – rational solidarity and autonomy – might better 
be framed in terms of something like what Hannah Arendt called “bear-
ing with strangers.” To be oneself means to engage others in ways that 
are neither purely instrumental nor overwhelmingly fraternal, and that 
involve neither hostility, nor indifference, nor benevolence.  31  
 Understanding the conditions and prospects for solidarity and auton-
omy in this light suggests that a key link between private and public 
autonomy and democratic political forms, institutions, and practices is 
the shifting character of the relation between private and public spheres 
of activity. In effect, this is Habermas’s way of formulating under con-
temporary conditions Hegel’s claim that freedom consists in being with 
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oneself in another. Both public and private spheres always and already 
exist as mutually determining: the context and content of each refer to 
those of the other. (In Arendt’s case, of course, there is a third, mediat-
ing dimension: the social, itself a complex intermingling of the public 
and private.) 
 Other critical theorists try to either criticize of defend a deliberative 
concept of democracy without elucidating its basis in the lifeworld. 
This creates misunderstanding. James Bohman, for example, seems 
to think that deliberation is purely formal – that it does not provide 
any substance for a democratic theory. By contrast, Nadia Urbinati and 
Maria Paula Saffon want to defend deliberative democracy strictly, 
using the principles of freedom and equal respect, and to detach these 
from the requirements of rationality.  32  Urbinati relies on what might be 
called a “top down” reading of Habermas’s theory of the conditions of 
deliberation as developed in his early account of the ideal speech situa-
tion. The conditions that provide fair deliberation are given only in the 
ideal case. A more “bottom up” approach to Habermas’s theory begins 
with the condition of subjects in the lifeworld. Our capacity for mutual 
accountability does not stem from ideal conditions; rather, ideal condi-
tions are rooted in the interactive capacities of subjects. We operate in 
daily life with the capacity both to reason and to discuss our concerns 
with others. We hold a set of ideas or assumptions about the world that 
we believe to be true, as well as norms we believe to be just or right. We 
are reflexively aware of participation in the world. Thus we can assess 
and evaluate not only the claims that are made about the world but also 
events within this world that we encounter. Similarly, our mundane 
interaction is characterized by concerns and involvements. We have 
moral conceptions that we use to evaluate the institutions, practices, 
and persons we encounter. 
 When called upon to do so in everyday life, we can give an account 
of our actions, using our reasoning capacities. We do not abandon these 
when we enter into discourse. The conditions that Habermas calls ide-
alized presuppositions are refinements of the conditions of ordinary 
interaction. We assume that people are capable of reasoning and that the 
reasoning process leads to conclusions that are true or valid. Habermas 
does not have in mind here a situation in which anything that people 
agree to must conform to a process of validation. He simply says that 
for a discourse to be reasonable, we must strive to achieve those condi-
tions, and that the elements of idealization are not alien to everyday life. 
When we read a text that seems alien or find another person difficult to 
understand, we try to make sense of what they say. We assume people 
make sense until we are convinced otherwise. If we did not assume that 
 Deliberation, Self-interest, and Solidarity 185
speakers and texts are comprehensible, we would be unable to speak a 
language at all. 
 Just as in situations in which expectations are not fulfilled, or we 
do not understand why someone is acting in a certain way or hold-
ing something to be true and are thus entitled to ask for an account, 
in deliberation and discourse we are similarly justified in asking for 
an account. It seems to us that this structure of accountability guaran-
tees that an element of rationality is necessary in all deliberation, Thus 
trust, solidarity, rationality, and communicative power are all elements 
of discourse. 
 In contrast to discursive or deliberative processes, reification can 
be characterized by a diminution or even elimination of communica-
tive power. The problem with Marxian models of reification is that 
in the past they have been modelled largely on a concept of subject-
centred reason of an expressive subject.  33  As we’ve noted, in Georg 
Lukács’s formulation the relations between humans are reduced to 
relations between inert things. He saw that the capitalist forms of reifi-
cation treated everyone as a commodity, that is, as goods to be bought 
and sold. Today, intensified marketization has extended the process 
of converting human relations to market form. From the standpoint 
of a theory of communicative reason and communicative action, rei-
fication manifests itself as the removal of human actions from the 
sphere of public deliberation and authorizing will, and subjects them 
instead to quasi-automatic regulation though instrumental and stra-
tegic imperatives. When, for example, education is governed by mar-
ket considerations, the standards of evaluation are based on those of 
profit and loss or benefit to industry, not on the creation of free and 
equal persons who create a common way of life. Bureaucratic impera-
tives related to education have pushed it towards a regime of high-
stakes testing in which students’ progress is constantly monitored and 
measured. The standards are based on the abstract mastery of skills 
geared to job performance, without any reference to the students’ 
agency. Equal and respectful treatment of students is subordinated to 
the testing regime. 
 Reification also extends to personality formation. As critics have 
noted, educational regimes, which have always been slanted towards 
business, now function like factories in which students are devalued. 
High-pressure competitive testing is discouraging many students, who 
in addition have low economic status. Schools in marginalized, disad-
vantaged, low-income areas are being targeted for privatization or radi-
cal reform, with local control ceded to governments. As pawns in this 
power struggle, students learn mostly that they have little chance to 
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get ahead in a world in which job prospects are weak and the poor are 
increasingly marginalized. 
 The Limits of Participation? 
 Mark Warren contends that we should take a more circumspect view 
of what a transformative politics can do.  34  The basis of politics is social 
groundlessness and contestability. Politics is essentially agonistic. It is a 
domain of struggle in which norms, practices, rules, and identities are 
contested. Where there is no disagreement, there is no politics. Politics 
emerges out of social groundlessness because when there is contesta-
tion, one loses one’s identity and sense of belonging with others; in 
order to express disagreement, one has to take a stand apart from oth-
ers, which risks conflict. 
 Warren further contests the classic Aristotelian notion of politics. The 
Aristotelian tradition sees participation as a virtue-creating activity, one 
in which participation builds character and indeed is necessary for real-
izing our potential. Warren, by contrast, sees politics as a risky, anxiety-
promoting activity, which because it sets us apart from others exposes 
vulnerabilities and creates hazards. To be sure, political action has a 
transformative character. Warren uses examples of isolated individuals 
confronting a system that is rigid and in so doing exposing its flaws 
and limits. His model is one of a politics that creates no common good 
or “we” relation. 
 The problem with Warren’s analysis can best be explicated using a 
counter-example that shows that the political does have some of the 
qualities he denies. One of his examples involves a woman who finds 
the language and atmosphere of her workplace oppressive. She has to 
decide whether to contest this environment or leave it be. In the for-
mer case she risks being labelled difficult or a troublemaker. She faces 
a condition of social groundlessness where she is at odds with prevail-
ing norms. As an actor she is isolated and at odds with the behavioural 
expectations of her workplace. She rightly considers those norms to be 
flawed and takes a stand against them. 
 Consider this other example taken from the news. The state of Indi-
ana enacted legislation allowing businesses to discriminate against LGBT 
people on religious grounds. Many groups reacted negatively to this, 
including businesses organizations and professional associations, as well 
as individuals and groups that either represent or support LGBT rights. 
 The first thing to notice is that political issues have an unavoidably 
public character. While someone may choose to avoid LGBT persons 
in private life, this matter becomes problematic when it involves the 
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public sphere – that is, institutions such as businesses, schools, and gov-
ernments, all of which necessarily deal with the public at large. Pub-
lic issues are generally created when private troubles become public 
issues. This is not to say that the example Warren gives is of private 
troubles – only that his account leaves out the link to larger public con-
cerns. It is not the nature of an issue as contestable that makes it public 
or political. It is, rather, the type of concern we have where what is often 
precisely at stake is the question of the right to say “we.” 
 It seems to us that in this situation we are looking at the creation of 
a “we” relation as this represents a will to act in concert. With respect 
to the state law restricting the rights of LGBT individuals, the central 
question raised by the law concerns the right of individuals on the pre-
sumptive ground of religious conviction to exclude some from equal 
consideration and respect under the law. That equal consideration and 
respect have been the result of long struggle is an important part of 
what defines us a group. What Warren sees as social groundlessness 
is in this case what we have identified as the diminution, if not loss, of 
equal respect. But it is not clear how far this alienation extends. When 
we are treated in a differential way in important public arenas, our self-
respect can be diminished. 
 However, it is also true that political discussion is carried out collec-
tively. I may find I have been treated unfairly or in a demeaning way 
by one possibly dominant group. I may join with others who believe 
similarly and so organize to transform such issues into public ones. As 
citizens we can appear together to deliberate about a shared situation. 
 The arguments of Mansbridge and Warren provide a rather restricted 
view of political action, especially in the face of neoliberalism. The 
thrust of the neoliberal project is to reduce or eliminate features of 
strong democracy, that is, precisely those possibilities for transforming 
what seem to be exclusively personal into political questions.  35  This is 
particularly the case with respect to the apparently nature-like quali-
ties of a capitalist market economy, qualities enhanced by neoliberal 
values, institutions, and practices. A strong, radical democracy must 
raise issues around the creation of solidarity and strong participatory 
relationships and in turn must link these to a critique of the domination 
inherent in the capitalist economy. It must, in other words, promote the 
autonomy of subjects. 
 The project of creating a strong, radical, and participatory democracy 
thus also requires at the very least a radical reform of the current welfare 
state. But it also needs to recognize the importance of a welfare state, that 
is, the necessity for a social safety net in capitalist societies. The existence 
of welfare measures at the least recognizes the side effects if capitalism. 
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 The reification/marketing of forms of life runs up against immanent 
limits. If we were to eliminate all possibilities for the exercise of com-
municative reason, we would not have socialized individuals who can 
function in the reified world – they would be unable to develop the abil-
ity to challenge it. We cannot completely eliminate forms of mutual rec-
ognition, though the power of recognition can be minimized by forms 
of subordination. While open to vast change, human life is not infinitely 
malleable. Critical theorists should be sensitive to the points at which 
these conflicts emerge. However, the agents of the process should be 
seen not as strategic actors but as communicative participants. 
 We therefore should seek institutional practices that enhance indi-
vidual autonomy. By “autonomy” we do not mean simply freedom to 
choose, but more fundamentally a sense of a strong identity and an abil-
ity to resist domination. Autonomy might well include the formation of 
more autonomous publics and alternative institutions, including social 
movements. The latter have been central to raising questions of social 
justice. In other words, we need to raise questions of social rights – a key 
element of social freedom. 
 Another important area of conflict is the workplace. Here, traditional 
socialism, including of course Marxism, has emphasized the condition 
of the working class under capitalism, something that remains central 
to any theory of radical democracy. Our everyday lives are becoming 
more exploited, while the power of unions is declining. Much paid work 
is largely meaningless and at the same time is becoming more contin-
gent and insecure. Any conception of justice must include the need to 
move beyond distributive questions, which are to be sure important, 
to the exploitation of work relations under neoliberalism. The hyper-
exploitation of workers has created a situation in which the loss of 
power and autonomy is extensive. Any theory of justice must address 
these features of the contemporary work situation. One example of 
hyper-exploitation is found within the confines of the academic world. 
At many universities, teaching is increasingly conducted by adjuncts 
or temporary faculty who lack the security and benefits enjoyed full-
time, permanent employees. Of course, this example can be general-
ized across all spheres of employment under the current conditions of 
neoliberal capitalism. 
 Neoliberalism and Crisis Revisited 
 In this context, there is thus the question of whether capitalism, par-
ticularly in its current, neoliberal stage, is at all compatible with social 
justice, and if it is not, whether then it might be vulnerable to crises 
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or crisis tendencies. Some analysts of neoliberalism see an irresolvable 
conflict between capitalism and democracy. Unregulated capitalism 
creates “savage inequalities” that send tremors throughout the politi-
cal system. Today this has reached the point where even supporters of 
capitalism have taken note. Works like Thomas Piketty’s have garnered 
widespread attention.  36  Piketty’s principal contention, which most 
accept, is that unfettered capitalism does not lead to the diffusion of 
wealth throughout the economy. Left to its own devices, in producing 
inequalities the “free” market tends to move in the direction of an anti-
democratic oligarchy. It is thus hard to see how the unfettered market 
can be the best guarantor of individual freedoms and liberties. On the 
contrary, it has become the site of an ongoing conflict between demo-
cratic rights and conceptions of the good life, on the one side, and the 
deepening rationalization of forms of social life, on the other. 
 While Piketty seems to think that measures such as progressive tax-
ation and wealth redistribution can remedy many ills, analysts such 
as Wolfgang Streeck seem to think that these contradictions cannot be 
fully reconciled, even in welfare capitalism. Rather, they represent an 
endemic and essentially irreconcilable conflict between capitalist mar-
kets and democratic politics that, having been suspended for the his-
torically short period immediately following the Second World War, has 
forcefully reasserted itself since the waning of economic growth in the 
1970s.  37  
 For Streeck the financial crisis of 2008 was indicative of permanent 
instability in the capitalist economy; it signalled that tensions between 
the demands for democratic rights and liberties and the requirements 
of continuing accumulation were becoming more acute. Here, he was 
updating the conflict between accumulation and legitimation identified 
by Claus Offe and Jürgen Habermas in the 1970s. Offe and Habermas 
thought that the breakdown of the Keynesian welfare state would raise 
new challenges to legitimacy, challenges most strongly and visibly raised 
by new social movements. Their assumption turned out to be faulty – in 
fact, the political economy of the post-Keynesian era would come to be 
dominated by neoliberal market assumptions. Rational choice theory, 
which in various guises came to predominate in academic/intellectual 
circles and even to some extent in popular journalistic quarters, attrib-
uted economic crises to unnecessary and ultimately damaging state and 
political interventions, which distorted the economy. For proponents of 
rational choice, as for those neoconservatives who wrote of the threat 
of an economically destabilizing democratic “overload,” calls by social 
justice proponents to redistribute goods and maintain social rights rep-
resented excessive democratic demands. 
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 Given the criticisms made by Piketty, Paul Krugman, and others, all 
of whom have highlighted growing inequalities as well as the weaken-
ing of democratic institutions and freedoms, the key points of conflict in 
neoliberalism seem to revolve around the question of social rights. Neo-
liberals typically argue that social justice, if it exists, should be based on 
merit. Redistributive policies should be discouraged, market-friendly 
initiatives should be pursued vigorously, and fiscal austerity should 
be applied to rein in “excessive” demands for social protection. In this 
regard, Wolfgang Streeck notes that participants are still vigorously 
resisting challenges to the social welfare net. He claims that at least so 
far, non-market notions of social justice have not totally given way to 
efforts at economic rationalization, forceful as they may have become, 
especially in the era of an advancing neoliberalism. Apparently, people 
stubbornly refuse to give up on the idea of a moral economy under 
which they have rights as people or as citizens that should take prece-
dence over the outcomes of market exchange.  38  
 In addition to challenging social justice, neoliberalism pursues an 
anti-solidaristic approach that seeks to devalue the experiences of indi-
viduals and their connections with others. In the United States, at least 
since the Reagan era, recipients of government aid have been labelled as 
deviants (welfare queens) and leeches on the system. In this context the 
anti-solidaristic direction of neoliberalism extends far beyond an intel-
lectual argument about the limits of intervention; it extends too into 
the sentiments and personality structures of individuals. Social demo-
cratic notions are widely held in society, so they must be forcefully sup-
pressed in a multitude of ways. Their basic worth is now under siege, as 
is the value and even legitimacy of union membership, among teachers 
or anyone else. There is a growing authoritarianism in American society 
and a hardening of political divisions and conceptions of the “enemy.” 
 In contrast to Streeck, Claus Offe seems to recognize that such tenden-
cies are present. Instead of a conflict between neoliberalism and social 
justice, in which context the latter is holding its own, Offe stresses the 
pathologies of liberal democracies: declining rates of participation and 
the potential for a rise in right-wing populism.  39  In America, at least, 
the growing power of seemingly right-wing forms of populism, funded 
and driven by oligarchs, appears to be succeeding in destroying social 
welfare institutions. If they have not triumphed entirely on the national 
level, they have had notable successes on the state level, where gerry-
mandered legislative districts have yielded conservative majorities and 
super-majorities that have sometimes in a blitzkrieg fashion passed reg-
ulations against labour and reproductive rights and have also moved to 
defund and privatize education. Even beyond the sphere of education, 
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key features of government administration have been privatized and 
outsourced. The transformation of American politics has been so funda-
mental that one group of researchers has not hesitated to call the politi-
cal system an oligarchy. 
 The conflict between democracy and capitalism has taken some new 
forms. As Streeck has observed, “it seems clear that the political man-
ageability of democratic capitalism has sharply declined in recent years, 
more in some countries than in others, but also overall, in the emerging 
global political-economic system. As a result the risks seem to be grow-
ing, both for democracy and for the economy.”  40  
 Since the financial collapse of 2008, the economic situation has stabi-
lized to a degree. However, the crisis tendencies of neoliberal capitalism 
have by no means disappeared. The financial sector has not been ade-
quately reregulated and continues to move towards new bubbles and 
ruptures. Banks remain too big to fail, but popular opinion may militate 
against any future bailouts. Inequality has increased, and despite some 
degree of recovery, growth remains slow, debt is high, and demand 
remains flat. It is becoming more possible that, without any remedial 
action on the horizon, capitalism will experience decline and even the 
possibility of a more extensive breakdown. 
 Here too the conflict between capitalism and democracy is intensi-
fying. As claims of increasing debt are being used to impose auster-
ity, redistributive policies are being further limited and citizens are 
losing faith in government as an agent that can improve their lives. 
As the power of labour unions and other social movements declines, 
analysts such as Wolfgang Streeck have pointed out that the economy 
itself has become increasingly insulated from popular and democratic 
initiatives for reform. “For the time being, the neoliberal mainstream’s 
political utopia is a ‘market-conforming democracy,’ devoid of market-
correcting powers and supportive of ‘incentive-compatible’ redistribu-
tion from the bottom to the top.”  41  In these conditions the legitimation 
of capitalist democracies seems to be fraught with difficulties. If demo-
cratic equality and freedom are to be preserved, the economy must be 
transformed. 
 Adding to this analysis, we would point to the increasing presence 
of authoritarianism and undemocratic political rule exercised to sta-
bilize this contradictory set of forces. As we have seen, the inequali-
ties of neoliberal capitalism have had an impact on democratic life. For 
some critics, Karl Polanyi has provided the framework for confronting 
neoliberalism and its threat to democracy; we think the ideas of C.B. 
Macpherson can add to this discussion as well. Particularly valuable 
here is his account of the central place of possessive individualism in 
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those forms of democracy most fully tied to the triumph of capitalist 
market relations and values: protective and equilibrium democracy, 
especially the former in its current incarnation as neoliberal politics and 
government.  42  In this situation the calls for social justice must include 
re-establishing solidarities, as well as increasing needs and possibilities 
for participation. 
 Neoliberalism not only limits developmental freedoms and pursues 
anti-solidaristic aims; it also rejects the efficacy of most forms of com-
municative freedom and communicative power. Thus, one set of strate-
gies for reform should centre on enhancing the communicative power 
of participants. This would no doubt include strengthening the public 
sphere through non-governmental institutions. Some writers focus on 
the creation of institutional supports, but non-institutional forms of 
communicative action, as embodied in social movements and protests, 
are important as well. It is unlikely that capitalism will tolerate the 
development of new institutional forms without significant opposition. 
More participatory institutions will be established only through con-
flict. Participation in and identification with social movements could 
also promote forms of solidarity. In addition, critical theories need to 
enter the debate about economic inequality and the quality of work, 
especially the increasing predominance of precarious and casual labour. 
 Finally, a critical theory must make an issue of the present day’s ris-
ing authoritarianism and willful ignorance of information; both have 
been prevalent at the level of personality and identity structures. In 
his account of communicative action, Habermas discusses briefly the 
notion of a defensive preservation of the lifeworld whereby bureau-
cratic rationalization and reification would foment a critical response 
that attempts to preserve tradition in the face of disorganizing forces. 
We are not sure, however, that those who adopt a traditionalist defen-
sive posture to threats to the lifeworld would respond to deliberative 
measures because they might not be amenable to the kind of persuasion 
involved. To be sure, appeals to sensibilities may work in such circum-
stances. But the limits to a purely deliberative approach are encountered 
when individuals are incapable of basic trust and deliberative compe-
tence.  43  If they believe others are so tainted that they are incapable of 
a cooperative endeavour, then trust and deliberative competence are 
threatened. In this case a critical theory has to consider what reparative 
measures would be needed to establish deliberation and to deal with 
bigotry and authoritarianism. We do not say this in the sense of some 
cliché, such as “being nice to everybody.” Conflict of some sort would 
likely be unavoidable. However, the nature of this conflict would be 
decisive: conflict involving solidarity around issues of equality and 
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social justice could reinforce rather than undermine the transformation 
of private woes into public concerns. 
 It seems to us that for any consideration of a robust critical and radi-
cal theory of democracy, it is essential to raise the various issues and 
concerns we have tried briefly to address in this chapter. But before we 
directly explore what such a theory might be – in our view, this would 
be a theory of participatory democracy – we return in the next chapter 
to the Frankfurt School and a more detailed account of its significance 
for grasping the challenges of democracy. 
 
 
 Chapter Five 
 Towards a Critical Theory of Democracy: 
The Frankfurt School and 
Democratic Theory 
 In this chapter we build upon our discussion in the previous chapter 
and attempt to lay out what we believe are central elements of a critical 
theory of democracy. This raises the obvious question of what such a 
theory would entail: what elements of critical theory as we explored it 
in previous chapters; and what kind of democracy for which such ele-
ments could provide a solid basis. More specifically, we need to show 
how to connect (a) a theory that in its focus, structure, and concepts 
offers a critical diagnosis of the pathologies of the present from the 
standpoint of a possible future society that secures social freedom and 
solidarity, with (b) a conception of democracy that emphasizes not just 
present forms of democratic politics and government, nor even nec-
essary institutional reform, but also the normative requirements of a 
democratic social order capable of fostering and sustaining an eman-
cipated form of life. As we argued in our first chapter, this would be a 
radical, developmental democracy within which all individuals would 
have the equal right and ability to use and develop their distinctively 
human capacities. 
 To explore the question of what a radical, developmental democracy 
would involve, we focus primarily once again on the claims and con-
cepts of Jürgen Habermas, specifically as he developed these in  Between 
Facts and Norms , which we discussed in chapter 1, and which represents 
his most systematic treatment of what he calls a discourse theory of 
democracy. But we also return to the ideas of the first generation of 
Frankfurt School critical theorists. We noted in previous chapters that 
these thinkers, most notably Max Horkheimer, did not systematically 
explore the idea of democracy, much less work up an explicit theory of 
it. In part this reflected their belief that liberalism and capitalism were, 
if not identical, certainly indissolubly linked. But as Albrecht Wellmer 
has recently reminded us “the very term  critical theory was coined in a 
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secret reference to Marx’s critique of political economy.”  1  The task was 
to overcome capitalism and its pathologies; issues of politics, including 
democratic politics, took a back seat. At the very least the theory assumed 
the possibility, and not just the necessity, of replacing capitalism with 
socialism. With the transcendence of capitalism, the class antagonisms 
endemic to bourgeois society, which precluded the achievement of the 
common will essential to democracy, would be overcome: a classless 
society would  inter alia be egalitarian and thus democratic. 
 Historical developments outwitted such hopes and aspirations. It 
became clear that the economic base does not determine the political 
superstructure, and that abolishing private property was not equivalent 
to establishing to a solidary common life, nor did it automatically lead 
to it. The question of socialism and the issue of democracy had to be 
treated separately: the political had an autonomy that demanded an 
autonomous form of political thought. 
 Yet as necessary as it has been, the turn to political theory and an 
autonomous theory of democracy has had a paradoxical implication. 
The reality that politics cannot be reduced to economics has frequently 
led to a diminished concern with the unified political economy that char-
acterized traditional Marxism, upon whose assumptions Horkheimer 
had relied even as he recognized the need to revise these assumptions 
in the face of historical circumstances. The securing of an autonomous 
political theory raised issues of power, citizenship, and public life that 
often came to be seen as legal and governmental and that were treated 
from either a descriptive/institutional or a normative perspective. So-
called economic questions were acknowledged as factors influencing 
the political process and even shaping the policy concerns of govern-
ments. However, this approach failed to take on board what classical 
socialist political economy had understood – that economic and politi-
cal power and identity were intertwined, even though the political 
could not be reduced to the economic. As C.B. Macpherson presented 
it, possessive individualism was an account of agency that manifested 
itself in all spheres of society, not just the economic or political as these 
might be narrowly conceived. That political behaviour could not be 
completely reduced to supposed economic motives and interests did 
not preclude or eliminate the need to link democratic possibilities to 
overall social dynamics in a society that remained resolutely capitalist. 
What Macpherson called the economic penetration of political theory 
still needed to be acknowledged, even if in a non-reductionist way. 
 We agree. In this chapter we attempt, through an exploration of the 
work of the Frankfurt School, both first and subsequent generations, 
to approach the question of a critical theory of democracy on the basis 
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that political economy and critical theory must be rejoined. So that there 
is no misunderstanding, we want to be clear that the necessary turn to 
political and democratic concerns by critical theory has generated much 
of continuing value. As should be apparent from our account to this 
point, we ourselves have been influenced by these currents and believe 
them to be fundamentally important for a radical, critical democratic 
theory and practice. Critical theory has no doubt been enriched by 
second and subsequent generations of thinkers who in different ways 
have sought to maintain the currency of the paradigm in the face of 
changing social and historical conditions and challenges. Yet we think 
that the shift has frequently come with a cost: the failure to provide an 
adequate analysis of the pathologies of neoliberalism has meant that 
critical theory has lost some of its broader cultural resonance for a wider 
audience that the original architects of critical theory hoped would be 
drawn to their work.  2  
 We continue here to explore the ideas of Jürgen Habermas because he 
is the thinker whose thought most fully expresses the turn to autono-
mous political and moral theory, its contributions, but also its limita-
tions. However, to fully grasp the concerns that motivated Habermas, 
and his approach to critical, democratic theory, we must first examine 
in some detail the thrust and impact of the first-generation Frankfurt 
School thinkers and the problems and dilemmas – but also resources – 
they bequeathed to those who followed. We can then offer an appraisal of 
Habermas’s thought and his legacy, including efforts by theorists such as 
Axel Honneth to build on this thought while addressing its shortcomings – 
including the limited place it allows for political economy. 
 Our account in this chapter is intended to pave the way for the 
next one, in which we examine various attempts to produce theories 
of democracy that we believe are at least open to the reconnection of 
political economy with political theory. These will be developmental 
and participatory accounts, especially as laid out in the work of C.B. 
Macpherson, Carol Gould, Carole Pateman, and Axel Honneth. In their 
respective ways these theorists have attempted to link issues of demo-
cratic practice to social critique, political theory to political economy. 
 What Is Democracy? 
 The term democracy has had a wide variety of meanings, from mini-
mal and formal to rich and substantive. As noted above, in its broadest 
sense democracy may be considered a theory of sovereignty in which 
the power to rule lies ultimately with the people. However, this leaves 
much room for interpretation and even constriction of the scope of 
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democratic institutions and practices. In the post–Second World War 
era, theories of elite democracy, or competitive elitism, saw democracy 
simply as a method of choosing those elites that would rule. Hannah 
Pitkin called this conception the “authorization” position. As the cen-
tral feature of representative democracy, representation is “seen as a 
grant of authority by the voters to the elected officials.”  3  We elect lead-
ers and then authorize them to do anything they wish. Such restrictive 
notions of representative government often prevail in Western and cap-
italist democracies; the populace at large plays a limited role. Of course, 
this view is short on democratic accountability. It does not specify how 
or why the decisions that are authorized have be representative of the 
public or the public interest. 
 Often this elitist view was combined with a rational choice perspec-
tive. As we have seen, rational choice theorists claim that in authoriz-
ing those who are to govern them, citizens are “choosers” who have to 
decide between two or more alternatives. As we have indicated, many 
rational choice analysts reject any notion of a common will or of the 
active formation of common goals through deliberative selection.  4  Poli-
tics is seen as fundamentally an aggregation of choices created through 
a competition for goods – in this case, competition among leaders. 
 A broader perspective would see democracy as the ability of citi-
zens to influence and “have a direct political impact on the choices and 
actions of those who govern.”  5  This is certainly more comprehensive 
than the first definition, but it too has several drawbacks. It makes 
democracy a function of the choices and actions of those who govern, 
not an expression of popular sovereignty. Questions around agenda set-
ting and initiatives from below are not sufficiently clarified. A fuller 
notion of democracy might include the ability to initiate action, in con-
cert with others, in a wide variety of spheres of public and private life. 
Of course, acting in concert also means that in the public sphere, democ-
racy involves more than just the power to initiate – it includes as well 
a public process of discussion and deliberation in which questions of 
justice, the good, and legitimacy are central. 
 In the classical notion of politics, democracy was identical to self-
governance. Only those individuals who ruled themselves, albeit in 
concert with others, were considered free. Citizens were full partici-
pants in society and were expected to take positions of authority and to 
engage in deliberations with other citizens. Of course, the Greek  polis 
differed from our society in vital ways. In the first place, the freedom 
of the citizens rested largely on the labour of unfree individuals and 
groups (i.e., slaves and women). Second, the Greek  polis was smaller in 
size than modern democracies, which are both large and diverse. We 
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cannot always expect to have citizens who share a common world view. 
Nonetheless, the idea of a democratic politics needs to retain the idea of 
self-rule through participation to guide its reflections. 
 Democratic Deficits: The Frankfurt School, 
Capitalism, and Liberalism 
 The early Frankfurt School’s legacy for political theory is ambiguous. 
At least in the work of its major figures, Max Horkheimer, Theodor 
Adorno, and Herbert Marcuse, critical theory often had a “democratic 
theoretical deficit.”  6  Horkheimer’s earlier works were more concerned 
with the psychological, social, and philosophical aspects of critical the-
ory than with politics. There were, however, several intra-theoretical 
reasons why Horkheimer did not develop a systematic theory of poli-
tics. On the one hand, he seemed to employ a model of politics and 
political economy derived from Marx. Politics, for him, was a form of 
antagonistic conflict that would disappear when capitalism was super-
seded. Thus, if politics was little more than a function of class rule, there 
was little to be found of the Greek notion of politics and participation. 
What was important was conflict over control of the economy. To be 
sure, Horkheimer claimed in his earlier works that an emancipatory 
social theory would have to replace determination by blind social forces 
with conscious human direction. But he never moved towards what we 
could call political theory. 
 Horkheimer assumed that classical capitalism and liberalism were, if 
not identical, nonetheless intimately linked. Liberalism was the theory 
of private property. By the early 1930s, critical theory had developed an 
account of capitalism according to which it had exited its liberal phase 
and had entered a new, authoritarian one. Herbert Marcuse in his 1934 
essay “The Struggle against Liberalism in the Totalitarian View of the 
State”  7  more fully developed this theme and hence illuminated key 
assumptions about liberalism inherent in the Frankfurt School’s view. 
 Marcuse defined liberalism purely and simply as the defence of pri-
vate property. As he saw it, the other features of liberalism could be 
modified based on the constellation of forces: 
 Liberalism was the social and economic theory of European industrial 
capitalism in the period when the actual economic bearer of capitalism 
was the “individual capitalist,” the private entrepreneur in the literal 
sense. Despite structural variations in liberalism and its bearers from one 
country or period to another, a uniform foundation remains: the individ-
ual economic subject’s free ownership and control of private property and 
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the politically and legally guaranteed security of these rights. Around this 
one stable center, all specific economic and social demands of liberalism 
can be modified – modified to the point of self-abolition.  8  
 Classical liberalism, however, had been superseded by a new stage of 
capitalism – monopoly capitalism – in which the competition of forces 
was replaced by a concentration of power in large conglomerates and 
corporations. While the foundation of liberalism in the centrality of pri-
vate property was maintained, there was the need for a more holistic 
conception of society, in terms of which acceptance of authority had to 
be a core element. The rationalist conception of reason with its stress 
on the critical power of the individual had to be replaced – a move that 
anticipated to some extent Habermas’s later analysis of the decline of 
the bourgeois public sphere, whereby free discussion was replaced by 
an authoritative disclosure of the whole. Marcuse, like Horkheimer, did 
not draw a sharp distinction between societies that were fascist and 
those that were corporate but democratic. The liberal democratic nature 
of the capitalist state was absorbed into the totalitarian formulation. 
 Horkheimer did not in his earlier work take up the question of the 
form of the state under monopoly capitalism. He did, however, see 
political forms as dependent on economic ones in the manner of base 
and superstructure, an antagonistic relation that would disappear when 
capitalism was transformed.  9  In this light, political institutions had no 
independent function. Later, when Horkheimer was more concerned 
with the structural changes made by monopoly capitalism, he loos-
ened this analysis somewhat. In late capitalism the political had come 
to dominate the economic. By this formulation he meant that the state 
had taken over socialization processes, such as education, previously 
carried out by the family or civil society. For Horkheimer this meant, 
as it did for Marcuse, the decline of the independent individual who 
could at least to a limited extent assess knowledge on his or her own.  10  
Here Horkheimer also employed Pollock’s analysis of state capitalism.  11  
Pollock thought that because the state was capable of stabilizing capi-
talism through intervention and regulation or the co-opting of labour, 
the crisis tendencies of capitalism had been muted. To be sure, he did 
not strictly equate democratic and totalitarian variants of this process. 
But in Horkheimer’s analysis the distinction between the two became 
blurred. This was not so much, however, a problem of an apologetic 
approach to a post-liberal capitalist society as it was the denial of any 
crisis tendencies in state capitalist formations. 
 In  Eclipse of Reason and  Dialectic of Enlightenment , Horkheimer to a 
considerable extent replaced his critique of political economy with a 
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critique of instrumental reason. Even here, however, he presented liberal 
theory as a form of subjective reason, exemplified particularly in Lock-
ean liberalism and, later, in pragmatism and positivism. Reason was no 
longer a critical reflection on the conditions of human life, but a way of 
calculating means to pre-given ends. In the process, however, lost were 
any vestiges of liberalism or even republicanism as elements of a politi-
cal formation capable of criticizing society. Reason for Horkheimer was 
self-liquidating.  12  The very processes that had led to increases in social 
rationality had come to undermine that same rationality. 
 Franz Neumann and Otto Kirchheimer were somewhat outside the 
main circle of the Frankfurt School. Their early work was influenced by 
Carl Schmitt’s conception of the political and his critique of liberalism.  13  
For Schmitt, recall, parliamentary democracy was ineffectual and impo-
tent. It was rooted in endless and fruitless discussion and deliberation 
between competing interests and was unable to produce or maintain 
legitimacy. In his first work, Neumann accepted this criticism of liberal 
parliamentary government, but he also tried to maintain a socialist the-
ory of the rule of law, which was in his view being impeded by liberal 
capitalism. Later, he moved in the direction of a social democratic con-
ception of the rule of law that recognized its importance in restraining 
bureaucratic power.  14  
 Both Neumann and Kirchheimer felt that Horkheimer’s and Pol-
lock’s notion of an administered society underestimated the conflict 
potentials of state capitalist societies. Whereas Horkheimer claimed 
that the rise of fascism and totalitarianism was a developmental ten-
dency of capitalism that was not affected by events, Neumann took 
the view that it was historical and contingent and that it could have 
been averted if the correct actions had been taken. He struggled, rather 
unsuccessfully, with the task of developing a notion of political free-
dom and the rule of law that could accommodate the gains of the wel-
fare state. Both he and Kirchheimer were critical of the nascent neolib-
eral theories of the time associated with thinkers such as Friedrich von 
Hayek and Milton Friedman and wanted to defend some version of 
the welfare state.  15  Neumann’s attempt suggests some links between 
his essentially legal theory and a political theory along the lines of that 
of C.B. Macpherson. A developmental theory based on the exertion 
of capacities could provide a basis for the social rights of the welfare 
state as well as a way of identifying those conflict potentials that had 
not been completely neutralized under late capitalism. It also could 
provide an alternative theory of freedom that emphasized the organi-
zation of society around the protection of social rights and social and 
economic freedoms.  16  
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 The development of an adequate critical theory of democracy has 
been one of the central aims of Jürgen Habermas’s reformulation of 
critical theory. He has taken a less orthodox approach to politics than 
did Horkheimer and Marcuse and has been more sensitive to elements 
of liberal and republican theory than were his predecessors. Habermas 
has also located crisis potentials in advanced capitalism that Hork-
heimer and Adorno failed to find. In what follows, we focus primarily 
on the first aspect, namely, Habermas’s attempt to formulate a radical 
democratic theory and his attempt to combine it with the rule of law. 
 The Early Habermas and Radical Democracy 
 As we have argued, Habermas broke ranks with the first generation of 
the Frankfurt School – at least with Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, 
and Herbert Marcuse – in his treatment of the emancipatory possibili-
ties of modern politics and liberalism. Whereas the first-generation the-
orists saw liberalism as closely, if not internally, linked to capitalism 
and the reification of social life, Habermas argued that liberalism also 
contained the idea of a public sphere of free discussion that was not 
linked to possessive individualism but instead represented a realm of 
discursive will-formation. Possessive individualism was only one pos-
sible outcome of the development of liberalism. To be sure, Habermas 
did not think that the dominant form of liberalism was sufficient. His 
notion of the public sphere was not intended to be official liberalism 
by other means; rather, it drew implicitly upon republican notions of 
communicative or discursive interaction. However, unlike republican 
theory, which tends to link discussion to the idea of a single nation, to 
a body politic unified along a shared dimension, Habermas’s concep-
tion was tied to a cosmopolitan realm of public discussion. In addi-
tion, Habermas, at least early in his career, accepted that capitalism and 
democracy were contradictory. In what remains one of his most pow-
erful works,  The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere , he essen-
tially agreed with the early Frankfurt thinkers that late capitalism had 
created a mass society with monopoly control of media of communica-
tions and the consequent manipulation of public opinion.  17  
 As Jean Cohen pointed out some time ago, Habermas’s subsequent 
work did not fully develop this insight.  18  Indeed, he did not begin to 
fully analyse the relation between liberalism and republicanism until he 
had reformulated his intersubjective perspective in  The Theory of Com-
municative Action . But his fullest attempt to work out this relation came 
in  Between Facts and Norms . As noted in chapter 1, in that book Haber-
mas lays out a theory of democracy that he believes could bridge the 
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gap between liberalism and republicanism; in this respect his position 
demonstrates similarities to Macpherson’s attempt to fuse liberalism 
and socialism. 
 Habermas’s earliest work took up questions of democracy in the 
context of a Frankfurt Institute study of students’ political attitudes. 
While he found that many students had authoritarian attitudes – which 
is similar to what earlier Frankfurt School studies on authority had 
found – he also contributed an introduction to the collection about the 
concept of political participation that provided a theoretical overview 
of the problems of democracy. Habermas employed the idea of partici-
patory democracy associated with both the Greek  polis and the radical 
democratic movements of the bourgeois era. The basis of democracy 
was popular sovereignty, not the parliamentary forms of capitalist 
democracy. Both contemporary parliamentary democracy and the wel-
fare state could be seen as attempts to restrict participation by the popu-
lace.  19  Here, as Douglas Kellner notes, Habermas employed, in contrast 
to parliamentary forms, a notion of strong democracy as found in the 
work of John Dewey and that of later writers such as Benjamin Barber.  20  
At the time he wrote his  Habilitation on the public sphere, Habermas, 
like Horkheimer and Adorno, saw late capitalism as a closed system 
that had successfully managed crisis tendencies and muted opposition. 
 It was in his work on the public sphere that Habermas began to 
develop a model of radical democracy that went beyond the analysis 
of the earlier Frankfurt School. Here a radical democracy meant more 
than simply participation in government. It also involved a separate 
realm of civil society in which public opinion could be formed. This was 
a model more adapted to a modern bourgeois society in which, unlike 
in the Greek world, state and society were separated. The formation 
of a sphere of public opinion expanded the social elements of demo-
cratic theory. Radical democracy also required the democratization of 
the institutions of civil society. 
 It is no doubt true that Habermas’s formulation of the public sphere 
has limitations, which he has acknowledged. However, regarding the 
inclusion of women, minorities, and the working class in the bourgeois 
public sphere, it retains importance because it identifies structural pos-
sibilities for freedom that were not effectively identified by the earlier 
Frankfurt School. Habermas sees the public sphere as a social realm 
that resists and is opposed to the imperatives of capitalist rationaliza-
tion. It represents a counter-sphere of democratic will-formation within 
capitalist development. 
 Habermas agrees with the earlier Frankfurt theorists that late capital-
ism forecloses possibilities for action. However, he does not share their 
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view that critical reason has been completely supplanted by instru-
mental reason. He worked out this line of thought over the course of 
a decade, from his essays in  Theory and Practice to his rehabilitation of 
crisis theory in  Legitimation Crisis . In his earlier work he still adopted 
a conceptual perspective reminiscent of the early Frankfurt School. 
This position, however, could not always accommodate his insights 
into modern democracy – insights that have allowed him to maintain 
a commitment to radical democracy while taking on and exploring the 
possibilities of the liberal and republican traditions. 
 In the essays on the classical doctrine of politics and natural law, 
Habermas develops a distinction between practical and technical rea-
son. While the latter is a kind of instrumental reason that entails the 
development of efficient means to achieve selected ends, practical rea-
son refers to consciousness, will, and understanding. At this point in 
his work he sees the distinction as between control and action, or forms 
of purposive and communicative action. The classical notion of prac-
tice derives from Aristotle’s conception of practical philosophy and is 
opposed to technical control. The former is a notion of practical delib-
eration about questions of the good.  21  For Aristotle practical philosophy 
was  phronesis . It did not seek theoretical certainty of the order of things 
but rather practical knowledge of the right thing to do. By contrast, the 
tradition that starts with Hobbes sees the problems of politics as capa-
ble of objective scientific solutions. The laws of politics could be derived 
axiomatically from first principles. This system of laws derived by the 
theorist could be applied by the ruler independently of the consent 
of the governed. The only consent needed was for the original agree-
ment. For Hobbes man was no longer the social animal of Aristotelian 
thought. Society was an arrangement for ensuring commodious living 
and the protection and security of citizens. It was the application of sci-
entific knowledge of the mechanisms of social order – mechanisms that 
are timeless and permanent.  22  
 We can see this construction in elements of Horkheimer’s approach 
to Cartesianism in “Traditional and Critical Theory,” although it also 
closely connected to the critique of instrumental reason that Hork-
heimer and Adorno formulated in the 1940s. However, Habermas did 
not see instrumental reason in the totalizing fashion of his predecessors. 
He thought that instrumental reason had a role in social action. How-
ever, when technical claims take the place of processes of democratic 
deliberation, instrumental rationality oversteps its bounds. In their 
attempts to replace the normative orientation of the classical notion of 
politics with a technical conception, Hobbes and his successors essen-
tially bypassed a politics that featured active citizen participation. 
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 Habermas’s notion differs in some other important respects from that 
of his predecessors. First, it provides a source of non-dominating reason 
and action. Horkheimer’s distinction between objective and subjective 
reason left little room for a notion of praxis. The concept of mimesis, 
which Adorno and Horkheimer developed in  Dialectic of Enlightenment 
as an alternative, is primarily negative: it does not deal with processes 
of deliberation, discussion, and consent that are central to the formation 
of political will.  23  Habermas’s use of an independent notion of praxis 
fills that lacuna. There is an independent capacity for forming a political 
will that can persist even under the conditions of late capitalism. The 
notion of practice gives some substance to the capacities identified in 
the public sphere. The second issue is related to the first. The concept of 
practice also provides the space in which democracy can take root and 
grow. The idea of an intersubjective formation of political will – that is, 
popular sovereignty – requires something like the concept of praxis if it 
is to have any possible grounding. 
 As some critics have noted, however, Habermas’s conception of prac-
tice seems to incorporate an unresolved tension. His use of the Aristo-
telian model of praxis is based on a world in which the modern distinc-
tion between state and society is absent. At the same time, the existence 
of a viable public sphere requires the separation of state and society, 
as well as the maintenance of those autonomous institutions of public 
media and discussion that Habermas emphasizes. He therefore needs a 
concept of practical reason that more adequately fits modern societies 
than does the Aristotelian notion. In his essay on the classical concep-
tion of politics, he argues along with neo-Aristotelians that Aristotle’s 
notion of practice persisted through the nineteenth century until the 
rise of positivism and a modern “political science” brought about its 
final defeat. This neo-Aristotelian version of course stressed virtue as 
its normative basis, not rights and freedoms. 
 The problem of natural law is, however, capable of a more radical 
interpretation. Modern natural law has been uncoupled from its ties 
to a substantive or material basis in the ethical structures of the good 
life. In the process, it has become formal. Still, it retains some element 
of normativity as expressing basic rights that all humans inherently 
possess. In the rationalism of the modern era, these rights were per-
manent and often given prior to society. As such they were applied, 
albeit in different ways, to the revolutions of the modern era, both the 
American and the French. In Habermas’s reading the revolutionary 
character of these rights was less apparent in the American Revolution 
because they took the form of an essentially Lockean notion of property. 
As opposed to Hobbes, Locke saw the basis of self-preservation in the 
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property-owning individual and the attainment of goods. In the state of 
nature this was the fundamental right. To recall our earlier discussion, 
for Locke property was owned when an individual mixed his labour 
with the resources provided by nature through gathering or, later, farm-
ing or craft production. In the state of nature the individual had the 
right to enforce natural law; a state only became necessary in a market 
economy, when production allowed us to store and trade beyond our 
immediate needs. At that point a state was needed to regulate the mar-
ket order. 
 Natural law was seen as a “revolution” of property owners, yet it sig-
nified no more than the recognition and reclamation of those rights that 
were already assumed to exist. Even more than Locke, Thomas Paine 
thought that while it was essential to establish government, such a gov-
ernment needed to be restrained so that individuals who owned private 
property could peacefully create a successful social order in a market 
society. In each of these formulations, the bourgeois character of the 
American Revolution was clear. It was already based on the common 
sense, the public opinion, of the bourgeois class. Thus, America was far 
from an ideal public sphere. The public there was limited to one group 
and the views it held. It fell short of a notion of popular sovereignty. 
 A very different understanding of the people and popular sovereignty 
emerged during the French Revolution. In France, revolution meant the 
construction of a new society that included those who were not part of 
the propertied order. Here Rousseau was a better guide than Locke or 
Hobbes.  24  Rousseau, too, employed the fiction of a state of nature that 
led to war; however, he saw the resulting society not as peaceful but as 
inherently conflictual. Market societies were rife with egoism, greed, and 
inequality. Thus a social contract could not merely trade the rights of 
nature for civil rights of the state. It needed to create these rights anew 
within society. A notion of popular sovereignty was embedded in Locke’s 
and especially Paine’s version of revolutionary change; but notwith-
standing Paine’s nod to the poor, this was largely the sovereignty of the 
property-owning classes. This was not true for Rousseau, for whom the 
central problem was the inequality of society, which had to be addressed 
not transferring rights to society but by reconstructing society and state. 
 To be sure, Habermas believes that Rousseau’s version of the general 
will is inadequate.  25  It is not based on the idea of public opinion forma-
tion and discussion, but rather on a common feeling; Habermas calls it 
“unpublic” opinion. Still, Rousseau’s work stands at the inauguration 
of another conception of rights, a positive conception derived from the 
new formulation of natural rights as a product of a constitution that 
forms both state and society. 
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 In revolutionary France, rights were no longer seen as pre-political 
and as having a purely negative function. The new rights were positive – 
they were posited by and through the act of constituting the new state 
and society. These rights included the right to political participation and 
to equality, not just as a private citizen but also in public life. Individu-
als also had justified claims to social welfare provisions. As Habermas 
notes,  th ese rights were by no means developed fully in the revolution-
ary constitution, which still assumed that they could be protected nega-
tively, but they nonetheless became the basis for the guarantees of the 
welfare state.  26  
 This second dimension of positive rights is not really integrated into 
the earlier formulations of critical theory. To be sure, notions of free 
human development arise frequently in the work of Horkheimer and 
Marcuse. These derive, however, from Marx and are strongly indebted 
to his early writings, which were rediscovered in the 1930s. But the main 
theorists of the Frankfurt School all concurred on the central role of a 
certain line of development. The liberal order with its assumption of a 
rational individual consciousness was being replaced by the totalizing 
state of late capitalism. The welfare state did not represent a new source 
of rights but was part of a system of intensifying control. However, 
as earlier noted, the emerging developmental interpretation of natural 
rights came to include rights to participation and equality that had gone 
unrecognized in classical notions of individual, negative rights. Here 
the rights guaranteed by natural law went beyond the protection of 
bourgeois property and extended to those who could oppose it. 
 This reading has an explicit as well as an implicit relation to the work 
of C.B. Macpherson. It is explicit in that Habermas draws on Macpher-
son’s reading of Hobbes and Locke. It is implicit insofar as he anticipates 
Macpherson’s later work on developmental democracy. Habermas in 
his early writings is more pessimistic about the possibilities of democra-
tization, but he does not fully close off these possibilities. He notes that 
the concepts of rights formulated in the welfare state still maintain the 
possibilities of participatory democracy even as the welfare state tends 
to suppress these claims because of its ability to mute crises. 
 Transforming the Theory of Democracy: 
Legitimation Problems and Beyond 
 Some of the issues raised by the Marxian notion of crisis are given a 
more sociological – one could say more political-economic – reading 
in Habermas’s account of legitimation crises. This marks a further 
break from the analyses of the first generation of the Frankfurt School. 
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Whereas the critical theories of late capitalism held that capitalism had 
largely succeeded in staving off crises and exerting almost total con-
trol over social affairs, Habermas, who wrote in the shadow of the civil 
rights, antiwar, and student protests of the time, was aware that late 
capitalism was not as successful in staving off crises as Horkheimer 
and Adorno had thought. In part this was due to the limits of its inner 
development as a technical system. Postwar liberals, especially propo-
nents of the American version of the “vital centre,” thought that plural-
ist democracy had put in place the best system of government, which 
only needed technical refining and correcting to function properly. 
In short, liberals thought that normative questions had been settled. 
Thus, as Habermas and others were later to point out, they had little 
understanding of or sympathy for social movements that raised these 
normative questions anew. However, standing behind the social and 
technological assumptions undergirding welfare state democracies 
were the earlier questions raised in the second version of natural law 
and developmental democracy, namely, those relating to the demands 
for greater democratic inclusion and participation linked to the idea of 
popular sovereignty. No doubt these questions are recast in the welfare 
state, but they remain available for participants. Rights no longer can 
have a transcendental basis but must be justified through communica-
tive reason. Protest movements raised questions not only about civil 
rights but about these positive rights as well. They called into question 
the ways in which Western democracies understood and justified their 
own project. Similarly, late capitalist societies were seen to have failed 
to provide motivations for its citizens not just to participate in society 
but also to accept the work discipline central to their economies. 
 In making this argument, we do not mean to leave out the major revi-
sions that Habermas was making to Marxian theory. We simply mean to 
highlight some of the assumptions that he carried over from his earlier 
work.  Legitimation Crisis both elaborates and modifies the earlier formu-
lations in the context of a new approach to a theory of society. To begin 
with, Habermas increasingly gives an independent status to normative 
considerations. This independence was already evident in the role he 
accorded to practical rationality in his earlier work. This role was not, 
however, anchored in a theory of society. Now, Habermas conceives of 
different concepts of social action. Normative questions have an inde-
pendent logic in that they represent dimensions of social interaction 
that are basic to all societies. Societies are held together not only by 
the requirements of an economic order but also by forms of mutual 
understanding. In Habermas’s terms this involves communicative 
action. Such action is oriented to agreement among the participants. 
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Habermas sees this kind of action as different from purposive ratio-
nal action, which like social labour and natural science is oriented to 
success or the achievement of ends. The logic of norms in the social 
lifeworld is not simply dependent upon the structure of social labour 
or purposive action. Of course, while independent, these dimensions 
are closely related. The economy still plays a dominant steering role in 
his theory of society. Economic problems are still central to the crises of 
late capitalism. Writing at the end of the Keynesian era, Habermas has 
been much more aware of its tensions and limits than were the earlier 
Frankfurt theorists. He sees Keynesian theory as having failed to solve 
the accumulation crises of late capitalism, which was presumptively in 
the process of dissolution. 
 However, it seems to us that Habermas still provides space for a radi-
cal democracy that can steer the economy and provide more widespread 
participation. The tensions in late capitalism keep these possibilities 
open. Certainly, Habermas sees contradictory forces at play in the com-
peting spheres of accumulation and legitimation. In seeking legitima-
tion, capitalist societies draw on the reservoir of traditional meanings 
created in pre-capitalistic social orders. Paradoxically, such traditions 
have been eroded by capitalist rationalization. Like Weber, Habermas 
sees traditional meaning as being emptied in modernity. However, in 
his later work, beginning with  The Theory of Communicative Action and 
especially in  Between Facts and Norms , he argues that modern societies 
themselves have an independent generative power, a communicative 
power, that creates an intersubjective will and binding force. 
 We cannot go into a full-blown analysis of Habermas’s discussion 
here. But central to his claim is the idea that the relations of production 
are depoliticized in late capitalism. In the liberal capitalist era the state 
guaranteed the conditions of production but was independent of it. 
However, as the dysfunctional elements and side effects of the capital-
ist market become apparent the state has come to assume some of these 
functions. It is called upon to regulate the economy in various ways 
through active interventions. For Habermas, as for the earlier Frank-
furt theorists, the political comes to predominate over the economic. 
However, political intervention into the economy leads to new conflicts 
and problems. The performance of the state in directing and interven-
ing in the economy becomes subject to legitimation questions and open 
to contestation. It creates needs for legitimacy that Horkheimer and 
Adorno either did not recognize or did not accept. 
 Here we must shift focus. Habermas extended his notion of practice 
as developed in his earliest essays in the direction of the theory of com-
municative action that we discussed earlier. More broadly, the need for 
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legitimation derives from his claim that societies are held together by 
forms of social integration – consensual forms of mutual understand-
ing that bind subjects. Social interaction in his view is oriented towards 
standards of truth or normative validity. When these agreements break 
down, individuals need to renew, repair, or replace their understand-
ings if they are to maintain consensus. Of course, we do not have to 
rely on a notion of complete agreement here; societies can no doubt 
maintain their integrity with fair amounts of dissensus. But when an 
institution like the state no longer acts in a way that is consistent with 
its core values or principles, it can lose the trust of the populace, which 
no longer gives its consent. We can become alienated from our soli-
darities and our identities as citizens; or we can engage in resistance. In 
advanced capitalism the state takes on the burden not only of managing 
the economy but of providing for basic welfare needs and social equal-
ity. These clearly make the state open to claims that it is failing either to 
properly manage the economy or to fulfil the normative expectations 
of participants. 
 What stands behind these legitimation crises are the norms of equal-
ity and participation that are central to the developmental view. At 
the same time, late capitalism attempts to create  de facto legitimation 
through mass loyalty. The latter is more a form of administratively cre-
ated acceptance of authority through exchange for material goods and 
services. Central to this dynamic is a kind of civic privatism, in which 
individuals focus on family, private life, and material goods. Habermas 
also includes parliamentary democracy as a form generating loyalty. 
It limits the participation of citizens to periodic voting and restricts 
the accountability of public officials and administrators. And it often 
reduces political problems to technical ones. 
 In adopting a systems framework, which for many critics is prob-
lematic, Habermas in some respects moves away from the political-
economic perspectives that are central to some of his earlier work. He 
contends that the changes in late capitalism have significantly altered 
both the way we understand the social system and the kinds of crises 
that can occur. The exploitation and domination of the working class 
has been partly mitigated by the welfare state. 
 Nonetheless Habermas retains some important elements of Marx’s 
analysis. For our purposes one question is important: Are democracy 
and capitalism compatible? In the full sense of democracy that Haber-
mas employs, they cannot be. The limits of reform within late capital-
ism are given by this contradiction. Habermas maintained this position 
up until  The Theory of Communicative Action . There he wrote: “Between 
capitalism and democracy there is an indissoluble tension; in them two 
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opposed principles of social integration compete for primacy.”  27  He 
cited Offe’s interpretation of this conflict as the contradiction between 
the drive to privatize the means of production and the countervailing 
drive in late capitalism to politicize or socialize them. Habermas saw 
a series of dilemmas in the fact that politicians must simultaneously 
appeal to investors and to the masses; public opinion is both an expres-
sion of the popular will and the product of the engineering of consent. 
 Whatever we think of this analysis, it showed the changes in Haber-
mas’s conception of the possibilities inherent in late capitalism. Instead 
of a one-dimensional rationalization, which foreclosed possibilities and 
eliminated contradictions, while class conflict was muted, there had 
emerged other zones of conflict and other contradictions. 
 During the period following  The Theory of Communicative Action and 
culminating in  Between Facts and Norms , Habermas largely developed 
the paradigm of communicative action in the realms of both ethics and 
political/legal theory, and with this, indirectly, a theory of democracy. 
This later work essentially expresses the assumptions and commit-
ments he continues to hold. There is far less discussion of political-
economic issues and how these bear on democratic theory. On the one 
hand, Habermas develops his political theory in the light of a lifeworld-
based conception of interaction. Ethics and politics are discursive and 
deliberative. The constitutional state, he contends, is anchored in “the 
 higher-level intersubjectivity of communication processes that unfold 
in the institutionalized in parliamentary bodies, on the one hand, and 
the informal networks of the public sphere, on the other. Both within 
and outside parliamentary bodies geared to decision making, these 
subjectless modes of communication form arenas in which a more or 
less rational opinion-and will-formation concerning issues and prob-
lems affecting society as a whole can take place.”  28  This idea of the com-
municative basis of will and authority is meant to serve as a counter-
weight to the systemic imperatives of the economy and administrative 
rationality that attempt to insulate political decisions from collective 
will-formation. The nascent political theory evident in this position still 
points to a notion of democratic popular sovereignty that underlies his 
critical theory. 
 Popular Sovereignty Revisited 
 However, Habermas has returned to the concerns of the public sphere 
from his earlier work to ground a communicative alternative to both 
liberalism and republicanism. He argues that the discourse conception 
of law is meant to suggest a bridge between the rule of law associated 
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with liberalism and popular sovereignty. The parliamentary system of 
democracy needs to be supplemented by a strong public sphere that 
surrounds metaphorically the parliamentary and bureaucratic pro-
cesses. This would provide a normative basis for the participation of all 
in the political process. Citing Ingeborg Maus, Habermas argues that 
the communicative theory of law entails the mediation of legal institu-
tions and non-institutionalized popular sovereignty: “Here the social 
substratum for the realization of the system of rights consist neither 
in spontaneous market forces nor in the deliberate forces of welfare 
state but in the currents of communication and public opinion that, 
emerging from civil society and the public sphere, are converted into 
communicative power through democratic procedures.”  29  Habermas 
has in mind here a robust and democratically structured public sphere 
that includes plebiscites, grassroots party organizing, and open politi-
cal participation, as well as a democratized media. The idea is that 
the public sphere is the space in which democratizing impulses are 
generated. 
 To be sure, as we have argued, there has been a shift from political 
economy to political and legal theory over the course of the develop-
ment of Habermas’s thought. Nonetheless, with respect to the idea of 
a democratic public sphere there is still a strong continuity between 
Habermas’s account as it was formulated in his earliest work and the 
theory he develops in his later writings. This later treatment upholds 
the ideas of popular sovereignty and political participation, albeit in a 
new theoretical framework. The theory of communicative action pro-
vides a framework for grasping the consensual nature of social action 
and the deliberative bases of understanding. 
 However, it is not clear whether Habermas provides the socio-polit-
ical resources for such a program. We can get at this issue first by ask-
ing why the impulses that originate from below in the communicative 
substructure of society do not enter further into the structure of the 
state as such. Because Habermas sees the lifeworld as limited by system 
imperatives of money and power that structure action non-communi-
catively, economic and state structures are removed from any forms of 
mutual accountability. It should not be impossible, however, for partici-
pants who are reflexively aware of their own situation to act together in 
order to put the economy and even the bureaucracy under more demo-
cratic direction – or even to take certain types of actions regulated by 
the market out of market regulation, that is, place more elements of the 
economy under democratic control. 
 A more radical form of democracy would involve more than the dis-
tinction between system integration and social integration, or between 
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the internal perspective of the participant and the external perspective 
of a social system. This relation is far more fluid than Habermas argues. 
Consider, for example, the question of higher wages. Businesses argue 
from a system point of view that higher wages are a brake on accumula-
tion and affect competitiveness. These are objective requirements. But 
actors form groups to advocate for change in the public sphere. These 
could be seen on the one hand as system imperatives for mass loyalty, 
which in a bureaucratic administrative/corporate social formation pro-
motes labour peace and thus long-term profitability. It is also, however, 
an element of social integration, that is, it represents a norm derived 
from the expectation of fair treatment on the part of those who work 
in the marketplace. Having a decent living standard is an expectation 
held by of a large part of the citizenry of a democratic country. The point 
here is that ordinary actors engaging their situations from the inter-
nal perspective of the lifeworld are capable of reflexively monitoring 
and incorporating knowledge of system imperatives. They can assess 
whether and how they can act in relation to these supposedly objective 
conditions, those that can be modified by collective action, and others 
that are resistant to change, at least in current historical and social situ-
ations.  30  By contrast, the externalist perspective tends to see these sys-
tem constraints as objective conditions, necessary requirements of the 
economic and administrative systems in terms of which fundamental 
change is largely ruled out.  31  
 The second question that emerges from a consideration of Haber-
mas’s theory of discursive, constitutional democracy, particularly as 
laid out in  Between Facts and Norms , is whether and to what extent his 
proposals could be realized within an essentially capitalist society. In 
his earlier work, as we have noted, he saw capitalism and democracy as 
incompatible. Are the proposals for greater equality and participation 
likely to wreck on the barriers in capitalist societies? Are the barriers 
high enough to make the kind of robust democratization of public life 
that Habermas desires beyond reach? 
 Finally, Habermas bases his theory on a strongly universalist pro-
gram that is linked to a transnational world and transnational identi-
ties. This would seem to entail a socialist or social democratic under-
standing widespread throughout the larger transnational society that 
Habermas seeks. 
 While this ideal is indeed worthy, it needs to be combined with 
additional, more elaborated analysis of the conditions of the neolib-
eral constellation. This becomes evident from a closer examination 
of the key elements of Habermas’s theory of democracy, to which we 
now turn. 
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 Radical Democracy Revisited 
 Habermas presents his democratic theory as a form of radical democ-
racy. It retains the project of a democratic self-organization in which 
participants decide on the laws that will govern them. However, this 
project takes a different shape in contemporary society. It no longer 
involves the realization of a specific form of life. Rather, it points to an 
understanding of democracy and socialism as a set of formal qualities 
that lead to greater emancipation: “If, however, one conceives ‘social-
ism’ as the set of necessary conditions for emancipated forms of life 
about which the participants  themselves must first reach an understand-
ing, then one will recognize that the democratic self-organization of a 
legal community constitutes the normative core of this project as well.”  32  
 Here Habermas retains the idea of popular sovereignty but interprets 
it procedurally though his notion of communicative rationality. Popular 
sovereignty is embedded in the communicative power of participants 
in social interaction. It is constituted by the creation of both understand-
ing and the practical will to act in common. There is a necessary discur-
sive and dialogical element of practical reason that is linked to the cen-
tral elements of political sovereignty through mutual understanding 
and mutual accountability. These ideas form the core of what Haber-
mas sees as a post-metaphysical notion of democracy. However, he also 
acknowledges the limits of this model under the conditions of modern 
societies. These conditions affect what is in many respects a Hegelian/
Marxist understanding of democracy. Democracy and democratic soci-
ety can no longer be considered, at least potentially, as a totality. 
 Habermas feels that the utopian energies of the Marxian project cen-
tred on the emancipation of labour are exhausted. They were always in 
any case too concrete. In its classical form Marxism provided a holistic 
notion that interpreted society as a meta-subject or unity. In his view, 
Marxism took from Aristotle and Rousseau the idea that society was a 
settled or concrete form of life rather than a set of necessary conditions 
for freedom and emancipation about which the participants themselves 
could decide.  33  Thus he finds the notion of revolution untenable. Rather, 
Habermas sees communicative freedom and power as the repository of 
any utopian energies left in society: “Instead of the rationality of pro-
ductive forces, including natural science and technology, I trust in the 
productive force of communication.”  34  
 Habermas’s essay on popular sovereignty as procedure revisits 
the concerns of his earlier work on popular sovereignty and political 
participation, but now addresses these concerns in the context of his 
lifeworld/system distinction. At least one of the issues raised by the 
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French Revolution retains its significance for Habermas: the creation 
of popular sovereignty through a discursive process of will-formation. 
The model employed in  Theory and Practice is continued in one dimen-
sion. The notion of radical democracy that combines human rights and 
popular sovereignty is based upon the idea that both rights and sover-
eignty are founded within society. We cannot consider basic rights as 
external to or prior to society. 
 However, Habermas now rejects several versions of his prior formu-
lation. Specifically, he rejects what he sees as the totalizing elements that 
characterized traditional ideas of sovereignty. Sovereignty cannot be 
conceived as a unitary will or the expression of a people. In one sense 
this is because of the pluralist character of modern societies, which 
cannot be unified by a pre-existing ethos or will. Habermas is dubious 
about conceptions of the nation-state that view it as a carrier of a unified 
will that expresses the spirit of the people. 
 Nor does he see the idea of revolutionary transformation as necessary 
in the current constellation. As noted above, the productivist orienta-
tion he associates with the French Revolution and the Marxian tradi-
tion is exhausted. We can no longer speak of a workers’ utopia that will 
overthrow capitalism in one stroke and bring in a totally emancipated 
society. To the extent that as with Marxism we could organize a soci-
ety through rational economic planning and administration, Habermas 
sees this vision as flawed: economies are crisis-ridden, and administra-
tion is often irrational. Instead, he sees human rights and sovereignty as 
potentially capable of fostering reform, perhaps even radical reform.  35  
Thus for Habermas the deliberative processes that could engage mem-
bers of democratic societies implicitly include ideas – and ideals – of 
popular sovereignty in terms of which citizens can discuss and delib-
erate about collective decisions. In other words, Habermas is scepti-
cal about notions of national identity as the basis for a revolutionary 
consciousness. 
 These claims are linked to a third idea. Habermas does not think the 
notion of a self-directed society, whereby society is viewed as a collec-
tive totalizing subject able to give itself its own norms, is any longer 
plausible. Rather, he believes that in modern societies elements of the 
economy and the state are organized in a functional manner. They have 
been detached from normative moorings and can act independently for 
essentially instrumental reasons. For example, administrative rational-
ity is concerned with order and the stability of the system and not with 
its normative functions. For Habermas, both administration and the 
market have the tendency in modern society to take over or “colonize” 
more and more elements of social life that need to be norm-governed. 
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The marketization of elements of social life, such as education, provides 
good examples of how the lifeworld is colonized. In the circumstances 
such forms of consensual action and popular control are no longer effec-
tively able to facilitate social integration. In Hannah Arendt’s terms the 
colonization of the lifeworld and the expansion of, and strengthening 
of, administrative and economistic values and practices represents the 
increasing predominance of behaviour – potentially measurable and 
predictable responses to the unquestioned demands of hierarchical, 
authoritarian bureaucratic apparatuses – over action – the capacity 
to intervene in ongoing social processes by means of new initiatives 
undertaken in a vibrant public realm that embodies and furthers civic 
freedom. 
 Habermas’s more formal notion of democracy sees it as placing a 
limit on the power of economic and bureaucratic imperatives. In con-
trast to his position in  The Theory of Communicative Action , in which 
these system imperatives seem to have greater independence, here he 
believes that these imperatives should be subordinated to democratic 
considerations. The aim of radical democracy is to place the economy 
and bureaucracy under popular control. However, subordinating and 
controlling the economic and administrative apparatus does not mean 
transforming society into a unitary entity in which the differentiation of 
separate spheres would be overcome. Habermas thinks this differentia-
tion means that economic and administrative spheres cannot be struc-
tured by forms of mutual understanding. They can only be regulated; 
they cannot be reintegrated into a social whole. But even if we were to 
accept Habermas’s conception of modernity, it is not clear exactly what 
form this democratic control of the economy would take. 
 This issue highlights a key element of Habermas’s democratic theory, 
namely, its incorporation of a strong rights discourse and his adoption 
of a legal parliamentary model of political will-formation. This has 
led some to think that Habermas has regressed to a form of liberal-
ism that defends the status quo. But such a view is misleading. If lib-
eralism represents a theory that sees rights as prior to society and as 
based in self-interest, the task of government in those circumstances is 
to protect the individual’s interests and property from intrusion. Haber-
mas rejects this version of liberalism to the extent that a liberal politi-
cal theory sees politics as the aggregation of individual interests and 
the protection of these interests. Habermas’s position is more clearly 
sympathetic to republicanism and its emphasis on popular sovereignty. 
Republican theory stresses the virtuous citizen who engages in public 
participation to determine the common good. In the republican view, 
law does not simply protect the individual, it also expresses the ethos of 
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the community. Habermas is uncomfortable, however, with the notion 
of a common ethos or political community. His communicative theory 
attempts to combine the best elements of both theories. His synthesis 
is not a return to liberalism but rather an attempt to link the notion of 
rights to popular sovereignty. We will return to this issue later in this 
chapter. At this point we wish to focus more explicitly on Habermas’s 
specific understanding of rights. 
 In one sense Habermas’s conception of rights is a new elaboration of 
his concerns with the dual foundations of democracy as he laid these 
out in his early essays, although his position on rights is not identical 
to his earlier perspective. For democracy, including radical democracy, 
must be built on a foundation of human rights  and popular sovereignty, 
in which members of a society take on a form of self-organization. 
These human rights represent the basic conditions for the institution-
alization of discourses in democratic societies. We might extend this 
argument and say they represent the basic conditions for communica-
tive freedom. In this view, then, rights are not claims that derive from a 
natural law or moral law prior to society. Rather, they are both internal 
to society and state basic conditions that transcend partiality and apply 
to all. Here popular sovereignty and rights are complementary in char-
acter and not in conflict. If one accepts democratic rule as a discursive 
process in which individuals acting in concert decide on and implement 
rules, policies, and practices through deliberation (what Habermas calls 
the discourse principle), this requires an institutionalization of basic 
rights that protect the conditions of communicative freedom of indi-
viduals. Only if they are legally free to participate as equals can they 
discursively determine their shared conditions of political life. These 
rights associated with communicative freedom and action cannot be 
just moral rights, as some might argue. They need to be legally enforce-
able if they are to serve as bulwarks against unjustified coercion and 
domination. 
 As we saw with Habermas’s earlier reflections on the genesis of mod-
ern political theories, the relation between rights and popular sover-
eignty is not fully clear. This disjunction is more straightforward in a 
thinker such as Thomas Hobbes, who detaches sovereignty from rule. 
But of course, the Hobbesian solution is unavailable to Habermas. 
 Habermas then thinks he can avoid some of the problems of earlier 
theories. Against Marxism and to some extent the earlier Frankfurt the-
orists, he believes that rights are not just a creation of capitalism and 
bourgeois society, expressions of an atomistic individualism. Rather, 
they are rules and laws that enable social action. He does not envision 
a society in which all antagonisms are eliminated and all politics is 
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abolished. A legal constitutional framework is needed to regulate these 
antagonisms and conflicts. 
 Thus, as we have seen, Habermas rejects the idea of a nation or 
community as unified by a single ethos or sense of moral uniformity. 
He does this for two distinct reasons. On the one hand he thinks that 
notions of the good are local, not universal. Conceptions of the moral 
good cannot by themselves be sufficient to found basic rights or legal 
order. Since modern societies are inherently pluralistic, we cannot have 
a purely ethical/moral reading of human rights independent of legal-
ity. Otherwise a single understanding of the good would be imposed 
on others, without discursive redemption. On the other hand, the 
impulses of human rights are certainly moral. We view infringements of 
human rights as violations of our moral sense. Nonetheless these moral 
impulses are insufficient for a constitutional state unless they have a 
legal foundation.  36  
 The second limit on the idea of a unified moral community involves 
a theme we discussed earlier: the idea that modern societies are based 
on the imperatives of money and power, that is, the market and bureau-
cracy. Modern societies are too large, complex, and pluralistic to be run 
on the model of direct democracy. However, Habermas argues that 
despite these features a theory of democracy based in popular sover-
eignty still has force. Such a theory, however, must accept the reality 
of a market society and administrative state as well as the conditions 
of plurality. This sets a difficult task: how is a socialist conception of 
popular sovereignty to be reconciled to a constitutional state with a 
market economy? 
 Rights and the Claims of Welfare: Reconsidering 
Social and Economic Rights 
 Another element of Habermas’s theory of democracy that is clarified 
in his work is a conception of the legal status of welfare state norms. A 
tradition of thought that moves from Weber through the early Frankfurt 
School, and that undergirds the distinction between formal and mate-
rial law, has been used to criticize welfare state measures. Legitimate 
law according to Weber is formal, that is, general. Weber criticized laws 
that treated different groups or classes unequally, as welfare measures 
have done. Among the Frankfurt School theorists, Franz Neumann 
adopted this perspective. The deformalization of law was in this view 
anti-democratic and a precursor to fascism. Neumann carried this line 
of thought and influenced Habermas in his earliest work.  37  However, 
Habermas’s conception of formal law is not only abstractly formal but 
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also tied to a discursive procedure of justification. Law is based on com-
municative power, and it is that, rather than its formal quality, which 
gives it legitimacy. One could enact welfare state measures that deal 
with specific groups if they passed the test of reasonable acceptance by 
all parties. 
 Habermas believes that rights and popular sovereignty are linked 
through the discourse principle, and in a similar fashion he thinks 
that public and private rights are co-originary. Private rights are nec-
essary to protect the autonomy of the individual from interference so 
that she has the private freedom to say “no” to prevalent social norms 
and take her own path. This is the source of a context-transcending 
power that can make possible new forms of mutual understanding. 
At the same time, rights protect the equal opportunity of all to par-
ticipate in discourses as free and equal citizens. An individual who 
lacks the private freedom to say no also lacks the ability to be an inde-
pendent individual and form his own plans. Moreover, individuals 
are participants in a larger world. Their private freedom is based on 
public freedom. 
 In casting rights in this fashion, Habermas intends to resolve the 
dilemma found in Kant and Rousseau. Kant saw basic rights as the 
foundation of a legal political order, but he conceived these as  natural 
rights and hence prior to society. Thus he recognized and highlighted 
the central place of individual autonomy and self-determination but 
was unable to account for the idea of popular sovereignty that he drew 
from Rousseau. By contrast, Rousseau saw rights as emerging from pro-
cesses internal to society, but he also came to view sovereignty only as 
the creation of a unified order – a conception that was insufficiently 
attuned to autonomy and plurality. It is Habermas’s claim that his 
account can do proper justice to both individual autonomy and popu-
lar sovereignty. 
 Habermas develops an alternative to direct democracy in his idea of a 
two-stage process of democratic deliberation, a process that is meant to 
preserve in large measure popular sovereignty. He sees the necessity of 
an open and wide-ranging public sphere in which there is unrestricted 
discussion and debate of issues. In this public space, new issues are 
raised, new structures of relevance are created, and new agendas are 
debated. The public sphere, recall, is intended to incorporate an institu-
tionally unbound process in which “wild” communicative reason is to 
prevail. This is still, however, seen as a deliberative or quasi-delibera-
tive process in which the force of good reasons prevails. Habermas sees 
his proposal as the communicative theoretical translation of the idea of 
popular sovereignty.  38  
 The Frankfurt School and Democratic Theory 219
 Following once again the ideas of Ingeborg Maus, Habermas views 
the democratic genesis of law as indeed resting with the ultimate author-
ity of the people to formulate the problems and the direction of society – 
but only if, and insofar as, popular self-determination is understood 
not as a single will that can be ascertained, but rather as a web of com-
municative and action structures that can permit citizens to unite on 
specific themes, goals, or norms. To be truly feasible, however, this pro-
posal would also require a large-scale democratization of all elements 
of society – a true social democracy. Habermas does intend his account 
to represent a “bottom-up” approach to democracy. His approach is 
broadly pluralistic but is not intended to be simply another variant of 
interest group liberalism. He sees competing groups not as the centre of 
a politics oriented strictly towards the contentious quest for power but 
as a series of decentred processes for forming and discussing of prob-
lems, processes that are aimed at reaching agreement on the salience of 
these issues. 
 The second stage in this account requires a more formal democratic 
element involving legislatures and government agencies, formal elec-
tions and even courts. Habermas, like many others, recognizes that in 
societies the size and scope of our own, a direct democracy is impossi-
ble and only some form of representative democracy is feasible. He sees 
these institutions as keyed to a deliberative assessment of proposals 
and issues formulated from below. Legislators and others are supposed 
to make such assessments through impartial deliberation about the fair-
ness of legislative proposals; or, in the case of courts, they are supposed 
to offer reasonable appraisals of the results of legislative enactments. 
 Habermas thus offers a challenging and thoughtful solution to the 
problems of popular sovereignty in complex societies. Several questions 
are yet to be answered, however. There is the matter of formal institutions 
serving as a translation process that could under certain interpretations 
become elitist despite the nod to popular sovereignty. The problems and 
concerns raised in the public sphere cannot simply be handed off to the 
legislature and left for it to decide. Habermas’s conception of the role of 
the legislature tends to support the idea that law-making processes are 
more rational than everyday discussions. This would seem to violate the 
reciprocal interaction of everyday and expert discourses that Habermas 
has formulated elsewhere. The transmission process cannot just be one-
way. There need to be ways for citizens to criticize these deliberations 
and participate in them, even if only virtually; and for this to be effective, 
there need to be strong democratic media through which citizens can be 
informed about legislative deliberations, and they must have the means 
to effectively criticize those deliberations.  39  
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 Even if we were to accept Habermas’s proposal at face value, a sec-
ond problem arises for its employment as a critical theory of law and 
justice. Real deliberative processes, especially as conducted in legisla-
tures, hardly qualify as ideal exercises in deliberation. In many respects, 
legislative deliberation – if indeed it could be called that – is less rational 
than discourses of the sort one finds in the public sphere. Indeed, where 
they have been captured by corporate economic interests, as has hap-
pened in the United States, state and national legislatures have worked 
to  restrict popular input and have thus become reactionary instruments 
of conservative revolution, not expressions of popular sovereignty. 
 On these grounds, and understandably so, progressive and radical 
scholars and thinkers have criticized Habermas’s discourse theory of 
democracy. However, we want to be a little more precise than some 
critics have been in specifying the nature of our own criticisms. As we 
noted earlier, many have viewed  Between Facts and Norms as a surrender 
of radical principles, especially Marxism, and as an embrace of conven-
tional liberalism. We think this view is mistaken. While Habermas as 
we noted above clearly rejects the model of revolutionary transforma-
tion of society that Marxists have traditionally defended, he nonethe-
less thinks that radical reform can bring about the realization of the 
ideals Marx desired, even if in a changed form. Habermas believes, 
however, in the power of the constitutional state to serve as a vehicle 
for this radical reform. As Matthew Specter has observed, Habermas’s 
mature work can hardly be characterized as a document of political 
resignation. In  Between Facts and Norms , constitutionalism is imagined 
as capacious enough to absorb the full force and breadth of “the revolu-
tionary project of the French Revolution.”  40  Habermas contends that the 
constitutional state preserves the ideals of the French Revolution, and 
of Marx, with regard to freedom, equality, and solidarity. He argues for 
a notion of constitutional patriotism that is based not on simple loyalty 
to country but on loyalty to the idea of the realization of the democratic 
project. 
 Thus for Habermas the constitution, very much like modernity itself, 
represents an unfinished project based in a fallible learning process. 
Certainly, there is some evidence in favour of the idea of radical reform 
within a constitutional order. In the United States, for example, some 
have seen three waves of progressive reform in the twentieth century: 
the Progressive era, the New Deal, and the Kennedy–Johnson Great 
Society. These periods of reform involved expansion of the democratic 
franchise and the generation and extension of social rights and free-
doms. Yet even these are ambiguous: the Progressive era often looked to 
an expert culture to reform society, and the New Deal’s establishment of 
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the foundations of the welfare state was largely the creation of an inner 
circle of bureaucrats. Still and all, the initiatives associated with these 
two periods in American history  did represent significant and progres-
sive changes within a constitutional democracy. 
 These considerations do not invalidate Habermas’s achievements in 
formulating a discourse theory of law and democracy. They do, how-
ever, point to its shortcomings as a critical theory. The latter, to recall, is 
also concerned with the ways in which these popular democratic devel-
opments nonetheless proved inadequate to the challenges of a social 
world still very much in the thrall of domination, unfreedom, and irra-
tionality. In short, Habermas’s account, like other theoretical initiatives 
shaped by its contours and concerns, lacks a thoroughgoing discussion 
of the pathologies of neoliberal society and its profound threats to the 
ideals that Habermas holds and defends. 
 Perhaps this is too much to ask of a work the scope and breadth 
of  Between Facts and Norms . Nonetheless the book was published in 
Germany in 1992, at a time when the spread of neoliberal ideas and 
practices was already becoming apparent. In the intervening quarter 
century, Habermas has not really developed or presented a comple-
mentary analysis of the pathologies of neoliberalism. In some respects, 
his recent remarks on Brexit and the rise of Donald Trump in the 
United States, and on the emergence of right-wing populism more gen-
erally, show too much faith in the power of existing liberal democra-
cies to deal with the serious problems of neoliberalism. At least up to 
now, his focus on the need for transnational institutions of justice has 
failed to recognize the force of the reaction against existing institutions 
and practices, and the crises created by neoliberalism. The question is 
whether the kind of full-scale democratization of society envisioned 
by Habermas could come about within a capitalist social formation. 
How far can radical reforms be carried out under capitalism? Is there 
some point at which a clear shift towards a socialist society becomes 
necessary? It may be true, for example, that the ideals of freedom and 
equality are the liberal core of the socialist ideal, but what conditions 
are conducive to the realization of those ideals? 
 The Problem of Administrative Rationality 
 A major issue raised in debates over the radical potential of  Between Fact 
and Norm is the relation between public spheres and administrative sys-
tems. Some critics think that, despite his commitment to radical democ-
racy, Habermas assigns too great a role to administrative rationality and 
not enough to democracy. He does not, it is argued, allow sufficient 
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scope for popular control of administrative decisions. He holds that 
administrative decisions often require a level of technical expertise that 
ordinary citizens do not have – for example, in areas of medicine or sci-
ence, or economics. For that reason, expert professionals in such areas 
must be granted a certain scope and autonomy. However, this does not 
mean that administrative decisions are completely insulated from pub-
lic opinion or debate. Ordinary citizens as well as legislatures and other 
formal deliberative bodies must have normative and even legal con-
trol over the direction of policy. The average citizen is not going to be 
able to carry out tests to decide on the safety of a new drug or medical 
device, but they could – as the case of HIV/AIDS research shows – exert 
pressure to bring new drugs to ill individuals more quickly. Individual 
citizens may not have the technical expertise to assess research on cli-
mate change, for example, but once aware of its effects, the public has a 
crucial role to play in the direction of policy. 
 Habermas argues that with the exception of specialized functions, 
technical problems are not independent of the public sphere. Members 
of the public are sufficiently cognizant of their own their health and of 
the environment that they might play a role in guiding decisions. In 
matters like these, problems arise less with expert opinion and more 
with a public sphere that may come to be dominated by corporate inter-
ests that are able to apply their own money and influence to shape and 
restrict public discussion. 
 To differentiate among organized bodies of opinion formation and 
exchange, Habermas writes of strong and weak publics. Although the 
term is somewhat misleading, Habermas defines weak publics as infor-
mal public spheres such as private associations and the mass media 
as well as, it seems, sites where citizens in their everyday lives come 
together to discuss ideas. As the first stage or, as it were, “ground floor” 
of discussion, these weak publics are most sensitive to emerging issues 
and problems in society. They have the burden of creating and renew-
ing the normative frameworks within which problems are defined out-
side of and prior to their treatment in a bureaucratic/administrative 
legislative context. By contrast, strong publics are formal bodies such 
as parliaments, legislatures, executives, and courts. These institutions 
possess the ultimate decision-making power in society and are also 
responsible for applying formal standards. 
 If Habermas were to give extensive authority to bureaucratic and 
administrative rationality, it would not be consistent with some of 
his earlier positions. In addition to defending the public sphere, he 
inveighed against the dominance of politics and society by technologi-
cal reason, which is exercised independently of the reflective capacity 
 The Frankfurt School and Democratic Theory 223
of subjects. Most important for our purposes is Habermas’s view on the 
reciprocity of participants and observers in social inquiry, an issue we 
discussed earlier. We have argued that this formulation leads to a dia-
logue between participants and observers. But in these reciprocal pro-
cesses, participants and experts are capable of mutual critique. Claims 
of expertise are never justified in advance and can in fact be criticized. 
And as we have become aware, the social function of expertise can be 
challenged. Medicine provides a good example of this. In recent years, 
the model of the doctor or medical professional as the ultimate author-
ity in all decisions has been ceded to the patient or the family. Often, 
the model of the patient as simply a physical body to be diagnosed and 
treated by the doctor has given way to alternatives that allow more 
scope for the human factor. 
 Similarly, the role of expertise in administration and bureaucracy, 
as well as the scope of parliamentary authority, must be carefully lim-
ited. The idea that parliaments are filters that can judge laws and poli-
cies in ways that take greater account of fairness and equality seems 
to represent a rather idealized picture. In the current climate, legisla-
tive decision-making often does not always create greater fairness or 
equal treatment; indeed, it very often produces the opposite. Habermas 
assumes a set of conditions that, while desirable, require more specifica-
tion. We must ask what kinds of arrangements and cultural conditions 
are required to achieve the types of deliberation Habermas defends as 
essential for democracy in the present day. 
 However, even under these conditions there needs to be a more recip-
rocal relation between weak publics and strong ones. Ordinary citizens 
have the capacity to pass judgment on legislative deliberations and 
to criticize them while they are happening. They have the reflective 
capacities to make judgments about such policies and legislative pro-
cesses. They need to have a vital role in shaping these deliberations in a 
reciprocal way. It is not outside the scope of ordinary understanding to 
make sense of major legislative initiatives. And it is the responsibility 
of the media and government leaders to make information available to 
the public and ensure it is widely disseminated. 
 Habermas’s idea of weak publics would seem to require a widespread 
democratization of all aspects of society. Citizens who have extensive 
experience with participating in deliberation at all levels of society are 
more likely to have developed their reflective capacities where there 
have been efforts to democratize the family, educational institutions, 
and workplaces, just to name a few. 
 Habermas does not treat property extensively in  Between Facts and 
Norms . He does speak of collective goods, though not in a way that 
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helps clarify his views. We can infer, however, from his conception of 
basic rights that he does conceive of a notion of rights that would limit 
private property. This can be seen in his commitment to the protection 
of civil rights, but also and especially in his defence of the right of all 
to participate as equals in meaningful processes of democratic will-
formation, which, as Habermas indicates, requires social rights in the 
form of social and economic security. These latter rights are what C.B. 
Macpherson and others might call developmental rights. They would 
secure those conditions that allow individuals to realize their purposes 
and form their identities. Habermas also recognizes self-development 
and self-realization as central to the development and protection of 
social rights and thus democratic deliberation. Conceptions of both can 
be and have been used to critically assess social and economic condi-
tions, such as inequality and exploitation.  41  
 If rights have a developmental component then the line between neg-
ative and positive, civil and developmental, rights is not hard and fast. 
Just as Habermas sees the co-priority of public and private rights, ques-
tions of self-determination and self-realization are connected. Being 
truly free to make one’s own choices means that one has the resources 
and capacities to make those choices and to form one’s own identity. 
These in turn no doubt require at least some minimal notions of a 
decent life. Gross levels of inequality, of political and social domination 
or oppression, of cultural invasion and colonization seem incompatible 
with Habermas’s conception of rights. Habermas does not think that 
the welfare state satisfies these considerations, nor does the state social-
ist version of the legal state. But neither does he advocate a return to a 
free market. 
 Between Liberalism and Republicanism: 
Deliberative Democracy in a Wider Perspective 
 If our analysis to this point is correct, it is in the context of both the aspi-
rations Habermas holds for his account and the challenges posed by the 
neoliberal constellation that his appraisal of alternative forms of democ-
racy must be understood. For Habermas, liberalism and republicanism 
represent two models of democracy, neither of which is sufficient by 
itself.  42  Liberalism starts from the model of a market-like competition of 
interests for the control of state power. On this model, political power 
is seen primarily as administrative or strategic power, which is then 
employed to achieve politically chosen goals. Subjects are viewed as 
independent bearers of rights protected by the state. This is the clas-
sic understanding of negative freedom or liberty. Political choices are 
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essentially an aggregation of individual private choices. These in turn 
shape the use and direction of political power. 
 By contrast, republicanism develops a theory of popular sovereignty. 
Politics and ethics are fused. Politics is not an aggregation of private 
interests; rather, it takes form around a collective ethos that possesses a 
quasi-objective character. Citizens of good character are formed through 
political participation, and in this respect republicanism bears affinities 
to the developmental liberalism of thinkers such as John Stuart Mill. 
 The form of ethical life specific to each community creates elements 
of political solidarity. Through sharing this ethos, individuals become 
aware of one another as citizens, as free and equal co-participants in the 
shared life of a common world. Citizens are primarily public persons 
whose rights of communication and participation are prior to private 
rights. Politics is not primarily administrative or strategic, but a way of 
acting in concert whereby the deliberations of citizens determine the 
aims of politics. 
 While liberalism largely lacks any sense of the solidarity that republi-
can political thought emphasizes, and hence has a limited notion of the 
social world, republican conceptions fail to recognize the independence 
of rights claims from a specific ethos and tend to underestimate the role 
of administrative power. Liberalism employs an exclusive notion of pri-
vate interests; republicanism holds an exclusive notion of public free-
dom. For Habermas, like Macpherson, an adequate theory of democ-
racy must recognize the co-priority of private and public freedom. 
 Habermas’s conception of deliberative, or discursive, democracy is 
meant to provide the basis for such a theory. Deliberation is here con-
ceived as a structural property of human interaction and justice is seen 
in the first instance as procedural. Deliberation and its possibilities 
emerge from the basic structure of mutual understanding prior to any 
specific human rights or concrete sense of community. Our basic capaci-
ties for deliberation and action are derived not from a particular content 
but rather from our ability to deliberate together to reach understand-
ing and to act in concert.  43  Thus basic rights to equality, freedom, and 
communication are drawn from the core conditions of mutual recogni-
tion and not from isolated individuals. 
 Because Habermas formulated the intersubjective bases of communi-
cative rationality and its notion of mutual recognition, he could employ 
this analysis to show the relation between public and private freedom 
that liberals and republicans had failed to achieve. He argues that this 
“reciprocal relation is expressed by the idea that legal persons can be 
autonomous only insofar as they can understand themselves as authors 
of just those rights which they are supposed to obey as addressees.”  44  
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 For Habermas, human rights are required to ground the universal 
public right of reason. They need to be institutionalized if public reason 
is to be free and accessible to all. At the same time, the public use of 
reason, and republican freedoms, require the assumption that there are 
independent individuals who are free to accept, reject, or modify these 
rights. They have a context-breaking and not just a context-dependent 
quality. 
 And this capacity can only develop intersubjectively and dialogi-
cally, in relation to others. Thus Habermas’s specific procedural con-
ception of democratic will-formation distinguishes his position from 
that of, for example, John Rawls or Immanuel Kant. In contrast to the 
original position of Rawls’s or Kant’s transcendental subject whereby 
individuals are fundamentally unconnected to one another, Haber-
mas’s intersubjective starting point interprets human rights and dis-
course as requiring a higher level of solidarity – a solidarity with 
others. 
 This understanding of solidarity indicates that while it is generally 
seen as Kantian, even by himself, Habermas’s account nonetheless has 
a significant if latent Hegelian quality – a point we emphasized in chap-
ter 1. To remind,  Between Facts and Norms has an architectonic structure 
reminiscent of Hegel’s  Philosophy of Right . In place of Hegel’s account 
of abstract right, morality, and ethical life, Habermas presents the sys-
tem of rights, the constitutional state, and procedural (deliberative) 
democracy as a system of public opinion and will-formation. Instead of 
absolute spirit by which a substantial ethical life is realized as objective 
spirit, there is communicative reason (the discourse principle) by which 
an inner connection between the system of rights and the constitutional 
state, the rule of law and popular sovereignty, is secured. And a similar 
basis for the critique of the  Philosophy of Right of the kind offered by 
Marx can be established for  Between Fact and Norms : just as Marx argued 
that in reality the state as a concrete ethical community was subordi-
nated to civil society and its class-based antagonisms, so it could be 
argued that communicative rationality is subordinated to instrumental 
rationality via the spread of relations that convert moral/practical into 
technical questions (to use Habermas’s earlier formulations), which are 
posed in such a way that their inescapable moral/practical dimension 
is occluded. 
 Habermas intends his ideas to represent a critical diagnosis of the 
present in a post–Frankfurt School, post-Marxist, post-socialist context. 
Specifically at issue is the nature of a viable democracy that retains a 
connection with the normative/egalitarian impulses of classical demo-
cratic theory and classical socialist doctrine, while acknowledging the 
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realities of societal complexity and a pluralism that generates multiple 
concrete life plans and motives. 
 At one level, this account targets various self-declared realist theo-
ries of democracy that dismiss the possibility of any substantive con-
ception of popular will-formation. Such theories are rooted in the 
recognition of the evident asymmetries of power in society, on the 
one hand, and the existence of social complexity, which makes dis-
cursive will-formation and normative direction by self-conscious, 
acting individuals unrealistic, on the other. Habermas wants to chal-
lenge such “realism” while acknowledging the significance of issues 
it raises. (We more fully examine realist theories of democracy in the 
next chapter.) 
 Thus, at another level, Habermas is attempting to distinguish his 
view from “classical” Marxist and social democratic conceptions of 
the state, as well as from the neoliberal revival of classical liberal 
accounts of the relation of the state to (free market) society, a revival 
that shares ground with the realist position. The cornerstone of his 
argument here is his account of the legal paradigms he identifies 
with alternative conceptions of democracy: formal liberal, material 
welfare state, proceduralist. This argument too exhibits a Hegelian 
structure: the relation Hegel drew between abstract right, moral-
ity, and ethical life is here recast in terms of the relations among 
these three paradigms, with the proceduralist paradigm performing 
the role of ethical life. It does so because it embodies the claims of 
communicative freedom in the same way that ethical life embod-
ied those of objective spirit. Of course, communicative freedom is 
not the equivalent of objective spirit, nor can it be. Spirit takes on 
its distinctive characteristics only within the framework of a phi-
losophy of consciousness whereby as a totalizing power it “makes” 
society. No longer tenable, the philosophy of consciousness needs 
to give way to an account of intersubjectivity  qua communication 
and communicative rationality: the procedural legal paradigm is 
the “spirit” of a plural universe in which the mutual recognition of 
subjects guaranteed by Hegel only at the level of the fully realized 
universal reason of ethical life now takes the form of legal guaran-
tees of private and public autonomy as a system of rights among 
equal legal consociates who must order their relations under the 
framework of this-worldly positive law. The “spirit” of procedural-
ist law informs and rationalizes the institutions of political opinion 
and will-formation in light of the securing of a functional separation 
of powers “which, at a different level of abstraction, governs the 
availability of various sorts of reasons and how these are dealt with. 
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This logic requires the institutionalization of various discourses and 
corresponding forms of communication that,  regardless in which local 
context , open up possibilities of access to the corresponding sorts of 
reasons.”  45  
 Hence “the social substratum for the realization of the system of 
rights consists neither in spontaneous market forces [i.e., formal liberal 
law  qua abstract right] nor in the deliberative measures of the welfare 
state [i.e., material welfare state law  qua morality] but in the currents 
of communication and public opinion, emerging from civil society 
and the public sphere, that are converted into communicative power 
through democratic procedures [i.e., proceduralist law  qua ethical life, 
here understood as establishing the identity of the modern democratic 
constitutional state in terms of which there is a necessary inner con-
nection between private and public autonomy, justice and popular 
sovereignty].”  46  
 Habermas’s conception of the interpenetration of private and pub-
lic freedom provides a starting point for a critical theory of democracy, 
one that, as noted in chapter 1, has considerable similarities to the 
developmental democratic theory of C.B. Macpherson. This relation 
again entails going beyond the Kantian notion of critique as the illus-
tration of the limits of knowledge to a conception that links concrete 
forms of life that are historical and social in nature to the pathologies 
of late-modern forms of capitalist globalization – that is, towards the 
key concerns of Frankfurt School critical theory. As Macpherson and 
others have pointed out – and, to a considerable extent, as Habermas 
accepts – the liberal idea of basic rights is both atomistic and easily 
transformed into possessive individualism. It fails to account for the 
impediments to public freedom generated by an exclusive reliance on 
the market model. This model significantly restricts the public real-
ization of freedom because it generates deep inequalities of power 
and money. Unequal power leads to unequal public freedom – a key 
insight that informed Macpherson’s conception of the net transfer of 
powers. The achievement of equal private rights requires equal public 
freedoms and social rights. Habermas argues, however, that public 
freedom requires not just the interventions of the social welfare state, 
which can in isolation lead to welfare paternalism, but also appropri-
ate and supportive cultural conditions. Such conditions must incor-
porate a radical egalitarianism. While Habermas has not fully devel-
oped this idea, particularly in his more recent work on human rights, 
it points to the need for an extensive network of public and private 
spaces that could in turn enable a much more robust participatory 
democratic politics. 
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 Radical Democracy and Democratic Autonomy 
 Habermas’s theory, in other words, points in the direction of a radi-
cal democracy that requires a wide variety of well-developed public 
spheres within civil society that can sustain a democratic autonomy. 
So understood, autonomy is a complex process that interweaves 
self-interpretation, self-development, and self-determination with 
a robust freedom of communication in an intersubjective context. A 
network of public spheres would provide more than simply a means 
of organizing private interests to influence state power. Such spheres 
would also facilitate active participation whereby citizens could 
form themselves through their involvements in the world. According 
to Habermas, this would be possible only in a radically egalitarian 
society. 
 Habermas’s conception of a radical egalitarian society could thus 
suggest important elements of a critical theory of democracy. Unfor-
tunately, as noted at the beginning of this chapter, in his more recent 
writings on global cosmopolitanism, neoliberal globalization, and the 
contemporary crisis of the European Union, he does not adequately 
develop these elements in his own work.  47  But a more developed 
version of Habermas’s insights could provide a powerful critique of 
the barriers that limit the emergence of egalitarian global justice. The 
unregulated expansion of global capital has led to increased exploita-
tion and the passing on of social risks to subaltern and even middle 
classes. Capitalist globalization increases the vulnerability of life plans 
and forms of life. It generates ever more massive inequalities and a 
greater concentration of wealth and power. While undermining some 
of the achievements of the social democratic welfare state, it creates new 
forms of socio-cultural colonization that restrict the cultural freedom 
and integrity of exploited groups. 
 This is another way of making the point we highlighted in the intro-
duction to this chapter: that critical theory needs to re-engage with 
critical political economy if it is to be faithful to its own insights. The 
strengths, possibilities, and limitations of Habermas’s position high-
light this need. 
 Nonetheless, Habermas’s attempt to reformulate the grounds of 
moral and political theory in response to the challenges of neoliber-
alism, neoconservatism, and postmodernism raises important themes. 
These include of course his substantive theoretical principles and com-
mitments. But there are also methodological issues important for our 
own analysis in that they suggest a basis for a plausible radical and 
developmental theory of democracy, one that would meet the criticisms 
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usually levelled against developmental theories in general. We would 
identify these issues with an intersubjective perspective that draws on 
Habermas, while hopefully going beyond the limitations of his posi-
tion. The core of our perspective in this respect includes the following 
claims: 
 • Neoliberal and rational choice theories revive a form of methodolog-
ical individualism based on an economic conception of rationality. 
The individual is seen as a strategic actor who aims to maximize hap-
piness, wealth, or some other utility. Here, social order is achieved 
through the coordination of choices in the market. The problem of 
individual consent is reduced to the aggregation of such choices to 
create a social equilibrium. 
 • Republican or communitarian accounts see social order as an ethos 
or tradition that exists prior to individual preferences or freedom – 
that is, it has a quasi-objective quality. While many communitarian 
thinkers share a republican outlook compatible with developmental 
theories, they employ strong notions of context that limit the scope 
of community. 
 • Ironically, many post-structuralist theories recapitulate certain ele-
ments of communitarian thinking. Post-structuralist theorists posit 
social order as a unitary structure that discloses prior to the indi-
vidual conceptions of truth, reality, and selfhood by means of which 
these individuals find themselves defined. Power-interpretative the-
ories argue that order is not a function of reason or tradition; rather, 
it is established through a will to power. Because of its capacity to 
define situations, interpretation is a mechanism for dominating oth-
ers. By contrast, other interpretative theorists hold that social forms 
are a given, or represent a dispensation, but are never completely 
produced by anonymous force. None of these theories captures the 
dialectic between individuals who take on rules and the social order 
into which they are born. 
 This somewhat circuitous route into questions of social order is nec-
essary to illustrate the context in which we can rethink developmen-
tal theories. As self-interpreters who take up, renew, and sometimes 
transform the world, we come to be accountable for the ideas we accept 
as valid. Here self-determination means that we can choose among 
alternatives and formulate our own purposes, and beyond this, con-
struct through these purposes a core of our own identity, our sense 
of place in the world, and our projects within it. In this context, self-
understanding refers not just to an individual who externalizes and 
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realizes an inherent  telos or goal but also to social processes through 
which we form a sense of the world. Thus, developmental theories 
need not posit fixed individual ends or a fixed human nature. Rather, 
in a way that recalls Jean-Paul Sartre, it is a matter of making oneself, 
and in the course of doing so renewing humanity. This should be at the 




 Chapter Six 
 Towards a Critical Theory of Democracy: 
Participatory Democracy and 
Social Freedom 
 In this chapter we consider participatory democracy as a model of 
democracy that is most compatible with the main themes and concerns 
of a critical theory of society and an account of radical democracy that 
could emerge from it. Indeed, the link between participatory democracy 
and critical theory would seem obvious. Critical theory aims to identify 
the barriers within existing social structures to the realization of freedom 
and reason, where this realization would involve those norms, practices, 
and institutions that facilitate the achievement of both individual self-
determination and social solidarity – what Jürgen Habermas calls the 
inner connection between private and public autonomy, and what Axel 
Honneth understands as social freedom. At the heart of a theory of par-
ticipatory democracy is the idea that democracy should not be limited 
to current electoral and representative forms; rather, it must be broad-
ened to incorporate a more direct, active, and extensive engagement 
by citizens as they collectively determine their social relations. This in 
turn requires that the range of issues and the forums within which those 
issues emerge be expanded so that any and all – or at least all possible – 
areas of social life within which power is exercised and where prospects 
for the fullest use and expression of human capacities are at stake are 
subjected, at least in principle, to collective will-formation. 
 So understood, participatory democracy occupies common ground 
with deliberative democracy; indeed, some theorists now consider the 
two equivalent.  1  However, it is important to specify which approach to 
deliberation is most compatible with the commitments of a critical and 
radical participatory theory. As we have already indicated, notions of 
deliberative democracy run the gamut from weak versions to strong 
ones. Weak versions cast deliberation as a decision-making procedure 
to be employed primarily, if not exclusively, in formal political settings. 
So conceived, a deliberative procedure is designed to ensure free and 
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equal access to sites of deliberation, where political decisions would 
ideally result from the fullest and freest exchange of good reasons on 
the part of participants. Where deliberative democracy is understood in 
this way, it differs significantly from participatory approaches. Partici-
patory theorists tend to be concerned not just with democratic decisions 
but also with the ongoing arrangements that facilitate democratic social 
and political values and practices. In other words, they see the role of 
participation in democratic institutions not simply as a way of making 
decisions, but as a way of life. 
 A participatory democracy, then, looks to democratic organization as 
a mode of development, a vehicle for becoming who we are. Taken in a 
narrow sense, deliberative democracy need not imply anything specific 
about participation in sectors of society beyond the political arena, and 
it says little about the self-constitution of subjects or the development 
of individuals. 
 The situation appears different, however, when we take a stronger 
and broader notion of deliberation. A strong version of deliberative 
democracy is closely linked to a theme we have discussed and empha-
sized in previous chapters: mutual recognition and mutual accountabil-
ity, that is, the nature of the self and the social constitution of partici-
pants. It involves the reflexive capacity of participants to understand 
and critically assess social arrangements and plans of life. Deliberation 
is here understood more broadly. It is seen not just as a decision-making 
process, but as an element in the formation of the reflexive capacity for 
intersubjective relations. 
 The connection between a strong version of deliberative democracy 
and participatory democracy is considerably tighter. As we see it, par-
ticipatory democracy is linked to the extension of the capacities for 
communicative reason and communicative freedom throughout a wide 
range of social relations. Hence the developmental account we have ear-
lier discussed, which has been formulated largely in Aristotelian terms, 
must be supplemented by a more Hegelian approach that stresses the 
modern conditions of subjectivity realized through intersubjective ties. 
We become who we are through our relations with others. But these 
relations are themselves constituted through a rationality that is elabo-
rated in the giving and taking of reasons. An emphasis on forms of 
participation that facilitate the development of communicative freedom 
seems compatible with a strong notion of deliberation. The extension of 
participation to all important dimensions of social life entails the insti-
tutionalization of discourses along those same dimensions. 
 With this understanding of deliberative democracy as a backdrop, in 
what follows we examine the core elements of participatory democracy 
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as developed by Carole Pateman, C.B. Macpherson, and Carol Gould, 
three key thinkers long identified with participatory democratic theory. 
These thinkers share significant concerns – notably a critique of liberal 
individualism – and at times they cite each other’s work. At the same 
time, each provides a distinctive focal point for a critical appraisal of 
existing liberal democratic forms that serves as a basis for their alterna-
tive conceptions of democracy: Pateman, with a critique of the social 
contract as a basis for liberal democracy; Macpherson, with an account 
of the contradictions of capitalism and the need for individuals to move 
beyond their self-consciousness as limitless consumers and appropria-
tors if a participatory democracy is to be at all possible; and Gould, with 
a distinctive social ontology and an intersubjective theory of human 
rights. Throughout, we attempt to indicate that although somewhat 
marginal to recent theoretical work, participatory democratic theory, as 
spelled out by Pateman, Macpherson, and Gould, offers a unique per-
spective that deserves a more significant place in current discussions. 
 We then follow up and further elaborate a theme we discussed in chap-
ter 4 by seeking to demonstrate that from the point of view of critical 
theory, a key component of participatory democracy as a form of radical 
democracy – and a common if implicit element in the work of the three 
thinkers treated here – is the idea of social freedom. We believe that social 
freedom could represent an important dimension of a reinvigorated par-
ticipatory democratic theory – one that is adequate to the demands of 
democracy in the current era – because it is uniquely equipped to address 
the challenges of neoliberalism and the constrained understanding of 
democracy associated with it. To this end we discuss and appraise the 
recent work of Axel Honneth, who as we indicated earlier has devoted 
considerable effort to highlighting the key elements and critical signifi-
cance of social freedom for contemporary social and political thought. 
 To be clear, although we offer a detailed treatment of the ideas of 
Pateman, Macpherson, and Gould, our aim in this chapter is not to 
undertake a complete survey or analysis of participatory democratic 
theories or theorists  per se . Rather, we wish to highlight what we see as 
important and suggestive elements of such theories that illuminate key 
concerns central to a critical theory of democracy. 
 Participatory Democracy and the Critique 
of Democratic “Realism” 
 Wherever and however it is defined and carried out, for theorists of 
participatory democracy, participation is a central element of individ-
ual and social identity; indeed, it plays a powerfully formative role in 
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the establishment and flourishing of this identity. In short, participatory 
democracy and developmental democracy are intimately linked. Given 
this connection, participatory democratic theory poses a key issue 
that we have raised throughout this study: how classic developmen-
tal themes defined in terms of the flourishing and exercise of human 
capacities can be related to communicative reason and action. 
 In turn, the idea that participatory and developmental democracy 
are, if not identical, tightly intertwined suggests that when so viewed, 
the range and scope of democracy, its nature and extent, raises at the 
same time the question of politics itself,  its nature and extent. That is, 
under modern conditions and especially in the context of the emergence 
and development of capitalism, democracy defines the scope of collec-
tive will-formation and decision-making in both state and society. In 
this light, John Dryzek has usefully identified three criteria for defining 
democracy and its extent, and thus the range of politics:  franchise (“the 
number of participants in any political setting”),  scope (“the domains of 
life under democratic control”), and  authenticity (“the degree to which 
democratic control is substantive rather than symbolic, informed rather 
than ignorant, and competently engaged”).  2  
 In a similar vein, Jeffrey Hilmer distinguishes between  modes and  sec-
tors of political participation. A sector has to do with the physical location 
of participation, while a mode represents the form or forms of political 
action that take place in various sectors. Thus, a sector “includes social, 
civil, and economic realms: the household, classroom, neighbourhood, 
associations, or … the workplace; and also governmental realms: local 
and regional seats of political power and bureaucratic administration.” 
By contrast, a mode “might include deliberation, cooperative owner-
ship and management, collective decision-making, administration, and 
so on.”  3  Theorists of participatory democracy may emphasize one or the 
other of these dimensions of democratization, but all of them address 
each one, be it explicitly or implicitly. 
 From yet another perspective, Frank Cunningham has explored the 
meaning of democracy through an analysis of different “degrees” of 
democracy in different social settings. Cunningham draws upon the 
ideas of John Dewey, who viewed democracy as more than a narrowly 
political phenomenon identified almost exclusively with voting and 
elections. Dewey also conceived it as a broadly social idea in terms of 
which people possess the capacity to regulate the activities of overlap-
ping social groups to which they belong. Democracy, for him, involved 
determining, shaping, and conducting the affairs of multiple “publics,” 
with each “public,” or site of collective activity, posing distinctive chal-
lenges and prospects for participatory engagement. Thus, “rather than 
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regarding democracy as a quality that a social site either has or lacks, 
one should focus on ‘publics’ to ask how democratic (or undemocratic) 
they are, how democratic they might (or ought) to be, and how democ-
racy within them can be enhanced.”  4  
 Cunningham clearly includes within the scope of his analysis not 
only representative and formal political bodies but also other social 
and economic institutions; contemporary questions of identity along 
the lines of class, race, and gender would likely fit here as well. In this 
light he expresses sympathy for the position of Dewey and Macpherson 
“that a democratically functioning group is to be valued especially for 
liberating development of the potentialities of all the individuals in it,” 
and he also notes favourably “the view of each theorist that egalitarian, 
and in Macpherson’s case socialistic, policies are required for approxi-
mating this goal.”  5  
 Dryzek, Hilmer, and Cunningham suggest the tight link between 
individual autonomy and social solidarity, as well as the need to take 
on board not simply issues of political philosophy but also questions of 
political economy and social analysis. Each of their approaches is essen-
tial for a robust theory of democracy faithful to its deepest commit-
ments to equal citizenship and social equality. Although not specifically 
laying out a model of participatory or developmental democracy  per se , 
their accounts identify key elements that such a model would incorpo-
rate. And inasmuch as the boundaries of democracy and the range of 
politics are understood as dynamic and historical, there is yet another 
link to a critical theory of society, for which the idea of the historical and 
dynamic character of social phenomena is indispensable. 
 Interest in participatory democracy as an alternative to electoral, rep-
resentative democracy began to take shape in the 1960s in the face of 
increasing dissatisfaction with existing structures of power and author-
ity. These were often viewed as unresponsive or irrelevant at best and as 
corrupt at worst – or even as deliberately designed to thwart the emer-
gence and expression of a popular will for social and political change. 
(This was perhaps most succinctly expressed by the pithy and ironic 
new left barb that if elections could actually change things, they would 
be made illegal.) The conditions of its emergence highlight those his-
torical and dynamic features of participatory democracy that link it to 
critical theory. 
 But there is another equally significant connection between participa-
tory democracy and critical theory that is particularly important for our 
purposes. Although it is insufficiently noted or appreciated, at least in 
contemporary discussions of democracy, the emergence of the theory of 
participatory democracy coincided as well with the challenge mounted 
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by progressive and radical political and social scientists to the domi-
nant paradigm of democracy within academic and intellectual circles, 
namely, the pluralist–elitist–equilibrium model. This model, which 
was both an empirical and normative one, viewed democracy as, in the 
words of Macpherson, a mechanism for choosing and authorizing gov-
ernments. The democratic process was driven by self-organized politi-
cal elites, or parties, which competed for voter support in elections. Vot-
ers authorized one of the competing parties to govern in their name, 
eventually passing judgment on the performance of this government in 
a subsequent election. Given the realities of society and human nature, 
this was the best that could be expected of a democratic system. To press 
for more extensive popular engagement or participation beyond the 
casting of a ballot, or some degree of involvement in interest or pres-
sure group activity, was to court the threat of political instability, mass 
upheaval that in the extreme could threaten liberal values and indeed 
potentially unleash totalitarian forces. The Cold War setting within 
which this account came to prominence was decisive here as its propo-
nents generally assumed a world-historical struggle between (liberal) 
democracy and (communist) totalitarianism. 
 In the words of Lane Davis, a critic of the elite model and its assump-
tions, there is a significant cost to the “realism” it claims to express. 
Counterpoising to this dominant paradigm a conception of “classical” 
democracy along the lines of the Athenian  polis or the New England 
town hall meeting, he argued that that the pluralist–elitist–equilibrium 
understanding of political democracy 
 sharply reduces the extent and the intensity of necessary individual par-
ticipation in democratic politics. This permits the abandonment of the 
classical notion that general attainment of the ideal of rational, active, and 
informed democratic man is essential to the realization of genuine political 
democracy. Political democracy is now considered to be a complex system 
within which apathy and ignorance as well as activity and informed rea-
son have a part to play. Thus, the reality of irrational mass emotion, self-
interest, group egoism, and the prevalence of oligarchic and hierarchical 
social and economic organizations need no longer be denied in the name 
of democratic values … Popular participation is reduced to the manage-
able task of periodic choices in elections. This kind of participation is, at 
best, a pale and rather pathetic version of the responsible and active par-
ticipation which was the aspiration of classical democracy. It is hard to see 
this sort of thing, intermittent in time and marginal in importance for an 
overwhelming majority of the public, as the central means to educate the 
intellectual, emotional, and moral capacities of the citizen … By limiting 
238 Critical Theory, Democracy, and the Challenge of Neoliberalism
the moral possibilities of political activity, contemporary democrats reflect 
something of earlier Whig suspicions of political power.  6  
 It is worth noting that the issues raised by both the critique and 
its target would not seem out of place in the contemporary world. 
Today’s combatants are various forms of centrist liberalism, on the 
one hand, and so-called populisms of the left and right, on the other. 
And the fear of “unreasoned” mass, potentially destructive opposi-
tion to governments and “elites” that exercised so many academics, 
commentators, and political actors during the Cold War resonates 
with those who have followed in the footsteps of the proponents of 
the elite model and become self-appointed defenders of civilized lib-
eral values. For example, former British prime minister Tony Blair, a 
key architect of the “third way,” argues that “the modus operandi of 
[right-wing] populism [which, according to Blair, left-wing populism 
has to some extent unfortunately emulated] is not to reason but to 
roar.  It has at times an anarchic feel … The question is, will this be a 
temporary phase, perhaps linked to the aftermath of the 2008 financial 
crisis and Sept. 11,  and will politics revert to normal , or has a new politi-
cal age begun?”  7  The history of suspicion that democracy is always 
potentially liable to descend into mob rule and thereby threaten or 
even destroy civilized values and institutions is a lengthy and by no 
means unfinished one.  8  
 Our point here, however, is that the earlier critique of elite democratic 
theory, and of its architects and defenders, embodied what might be 
called the driving force of the critical theory of society: that (scholarly) 
method and (social) object are connected; that forms of thought and 
social life, and conceptual and social structures, are intimately linked. 
Social analysis not only describes (or purports to describe) social and 
political phenomena but also helps constitute them. 
 Lane Davis’s critique of behaviouralism and the elite theory of democ-
racy that we summarized above offered a defence of robust popular 
participation against the limited conception of participation associated 
with elite theory. In effect, an alternative model of participatory democ-
racy emerged immanently from the critique of the dominant theory. It is 
an articulation of those values and practices to which democracy points 
but which it rarely achieves. 
 To be sure, the critics of behaviouralism in politics were not usually 
critical theorists.  9  Meta-metaphysical and self-reflexive thinking – that 
is, developing concepts while at the same time attempting to account 
for them in relation to rationally defensible insights about historically 
emerging human social challenges and possibilities – did not explicitly 
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shape their criticisms and reflections. Critics of “apolitical politics” 
tended to juxtapose the ideal of “classical” democracy to the (false) 
“reality” of pluralism. This largely abstract counterpose of the “ought” 
to the “is” made the critics easy targets for conventional political sci-
entists, who could defend the “realism” of their own claims and easily 
dismiss their critics as utopian and “unrealistic” proponents of a classi-
cal democracy that never was, nor could be.  10  
 But the critics were on to something that they could not or did not 
explicitly articulate. The Hegelian–Marxian impulses of the Frankfurt 
School and critical theory supported the claim that the real and ideal 
interpenetrated in a historically evolving, dialectically accessible syn-
thesis, whereby a decisive social concept or category – in this case “clas-
sical” democracy – represented a rational universal; that is, it was not 
merely an abstract notion but rather an articulation of real and ideal 
possibilities. Such possibilities were tied to deeply entrenched human 
aspirations, whose partial realization over time demonstrated genuine 
potential for human fulfilment and flourishing through the medium 
of ever-evolving wants, needs, and purposes. Wants, needs, and pur-
poses have varied in relation to the ongoing development of human 
productive powers, both material and intellectual. These powers are 
manifested not simply in the command associated individuals come 
to exercise over external nature, but also in the expansion of moral and 
ethical insight – that is, mastery over human nature. From Horkheimer, 
Adorno, and Marcuse to Habermas to Honneth, this understanding of 
the human condition has endured in one form or another as a central 
dimension of critical theory. 
 Thus, participatory democracy should not be viewed simply as an 
abstract model. Rather, it is itself a form of critique, whereby a way is 
indicated or suggested for realizing human purposes in the sphere of 
political life such that the fate of democracy and the fate of politics are 
inextricably linked. 
 But as with all critique in the tradition of the Frankfurt School and 
critical theory, the connection between thought and world, or thought 
(critique) and historical actuality, is not fixed. (The failure to grasp or 
explore this connection was another limit of the critical response in the 
1960s to behaviouralism and pluralist–elitist–equilibrium democracy.) 
Participatory democracy emerged in the 1960s and 1970s as essentially 
a global project, both geographically and socially/institutionally. It was 
tied to a sweeping critique of capitalist (and “really existing,” Soviet-
style socialist) political-economic forms. The prospect that capitalism 
could be radically transformed, and socialism made more humane, 
seemed both realistic and imminent. 
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 Subsequent developments dashed such hopes and expectations. A 
scaled-down conception of historical possibilities for change generated 
a scaled-down approach to alternatives. Participatory democracy has 
not been immune to this development. Its recent revival, at least as a 
standard of critique, is instructive.  11  As Antonio Florida has noted in a 
very interesting and extensive account of the “genealogy” of participa-
tory democracy, this new theoretical turn has tended to emphasize the 
local and communitarian, focusing on initiatives such as the popular 
participatory budgeting process in the Brazilian city of Porto Alegre.  12  
Such local experiments clearly have value. But are they and the theoreti-
cal reflections associated with them sufficient? 
 We think it is necessary to reimagine participatory democracy in the 
more comprehensive sense associated with its original aspirations in 
the 1960s, while at the same time acknowledging that conditions and 
circumstances have indeed altered. In this light we want to argue that 
a theory of participatory democracy could be reconsidered on basis of 
the idea of social freedom: the notion that our freedom and thus our 
identities are not secured independently of our social bonds, but rather 
in and through them. 
 Participatory Democracy, the New Left, and After: 
Carole Pateman, the Sublimation of Politics, 
and the Quest for a Radical Alternative 
 As is well known, a key expression of the core ideas of what came to be 
called the new left in the United States was the Port Huron Statement 
produced by Students for a Democratic Society in 1962. Challenging the 
stifling orthodoxy of the dominant Cold War liberalism, the document 
promoted a new, more vigorously democratic politics in the service of 
fundamental social, political, and economic change. This politics would 
express and reflect the reality that humans “have unrealized potential 
for self-cultivation, self-direction, self-understanding, and creativity” – 
in other words, what we have throughout this study identified with 
developmental and communicative individualism and thus develop-
mental and communicative democracy. Building upon a non-egoistic 
individualism – “the object is not to have one’s way so much as it is to 
have a way that is one’s own” – the statement proposed an alternative 
that “would replace power rooted in possession, privilege, or circum-
stance by power and uniqueness rooted in love, reflectiveness, reason, 
and creativity; … the establishment of a democracy of individual par-
ticipation, governed by two central aims: that the individual share in 
those social decisions determining the quality and direction of his life; 
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that society be organized to encourage independence of men and pro-
vide the media for their common participation.”  13  
 This alternative, then, was to be a participatory democracy in which 
all major social institutions – political, economic, cultural, educational, 
rehabilitative, and others – “should be generally organized with the 
well-being and dignity of man as the essential measure of success.” Par-
ticipatory democracy would be rooted in several core principles, chief 
among these the idea that individuals should have the opportunity to 
participate in public groups that could collectively create acceptable 
social relations through arrangements under which it would be pos-
sible for these individuals to emerge out of isolation and into some rela-
tion of community. Echoing the ideas of C. Wright Mills, which exerted 
a powerful influence on Tom Hayden, a key author of the Port Huron 
Statement, the document called for the creation of political channels 
that “should be commonly available to relate men to knowledge and 
to power so that private problems – from bad recreation facilities to 
personal alienation – are formulated as general issues.” And because 
the economy was of such critical social importance, “its major resources 
and means of production should be open to democratic participation 
and subject to democratic regulation.”  14  
 Clearly, powerful and ambitious words like these call for more exact 
specification if they are to be fully effective as elements of critique. In 
this light, David Held has offered a lucid and helpful further clarifi-
cation of the core justification for participatory democracy. Drawing 
primarily upon the ideas of Carole Pateman and C.B. Macpherson, he 
states that an “equal right to liberty and self-development can only be 
achieved in a ‘participatory society,’ a society which fosters a sense of 
political efficacy, nurtures a concern for collective problems and con-
tributes to the formation of a knowledgeable citizenry capable of tak-
ing a sustained interest in the governing process.” Among other things, 
a truly and fully participatory system requires the direct participation 
of individual citizens in the key institutions of the society; democra-
tization of the internal organization of political parties; the provision 
of participatory opportunities directly within state structures, includ-
ing legislative and administrative bodies; and an ongoing openness to 
experimentation in expanding participatory opportunities in response 
to both citizen experience and shifting and evolving social challenges.  15  
 If the Port Huron Statement represented an early clarion call for a 
radical transformation of existing liberal democracies to make them 
more robust and egalitarian, it is the ideas of Carole Pateman and C.B. 
Macpherson that are most often associated with the theory of partici-
patory democracy, to be sure supplemented and expanded upon by 
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thinkers such as Carol Gould. At the core of the work of Pateman and 
Macpherson are questions of freedom and equality. In contrast to the 
restriction in the neoliberal understanding of freedom to negative (eco-
nomic) freedom, and of democracy to a state that at best aggregates 
individual preferences, Pateman and Macpherson emphasize positive 
or developmental freedom and a broader conception of democracy and 
politics that encompasses issues of state  and society. Democracy thus 
has to confront questions of power that are not limited to formal politi-
cal or state power. 
 Carole Pateman has been perhaps the most widely cited analyst and 
proponent of participatory democracy. Partly this reflects the fact that 
she has thoroughly explored issues of democratic participation for more 
than four decades – from her now classic study from 1970,  Participa-
tion and Democratic Theory , to her presidential address to the American 
Political Science Association in 2011.  16  
 But even more significantly, her work on participatory democracy has 
both drawn upon and informed her sweepingly broad critique of lib-
eral and existing liberal democratic theory from multiple perspectives – 
from her trenchant analysis of patriarchal domination and the rendering 
invisible of, and exclusion and subjugation of, women via the “sexual 
contract” to her signal treatment of the contradictions and elisions of 
norms and practices of political obligation.  17  
 In other words, in her approach to participatory democracy she 
makes clear that a meaningful and compelling account of democracy 
and its possibilities necessarily raises the question of the extent and 
nature of politics itself. While obviously critical of the sexist assump-
tions that have always haunted mainstream political theory, including 
most versions of democratic theory, she holds what amounts to an Aris-
totelian understanding of politics as central to human development and 
not simply as a concession to and check upon human weakness and 
potential for evil. Dominant liberal and liberal democratic theories are 
caught in a contradiction between a stress on the importance of politi-
cal authority to reconcile the competing goals and aspirations of puta-
tively free, self-interested individuals, and at the same time the fear of 
any political expressions that engage the whole community in man-
aging and regulating its common affairs, wherever those affairs might 
emerge. This contradiction is clearly reflected in the fact that while the 
liberal state and its theorist-proponents emphasize political  obligation 
with its assumption of free, voluntary commitment to political order as 
the centrepiece of the social contract that binds free individuals together 
in a political body, in reality they are defending political  obedience . Pate-
man writes: 
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 If “obligation” is taken seriously, and examined critically, it becomes clear 
that the practice of political obligation is not, and more importantly, can-
not be, given expression in the liberal democratic state. The dilemma for 
liberal theory is that it cannot afford to abandon hypothetical voluntarism, 
and talk merely of political obedience, or the liberal state is deprived of a 
major ideological support. But nor can it really afford to retain voluntarism 
because the concept of “obligation” is a standing reminder that the liberal 
state is being presented as something other than it really is, and that there 
is a democratic alternative to liberal theory and practice.  18  
 The idea that current liberal democratic theory and practice is 
contradictory – that is, the claim that its core assumptions and commit-
ments point beyond their current embodiment in political institutions 
and values – gives Pateman’s analysis a dynamic dimension that is also 
the hallmark of critical theory. And the suggestion “that there is a demo-
cratic alternative to liberal theory and practice” likewise indicates that 
democracy as an alternative to liberalism in its current form emerges 
immanently from liberalism’s contradictions: it manifests and tran-
scends the tensions that define the historical meaning of liberal values. 
 But in our view an even more significant foundation for Pateman’s 
reflections is her argument that the limits of liberalism – limits that 
point beyond it to (radical) democracy – represent what she calls the 
reification of politics in the modern age. This argument merits attention 
because of its potential for opening up issues central to participatory 
democracy as a form of critical and radical democratic theory. 
 Although not every model or theory of participatory democracy 
incorporates direct democracy – that is, a system within which citizens 
govern themselves or render political and social decisions in an unme-
diated way without others deciding on their behalf – the question of 
direct versus representative democracy has always informed reflections 
about what kinds of participatory initiatives and institutions are both 
desirable and possible. Since representation in whatever form has at 
its core a paradox in that it makes present something that is not liter-
ally present,  19  it has always raised the question of whether representa-
tive government and democracy as popular rule or sovereignty are or 
can be compatible. Especially in the United States, such doubts have 
only been reinforced by contemporary circumstances, which encom-
pass among other things the enhanced and increasing role of money in 
liberal democratic political systems and, associated with this, evident 
limitations of the electoral franchise: “hollowed out” political parties, 
diminished voter turnouts, political gerrymandering, and legislated 
voter restrictions that are supposedly designed to guard against voter 
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“fraud” but that in reality limit the political rights of minorities and the 
disadvantaged. The decay of representative bodies has also contributed 
to an increasingly authoritarian involution in many political systems as 
executive power has been consolidated and increasingly insulated from 
legislative and popular control and direction.  20  
 The limitations of representative liberal democracy provide a central 
point of departure for Carole Pateman’s conception of participatory 
democracy and what must be done to establish and maintain it. In an 
article from 1975 that remains important and valuable because of what 
it conveys about her key assumptions, then and now, Pateman plays 
off Sheldon Wolin’s well-known claim that at least since John Locke, 
what had been the autonomous realm of politics and the authentically 
political has under modern conditions been sublimated. By this claim, 
Wolin meant that those unique activities that historically addressed the 
common good or interest of the community have been displaced and 
consequently distorted. As Wolin put it, in the age of large public/gov-
ernmental and private/corporate bureaucracies, 
 [n]o longer do legislatures, prime ministers, courts, and political parties 
occupy the spotlight of attention in the way they did fifty years ago. 
Now it is the “politics” of corporations, trade unions, and even uni-
versities that is being scrutinized. This preoccupation suggests that the 
political has been transferred to another plane, to one that was formerly 
designated “private” but which now is believed to have overshadowed 
the old political system. We seem to be in an era where the individual 
increasingly seeks his political satisfactions outside the traditional area 
of politics … The problem is not one of apathy, or the decline of the 
political, but the absorption of the political into non-political institutions 
and activities.  21  
 The result has been a kind of anti-political politics of private interests 
and the consequent diminution of citizenship and civic life. 
 It should be noted that Wolin offered this view in the original (1960) 
version of  Politics and Vision , his comprehensive survey of the history 
of Western political thought. His thinking changed dramatically over 
the ensuing decades. Although he left the original text intact, including 
his discussion of the sublimation of the political, the lengthy addition 
he made to the original work in the expanded edition of  Politics and 
Vision (2004) reflected a sweeping change in his outlook. He presented 
this change as “the journey from liberalism to democracy” and as an 
increasing concern about what he called “the emerging divide between 
liberalism and democracy.” He argued that liberal thinkers – Wolin 
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highlights Karl Popper and John Rawls – have accorded little impor-
tance “to democratic ideals of shared power and an active citizenry” 
and have failed “to grasp the political significance of capitalism, not 
merely as a system of power but as one with totalizing tendencies.”  22  
In revising his position Wolin essentially moved to one much closer 
to that of Pateman, who argued that his notion of sublimation did 
indeed reflect a liberal understanding of the genuinely political in that 
it assumed the unavoidability of the contemporary state and existing 
forms of representation. 
 Nonetheless, there is still value in treating Pateman’s analysis and 
her response to Wolin’s position at the time. For one thing, it tells us 
something important about Pateman’s argument; it also raises general 
questions about participatory democracy. But beyond this, while this is 
not our focus here, the idea of sublimation might still illuminate certain 
features of contemporary political life and debate, although perhaps 
not quite as Wolin originally envisaged. The idea that the political has 
been absorbed by private interests has figured in criticisms of certain 
progressive political initiatives and is evident in a wide range of con-
servative views, from the critique of “rent seeking” by rational or public 
choice economists and political scientists to the opposition to “politi-
cal correctness” and the allegedly improper use of the state’s coercive 
authority in ways that threaten personal and political freedom. One 
element of such criticisms is the idea that, for example, the politics of 
gender and anti-racism reflect the psychic disorder of rights proponents 
rather than the “real” interests of the community: what should be pri-
vate or personal is now illegitimately rendered political. 
 In any case, Pateman challenges Wolin’s position as an explanation 
for the contradictions and problems of liberal democracy. Drawing pri-
marily from Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Karl Marx, and Hannah Arendt, 
she argues that reification, not sublimation, better explains the status of 
the political in liberal democratic theory and practice. Both Wolin and 
Pateman see the origin of the decline of or suppression of the political 
in Locke’s account of the state of nature and the transition via a social 
contract to civil or political society. They agree that Locke’s strategy – 
whereby individuals cede the right to enforce the law of nature or free-
dom to the political community and its standing rules as determined 
by representatives who serve as an umpire for the whole community – 
works to avoid the demands of a radical democracy. For Wolin, Locke’s 
approach was grounded in his account of the state of nature as already 
political because it was essentially social. Autonomous politics had so 
to speak “disappeared” into or been sublimated into social relations 
rooted in private property and individual interests such that political 
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power as collective power was dispersed and equally shared among 
these individuals. 
 By contrast, Pateman takes another tack. She argues rather that Locke 
includes among those rights that individuals enjoy in the state of nature 
“a natural,  political right” whereby “each individual has to perform the 
task that, historically, has been performed by a monarch [in the state of 
nature] or, in civil society, by a representative government, of ‘decid-
ing,’ interpreting and enforcing the rules necessary if social life is to 
be carried out in an ordered and peaceful fashion … The exercise of 
the natural political right requires that each individual judge ‘directly’ 
what is the right and good thing to be done to preserve communal life, 
and then act on that judgement.”  23  
 This situation establishes the basis for the reification of the politi-
cal. For Pateman, reification involves the emergence of the liberal (later, 
liberal democratic) state as an institution that supposedly embodies 
and acts on behalf of the interests of the community but that in fact 
stands as an external force over and against society, in which individu-
als conduct their lives within their everyday material relations with one 
another. As Pateman reads Locke, he identifies the political right as of 
a piece with other natural rights that individuals enter civil society to 
protect – except that in contrast to those other rights, individuals must 
give up their political right as the price for protection. Specifically, this 
political right is yielded up to their chosen representatives, who form a 
body that by majority vote enacts laws that secure individuals in their 
lives, liberties, and estates. Representatives do so by standing in for the 
associated individuals – but on this reading of Locke it is not clear how 
they could do so since those individuals no longer have political selves, 
if indeed they ever did have them. For having “given up” her politi-
cal right, the individual could plausibly be seen as never really having 
enjoyed it in the first place. Another way to view this situation is that 
it involves a kind of splitting off of the political side of the individual’s 
make-up, “the natural political aspect of their selves”:  24  the individual 
retains the right of direct judgment and action in all other spheres of life 
outside the political. 
 Hence the reification of the political in the received account of lib-
eral democracy, to which Locke made such a crucial contribution: the 
political is not sublimated so that it essentially disappears into social 
relations; on the contrary, it is accorded an elevated status above society. 
Ironically, if the political is “hidden” or displaced, this happens in plain 
sight. (Pateman indeed argues that despite Wolin’s criticisms of liberal-
ism for destroying the autonomy of the political, the establishment of a 
reified public realm suggests precisely that autonomous domain whose 
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resurrection he so vigorously promoted.)  25  The restrictions of the politi-
cal to formal institutions of government and the state masks the reality 
of power in other supposedly private and non-political spheres. This 
of course is at the heart of Marx’s view, to which Pateman specifically 
refers, that in bourgeois society individuals live heavenly communal 
lives as public citizens, but profane lives as private individuals who 
use others as means to achieve their self-interested ends. For these indi-
viduals their political selves are little more than the equivalent of rather 
threadbare political lion skins.  26  
 Thus, for Pateman, liberal democratic theory – and society – and the 
reified conception of politics and the political both enshrine depend 
upon and sustain two fictions: the fiction of citizenship and the fiction 
of a social contract. Illuminating these fictions and their consequences 
has over the decades continued to play a central role in Pateman’s work 
on existing liberal democratic exclusions and the need for a genuinely 
participatory democracy. The two fictions in turn rest on the paradox 
that the natural individual political right always has to be given up and 
thus becomes a fiction as well, “posited only to justify a certain kind of 
political authority in a specific manner. The individual’s political right 
has no  actual expression either in the … state of nature or in civil society. 
It is a conceptual hypothesis that serves to justify the exercise of politi-
cal authority by one man, or a few representatives, given the liberal 
starting point of the ‘natural’ freedom and equality of all individuals.”  27  
 If the natural political right, which has as its object the preservation 
of all and not just oneself, cannot be carried by individuals into civil 
society, then it is unclear what citizenship, which also must involve the 
preservation of all, can amount to. This in effect is the basis of Pateman’s 
claim that citizenship is in liberal democracy a fiction. And since the 
social contract was supposedly intended to establish citizenship as the 
right to participate as a legal and, with the achievement of (putatively) 
universal suffrage, political equal in the constitution of a civic order 
with the power and authority to preserve and sustain the whole, it, too, 
must be seen as fictional. Thus, the fiction of the social contract is not 
simply historical. More importantly, it is a fiction that sustains another 
one: that of citizenship itself. According to Pateman, the establishment 
of universal suffrage, whereby the liberal state devoted to the protec-
tion of individual interests – which in the state of nature had become 
increasingly contentious with the growth of private property along with 
the introduction of money – became democratic, did not fundamentally 
change the fictional nature of citizenship. Citizenship in liberal democ-
racy represented the achievement of formal political equality overlay-
ing substantive socio-economic inequality – the heavenly domain that 
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was the target of Marx’s critique. And although Pateman does not quite 
put it this way, in the measure that democracy threatens to bring the 
issue of social inequality into the political arena in a way that could 
lead potentially to the transformation of social relations, the state, as we 
earlier noted, increasingly tends to insulate its operations from popular 
pressures – yet another way in which citizenship becomes “fictional.”  28  
 Fictional citizenship, even where there is universal suffrage, in turn 
points towards the paradox we noted at the outset of our discussion of 
Pateman: the paradox of representation: 
 Citizens vote for representatives, but they do so precisely so that repre-
sentatives can make political decisions on their behalf; once again the right 
of political judgment is being given up. The representatives now become, 
as it were, the embodiment of the political selves, the citizen selves, of 
the members of the community. These selves can then be “viewed” by 
those members in a separate, autonomous sphere, the political sphere. The 
task of the representatives is precisely to represent the interests of all the 
citizens, i.e. to represent the political or public interest, not the separate, 
conflicting interests of individuals. This means that representatives, on 
entering the political sphere, put on their own version of the “political lion 
skin.” As Locke stresses, private judgement is now excluded; representa-
tives do not judge privately but politically. They make political decisions 
which are not so much matters of principle as of procedure or technical 
expertise, that of the umpire of conflicting interests in the game of the 
market. But what is the collective, political interest of citizens who are 
bound together by only a formal status? This is difficult, if not impossible, 
to answer.  29  
 Pateman goes on to note that 
 [the] giving up of the fictional right by actual private individuals leaves 
the political sphere with no concrete or actual embodiment in the com-
munity. Individuals have nothing in common to bind them together, so 
what is “common” to society … can only be seen as something over and 
above society, something abstracted from the actual social relationships 
of private individuals … Citizens can only look at such a political sphere 
and not act in it … The political sphere appears as a “thing” – “the state” – 
objectified and external to the members of society.  30  
 Representation and reification are linked at the source of liberal and 
liberal democratic conceptions of politics and the political. Thus, 
“[l]iberal theory … is based on the paradox of a ‘natural’ political right 
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that has no actual expression, and this forms the basis for the justifi-
cation of an allegedly ‘autonomous’ political sphere, reified in Marx’s 
‘heaven’ of the liberal democratic state.” Pateman goes on to note what 
she sees as the key contradiction: “Thus, on the one hand, liberal demo-
cratic theory mystifies the realities of political life. On the other hand, it 
also contains, buried within itself, an important truth about the liberal 
democratic state and contemporary citizenship: namely, the latter is a 
fiction and that the state is in fact external to and out of the control of 
its citizens.”  31  Her account of a “natural political right” that is neither 
natural nor a right suggests, however, an ambiguity in her account that 
we will discuss presently. 
 For Pateman, what is required is an alternative participatory con-
ception of the political, one that involves “moving beyond the liberal 
democratic state to a political community composed of a multiplicity of 
participatory or self-managed units (perhaps to be called councils).”  32  
Here she turns to Hannah Arendt and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. From 
Arendt, Pateman takes up her account of the emergence during modern 
revolutions of popular, self-managing councils that assumed the politi-
cal initiative by inserting themselves through word and deed into the 
affairs going on around them. In the process they established a public 
realm and thereby altered the course of events. According to Arendt, 
establishing such councils under contemporary conditions would 
require that the councils form a federal system as an alternative to the 
existing state. In a federal arrangement, political power “moves neither 
from above nor from below, but is horizontally directed so that the fed-
erated units mutually check and control their powers.”  33  
 From Rousseau, Pateman takes up his famous alternative version of 
the social contract. As is well known, in Rousseau’s view if the political 
order is indeed to be based on a social contract (and it is not altogether 
obvious that it can be, or that he thought it could be), this contract must 
be of a certain sort. It must be one under which (putatively) free indi-
viduals leaving behind the state of nature can somehow simultaneously 
unite with all yet remain as free as before. (The freedom achieved by 
means of this contract would be a form of social freedom, which we dis-
cuss below.) Under Rousseau’s social contract, individuals give them-
selves up or alienate themselves totally to the community and are then 
in turn received as equal, indivisible members of the whole. The whole 
is nothing other than the relations among these equal members. The 
contractual bond is one whereby an individual in effect makes an agree-
ment with himself. He is thereafter doubly committed: “as a member 
of the Sovereign he is bound to the individuals, and as a member of the 
State to the Sovereign.”  34  
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 For Rousseau, although the community and its members are sover-
eign this does not mean that private individuals, as private individuals, 
now legislate, relying on their private judgment as for Locke they had 
done in the state of nature. To give this a contemporary gloss, Rous-
seau is no libertarian anarchist  à la Robert Nozick. While individuals 
take on a new life as citizens – and as members of the sovereign body 
their citizenship is potentially very robust – they are still as they were 
in their “natural” condition: self-interested and competitive. To permit 
particular individuals in their particularity to act politically would be 
to continue the state of nature, its “inconveniences” and potential for 
war of all against all, when the point is to transcend it. (Again, there is 
some doubt whether Rousseau himself believed this transcendence to 
be likely or even plausible.) 
 So there still must be representatives. However, Rousseau famously 
distinguishes between the sovereign and the government (i.e., repre-
sentatives). Government is not sovereign but rather serves as an “inter-
mediate body set up between the subjects and the Sovereign, to secure 
their mutual correspondence, charged with the execution of the laws 
and the maintenance of liberty, both civil and political.”  35  Governments, 
that is, representatives, cannot have or develop private interests at odds 
with the common interest of the community. (To be sure, Rousseau 
doubted private interests could be held at bay for long. The govern-
ment, or the “prince,” would usurp the sovereign and so destroy the 
common good or the general will. Thus,  The Social Contract concludes 
on a pessimistic note, with Rousseau pondering the perhaps inevitable 
need for censorship and a civil religion, that is, an authoritarian state.) 
 Thus from Rousseau’s point of view, representatives “are not the 
bearers of the alienated political right of the citizens, nor are they par-
ties to the contract … These representatives are strictly accountable for 
what they do. It is citizens collectively who alone retain the right to 
make political decisions and who, therefore, are not merely spectators 
of their representatives but the active creators and controllers of their 
own political life.”  36  
 A radical, self-managing democracy formed through a federated net-
work of popular councils does not rule out the presence of represen-
tatives; nor does this presence necessarily contradict the radical ideal. 
Pateman’s view is that representation as such is contradictory only 
from the perspective of the reified liberal understanding of the state: 
“The alternatives, then, become either a – clearly absurd – assembly of 
millions, or a – clearly realistic – giving up of citizens’ political right to 
a few representatives who assemble to make decisions, representatives 
who embody the political interest of the community.”  37  By contrast, 
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“representatives are strictly accountable for what they do” when 
“an enlarged and actual citizenship in a multiplicity of participatory 
units” provides “concrete experience of the complex inter-relationships 
between different social spheres, roles and capacities.”  38  (We will see 
this idea surface again in Axel Honneth’s account of social freedom and 
a democratic way of life.) 
 Even given that representatives are likely to be required in any 
organization, self-managed councils not excluded, the scope of politi-
cal action would in a participatory system be widened dramatically. 
For democracy to be realized it would have to include, beyond tra-
ditional governmental institutions, what are now deemed private 
organizations, especially economic and industrial (and now, presum-
ably, financial), that make collective decisions and allocate resources. 
Indeed, Pateman’s  Participation and Democratic Theory devoted signif-
icant attention to the question of industrial democracy and offered 
empirical support for the proposition that a participatory politics in 
the workplace was both feasible and workable, and that enhanced 
participation facilitated the development of civic capacities and thus 
political efficacy.  39  
 However, according to Pateman, that the  private could potentially be 
political does not mean that the  personal should be – even though she 
recognized and sympathized with the feminist claim that the personal 
was political. Making the personal political and the political personal 
would simply assimilate the two spheres and thus serve only as a mir-
ror opposite to the liberal position. Assimilating the two would replace 
technocratic rationality with personal morality; neither is sufficient for 
a participatory democratic order: 
 The interrelationship of the personal and the political spheres can be rec-
ognized, as can the fact that any relationship can, in certain circumstances, 
have political effects, but this is not the same as arguing that the criteria 
and principles that should order our interactions and decision-making as 
citizens should be exactly the same as those that should underlay our rela-
tionships with friends and lovers … A public or political morality, princi-
ples of political right on which members of a self-managing democracy 
can self-consciously draw to order their political practice, has also to be 
developed along with a participatory conception of the political.  40  
 Both the personal and the political need to be reconceived and trans-
formed if participatory, self-managing democracy is to be possible – not 
in order to assimilate them but rather to preserve a deeper and richer 
meaning for both, since each suffers from the effects of reification. 
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 In “Sublimation and Reification,” as well as  Participation and Demo-
cratic Theory , Pateman outlined key themes that have been central to 
discussions and debates about participatory democracy: the scope and 
purposes of politics and the political; the relation of “private” institu-
tions, notably economic and financial ones, to public institutions and 
bodies and thus the interplay of private and public power; the nature of 
political representation; the character of individual agency and the rela-
tion of political life to identity formation; and the meaning and prac-
tice of freedom. These issues in turn reflect the key commitments and 
assumptions that inform her conception of participatory democracy: 
 The theory of participatory democracy is built round the central asser-
tion that individuals and their institutions cannot be considered in isola-
tion from one another. The existence of representative institutions at [the] 
national level is not sufficient for democracy; for maximum participa-
tion by all the people at that level socialisation, or “social training” for 
democracy must take place in other spheres in order that the necessary 
individual attitudes and psychological qualities can be developed. This 
development takes place through the process of participation itself … 
Therefore, for a democratic polity to exist it is necessary for a participatory 
society to exist, i.e. a society where all political systems have been democ-
ratised and socialisation through participation can take place in all areas.  41  
 Pateman has carried these and related themes, commitments, and 
assumptions forward into subsequent work down to the current time. 
This is evident from her 2011 presidential address to the American 
Political Science Association, in which she revisited the issue of partici-
patory democracy in light of contemporary challenges and possibilities. 
What is of particular interest and value is her attempt to relate par-
ticipatory to deliberative democracy; in doing so, she addresses what 
is arguably the most significant current model, one that proposes an 
alternative to or at least a modification of existing liberal democratic 
institutions. Her treatment of this relationship is key to her appraisal 
of the state of participatory democracy as we find it today: while she 
acknowledges certain recent developments and advances that at least 
potentially could address and inform participatory initiatives, she is by 
and large pessimistic about the current situation. 
 In reconsidering participatory democracy, Pateman lays out its key 
features as she now sees them, and her account here demonstrates sig-
nificant continuity with her arguments from forty years earlier. She con-
tinues to stress that a democratic theory that is both participatory and 
developmental must address the interrelation of individual capacities, 
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skills, and characteristics, on the one hand, and democratized authority 
structures, on the other. In other words, there need to be “opportunities 
for individuals to participate in their everyday lives as well as in the 
wider political system.” Ultimately, as before, the goals are to create a 
participatory society and to reform undemocratic institutions.  42  
 Pateman re-emphasizes these elements because of two recent devel-
opments in the worlds of political theory and political practice. One of 
these we have already indicated: the emergence of deliberative democ-
racy as the dominant form of alternative democratic theory. Because 
deliberative democracy stresses non-traditional forms of civic partici-
pation, such as citizens’ juries and assemblies, it can readily be assimi-
lated to participatory democracy. That both juries and assemblies, or 
“mini-publics,” have been utilized in real policy settings – she offers an 
account of assemblies established in the Canadian provinces of British 
Columbia and Ontario to consider alternative electoral systems – has 
even led some thinkers (as we noted in the introduction to this chapter) 
to claim that deliberative democracy represents a regeneration of par-
ticipatory democracy. 
 Pateman challenges this view. Deliberative democratic theory, which 
contends that “individuals should always be prepared to defend their 
moral and political arguments and claims with reasons, and be pre-
pared to deliberate with others about the reasons they provide,” would 
certainly play a role in a participatory system: “Deliberation, discus-
sion, and debate are central to any form of democracy, including partici-
patory democracy.” However, she goes on to argue that “if deliberation 
is necessary for democracy it is not sufficient” or “synonymous with 
democracy itself.” This is because “the primary interest of its advocates 
lies in the process of deliberation inside deliberative forums. They are 
not usually concerned with structural features of the wider society. This 
means, for the most part, that ‘democracy’ in the wider society and 
political system is outside their purview; it is largely taken for granted 
as an institutional background of the forums.”  43  Beyond this, exiting 
institutional structures have not been particularly hospitable to deliber-
ative initiatives. As Pateman notes, while the Canadian citizens’ assem-
blies undertook their activities in the context of referendums conducted 
simultaneously with provincial elections, their visibility in the electoral 
campaigns prior to voting day was limited, their roles marginal. Faced 
with daunting thresholds for success that had been set by governments – in 
effect, super-majorities were required – the referendums in both British 
Columbia and Ontario failed. Moreover, the fact that such mini-pub-
lics are temporary means that “they are not integrated into the over-
all system of representative government or democratic institutions, 
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nor do they become part of the regular political cycle in the life of a 
community.”  44  
 By contrast, the recent upsurge in participatory budgeting practices 
would appear to suggest at least some hope for participatory demo-
cratic alternatives. The participatory budgeting process that has been 
in place in the Brazilian city of Porto Alegre for more than a quarter 
of a century has been the most prominent example. And as Pateman 
acknowledges, it has demonstrated “how central components of par-
ticipatory democracy can be institutionalized successfully in what is 
conventionally seen as an expert, technical area.” In this way, “citizen 
participation in decisions about the municipal budget is established as 
a  right of citizens.” The pyramid structure established, with neighbour-
hood assemblies at its base, has encouraged extensive popular engage-
ment: “In a very significant reversal of the usual pattern of political 
participation, poor citizens form a large proportion of participants,” 
although “the very poorest are much less likely to participate, excluded 
by the costs of transport and loss of earnings.”  45  It is nonetheless note-
worthy that Indigenous and African Brazilians, as well as women, have 
participated significantly. 
 The system has seen redistribution of resources from wealthier to 
poorer areas of the city, and participants have recognized the connection 
between participation and outcomes and experienced enhanced politi-
cal efficacy. However, participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre does not 
extend to the entirety of the municipal budget; rather, it is restricted to 
capital projects. For Pateman, “if democratization is to be strengthened, 
serious thought needs to be given to ways in which PB can be used for 
a much greater proportion of municipal budgets.”  46  
 The actual reach of participatory practices is an especially important 
issue in light of the adoption of participatory budgeting practices by, 
according to one estimate, three thousand cities around the world.  47  
With respect to actual democratic control of budgets, even at the munic-
ipal level these models by and large fail to go as far as Porto Alegre. 
They are typically justified as mechanisms for improving governance, 
accountability, and transparency or for enhancing responsiveness to 
citizen preferences. Thus, existing participatory models for the most 
part “fit very easily within existing authority structures, and citizens 
are not participating, as a matter of right, in decisions about their city’s 
or town’s regular budget.” For Pateman this means that “we are seeing 
an expansion of participation and an extension of citizenship, but not 
the beginnings of democratization and the creation of a participatory 
society.”  48  Indeed, the extension of what is called participatory budget-
ing is not only compatible with current neoliberal practices but can in 
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fact serve to further legitimize them. Extending participation without 
substantive democratization so that citizens “have the right to public 
provision, the right to participate in decision-making about their col-
lective life and to live within authority structures that make such par-
ticipation possible” can be readily fitted “to a minimalist, ‘realistic,’ 
Schumpeterian conception of ‘democracy’ that sees citizens as merely 
consumers in another guise.”  49  
 If enhanced participation and citizen engagement by themselves 
are understood as an extension of democracy – even as the essence of 
participatory democracy itself – then from Pateman’s perspective it is 
clear why participatory democracy could be understood as a form of 
deliberative democracy. Both would involve greater citizen consulta-
tion. Depending on the circumstances they might even enhance gov-
ernmental responses to citizen concerns and thereby establish a wider 
range of policy options. But neither would address the broader patterns 
of power within the state and the economy that shape the life chances 
of individuals and prospects for human flourishing. Issues of, for exam-
ple, economic inequality, which shape individual conceptions of one’s 
possible social choices, and which can even distort cognitive capacities 
through “epistemological warping” and thereby generate value irratio-
nalities (as Michael Thompson argues), can slip from view.  50  In other 
words, the transformative possibilities of developmental individualism 
and communicative rationality would go unrealized or, at best, be given 
largely symbolic expression. The question of what kind of democracy 
is possible and desirable in current circumstances, and in foreseeable 
future settings, remains on this account unsettled – and unsettling. 
 In reminding us of the importance of posing the question of the 
meaning of democracy, of what kind of democracy is consistent with 
its humanist claims, Pateman has over the decades made an important 
contribution.  51  Recall, though, that she specifically presented her theory 
of participatory democracy as decidedly non-liberal. While it is clear 
what she meant – she had in mind the identification of liberalism with 
private property and the market, as well as “indirect” government with 
limited and largely passive citizen engagement – there is nonetheless an 
ambiguity in her argument about the reification of the political in mod-
ern liberal democracy. This ambiguity is the product of her reading of 
John Locke’s account of the state of nature. Pateman based her defence 
of an individual political right that individuals always had to give up in 
order to enter civil society on Locke’s claim that “ [p]olitical power is that 
power, which every man having in the state of nature, has given up into 
the hands of the society, and therein to the governors, whom the soci-
ety hath set over itself.”  52  She interprets this literally, as meaning that 
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every individual has specifically political power in the state of nature 
and that this is what is ceded in the move to civil society. It is therefore 
a key element in her effort to refute Sheldon Wolin’s claim that Locke’s 
theory involves the sublimation or disappearance of the political under 
modern conditions. 
 Yet this does not seem to be a totally obvious reading of Locke’s posi-
tion. Locke could also mean that although the power of the common-
wealth created by the agreement of associated individuals can only be 
the combination of each one’s power, it is the very combination itself 
that constitutes properly  political power. If this is so, then there is no 
political power in the state of nature and consequently no such power 
for individuals to lose when they leave. 
 If our reading of Locke is accurate, this does not mean that Pateman’s 
account of reification (and the theory of participatory democracy it 
undergirds) is thereby invalidated. It remains an important and incisive 
contribution to critical reflection on democratic possibilities. And she 
might well respond that, of course, individuals never had any “real” 
power in the state of nature to lose, but that nonetheless it was essential 
for Locke to argue as if they did – this is what sustains the fictions of 
both citizenship and the social contract itself. 
 But what in Pateman’s terms might function for Lockean liberal-
ism as an ideological conceit that sustains reification simultaneously 
serves for her as a critical standard that points to what individu-
als require for a genuine political life. Her position thus implies an 
unbridgeable gulf between the free individual who holds a political 
right (which is always already alienated) and the liberal and liberal 
democratic society that results from the social contract. Her participa-
tory democratic theory, radical and substantive, seems to require that 
individuals retrieve or reconstitute a power of self-government that 
under no circumstances can be enjoyed in the existing social order. 
But this leaves open the question of how to get from here to there. 
Although muted, there must be developmental and communicative 
possibilities in the present. However distorted, there remain poten-
tials for the development and exercise of communicative freedom; 
indeed, Pateman’s effort to lay bare the ideological character of the 
state of nature and the social contract relies on it. Without these poten-
tials it is difficult to imagine how to move towards a more genuinely 
participatory system that would enhance developmental possibilities 
and opportunities. 
 It may well be that the political, as well as political power, does 
indeed exist in the state of nature. But it inheres not in an individual 
political right but rather in the impersonal pressures of the market, 
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which imposes an order and structure on relations between property 
(or commodity) owners. In this respect Wolin’s conception of sublima-
tion is insightful. Certainly, it is the case that from the point of view of 
liberalism, the state of nature is fraught with uncertainty, and even dan-
ger, and requires that individuals contract to establish a formal political 
society. But the political dimension of the state of nature is not lost. It is 
carried over into civil society. 
 However, Pateman’s notion of reification also comes to the fore. 
Just as she argues, the political-economic power inherent in capitalist 
market relations is obscured by the attribution of power exclusively 
to government and the state. Highlighting the political dimension of 
exclusively private relations is central to the critique of existing liberal 
democracy that is at the core of participatory democratic theory. Both 
reification and sublimation accurately capture important elements of 
political systems that are liberal democratic and capitalist. 
 That a theory of participatory democracy can critically build upon 
and not completely repudiate liberal values and practices is at the core 
of C.B. Macpherson’s account of participatory democracy. While Pate-
man argues that a radical theory of participatory democracy must in 
fundamental ways be non-liberal, Macpherson believed that a radical 
participatory democracy could be a liberal democracy, at least where 
liberalism involved the equal right of all to develop and exercise their 
distinctively human capacities rather than the right of the stronger to 
do down the weaker using market rules.  53  
 Liberal Democracy beyond Capitalism? 
C.B. Macpherson’s Participatory Alternative 
 For Carole Pateman, the liberal notion of the “free and equal individ-
ual” represents an “abstractly individualist perspective” that “enables 
the position of the middle class male to be generalized, while the 
actual social position of other individuals is never seriously consid-
ered.”  54  Liberalism from this perspective fails to adequately account 
for relations of gender, race, and ethnicity, as well as class. If univer-
sal liberal rights and freedoms are to have concrete content, we must 
be aware of how the asymmetries of power in social life distort the 
capacity of people to enjoy freedom and equality in their everyday 
lives. For Pateman, as we have seen, “private” matters, and especially 
gender relations, are shot through with issues of power and so must 
be brought into view if claims on behalf of freedom and equality are 
to be realized. The reification of the political means that the extent to 
which the state is itself embedded in supposedly private spheres is 
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hidden behind claims of an autonomy that is simultaneously genuine 
and spurious. 
 As we have also argued, this situation poses the issue of what democ-
racy means and indeed what politics can involve. Classical Marxism 
raised this question but mistakenly assumed that representative or 
parliamentary institutions, elections, party competition, and the rest 
were themselves the problem – get rid of these “bourgeois” covers for 
capitalist class power and all would be well. This was a tragic misun-
derstanding. On the other hand, the Western-style social democracy 
that emerged as an alternative to Eastern Marxism-Leninism was in its 
own way seriously flawed. Its commitment to minor reforms of existing 
social and political relations led to the growth of a bureaucratic state 
that in its own way stifled prospects for democratic political action 
and thereby undermined its purported moral vision. Each model rein-
forced rather than challenged the process of reification that Pateman 
had identified. 
 Given the limitations of “classical” socialism and social democracy, 
what other possibilities might exist? According to David Held, the new 
left, to whose ideas about participatory democracy we have already 
alluded, emphasized two sets of changes: “the state must be democra-
tized by making parliament, state bureaucracies and political parties 
more open and accountable, while new forms of struggle at the local 
level (through factory-based politics, the women’s movement, ecologi-
cal groups) must ensure that society, as well as the state, is subject to 
procedures which ensure accountability.”  55  Citizen rights in the political 
arena needed to be complemented by similar rights in the family, the 
workplace, and the community at large. 
 Macpherson addressed these concerns through his own account of 
participatory democracy.  56  A participatory democracy depended upon 
a radical (but not in his view implausible) political and social transfor-
mation, one demanded by what he saw as the ethical requirements of 
democracy itself. In her account of reification Pateman contended that 
citizens were for the most part passive spectators of a political process 
in which they played virtually no role beyond the casting of a ballot. In 
a similar vein Macpherson argued that in existing liberal democratic 
(capitalist) societies the capacity for political activity had been stifled 
by structures of power that generated apathy, particularly among the 
lower strata. Through democratically organized political parties, each 
with a pyramid-like structure of accountability and anchored in a “base 
level” democracy that was further buttressed by workplace and com-
munity organizations promoting engagement in social spheres outside 
the formal political arena, people would be far more able to achieve the 
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benefits of active citizenship, including the equal right to liberty and 
self-realization. Individuals could as a result develop a greater sense of 
political efficacy as well as the capacity to appreciate collective prob-
lems and act in response to them. 
 For Macpherson, radical participatory democracy builds upon and 
extends the insights of John Stuart Mill regarding the importance of 
political participation for individual self-development. This is the claim 
that only as active agents (doers and exerters of their human capacities, 
as Macpherson put it) do individuals have the opportunity to develop 
their potential for freedom and solidarity. Thus the sphere of democratic 
politics must include areas of “private” life: only when individuals are 
empowered in all aspects of social life that impinge on their life chances 
can they realistically be prepared and willing to assume the challenges – 
but also the joys – of active citizenship. For Pateman, especially, this is 
vital, because, taking a cue from the democratic elitists, she (and likely 
Macpherson as well) accepts the unavoidability of elite leadership 
and more limited opportunities for citizenship at the national level (as 
opposed to more local ones). Representative institutions would still be 
required because of social complexity and the inevitability of compet-
ing interests and competing conceptions of appropriate resource alloca-
tion. Such institutions would also be needed to address the challenges 
of establishing mechanisms for decision-making that could facilitate 
social cooperation and coordination of activities, and for reconciling 
democratic participation with the demands of efficiency and leadership. 
Nonetheless, more extensive and meaningful participation at local and 
sub-national levels would allow citizens to more fully develop their civic 
capacities, which would better equip them to monitor the work of repre-
sentative bodies in order to ensure that popular views and perspectives 
were meaningfully considered. Even given its limitations, the experi-
ence of Porto Alegre with participatory budgeting testifies to the posi-
tive effects of more substantial popular involvement at the local level. 
 Macpherson believed that a genuinely participatory system would 
require fundamental social change on behalf of equality. Furthermore, 
any serious movement in the direction of participatory democracy 
would demand a transformation of consciousness. By this he meant 
there was a need for the majority of the population to change their val-
ues: from their current preference for affluence of the sort capitalism 
has until now been able to provide, at least to enough people living in 
advanced liberal democratic societies, to a desire for community and 
solidarity.  57  Without such a change, liberal democracies would remain 
saddled with a contradiction: formal, individual political equality clash-
ing with class-based, substantive economic inequality. 
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 This contradiction has been nicely captured by two American the-
orists of democracy, Joshua Cohen and Joel Rogers.  58  They relate the 
problems involved in moving towards a more radical and participatory 
democracy to two “constraints” or barriers thrown up by the existing 
institutions and culture of liberal democratic capitalism: the “resource” 
constraint; and the “demand” constraint. 
 The “resource” constraint refers to the reality that while highly val-
ued and valuable, the formal political rights found in liberal demo-
cratic, capitalist societies – the right to vote and form political parties, 
and the freedoms of speech and association – have a limited ability 
to help the disadvantaged organize on behalf of social change – a 
point Pateman also makes. This is because material inequalities make 
such rights unequal in practice. For example, trade unions have far 
fewer resources than do corporations to make their voices heard and 
heeded. 
 The “demand” constraint specifically addresses the problem of con-
sciousness that is central to Macpherson’s position. This constraint 
involves the tendency for individuals to view themselves as primarily 
limitless desirers and acquirers. Where this view is deeply embedded, it 
facilitates the ability of capitalist society to create, promote, and satisfy 
interests in short-term, material gain, where such gains are achieved 
by means of narrowly defined, or instrumental, calculation.  59  This state 
of affairs reinforces highly individualistic perceptions of who we are 
and how we relate to others. One way to put this: there is a tension 
in “possessive” individualism. On the one hand we believe ourselves 
free and responsible for achieving our ends, particularly our acquisitive 
ones, and that the world is strictly the product of our individual actions 
added together. On the other, if things do not work out – and they do 
not for large numbers of people – one must accept the consequences 
of the decisions of others (i.e., “the market”) as if they truly were one’s 
own. 
 Each of these constraints reflects the emphasis that Pateman and 
Macpherson, respectively, bring to their accounts. The constraints 
are related, and this explains why Macpherson put so much stock 
in the idea that for there to be a more radical, participatory democ-
racy we must come to see ourselves less as infinite consumers and 
appropriators and more as creative doers and exerters of our dis-
tinctively human capacities. Nonetheless, they point out the complex 
challenges posed by any plausible ideal of participatory democracy: 
it must avoid any fixed model or blueprint that, whatever its com-
mitments to freedom and equality, risks becoming an instrument of 
oppression. 
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 Participatory Democracy and Human Rights: The Social 
and Developmental Ontology of Carol Gould 
 This is perhaps why some theorists of democracy, and participatory 
democracy, have made human rights and securing such rights both the 
cornerstone and the key accomplishment of a robust radical and sub-
stantive democratic system with developmental intent. Human rights 
would seem to provide a standard by means of which models for politi-
cal change, including those representing a move towards a participa-
tory democratic society, can be appraised. 
 Macpherson hinted at such a reading in his reflections on partici-
patory democracy. To be sure, his most explicit discussions of human 
rights occurred very late in his life, after he had laid out his account of 
participatory democracy. However, he appeared to have something like 
human rights at least partly in mind in his treatment of the possibili-
ties for participatory democratic development. For him the key ques-
tion was not how to run a participatory democracy – and the idea of 
a blueprint suggests this is the only question – but how to reach it. He 
identified two key barriers to this. One of these we have already noted, 
namely, the predominance of consumer consciousness, the overwhelm-
ing tendency for people to view themselves as competitive, self-inter-
ested, infinite consumers and appropriators rather than as exerters of 
their own human capacities. The other, to which we have also alluded, is 
structural and significant (and, we might add, ever intensifying) social 
and economic inequality. These two barriers are inextricably linked and 
are essential to the reproduction of capitalist social relations. Each is 
inimical to the attainment of participatory possibilities. Consumer con-
sciousness reinforces an anti-solidaristic outlook and practice. Inequal-
ity results in the exclusion of substantial numbers of people from mean-
ingful participation. Unless these hurdles are removed, no participatory 
system is truly possible, and any model will have to be imposed by 
what is essentially a vanguard. As a result, Macpherson ruled out a clas-
sical Marxist revolutionary project, for which in any case the requisite 
working-class revolutionary consciousness was absent. A reformist lib-
eral alternative such as that of John Stuart Mill was also unlikely given 
the limited political engagement and widespread political apathy that 
resulted from both inequality and consumer consciousness. 
 Writing in the late 1970s, after participatory democratic theory had 
reached its high point, Macpherson argued that its proponents were 
confronted with a vicious circle: transforming consciousness and elimi-
nating inequality required extensive and intensive participation; but 
such participation could only result precisely from the transformation 
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of consciousness and the elimination of inequality. Macpherson pointed 
out then contemporary developments that he believed offered at least 
some hope for and prospects for breaking out of this circle. His spe-
cific account of those prospects does not concern us here. However, 
his approach does suggest that we view his treatment of participatory 
institutions with great care. Always more cautious and even pessimistic 
than his writings might suggest, or most analysts of his work recognize, 
Macpherson implied that any participatory system not based on over-
coming or at least reducing the barriers to such a system was bound to 
fail – or, just as ominously, serve up the pseudo-legitimation of a man-
aged plebiscitarian state. (The contemporary emergence of right-wing 
populism indicates that Macpherson was prescient here.) It would, in 
short, risk becoming precisely the kind of abstract model that could 
only be realized by forcible imposition, and not by the actions of free 
and equal individuals exercising their distinctively human creative 
capacities. 
 Since Macpherson offered his account, human rights discourses, along 
with theories of deliberative democracy, have come to occupy centre 
stage in contemporary political and social theory, often in conjunction 
with proposals for strengthening or establishing global or international 
mechanisms for the defence of these rights. In chapter 5 we explored the 
relation between rights, positive and negative, and the critical theory 
of the Frankfurt School, particularly in relation to the position of Jür-
gen Habermas as he developed it in response to the blind spots of the 
original paradigm. Here we approach the question in the context of 
the reality that much analysis from a human rights perspective, if not 
at odds with democracy, nonetheless assumes a gulf between democ-
racy and human rights. Indeed, reflecting the long-standing fear that 
popular majorities could trample on the rights of both individuals and 
vulnerable minorities, human rights discourses typically assume that 
these rights require above all protections against legislative bodies and 
mobilized publics. This would go double for a participatory democracy. 
In fact, some proponents of human rights would likely reject participa-
tory democracy as potentially if not inherently tyrannical, or at least as 
a species of that populism that these days so exercises many analysts. 
 However, there is a way of conceiving human rights as not  opposed 
to popular engagement but rather as dependent upon and even essen-
tial for such engagement and hence for participatory democracy. As 
we have argued, in this view human rights must include, beside and 
beyond traditional liberal and individual rights, social, economic, and 
communicative rights and freedoms. Without specifically identify-
ing it, or developing an account of it, Macpherson indeed seemed to, 
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and needed to, assume the possibility of communicative freedom and 
rationality. 
 Carol Gould builds upon this implied commitment to a broader con-
ception of social rights and uses it to work up an account of democracy 
that fits well within the participatory framework. Drawing on “the tra-
ditions of political philosophy and critical social theory, and on more 
recent feminist theorizing,” Gould argues for a theory that “entails 
an expansion of democratic modes of decision making and of human 
rights themselves, not only internationally, but also beneath the level of 
politics, so to speak, in social, economic, and even personal life.” She 
anchors this in a social ontology that “gives priority to a conception 
of human freedom and to socially understood  individuals-in-relation s as 
the basis for the extension of democratic decision making to all contexts 
of human activity, whether political, economic, or social.” Social ontol-
ogy gives rise to a specific understanding of human rights: these rights 
“reflect the basic claims people can validly make on each other for the 
conditions that can make each one’s freedom achievable.” Furthermore, 
“feminist approaches to the idea of care and empathy as important val-
ues, to women’s equal rights and the corollary critique of domination, 
and to the idea of embodiment importantly suggest ways to personal-
ize, and in this sense, to transform both democratic politics and human 
rights doctrine.”  60  Hence Gould in effect incorporates and synthesizes 
the ideas of both Pateman and Macpherson even as she takes issue with 
certain elements in the work of both.  61  And as she acknowledges, her 
account also demonstrates explicit affinities with key themes from criti-
cal theory. 
 What makes Gould’s position particularly instructive from the 
perspective of Macpherson’s analysis of the challenges of reach-
ing as opposed to running a participatory democratic system, and 
how to respond to those challenges, is her conception of social ontol-
ogy. Macpherson thought that individuals could themselves gener-
ate insight into the painful contradictions of life within late capitalist 
society and so move away from consumer consciousness and its social 
basis and consequences. He viewed this as possible even if we make 
the minimalist assumption that people reason only in terms of a cost–
benefit analysis (he clearly believed they were capable of more than 
this). Gould offers an account that suggests how individuals might gain 
this insight. She argues that the evidence for what she calls “a social-
ontological characterization of human action and of human beings” is 
“experiential or phenomenological; that is[,] it presents itself to us in the 
structures of everyday action and social interaction.” On this reading, 
human rights are anchored in “the daily and recurrent recognition by 
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individuals of others as beings like themselves, namely, as agents with 
claims to the conditions for their self-developing or self-transformative 
activity … [I]n asserting one’s own right, one acknowledges the validity 
of the other’s claim as a right by virtue of reciprocally recognizing it as 
like one’s own.”  62  
 Rights are thus viewed as accomplishments and not statuses. They 
result from the joint political action of the individuals claiming them. 
In the words of James Ingram, “the politics of human rights should 
be understood as a democratic politics of universalization, based on 
the political activity of those they are to protect.” The achievement of 
rights, he further argues, suggests “a notion of the politics of rights that 
decouples it from the state and law … Rights politics can be thought … 
as the active, cooperative practice of those who recognize one another 
as equals.”  63  Viewing rights as politically claimed and secured entails 
the idea that they are both universal and democratic, with both ele-
ments indelibly linked. This in turn indicates that the liberalism of 
human rights, and democracy with its commitment to equal rights of 
participation in key social decisions and thus popular self-rule, can be 
rendered compatible through a radically participatory politics. This, at 
least, is the claim and hope of both Macpherson and Gould. 
 As we have indicated, in our view the key to a democratic conception 
of human rights lies in the need to expand the standard liberal political 
and individual rights to include social and economic rights. Both sets in 
turn require and give substance to communicative rationality and free-
dom whereby the mutual relations of trust and reciprocity essential for 
both human rights and democracy can be maintained and deepened. 
Human rights matter in the context of activities that matter, with each 
defining the other. 
 This is the focal point of Gould’s analysis of radical and participatory 
democracy with a cosmopolitan intent. A cornerstone of her position is 
precisely that human rights must include social and economic rights, 
along with civic and political ones. These rights express and embody 
the demands of justice, where the core principle of justice is what she 
calls equal positive freedom. Equal positive freedom requires that 
the material and social conditions of individual self-development be 
secured. The right of equal positive freedom tied to the establishment 
and maintenance of the conditions of self-development is crucial for 
the exercise of our capacity to be agents capable of making and acting 
upon choices. The individual right to self-development and the condi-
tions that make it possible are dependent upon the reciprocal or mutual 
recognition of individual agents, all of whom are entitled to equal posi-
tive freedom and hence justice. Such reciprocity is not limited to formal 
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discursive practices – thus Gould’s criticisms of deliberative democracy – 
but include as well norm-governed non-discursive activities (which to 
be sure may include discursive elements): “individual action and joint 
action oriented to the realization of goals, such as work; expressive or 
creative activity, such as in the arts; scientific activities of discovery and 
invention; as well as the range of caring relations among family, friends, 
and citizens, even across borders.”  64  As we have noted, these relations 
of reciprocity are tied to everyday patterns of interaction – they are at 
the core of Gould’s social ontology. 
 The tie between justice, or human rights, and democracy is a product 
of what this social ontology articulates and demands: 
 The principle of justice thus conceived as … equal right to the condi-
tions of self-development requires  democracy as the equal right to par-
ticipate in decision making concerning the common activities in which 
individuals are engaged. For engaging in such common activities 
involving shared goals is itself one of the main conditions for individu-
als’ self-development, the opportunity for which requires that they be 
self-determining in this activity. If, instead, an individual’s actions were 
determined by others in such contexts, it would not be an exercise of 
the agency that is required for self-transformation. However, since such 
common or joint activity necessarily involves acting with other indi-
viduals, the exercise of individuals’ agency in this context must take the 
form of codetermination of the activity, that is, rights to participate in 
decision making about it. 
 Furthermore: 
 Rights of democratic participation arise from rights to self-determination 
in the context of joint activities. At its root, it can be argued that people 
should be equally free to control the conditions of their own activity and 
that, where their activity is social or common, this gives rise to rights to 
codetermine it if they are not to be under the control of others. Common 
activity can be defined as activity in which a number of individuals join 
together to effect a given end. To the degree that they choose for them-
selves the end of this activity and the good it serves, it essentially involves 
the cooperation and coordination of many individuals in the realization of 
their joint projects or purposes. Yet such common activity can be seen to 
be among the conditions that people need for their own freedom as self-
development, in that it provides a social context for reciprocity and makes 
possible the achievement of ends that cannot be achieved by an individual 
alone.  65  
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 If this conception of common activities and its implications address 
the issue of democratic participation, matters of justice and human 
rights can according to Gould be addressed by a version of the “all 
affected” principle: the idea that everyone affected by the decisions 
of a political or social institution should have meaningful input into 
the decisions in question. For Gould this sweeping and overly general 
principle could be made more specific by determining whether such 
decisions have an impact on the possibilities for individual agency and 
hence self-development that are inextricably associated with their free-
dom, needs, or core interests – in other words, their basic human rights 
and the realization of equal positive freedom: 
 Given the status of these human rights as valid claims that we each make 
on others for the conditions that we need for our freedom and dignity, it 
follows that social, economic, and political institutions, including those 
in the international sphere, need to be designed to make it possible for all 
to fulfill these basic rights … Because of the centrality of democratic par-
ticipation in people’s having the ability to realize and protect their human 
rights, including economic and social ones … it follows that they should 
have substantial input into those decisions that affect rights fulfillment.  66  
 Over the years Gould has increasingly shifted her focus to the ques-
tion of how to create trans-border and international forms of demo-
cratic participation and practice in the face of intensifying globaliza-
tion. She has specifically attempted to show how human rights, along 
with the principles of common activities, can be made viable in the face 
of the increasing impact of bodies such as the World Trade Organiza-
tion, the International Monetary Fund, and regional entities such as the 
European Union, to say nothing of transnational corporations. She has 
also sought to explore how the growth of cross-border communities 
and transnational associations could offer new possibilities for realiz-
ing democratic norms in ways that do not require a world government 
or  demos . Again, the specifics of her proposals do not concern us here. 
It is her conception of human rights tied to individual agency as the 
development and exercise of human capacities, and the social ontol-
ogy that as an immanent critical standard grounds this conception, that 
we believe represents Gould’s important contribution to participatory 
democracy as a critical theory of democracy. 
 Starting from existing (liberal) democratic theory and practice, Pate-
man, Macpherson, and Gould explore the limits of the assumptions and 
commitments of this theory and practice and their failure to realize the 
promise of democratic life. Pateman begins with the social contract, 
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a key source of legitimation for the existing liberal order, and traces 
out its contradictions and exclusions. In doing so she points to poten-
tial sources of a reified politics that sustains a passive citizenship and 
undercuts democratic potential. Breaking through reification required 
movement towards a non-liberal form of participatory democracy. More 
sympathetic to liberalism and its contradictory heritage, Macpherson 
argued that for both liberalism and democracy to be faithful to their 
deepest commitments to individual development, democracy needed 
to be transformed from a mechanism for choosing and authorizing gov-
ernments into a society in which individuals were equally able to use 
and develop their distinctively human capacities. For this transforma-
tion to occur the massive inequalities intrinsic to capitalism had to be 
overcome, and, just as importantly, individuals had to see themselves as 
doers and exerters of their capacities rather than as self-interested and 
competitive infinite consumers and appropriators.  67  Gould picks up on 
this latter theme by way of a distinctive social ontology, in terms of 
which individuals should be understood as always and already embed-
ded in a multiplicity of relations within which they develop wants, 
needs, and purposes that define their possibilities for self-development. 
Self-development requires that individuals enjoy both the equal right 
to the material and social conditions that facilitate it – equal positive 
freedom – and the equal right to participate in decision-making with 
respect to those common activities that themselves form a significant 
element of this self-development. In other words, it requires both jus-
tice, or human rights, and democracy. 
 In their similarities and differences, all three thinkers elaborate 
core elements of a substantive and participatory theory of democ-
racy. Each thinker makes central the assumption that the individual 
should not be understood in an atomistic way, but rather as embed-
ded in social networks and contexts.  68  On this view, narrowly indi-
vidualistic conceptions of democracy based on the maximization of 
individual preferences or interests understood discretely must give 
way to a broader and richer understanding that acknowledges our 
social nature. Each thinker argues that democracy must be extended 
beyond the formal political arena into all areas of social and economic 
life that impinge upon individual life chances and prospects. Each is 
therefore concerned with issues of modes and sectors of democratic 
engagement, as suggested by Jeffrey Hilmer, as well as questions of 
franchise, scope, and authenticity, as outlined by John Dryzek. More-
over, Pateman, Macpherson, and Gould all strongly stress the need for 
robust publics anchored in those radically egalitarian social conditions 
that are essential for autonomy and self-development, and thus for a 
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democracy that is genuinely popular and solidary; in this respect they 
touch base with the position of Frank Cunningham. And if currently 
existing representative and electoral institutions cannot be and should 
not be completely replaced, at the least they should be reinvigorated 
and further supplemented by more direct forms of participation. These 
could include popular assemblies of the kind associated with partici-
patory budgeting initiatives and with forms of deliberative democracy 
more generally. 
 What might unite these distinctive if related conceptions of a radi-
cal democracy that put self-development and self-determination at their 
centre? In defining her position Carol Gould gives us a clue. She writes 
that “the common root or common foundation that normatively grounds 
the conceptions of both justice and democracy is freedom, understood 
as the crucial or distinguishing feature of human action.” She goes on 
to claim that such freedom is complex: “It is, on the one hand, a bare 
capacity for choice among alternatives; on the other, it is the exercise of 
this capacity – individually or together with others – in the realization of 
long-term projects and the development of abilities. In this sense, free-
dom is an activity of self-development or self-transformation as a pro-
cess over time, and I interpret this as the characteristic mode of human 
agency or life activity.”  69  
 We agree with Gould’s account here and believe it links her treat-
ment of democracy, and the analyses of Pateman and Macpherson, with 
the core commitments of critical theory. More specifically, it highlights 
the significance of  social freedom – the idea that individual freedom is 
attained in and through, and not outside or against, our relations with 
others and their needs and purposes; that freedom and a certain kind of 
mutual trust and obligation are linked – for a critical theory of democ-
racy. In the final section of this chapter we return to the issue of social 
freedom by once again exploring the recent work of Axel Honneth, a 
key contemporary Frankfurt School theorist. 
 (Participatory) Democracy as a Way of Life: Axel Honneth, 
Social Freedom, and Socialism 
 Axel Honneth has developed his conception of social freedom on the 
basis of an extensive engagement with and reconstruction of the phi-
losophy of Hegel, and in particular Hegel’s complex account of free-
dom as he laid it out in his  Philosophy of Right .  70  Eschewing historical 
teleology and the metaphysics of spirit that underpin Hegel’s position, 
Honneth argues that the  Philosophy of Right “can be understood as a 
draft of a normative theory of those spheres of reciprocal recognition 
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that must be preserved intact because they constitute the moral identi-
ties of modern societies.”  71  The freedom secured in these spheres is thus 
communicative because it presupposes that individuals are always and 
already linked through intersubjective relations. Why and how our ties 
to others are not restrictions on our freedom, or what Hegel calls the 
“free will,” but preconditions for it – namely, “those social conditions 
under which each subject is able to perceive the liberty of the other as 
the prerequisite of his own self-realization”  72  – is for Honneth the key 
insight we can reclaim from Hegel’s account. 
 As Honneth sees it, Hegel recognized that although essential 
for the realization of the free will, two components of our modern 
understanding of individual freedom – abstract right, whereby indi-
viduals, as holders of subjective rights, exercise legally secured, free 
personal and potentially arbitrary choice unencumbered by others; 
and morality, in terms of which we appraise our actions according 
to principles that spell out what we ought to do and thus exercise 
inner, reflective self-determination – are not by themselves sufficient 
to fulfil the demands and requirements of individual autonomy. This 
is because on their own they are indeterminate. They fail to provide a 
sufficient basis for establishing our aims, purposes, and aspirations, 
which, as moderns no longer acting under the constraints of tradi-
tion or the demands of the sacred, we are now called upon to respon-
sibly undertake. For this we require (re)engagement with others that 
respects the demands of autonomy without a re-submergence in a 
quasi-natural, organic community that under modern conditions 
could only be oppressive. We need relations with others in order 
to confirm and enact our freedom, but this must be consistent with 
what, following Hegel, Honneth calls being with oneself in the 
other.  73  We must have the capability to “withdraw” from our social 
bonds as bearers of both personal and moral freedom. However, we 
must also return to those ties, which in any case are always and 
already there, in our very withdrawal. We need confirmation by oth-
ers in determinate roles, connections, and activities if our freedom, 
which is communicative and interactive, is to be actualized as consti-
tutive of our identities. Otherwise we will be threatened by a kind of 
anomie that Honneth calls “suffering from indeterminacy.” Taken in 
isolation, our personal choices push out against those of others who 
thus appear instrumentally as either barriers to or facilitators of our 
efforts at satisfaction. Resistance to our efforts, or even unintentional 
facilitation by others, is insufficient to confirm our freedom and thus 
our selfhood. Conversely, our moral self-reflection lacks purchase in 
the external world. 
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 The problem of indeterminacy lays the groundwork for Honneth’s 
conception of social freedom, which completes and sustains what he 
defines as negative and reflexive freedom, his versions of abstract right 
and morality. He puts the problem this way: “While the idea of nega-
tive freedom … must fail because the ‘content’ of action cannot itself be 
grasped as ‘free,’ the idea of reflexive freedom is insufficient because it 
opposes the actions it views as free in substance, viz. as self-determined 
acts, to an objective reality that must continue to be regarded as com-
pletely heteronymous.” Hegel’s great accomplishment was to recognize 
that “individual freedom unfolds only within institutions of recognition” – 
that “the kind of freedom he has in mind can only be realized through 
participation in concrete institutions.”  74  
 Social freedom addresses the limits of both negative and reflexive 
freedom. According to Honneth, and following Hegel, for modern 
subjects 
 it is obvious that our individual freedom depends upon the responsive-
ness of the spheres of action in which we are involved to our own aims 
and intentions. The more we feel that our purposes are supported and 
even upheld by these spheres, the more we will be able to perceive our 
surroundings as a space for the development of our own personality. As 
beings who are dependent on interacting with our own kind, the experi-
ence of such a free interplay with our intersubjective environment repre-
sents the pattern of all individual freedom: The schema of free activity, 
prior to any tendencies to retreat into individuality, consists in the fact that 
others do not oppose our intentions, but enable and promote them … Our 
dealings with others, our social interaction, necessarily precedes the act of 
detachment captured in relations of negative or reflexive freedom. Hence 
we must define that antecedent layer of freedom located in the sphere 
in which humans relate to each other in some way. If we follow Hegel at 
this point, freedom signifies our experience of being free from coercion, of 
unfolding our personality – a kind of freedom that results from our pur-
poses being promoted by those of others.  75  
 For Honneth, social freedom under modern conditions can be and 
must be realized in the spheres of personal relationships of romantic 
love, friendship, and family; in the market economy, as consumers and 
producers; and through democratic will-formation in a public realm 
and constitutional state. As domains for the articulation and exercise of 
freedom, these spheres incorporate important dimensions of recogni-
tion that are essential to the formation and development of coherent 
individual personality structures: personal affirmation through love 
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and intimacy; egalitarian cooperation in the service of social produc-
tion; and civic and legal respect. 
 Honneth developed this notion of social freedom in detail over the 
course of several works, most fully in  Freedom’s Right . In our discussion 
here, we focus on his 2015 study,  The Idea of Socialism: Towards a Renewal . 
There are two reasons for our choice. First, it is the most recent iteration 
of social freedom and the central place it holds in his political and social 
thought. More specifically, it extends his analysis in  Freedom’s Right by 
attempting to more fully develop its implications for transformative 
social change. Second, in raising explicitly the question of socialism 
and linking it to the ideal of a democratic form of life, which as we 
have noted represents for him a vital sphere for the realization of social 
freedom, Honneth touches base with key concerns of Frankfurt School 
critical theory as well as with the issues we are attempting to explore 
in this chapter. We believe his ideas resonate with those of Pateman, 
Macpherson, and Gould and enrich our appreciation of the demands of 
participatory democracy. 
 In  The Idea of Socialism , Honneth identifies the source of both socialism 
and social freedom, and the tight connection between them, in the recog-
nition of an internal contradiction in the principles and normative ide-
als of liberty and fraternity that along with equality had emerged from 
the French Revolution. Early socialists such as Robert Owen, Charles 
Fourier, Louis Blanc, and Pierre-Joseph Proudhon believed that a nar-
row liberal, legal interpretation of liberty precluded the achievement of 
fraternity. As they saw it, the “aim of fraternity, of mutual responsibil-
ity and solidarity, cannot even begin to be realized as long as liberty 
is understood solely in terms of the private egotism characteristic of 
competition in the capitalist market … The contradiction in the moral 
demands of the French Revolution could only be removed if individual 
freedom was no longer understood as the private pursuit of interests, 
but rather as a relation in which the pursuits of individual members 
of society complement each other in the economic power-center of the 
new society.” The need, in other words, was to interpret liberty “in a 
less individualistic and more intersubjective manner.”  76  
 The reconciliation of individual freedom with solidarity became and 
remains the core of social freedom. Emerging as a normative demand 
bequeathed by the French Revolution, and not only from the desire to 
re-embed the capitalist economy in society to facilitate a more ratio-
nal and just distribution of resources, the idea of a new kind of free-
dom in solidarity required not merely that each individual supported 
the other in pursuit of their goals. It also demanded that the freedom 
of one became a condition for the freedom of the other. The challenge 
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from the outset has been to establish how this could be done – how, 
in other words, to echo Jean-Jacques Rousseau, it could be possible 
for each, while uniting with all, to remain as free as before – indeed, 
freer. The key question might be whether individual freedom, however 
understood, is a property of individuals as such, taken discretely, or 
exists only in and through mutual relations of fraternity or solidarity: 
“whether a free act can be regarded as already having been completed 
prior to being supplemented by others, or whether it needs the supple-
mentation of others to count as a completed act.”  77  (This is comparable 
to the question whether human rights should be conceived as statuses 
or accomplishments.) 
 In responding to this issue Honneth points to Daniel Brudney’s claim 
that social communities can be distinguished according to whether their 
members relate to one another by means of overlapping or intertwined 
aims. Individuals with overlapping aims might pursue these together, 
but common action is not the point. Market relations have this charac-
ter. But it  is the point for intertwined aims: unity is  itself the purpose 
so that individuals act not only  with but  for one another: “In the first 
case, that of overlapping aims, the fact that my actions contribute to the 
realization of our shared aims is a contingent effect of the pursuit of my 
own intentions; in the second case, that of intertwined aims, the same 
result arises as a necessary consequence of my conscious intentions.”  78  
 Honneth sees this account as crucial for Marx’s Hegelian approach 
to the reconciliation of liberty and fraternity: Marx’s conception of soli-
darity, as least as laid out in his early writings, involves not merely 
the implementation of our aims but, more fundamentally, their for-
mulation. The needs of others and their satisfaction become conscious 
sources of our fulfilment and not, at best, by-products of our quest for 
gratification, or, at worst, vulnerabilities to be exploited for our own 
egoistic ends. This is the case under capitalism, where we anonymously 
exchange products in the market with the aid of money in a system that, 
according to the young Marx, pitted isolated individuals against one 
another in a relation of “mutual plundering.”  79  
 Society, then, is to be organized as communities of solidarity, of 
mutual, shared sympathy, trust, and respect. Possessive individualism 
would give way to developmental, social individualism; purely nega-
tive freedom would be incorporated into, and transformed into, posi-
tive or developmental liberty. Thus: “Social freedom therefore means 
taking part in the social life of a community whose members are so sym-
pathetic to each other that they support the realization of each other’s 
justified needs for each other’s sake … If subjects practice mutual sym-
pathy, they will necessarily treat each other as equals and thus refrain 
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from exploiting or instrumentalizing each other in any way.”  80  Social 
freedom, then, “would eliminate not only the opposition between free-
dom and fraternity, but also the distinction between rich and poor, for 
members of society would then regard each other as partners in interac-
tion, to whom they owe a certain measure of solidarity for the sake of 
their own freedom.”  81  
 As we have seen, Honneth attributes the key insights that served to 
establish the idea of social freedom to the early socialists, including the 
young Marx, who took the community of solidarity, rather than the 
individual, as the bearer of freedom. This community, however, was 
understood not in opposition to the liberal or bourgeois demands for 
liberty, equality, and fraternity, but rather as the fulfilment of these via 
the resolution of their internal contradictions. Hence the community of 
solidarity is not conceived as existing above and beyond the individu-
als who comprise it, but in and through their interactions. Individuals 
come to consciously recognize this because, insofar as their aims and 
purposes are intertwined and mutually determined through the exer-
cise of communicative reason, they no longer view their freedom as sac-
rificed to the demands of fraternity, which in a capitalist market society 
imposes itself on them as external compulsion exercised by either social 
pressures or state action – that is, by means of the reified politics that so 
concerned Carole Pateman. 
 Moreover, the fact that socialists have built upon the ideas and ideals 
of freedom, equality, and solidarity – the very same ideas that anchored 
the bourgeois revolution and have subsequently served to legitimize 
the liberal social order – has always made it difficult for the forces of the 
status quo to wholly expunge the threat of a radical alternative claiming 
a common heritage. The ferocity with which the forces of order defend 
neoliberalism, even in the absence at this time of serious organized 
opposition, testifies to the always present sense that something like a 
socialist alternative could always emerge – at least as long as the heri-
tage of the French Revolution continues to shape the self-understand-
ing of citizens.  82  
 Based on his conception of social freedom, Honneth attempts to 
reconstruct the idea of socialism in order to see how it could be made 
relevant to a global capitalist era increasingly characterized by eco-
nomic stagnation, deepening inequality, and financial instability.  83  
Indeed under these conditions socialism ought to have a place, given 
increasing discontent in the face of the social and political consequences 
of largely uncontrolled and apparently uncontrollable market forces. 
But for socialism to gain a renewed vitality as a vehicle for the realiza-
tion of social freedom, it is essential to revisit the core commitments it 
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has historically embraced, parting company with those that no longer 
adequately address current challenges.  84  
 Honneth argues that as much as they promoted the development of 
social freedom as the immanent realization of the insufficiently fulfilled 
promises of the French Revolution, thinkers such as Saint-Simon, Owen, 
Blanc, and Proudhon, as well as Marx, were too deeply influenced by 
the Industrial Revolution and the emerging institutions of industrial 
capitalism. As a result, they attended almost exclusively to material 
production, an emphasis that was carried forward by subsequent gen-
erations of socialists and socialist thinkers. While understandable, this 
emphasis has led to an excessively restrictive and no longer tenable 
focus on the economy, the sphere of social labour, as the sole and neces-
sary forum for the realization of social freedom. Socialists have tradi-
tionally believed that overthrowing capitalist relations of production 
would automatically usher in a new society of freedom, equality, and 
solidarity because all other spheres were structurally dependent on the 
economy. 
 As Honneth sees it, this approach fails to successfully address the 
reality that in the modern era, ongoing social differentiation has under-
girded those relations of recognition he sees as decisive for individual 
agency. As we have seen, along with the capitalist market economy there 
have emerged distinctive spheres of, respectively, personal relations of 
intimacy and political relations of prospectively democratic and discur-
sive will-formation. Social freedom must therefore now be identified 
and realized not only in the economy but also in personal and political 
life. Individuals must be seen not just as workers but also as intimate 
partners and friends, and as citizens. Put otherwise, the sphere of social 
labour can no longer, if indeed it ever could, be the driving force, the 
collective directing centre, of a modern, differentiated social order. 
 Along with a now indefensible exclusive focus on the economy as 
the forum for the achievement of social freedom, Honneth argues that 
socialists have adhered to two additional dubious propositions: that 
socialist theory was the expression of the real interests and actions of 
a putatively revolutionary social force, the proletariat; and that history 
was inherently progressive and was thus moving inexorably towards 
the realization of socialism and social freedom. Honneth claims that 
both assumptions must be jettisoned. The “agent(s)” of change must 
now be seen and identified as those who in their outlook and actions 
challenge social dependencies and exclusions in all areas of social life, 
and not just the sphere of social labour. In addition, the idea(l) of inevi-
table progress, which has tended to discount incremental reforms in the 
present as insufficient for the task of fundamental transformation, must 
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give way to a willingness to build on potentials for change within the 
existing social order by means of social and historical experimentation. 
There is not, nor can there be, one “true” path, such as central economic 
planning, to a socialist transformation. Reflecting the long-standing 
influence of John Dewey and pragmatism on his thought, Honneth 
defines his position as “socialism as historical experimentalism.”  85  
 Nonetheless, if the classic model of proletarian revolution is no lon-
ger viable, nor progress guaranteed, and if we must now instead pursue 
socialism by means of historical experimentalism – and if the exercise of 
communicative reason and freedom forms the core of this process – the 
economic sphere must continue to hold a central place in any consider-
ation of what socialism can mean today. Although the realm of produc-
tion can no longer be viewed as the directing centre of society, realizing 
social freedom in the economy remains a fundamental aim, as it did for 
classical socialism. The question of how social freedom in the economy 
is to be realized under contemporary conditions can, however, only be 
addressed “by means of experimentation, by exploring different ideas 
whose sole commonality consists in pointing up possibilities for eco-
nomic value-creation beyond capitalism as a cooperative process aided 
by various institutional mechanisms … The guideline for any experi-
mentation with different economic combinations must lie in strength-
ening ‘the social’ in the economic sphere as much as possible, enabling 
all those involved to satisfy their needs through complementary activ-
ity without compulsion or restricted influence.”  86  Relevant experiments 
might include pursuing different ways in which markets could function 
without being tied to the compulsive requirements of capital accumula-
tion (market socialism); establishing different forms of productive and 
workplace organization (cooperative work relations); and expanding 
the range of social rights to include a guaranteed minimum income and 
greater democratic control of existing market forces (socialized markets 
in a property-owning democracy). All such experiments, including pre-
vious efforts at nationalization or collectivization, should be included 
in “an internal archive of past attempts at economic collectivization as 
a kind of memory bank detailing the advantages and disadvantages of 
specific measures,” whereby all such measures must fulfil the principle 
that experiments “resulting in the violation of established practices for 
will-formation in line with the rule of law must be viewed as having 
failed.”  87  
 For the economic sphere, then, “[w]hen it comes to experimenting 
with institutional models, we must welcome all proposals that are 
somehow committed to freeing producers from constraints and depen-
dencies, thus enabling them to view themselves as free contributors to 
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the task of equally satisfying the needs of all members of society, a task 
that can only be fulfilled in reciprocity.”  88  
 Hence social freedom, understood in terms of recognitive individual-
ism such that there is cooperation and solidarity whereby the freedom 
of one is dependent upon and defined by the freedom of the other, is 
the key and must be achieved in all spheres according to the inner logic 
of each. Socialism, then, entails a process by which the proper relations 
between and among differentiated social spheres are identified and 
established. Honneth ultimately hopes that this revised conception of 
the socialist project offers at least the prospect of realizing what social-
ism, with its roots in the French Revolution, has always pursued: the 
reconciliation of liberty and fraternity, in the process putting society on 
the path to becoming truly “social.” 
 This is a challenging and thought-provoking reinterpretation of 
socialism and what a plausible contemporary socialist project would 
have to include. Honneth is aware that this revision of the socialist idea 
threatens to turn socialist theory into a narrowly abstract and purely 
normative account along the lines of liberal theories of justice, theories 
with which he has taken issue in previous work.  89  His analysis suggests 
there is nonetheless still a difference. As we read him, he believes that 
his reconstructed version of socialism can still claim, in a way liberal 
accounts cannot, to represent genuinely progressive historical possi-
bilities, and that his conception and the project to which it would give 
rise is rooted in real social relations and thus in the processes of indi-
vidual identity formation. In short, there is a social dynamic whereby 
responses to contradictions people encounter in their life experiences 
could become the basis for a new social order, given the normative 
“grammar” by means of which they understand their wants, needs, and 
purposes. Such responses would include the emergence of demands 
not only for economic justice, or justice for workers, but also for the 
elimination of relations of domination along the lines of race, gender, 
and sexuality, as well as demands for radically new ways to relate to 
our natural world in the face of potential environmental catastrophe. 
From Honneth’s perspective, this approach is not available to standard 
liberal theories. 
 Thus, in contrast to such theories he argues that “the natural enemy 
of socialism – today just as in Marx’s day – is the predominant school 
of economic theory, which has sought for over 200 years to justify the 
capitalist market as the only efficient means for coordinating economic 
action under the conditions of an expanding population and its grow-
ing needs.” Taking on economic theory must involve, as it did for 
Marx, “viewing the capitalist economy as being already mediated or 
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co-produced by the theoretical terminology of dominant economic 
theory, meaning that we can only call reality into question by criticiz-
ing the theory.” (Critics of elite or “realist” democratic theory and its 
behaviouralist underpinnings in the 1960s held a comparable view.) 
And in line with his overall reconstruction of the socialist project and 
its emphasis on realizing social freedom in the personal and political, as 
well as economic, realms of society, he further claims that 
 socialism must always also offer a critique of those dominant theories that 
also contribute to producing social reality in the spheres of personal rela-
tionships and political will-formation, e.g. standard liberal models of the 
family or the dominant theory of democracy, which is firmly anchored in 
the concept of negative freedom. If we accept the moral fact of functional 
differentiation in the sense presented here in a strongly Hegelian manner, 
then it is not enough to present a critique of political economy. Instead, we 
must also offer a critique of hegemonial branches of knowledge that deal 
with the other constitutive subsystems and whose concepts have always 
contributed to creating the reality within these subsystems.  90  
 The close association Honneth enjoys with the Frankfurt School and 
critical theory, and his attempt to develop conceptions of socialism and 
social freedom broadly within this framework, are clearly visible in 
these passages. 
 However, the adequacy of Honneth’s position is not  per se our pri-
mary concern.  91  What is important for our purposes is that he views the 
realization of socialism as the achievement of what he calls a democratic 
form of life. His analysis here raises issues that are central to participa-
tory democracy. 
 Honneth starts from the position that identifying the potential for 
freedom in the spheres of personal relationships, the economy, and 
formal institutions of democratic will-formation is insufficient without 
some conception of how the interdependence of these spheres can be 
established and maintained: “Their relationship should enable them 
to follow their own, independent norms while at the same time freely 
cooperating in order to ensure the continuous reproduction of the soci-
ety as a whole. Such purposeful cooperation between independent 
spheres of freedom represents the quintessence of a democratic way of 
life.” Once again acknowledging his debt to John Dewey, Honneth goes 
on to argue that democracy “does not merely signify free and equal 
participation in political will-formation; understood as an entire way 
of life, it means that individuals can participate equally at every central 
point in the mediation between the individual and society, such that 
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each functionally differentiated sphere reflects the general structure of 
democratic participation.”  92  
 The democratic way of life is how socialism should be understood as 
an emancipated society. This society at one and the same time should 
provide for the independence of the respective spheres of recognitive 
social relations and at the same time for a rational, harmonious order – 
without, however, requiring a central directing core, such as the sys-
tem of production, to ensure this harmony. The image instead is of “an 
organic whole of independent and yet purposefully cooperating func-
tions in which the members act for each other in social freedom.”  93  The 
“democratic” element here rests on the willingness of the members of 
each sphere to cooperate as equals in pursuit of social knowledge that 
can help determine and develop potentials for enhanced social free-
dom. Social knowledge so acquired would foster the deepening of 
communicative and cooperative ties that are essential if the freedom of 
each is to be constitutive of the freedom of all. The open-ended quest 
to expand the capacity for social freedom, which cannot be considered 
apart from ties both within and between spheres, expresses and sustains 
communicative and developmental possibilities for individual agency. 
As these capacities grow and develop they would ideally promote the 
enrichment of norms of interaction consistent with the demands of each 
sphere, and at the same time and as a consequence enhance the poten-
tial for each to become an organ of social cooperation and democratic 
life. Although Honneth does not explicitly put it this way, we think he 
touches base here with what has always been a key theme of the Frank-
furt School and critical theory: the necessary, dynamic, and dialectical 
relation between social character and social structure.  94  
 A society that is democratic and socialist, without either a single 
fixed agent of transformation or a directing centre established by an  a 
priori logic of social reproduction and progress, would still nonetheless 
require an authority for managing the relations among the independent 
spheres, or risk becoming what would essentially be an anonymous 
and apolitical form of structural-functional coordination. To once again 
stress that socialism as a democratic form of life must be a continu-
ous accomplishment of social actors whose social freedom is secured 
through the very exercise of it, Honneth argues that the institution that 
should be responsible for “the task of integrative steering,” the “social 
organ in a complex society … capable of reflexively steering the desired 
development of a complex society,” is a vibrant public sphere. This is 
so because “the subsystem of action best suited to the task of reflexively 
steering overall social reproduction is that which provides the institu-
tional framework for democratic will-formation.”  95  
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 As Honneth spells it out, 
 The sphere of democratic action stands out among the other functionally 
complementary spheres of freedom; it is  prima inter pares , because it is 
the only place in which problems from every corner of social life can be 
articulated for all ears and be presented as a task to be solved in coopera-
tion. In addition to the epistemic leading role of the political public sphere, 
and owing to its legitimizing influence on the legislature, this is the only 
social sphere with the power to turn seemingly plausible solutions into 
law. There can be no doubt that the democratic public sphere, occupied by 
deliberating citizens, must take over the role of supervising the function-
ing of the entire organic structure and of making the requisite adjustments. 
Functional differentiation, which thus far seemed to take place automati-
cally, now becomes an object of democratic politics. In the democratic way 
of life, that which unfolds automatically in a living organism as the result 
of its internal structure … is brought about by the subjects of the demo-
cratic process. They are the ones who correct and adjust the outcome of the 
entirety of their own activity by means of public deliberation.  96  
 As with the account of socialism generally, this conception of a demo-
cratic way of life poses challenging issues. Key among them: the aspira-
tion for engagement “at every central point in the mediation between 
the individual and society” notwithstanding, does this admittedly gen-
eral formulation risk losing sight of a robust politics and citizenship for 
their own sake, as humanizing qualities crucial to social freedom itself? 
Is there here the danger of an ironic reiteration of the very “sublima-
tion” of politics against which Sheldon Wolin warned and that Honneth 
himself associates with the limits of traditional socialism? 
 Nonetheless, the links between socialism, social freedom, and a dem-
ocratic way of life, and the theories of participatory democracy we have 
considered in this chapter, are considerable and significant. Social free-
dom is an essential contribution to and component of a critical theory 
of democracy. Both, together, draw from the basic Hegelian formula of 
being with oneself in the other. 
 Indeed, the notion of social freedom might be said to incorporate the 
insights of both participatory and deliberative democracy. Deliberation 
forms a component of a fully participatory order, but according to Car-
ole Pateman and Jeffrey Hilmer, deliberative theory tends to be indif-
ferent to existing patterns of institutional structure and power, which 
it largely takes for granted. However, as we suggested in the introduc-
tion to this chapter, it is important to distinguish between weak and 
strong versions of deliberation and democratic theory. Strong versions 
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of deliberative democracy are more critically inclined. They present the 
formation of individual preferences, norms, commitments, and so forth 
as itself a legitimate and indeed essential object of the very process of 
deliberation. This focus at least implies a concern for considering those 
requirements essential for Gould’s equal positive freedom or Macpher-
son’s developmental liberty. That is, strong versions of deliberative 
democracy can take on board the essential insight and commitment of 
participatory democracy: the creation of conditions under which indi-
viduals can come to view the freedom of the other as constitutive of 
their own, and where their own needs are not only served by but  defined 
by the needs of others. 
 Theories of participatory democracy such as those of Pateman, 
Macpherson, and Gould more fully open up the possibilities for devel-
oping the conditions for social freedom because they target institutional 
structures and make the transformation, and not simply the preserva-
tion, of key sectors of social life potential objects of participatory initia-
tive. In other words, they represent a form of democracy as a way of 
life that incorporates social freedom as an essential foundation. How-
ever, these theories too face challenges around the question not only of 
the location of participation and the kind of participation available, but 
also of whether this participation allows for and in turn builds upon 
the intertwining as opposed to overlapping of individual aims and 
purposes. 
 And for both participatory and deliberative democrats, the threats 
posed to democratic possibilities by global forces further complicate 
the challenges a critical theory of democracy must confront. Axel Hon-
neth writes of the “tension between internationalism and an anchor-
ing in local traditions,” with the consequence that socialism, and thus 
democratic forms of life, “can only represent social freedom globally 
by means of a political doctrine, whereas it can only mobilize concrete 
and local publics by means of an ethically compact theory adapted to 
the cultural features of a certain region.”  97  Whether considered from the 
perspective of participatory or deliberative democracy, the challenges 
posed by globalization, as well as those raised by participation, involve 
both the range of issues, institutions, and practices accessible to demo-
cratic publics, wherever they might be, and the real impact that citizen 
engagement might generate. 
 One final point stands out for us here. Social freedom as, so to speak, 
the essence of radical democracy opens up fundamental questions about 
individual agency and social structure. Its key elements are surely rec-
ognizable as real potentials, and even as actual dimensions, of existing 
political arrangements, at least as long as and insofar as the heritage of 
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liberty, equality, and fraternity still resonates and can be drawn upon to 
make sense of this world and guide action towards a better one.  98  But 
can this heritage emerge unscathed from the impact of a neoliberalism 
that remains dominant, even in the face of the evident pathologies it has 
produced and continues to feed? 
 That a state of affairs may be desirable and even necessary, but may 
not ultimately be possible, is the sober insight upon which critical 
theory and the Frankfurt School has built. It is an insight that poses 
demanding challenges to a critical theory of democracy dedicated to 
realizing the goals of autonomy and self-development. 
 
 Conclusion
Critical Theory and Radical Reform 
 Throughout this book we have attempted to show that, however remote 
the possibilities might appear in the current era, there is still nonethe-
less the need for, and basis for, social transformation in the direction of 
a more richly democratic and egalitarian social order; and that a critical 
theory of radical democracy can inform such a project. In this conclu-
sion we briefly revisit our key themes and address questions to which 
our analysis might give rise. 
 We have sought in this work to develop a version of critical theory 
that addresses the problems and challenges raised by neoliberalism. 
To this end we have considered both the methodological-diagnostic 
and political-theoretic foundations of critical theory to re-establish it 
as a radical democratic alternative. This theory can only have a socio-
critical force when it offers a diagnosis of the pathologies of the times 
and points to a radically democratic solution. 
 Our approach contrasts with much of the dominant political the-
ory today. Since 1989 the alternatives to today’s capitalism have been 
limited. Not only has socialism been off the table, but even a signifi-
cantly reformed capitalism has seemed unattainable. What remains 
is a slightly more humane version of liberal democracy. Even where 
theorists purport to be radical, their critique of liberal consensus and 
conceptions of conflict are built on dubious philosophical premises that 
provide little guidance for a democratic social order based on both self-
determination and solidarity. 
 Similar problems plague current approaches to critical theory. Firmly 
ensconced in secure academic departments in which specialized schol-
arship is undertaken, many critical theorists have done interesting 
work but without the broader framework and oppositional stance of an 
earlier generation. While Jürgen Habermas carried the torch for an inte-
grated interdisciplinary critical theory up to and including  The Theory 
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of Communicative Action , more recently he seems to have lost touch 
with larger social trends. The fact that he was surprised by the rise of 
reactionary populism speaks volumes about the ability, or inability, of 
contemporary critical theory to diagnose and address neoliberal social 
formations in an integrated interdisciplinary way. The work of Axel 
Honneth, Habermas’s successor at Frankfurt and perhaps the most 
influential of the next generation of critical theorists, has also proved 
limited in important respects, although, as we argued in the previous 
chapter, in his recent work Honneth has sought to demonstrate that 
his formulation of democracy and reconsideration of socialism harbour 
considerable potential for informing the quest for radical social and 
political change. 
 We still think, however, that Habermas’s account of discursive 
democracy in  Between Facts and Norms , and Honneth’s notion of social 
freedom, can contribute significantly to a critical theory adequate to 
the challenges of neoliberalism. These positions must be placed, how-
ever, in a broader context of radical and participatory democracy. More 
attention must be paid to democratizing the economy and the state and 
putting them under moral regulation. 
 The founders of critical theory staked their claim on a position that 
was politically radical, if no longer revolutionary, at least as revolution 
had come to be understood in the Marxist tradition. In their view, what 
was needed was the creation of a society qualitatively different from 
capitalism. When they were confronted with the reality of the politi-
cal attitudes of the working classes under advanced capitalism they 
retreated into cultural pessimism and, in the case of Horkheimer and 
Adorno, a curious defence of the post–Second World War order. Even 
then, however, Horkheimer and Adorno did not entirely abandon their 
original position. In their 1956 discussion, “Towards a New Manifesto,” 
they tried to recover a radical reading of Marxism based on a radical 
conception of labour.  1  
 Still, Adorno and Horkheimer seemed to be left with an either/or. This 
was especially true of Horkheimer, who in his most Schopenhauerian 
moments thought that “we can expect no more of mankind than a more 
or less watered-down version of the American system.” Adorno, the more 
optimistic of the two, thought that if the veil of reification were lifted prog-
ress would be possible. Yet both rejected any kind of reformism. The over-
coming of what Adorno called the totally administered society could not 
be achieved peacefully. Both Horkheimer and Adorno were concerned 
with the question of planning that was central to the administrative state, 
as well as to the revolutionary reconstruction of society. Somehow plan-
ning had to be severed from its ties to bureaucratic domination. 
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 In this respect Marcuse’s later theory seemed to have the better of it. 
He identified a libidinal revolt against capitalist labour relations that 
rejected the surplus repression of advanced industrial societies. He 
found the basis for this revolt primarily in the youth and social move-
ments of the 1960s. However useful this analysis of the cultural roots 
of political change and its location in an immanent dynamic that had 
emerged within capitalist society, it did not really address the weak-
nesses of the Frankfurt School’s account of late capitalism; nor did it 
provide insight into a theory of democracy. 
 Writing in the 1930s to the 1960s (the 70s in the case of Marcuse) the 
first generation of the Frankfurt School could not have fully anticipated 
the character of neoliberalism. They were concerned primarily with the 
dynamics of late capitalism. Specifically, they were interested in the 
closure of political conflict, or at least class conflict, that the adminis-
tered order had brought about. While the Frankfurt School theorists 
identified one important set of tendencies in late capitalist and even 
state socialist societies, they posited too much closure to the system. 
Whereas they thought that the administrative state foreclosed the possi-
bility of fundamental change and immunized the social system against 
the cyclical crises that Marx analysed and that had plagued capitalist 
societies, a later generation of Frankfurt theorists have argued that late 
capitalist societies are not so totally immune to change and have gener-
ated their own crisis tendencies. Once the burdens of justification had 
been transferred from the economic to the political a new set of crises 
had become possible. Habermas, who drew on the work of Claus Offe 
and others, called these legitimation crises. 
 Late capitalist societies, as the first generation noted, relies on the 
depoliticization of much of everyday life and on a privatized familial or 
vocational ethic. Nonetheless, advanced capitalism still raises questions 
about justice and fairness. It is not simply the case that capitalism must 
deliver the goods. To the extent that governments engage in redistribu-
tion, or recognize welfare rights, issues around just distribution and of 
the social rights of individuals come to the fore, at least to the extent that 
their claims are based not merely on administrative performance but on 
social democratic and liberal democratic foundations. 
 As we noted above, the early Frankfurt School theorists especially 
were not sympathetic to many of the claims of the welfare state and 
social rights. They saw these as examples of the deformalization of 
law that typified authoritarian states or the authoritarian tendencies of 
democracies. (Habermas has advanced a similar view about the prob-
lems and limits of the welfare state.) They did not see immanent pos-
sibilities for change in these societies. However, developmental theories 
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that took up Marx’s ideal of the fullest expression of human potentials 
and possibilities to criticize the limits of unfettered markets did seem to 
pinpoint some capacities for critical reflection and action that could not 
be fully contained within the dominant structures of social life. 
 Once we get beyond the implicit either/or in some of the work of 
the first generation, the nature of radical democratic critique is called 
into question: can radical democracy find an immanent basis within 
capitalist societies, or must it reject all elements as capitalist machina-
tions? Habermas and Honneth opt for the first alterative, as do other 
radical democrats. Habermas’s early work on a public sphere that was 
independent of the state and provided the basis of a communicatively 
structured but institutionally unbounded public world in which partic-
ipants expressed their political and social autonomy suggested at least 
the possibility of a radical democracy in which theoretically all could 
participate. It defended ideals of reflexive freedom and equality, trust, 
care and solidarity, self-determination and self-realization, even if in a 
limited form. 
 As one commentator summarizes it 
 . . . in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, a distinct forum for rational 
public debate emerged in most Western European countries. It constitutes 
an area of social life, separate from the state apparatus, within which citi-
zens gather to converse about issues of the day in a free and unrestricted 
fashion, either literally as in the town square, or in diverse journals and 
periodicals. Debate proceeded according to universal standards of critical 
reason and argumentative structure that all could recognize and assent to; 
appeals to traditional dogmas, or to arbitrary subjective prejudices, were 
ruled inadmissible. Thus, it was in the public sphere that “discursive will 
formation” was actualized in the manner that represented the general 
social interest, as opposed to a class or sectional one.  2  
 Of course, in practice the bourgeois public sphere was hardly univer-
sal. Still, despite the many criticisms this notion of the public serves as 
an ideal type that can be used to assess and criticize the (limited) extent 
of participation in public life. It provides the basis of a conception of 
popular sovereignty able to counter the neoliberal foreclosure of such 
sovereignty and active political engagement. It also defines discourse 
as requiring the mutual accountability, recognition and responsibility 
necessary for a democratic society. Habermas’s earlier work, at least 
up until  The Theory of Communicative Action , was clear that free public 
discourse could be conceived as possible, although not necessarily real-
ized, within a capitalist social order. 
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 To be sure, the rise of neoliberalism has brought back into focus eco-
nomic issues that have been neglected in recent years, including the 
effects of social stratification, exploitation and inequality. We cannot, 
however, return to an unreconstructed accounts of class struggle or rev-
olution that do not fit the conditions of advanced industrial societies. 
On the other hand, critical theory does not and cannot embrace the ster-
ile alternatives of the third way or post-1989 liberalism. We think that 
the best way forward is to pursue in combination with a diagnosis of 
the times radical democratic reforms within society, reforms that could 
hold transformative possibilities. It is in this context that we considered 
Axel Honneth’s reformulation of socialism as one potentially valuable 
approach to a radical democratic politics. 
 Habermas returned to a consideration of publics in  Between Facts and 
Norms and expanded it in some respects. He employed there the idea 
of an institutionally unbounded sphere of communicative action within 
which public opinion could be formulated. Incorporating some of the 
insightful feminist critiques of the idealized bourgeois public sphere, 
Habermas considered publics in the first instance to be anarchic or wild. 
This idea is also linked to the notion of weak publics, which are con-
stituted by informal discursive practices out of which opinions can be 
generated but which themselves lack formal decision-making power. 
Such publics are open and permeable, characteristics often lacking with 
more formalized practices. 
 The formation of opinions uncoupled from decision-making would 
ideally take place in an open and inclusive network of overlapping sub-
cultural publics with fluid temporal, social and substantive boundaries. 
Within a framework guaranteed by constitutional rights, the structures 
of such a pluralistic public sphere could develop spontaneously. The 
currents of public communication would be channeled by mass media 
and would flow through different publics that develop informally 
inside associations; taken together these would form a “wild” complex 
that resists organization. Ideally, in other words, there is an “unsub-
verted public sphere” of unrestricted communication.  3  
 Although this formulation is not immune to excessive idealiza-
tion, it does provide an open-ended conception of a deeply democ-
ratized public life, one that could serve as a social basis for a radical 
democracy. The anarchic public is not, however, a highly structured 
discursive forum which is procedurally regulated but involves more 
informal processes of mutual understanding. We appeal to a variety 
of sources and influences in order to foster challenges and create new 
ideas. This can include dramatic and expressive or aesthetic elements. 
Practices and commitments associated with the structures of anarchic 
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publics would involve the entirety of our relations to ourselves, others, 
and the world. 
 In this study we have tried using somewhat different vocabularies to 
emphasize the importance of these more informal notions of discourse 
incorporating solidarity and concern, without losing focus on the life-
world basis of accountability and mutual recognition. In our view, 
notions of mutual understanding can incorporate a very wide range of 
possible forms of intersubjective communication, as well as inclusion 
of others. The quest for mutual understanding can be dramatic or emo-
tional because it can involve our concern for the welfare of others and/
or identification with them because of our common humanity. These are 
potentially significant ways of expressing equality and responsibility. 
 We think, however, that the model of interpretive capacities that we 
employ, while certainly compatible with Habermas’s position, is one 
that permits us to move beyond it and thus at least potentially offer 
greater explanatory insight. Instead of viewing individuals as engaged 
in the spontaneous generation of opinions, it might be better to see 
them as members of a lifeworld who very roughly share a common 
situation. Lifeworld participants reproduce this world thorough pro-
cesses of mutual accountability. This might have different dimensions. 
For example, taken for granted processes and structures could become 
problematic; that is, we could find our normal expectations are not 
fulfilled and we have dissonant experiences which cannot fit into our 
interpretive frames. Or, we might endure disappointments or encoun-
ter obstacles to the realization of our aims and purposes. On the other 
hand, because of our actions we may face informal disapproval and 
sanctions, including exclusion from opportunities or even from group 
membership; this could create feelings of guilt or shame. Whatever the 
nature of such breakdowns of everyday expectations within the context 
of the requirements of mutual accountability, these may not always be 
viewed as formal “problems.” 
 Such situations call for reinterpretation, reimagination and renegotia-
tion of our forms of understanding and of acting in concert. It is through 
these processes of ordinary understanding, which are pre-structured 
but open to criticism and change, that private troubles can become pub-
lic issues. 
 Habermas and feminist theorists recognize that such informal pro-
cesses are open to the influences of power and systematic inequalities. 
Communicative interaction can be distorted, elements and topics of 
discussion excluded, and interests suppressed. Dissonant experiences 
can be invalidated and denied as pathological by dominant powers and 
social groups. We outlined some of these possibilities in chapter 2. For 
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Habermas, this means that the democratic operation of public opinion 
requires support. The so-called spontaneous generation of weak public 
opinion relies upon a system of rights that guarantees that individuals 
have basic forms of equality and freedom. They can in theory appeal 
to such rights against mechanisms of oppression and domination and 
make legitimate demands that these be eliminated. 
 Habermas’s conception of constitutional democracy is an attempt to 
combine what he views as the liberal emphasis on individual rights 
with the republican discourse of popular sovereignty. He does not 
see these as opposed principles in which rights trump popular sover-
eignty, or vice versa, but instead as co-originary. To paraphrase, citizens 
cannot be free and autonomous in the public sphere that republicans 
emphasize without private autonomy. Individuals who enjoy only pub-
lic status would not have sufficient freedom to choose autonomously. 
But without public freedom there is no constitutional guarantee of pri-
vate rights. Private rights are not purely natural rights but are secured 
through the agreement of all. The basic ideas behind both private and 
public rights are self-legislation and self-determination. We can only 
assent to those laws that we freely agree to in a process of deliberation. 
 Habermas’s notion of the co-originary character of rights and popular 
sovereignty distinguishes his conception of radical democracy from, for 
example, Benjamin Barber’s notion of strong democracy.  4  While Barber, 
like Habermas, rejects unitary democracy – that is, the republican ideal 
of a single social ethos – and accepts the central significance of rights, 
he accords rights a lesser role in relation to self-legislation. 
 Legal (emerging from parliaments and congresses), administrative 
and judicial decisions among others must be based on a more formal 
model of deliberation than anarchic publics. These deliberative pro-
cesses entail the conditions of equality, equal freedom and responsi-
bility on the part of those who deliberate, where all are in principle 
included. To be sure, legislative and other formal political and legal 
bodies cannot include every participant, but Habermas believes that 
in a fully democratic society the discursive impulses of wild publics 
would be transmitted to deliberative bodies. The constitutional proj-
ect, however, is not a one-time phenomenon. It is an ongoing project 
of deliberation in which we try to realize and even reinterpret the basic 
ideals of a constitution. Habermas terms his approach constitutional 
patriotism. Rather than viewing patriotism as attachment to tradition 
and a national culture, he instead conceives it both as solidarity with 
all those who are subjects of rights and responsibilities and as com-
mitment to the constitution as form of life compatible with a nation of 
plural cultures. 
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 We agree that a modern society cannot be grasped from the vantage 
point of a pure popular will but must include a system of rights. There 
cannot be a single social ethos because division and disagreement are 
unavoidable. This may disconcert those who think that an emphasis 
on rights entails an embrace of, at best, a formalist, purely procedural-
ist liberalism. But as the work of Carol Gould makes clear, when we 
understand rights as tied to a socially embedded conception of self-
determination, and not simply to an isolated or atomized individual, 
rights discourse can hold considerable potential for a radical theory 
of freedom. Habermas’s position here bears some relation to that of 
Gould, as well as that of C.B. Macpherson, whose connection to Gould 
we explored in chapter 6. Gould, Macpherson, and Habermas all defend 
the radical potential of bourgeois right and protections for a socialist 
theory. Of course, rights claims here are taken broadly to mean more 
than just civil or personal, legal rights. The radical potential of these 
claims lies in the fact that they cannot be realized within capitalism 
itself. Such claims must include political, economic, and social rights, 
or what Macpherson called developmental rights. 
 Critics, however, are not sure that this account of rights goes far 
enough. They contend that liberal rights and protections, individual or 
social, are insufficient. The best one can achieve with an emphasis on 
rights is to provide a basis for a form of social democracy that would 
ideally tame the excesses of capitalism, but not point to its overcoming. 
 A second criticism has been voiced by Kenneth Baynes who questions 
whether informal processes of public opinion associated with a vibrant 
public sphere will in the long run lead to the kind of productive changes 
that Habermas assumes. Referring more broadly to Habermas’s faith in 
procedural rationality, he asks, “whether Habermas’s confidence in the 
rationality effect of procedure is sufficiently well founded.”  5  Another 
way of looking at this concern is to ask, as Baynes does, if Habermas’s 
conception of an anarchic civil society can generate solidarity and civic 
virtue. These questions cannot really be answered in the more theoreti-
cal conception of free opinion formation, as we have noted. To properly 
address them requires not just an emphasis on rights, even social rights, 
taken in isolation, but also reflection on our embeddedness in a social 
lifeworld. Conflicts emerge within the lifeworld wherever or whenever 
problems and troubles arise. Everyday action has a structure based on 
mutual accountability, a structure that is conducive to deliberation. But 
the extent to which the lifeworld can be rationalized in this manner 
depends on social forces. We must place this question within a diagnos-
tic social theory that identifies the crisis tendencies of neoliberal capital-
ism; this is at the core of our distinction between weak and strong forms 
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of deliberative democracy. If democratic institutions are strong, then 
there could certainly be a basis for a more democratic social order. But 
there would also have to be socialization processes of education and the 
establishment of norms. In a society with wide ranging participation 
and discussion, and proper institutional support, it seems likely that 
such issues would be discussed, and more egalitarians and democratic 
practices would emerge. Of course, there are no final guarantees. But 
the search for a theory that can provide ultimate guarantees is fruitless. 
 There are some respects in which Habermas’s hope that his theory 
will tame capitalism seems limited. History shows that the establish-
ment of social democracies in advanced capitalist societies was met by 
opposition and indeed over the course of the last three decades social 
democratic reforms have been rolled back in Europe and North Amer-
ica. Under what conditions would these reforms be more permanently 
anchored in these societies? Habermas’s own theory of legitimation cri-
sis indicates that welfare states are subject to multiple dilemmas and 
contradictions. These include not just political crises, which Habermas 
emphasizes, but also economic ones. Owners of capital have economic 
means to disrupt welfare states and certainly social democratic ones. 
They can engage in capital strikes, that is, they can refuse to invest if 
they think profitable opportunities are absent or limited, or when they 
think government policies are unfriendly to investment. They can exert 
political pressure to enact policies that favour their interests, resulting 
in greater inequality. These factors would seem to challenge the idea 
of a radical democratized lifeworld that Habermas desires, but they 
would also affect those transmission lines between the lifeworld and 
formal legal institutions that Habermas holds are necessary for a con-
stitutional democracy. 
 In this regard we believe that an informal democratic public, as 
well as a formal procedural one, would require a strong component 
of public property to counter the power of capitalist private property. 
We do not think Habermas’s recent writings on transnational justice 
and post-national political and economic structures contain a sufficient 
notion of social crisis that would allow him to analyse the problems 
neoliberalism generates in national and international economies. These 
have worked to undermine the protections of the welfare state and have 
produced greater inequalities. Moreover, in many neoliberal societies a 
reactionary populist backlash has occurred which threatens both social 
rights and popular sovereignty. In contrast to Habermas’s account, we 
have tried to indicate some of the major outlines of these pathologies. 
However, Habermas’s conceptions of rights and popular sovereignty 
can provide an important alternative to neoliberalism. 
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 To realize these principles, however, we think that a critical theory 
has to more explicitly formulate notions of participatory democracy, 
social rights and social freedom. The ethical ideals of self-realization 
that found a new modern form in the developmental theories of the 
nineteenth century do not simply reflect demands for personal happi-
ness, or an ancient ideal of wisdom, but are elements of the modernist 
notion of autonomy. They represent ethical ideals of a self-conscious and 
reflective form of life in which individuals robustly develop their own 
identities and a conscious reflexive understanding of their life histories 
within a framework of solidarity with others. Our conception of radical 
democracy would also include a strong emphasis on self-realization. 
This seems consistent with Marx’s own remarks on self-realization in a 
post-capitalist society – although we see these developments as imma-
nent in advanced capitalism. 
 The structures of personality and culture that support these develop-
ments are fragile and require, as we have noted above, legal support 
and protection. Here we think the idea of social rights that we discussed 
at length in chapter 6 can help identify what such supports and protec-
tions might entail. 
 Habermas often looks at the economy and bureaucracy as non-com-
municative systems that allow for the greater development of political 
and social freedoms because they relieve individuals of many of the 
costly and time-consuming burdens associated with social and material 
reproduction. For example, he speaks of administration as a command 
structure in which authority serves the realization of collective goals: 
“the authority to issue binding commands means that the superior 
does not have to convince subordinates of the advisability of each task 
assigned to them, thus reducing the need for explicit consensus.”  6  Simi-
larly, markets serve in theory as means to coordinate economic activity 
without explicit consensus. The strategic actions of individuals pursu-
ing interests in the market are supposed to ensure the most efficient 
distribution of goods and services. 
 While such arguments no doubt have a certain plausibility, they 
overstate the benefits of non-consensual coordination, and indeed to a 
considerable extent offer only a limited and indeed misleading concep-
tion of what such coordination entails. As is well known, these ideal 
models of strategic coordination have run into serious problems inter-
nal to their assumptions. This has led many rational choice theorists 
to supplement their models with the introduction of conceptions of 
prior normative constraints. Nor are markets or bureaucracies estab-
lished through independent logics of strategic action. As we discussed 
in chapter 3, even ordo-liberals argue that the market is established only 
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under legal constraints – something Habermas and Max Weber would 
also agree upon – but that it is not truly autonomous and must be con-
stantly maintained by extra-economic forces – something they may not 
have accepted. Other critics from the left have pointed out that the bor-
der between non-consensual and normative bases of the economy are 
porous. Thus, while we still agree with Weber and Habermas that the 
differentiation of society into separate spheres is necessary and desir-
able we think that Habermas’s conception of the dominance of non-
consensual coordination in some areas must be modified. 
 It is in this context that we contend that a more participatory demo-
cratic approach to all aspects of social life is warranted. Analysts such as 
Carmen Siriani and Lew Friedlander have illustrated some of the ways 
in which participation can improve political bureaucracies and not just 
economic institutions.  7  Forms of collaborative learning and institu-
tional problem solving can make bureaucracies more democratic and 
less a matter of command and control. Moreover, public administra-
tors can cooperate with citizen groups to accomplish social goals. Here, 
again, consensual action within the framework of communicative rea-
son with its commitments to mutual accountability and justification can 
define and facilitate self-development and self-realization, individual 
and social freedom, public and private autonomy. 
 Some contemporary theories of radical democracy tie their radical-
ism to a rejection of consensus. According to these accounts, consensual 
action is no more than a liberal tool which enforces closure and erases 
difference. This is a common charge levelled by post-structuralists 
against communicative and interpretive social theories. The close reader, 
however, will see that claims of closure and finality advanced against 
critical theory are unfounded. There is no need for a notion of differ-
ence or essential conflict utterly beyond the reach of consensual social 
action because consensual action provides the medium though which 
we articulate both conflict and agreement, alienation and solidarity. The 
intersubjective framework includes both the “otherness” of the stranger 
and the community we build with those others. The lifeworld is repro-
duced through acts of mutual understanding in an open-ended and 
open-textured process in which we engage others through interaction 
that includes both agreement and disagreement. To exercise communi-
cative power, then, is to act in concert with others to authorize action. 
 Although it is in the first instance anchored in a theoretical account 
of practical action, communicative power could easily serve as a crucial 
element of a radical democracy. The generative quality of communica-
tive power is captured in Hannah Arendt’s idea that through collec-
tive action we can always begin anew, where new beginnings include 
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radical change or even revolution. Communicative power and the 
communicative action with which it is necessarily tied also suggests 
those “moments” of democratic change central to Sheldon Wolin’s 
conception of fugitive democracy, although without his particular 
neo-Weberian assumptions which limit these occurrences to fleeting 
moments of freedom in the face of the bureaucratic domination that 
characterizes modern society.  8  We think this conception of democracy 
entails a notion of communicative freedom that is too restrictive, even 
for our society. To develop forms of democratic life is to enhance the 
communicative power of subjects and their ability to create new prac-
tices, new social and political relations. Of course, all this depends 
upon a more fully developed social theory. But without a notion such 
as communicative power, or some equivalent, radical democratic theo-
ries are not very radical. 
 In the end, however, we are not concerned about our fidelity to the 
work of Habermas, or indeed to any other position. We hope the ideas 
we have sought to develop in this work stand on their own and can 
contribute to what we believe to be a much-needed reconsideration of 
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